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Introduction 
 
 
 
What are the media? And what are they about? What is their function? Why 
do they have to be controlled? This study is an attempt to find answers for these 
most fundamental questions; questions that arise invariably when it comes to the 
media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), past and present. 
This study examines the motivations, logic, and functions of media control 
in the PRC. It is not intended to tell the history of media control in modern China, 
nor to give a comprehensive account of the techniques employed by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to control the media. Rather, I will investigate the origins 
of media thinking in modern China, as well as the consequences of the resulting 
concepts for practical media work in the PRC. 
The media and the press have received much attention from the political 
leadership in the PRC. All important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) were actively involved in media and propaganda activities at some point in 
their careers. In 1959, Mao Zedong once again stressed the crucial importance of 
the media in the political landscape of the PRC when he proposed the slogan 
“newspapers must be run by politicians” (yao zhengzhijia ban bao 要政治家办报).1 
In the light of the prominence that the CCP attaches to propaganda work, however, 
the subject of the Chinese media is surprisingly underresearched. 
In this study, I propose to take the media as a variable to measure changes 
in the CCP’s approach to governance. The Party’s handling of the media serves 
as a mirror of state-society relations; consequently, the investigation into the 
media provides us with information on the CCP’s conceptions of governance 
under changing circumstances. I will argue that over the past twenty years, the 
CCP has successfully altered and reinterpreted its vision of the state and its 
position therein; it has adopted a more flexible set of methods to achieve its 
fundamental political objectives. At the same time, the ultimate goals of the Party 
                                             
1 In a conversation with Wu Lengxi, the editor-in-chief of RMRB. See Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo 
wenxuan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983, p. 215-16. The lasting impact of the CCP’s early 
conceptions of propaganda is shown by the renewed attention this text has received in recent 
years. See, for example, Zhang Wenxue, Liu Wenbo. “Chongdu ‘Yao zhengzhijia ban bao ‘” in 
Junshi jizhe 1996.6, p. 4-5. Zhou Bin. “Ba zhengzhejia ban bao luodao shichu” in Zhongguo jizhe 
2002.6, 54-55. 
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have changed remarkably little: the CCP is still sticking to some of the basic 
credos of the Yan’an era. The goals and the methods employed to achieve these 
goals, thus, may come into conflict, sending out those mixed messages about the 
state of the PRC that tend to plague interpretations of Chinese politics by 
observers abroad. An investigation of the Chinese media, I argue, will help us to 
understand these contradictions. 
 
* * * 
 
In contrast to fields like the internal organization of the state or the 
dynamics of mass campaigns, the Chinese media have received rather limited 
scholarly attention. In general, research from the 1950s to the 1970s has 
concentrated on the propagandistic nature of the PRC media.2 Studies like those 
of Alan Liu had to cope with a scarcity of primary material, not to speak of internal 
sources that would provide information of the inner functioning of the media 
apparatus. Furthermore, they were written under the impression of the Cold War 
and influenced by the theory of totalitarianism.3 This background and their 
interpretative framework, however, has limited the explanatory value of these 
studies to the Chinese media sector of the Mao era. 
Recent writing on the contemporary Chinese media proceeds from the 
assumption that fundamental changes have occurred in the media sector after 
1978, a thesis supported by the official Chinese discourse. Research over the past 
twenty years thus has been preoccupied overwhelmingly with mapping the 
reinterpretations of the media in the face of reform and change that were brought 
about by China’s opening to the outside world and by technical innovation.4 The 
                                             
2 Frederick T.C. Yu. Mass Persuasion in Communist China. New York: Praeger, 1964; Alan P. Liu. 
Communications and National Integration in Communist China. Berkeley: University in California 
Press, 1971; and Oskar Weggel. Massenkommunikation in der Volksrepublik China: mit 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zustandes seit der Kulturrevolution. Hamburg: Institut für 
Asienkunde, 1970, to name the more substantial studies. More literature will be quoted in the 
following chapters. 
3 Especially Hannah Arendt’s book The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951, 
had a lasting impact on studies dealing with the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
4 See Zhao Yuezhi. Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the 
Bottom Line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998; Lee Chin-chuan (ed.). China’s Media, 
Media’s China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994; Won Ho Chang. Mass Media in China: The History 
and the Future. Ames: Iowa University Press, 1989; and Daniel C. Lynch. After the Propaganda 
State. Media, Politics, and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University 
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general tendency of this literature is to stress the greatly increased amount of 
leeway for the media and the retreat of the government from direct interventions; 
many authors predict a trend towards further liberalization of the Chinese media 
sector. This argument, however, is contradicted by a constant stream of reports 
detailing the efforts of the CCP and the Chinese government to strengthen their 
grip on the media.5 The astonishing growth, in numerical terms, of the Chinese 
media in the past twenty years has created a much broader spectrum of choice for 
the audiences, yet the analytical equation of commercialization with liberalization 
apparently falls short of reality. Much of the current writing on the Chinese media 
is furthermore plagued by too narrow a view on the subject, resulting from the 
transposition (all too often without reflection) of media concepts developed with 
view to Western paradigms by scholars with a background in journalism and 
communication science. The resulting studies thus have difficulties to explain how 
and in which terms their subject, the Chinese media, perceive of themselves.6  
 In this study, I will take a different approach. In order to understand the 
Chinese media as both a comprehensive phenomenon and a product of historical 
processes, we must proceed from the perspective of the media themselves. For 
this purpose, I will reconstruct: what does the Party think what media are (or 
should be), and how do the media speak about themselves? This leads to a text-
centred approach, an investigation into the reflexive discourses of the regime. It is 
necessary to place the media in their social and institutional environment, so as to 
explain both their historical roots and the logic of their operation. However, this 
does not mean the insulation of “things Chinese:” to the contrary, due 
consideration of China’s international environment is a necessary analytical 
component. The modern Chinese state has borrowed (first of all, the institution of 
the modern media itself), and is still borrowing from ideas and concepts originating 
                                                                                                                                      
Press, 1999. For an overview over this literature see Barrett McCormick. “Recent Trends in 
Mainland China’s Media: Political Implications of Commercialization,” in Issues & Studies 38.4-39.1 
(2003), p. 175-215. 
5 Compare the ongoing crackdown on dissent on the Internet, discussed in chapter nine. 
6 The positive exception here is Daniel Lynch’s study which opts for a more comprehensive 
approach. Yet while his After the Propaganda State is highly informed on a very broad spectrum of 
issues, the author tends to overrates the actual impact of globalization and technical innovation on 
the government’s ability to control the media sector. 
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abroad. While these elements are transformed, adapted to local needs, and 
reinterpreted, they do also provide the basis for comparative reflection.7 
 Secondly, placing the media within the complex social and political 
framework they interact with on a constant basis, is not only an essential 
requirement for a comprehensive analysis of the media themselves. The process 
can be reversed: the reflection on the ideological and institutional arrangements of 
the media within the state-society framework also allows us to translate the 
findings of the investigation into the media back into the complex of the state-
society relationship. Being one factor within the structural arrangements of the 
political space, the media are also an indicator of the dynamics of this framework 
in general. On a micro-level, the media sector mirrors the structural arrangements 
of the larger state-society matrix within the political space. I will thus propose to 
see the media as an analytical category for the study of the relationship of state 
and society, an issue that has drawn much attention in recent years.8 The analysis 
of the media sector from a diachronical perspective reveals elements of both 
change and continuity, allowing for a view on the dynamics of this relationship, and 
for an empirically informed interpretation of the changes taking place. 
The CCP has never formulated a single, unitary concept of the media in a 
theoretical form. I will therefore step in and do so in the Party’s place: the core 
features of such a concept can be extrapolated from the writings and documents 
of the CCP’s formative period, the Party’s Yan’an years in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. What I refer to in the following as the “modern Chinese media concept” 
thus is an integrated system of beliefs and assumptions concerning the media that 
relies on a peculiar world view and draws on both the Marxist-Leninist tradition and 
on indigenous Chinese sources. The modern Chinese media concept governs a 
section of political space that is identified as a crucial part of the “propaganda 
sector” (xuanchuan xitong 宣传系统). Proceeding from the CCP’s own logic, I 
demonstrate that the role of the state in the media sector is characterized not 
                                             
7 There have been some efforts to develop a comparative perspective. See Julian Po-keng Chang. 
Propaganda and Perceptions: The Selling of the Soviet Union in the People’s Republic of China. 
PhD Diss., Harvard University, 1995; and Gabór T. Rittersporn, Malte Rolf, Jan C. Behrends (eds.). 
Sphären von Öffentlichkeit in Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs: Public Spheres in Soviet-Type 
Societies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003. 
8 Merle Goldman, Elizabeth Perry (ed.). Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China. 
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2002, contains a number of attempts to reconceptualize 
the state-society relationship. Chapter One will expand on this issue. 
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simply by negative interventions (censorship etc.), but primarily by a proactive 
approach: the modern Chinese media concept is part of a much larger normative 
system with the general objective to educate and reform the population in 
accordance with a value system prescribed by the state. The Party’s value system 
has shifted over time, and the media have generally followed these shifts. 
The concept formed in the Yan’an era has provided the ideological 
framework for the organization of the media sector after the creation of the PRC in 
1949. Notwithstanding the frequent twists and turns since the CCP’s assumption 
of power, the role and the functions of the media have changed remarkably little 
over roughly half of a century: the core features of the media concept are visible 
even through the veil created by commercialization and globalization. The success 
of this concept, so my findings in this study, is owed to its openness that allows for 
reinterpretations if circumstances require. The “Yan’an way” of politics proposed 
by Mark Selden9 is therefore an inappropriate formulation as far as concerns the 
media, since it does not differentiate between means and goals: the CCP’s media 
concept has formulated the goals of Chinese media work, but left open the choice 
of the means to attain these goals. Thus, the media concept, and especially the 
Party’s claim to control the media, has been able to resist all major challenges to 
the present day, while a flexible interpretation has made possible the adaptation of 
the concept to varying political settings and circumstances. The Party has 
permitted changes in the means of implementing the media concept, but has stuck 
closely to the goals formulated in the 1940s. In the media sector, continuity weighs 
heavier than change. 
 The first part of this study traces the modern Chinese media concept back 
to its origins in Marxist-Leninist political philosophy. This tradition, however, has 
not been transferred directly into the modern Chinese context: rather, it has been 
mediated and transformed in the process of modernization and “Sinification”. As I 
will show, those elements of the complex of Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning the 
media were accepted in China that could be imagined and understood in the 
context of traditional Chinese political thought. The efforts to put the resulting 
media concept into practice make up the body of part two of this volume. A series 
                                             
9 See Mark Selden. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971; and Selden. China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 
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of case studies will provide a diachronic perspective that shows how the media 
concept has been adapted to different challenges arising from the political 
environment. These chapters focus on the degree to which the theoretical 
concepts have been shaping practical media work under different conditions, and 
how in turn these conditions have influenced the evolution of the media concept. 
Notwithstanding the major political, social, economic, and technological 
transformations of the PRC over the course of the second half of the twentieth 
century, the modern Chinese media concept has remained remarkably stable, its 
core tenets being as firmly in place today as ever. 
 
* * * 
 
 The first chapter of the present study is dedicated to some of the conceptual 
issues indicated earlier in this introduction. Beyond establishing a framework of 
analysis, the basic structure of the media field and its position within the 
propaganda sector are outlined; furthermore, some important terminological 
problems must be addressed that are all too often neglected. Terms and words 
are not simply designations of objects existing in the “real world,” but do by 
themselves provide the categories that structure the subjective human reality; it is 
along these lines of categorization through linguistic structure that human thinking 
operates. The categories associated by terminology and the resulting structures, 
however, vary in different languages, creating major problems of translation that 
are almost never addressed. Only after the particular logic has been made visible 
that is reflected in the terminological structuring of the media sector, the Chinese 
media concept and its origins can be analysed. Arguing that the linguistic and 
conceptual arrangements are reflected by real political structures, I will, in the 
remainder of chapter one, investigate the composition of the Chinese propaganda 
sector and its formation in the early decades of the CCP’s history. 
The role of the state in the management of social values is usually being 
discussed in terms of negative intervention, such as censorship, prohibition of 
pornography etc. With regard to media in socialist countries under the leadership 
of Communist parties, however, this argument falls short: similar to theocratic 
systems, the socialist state adopts a more proactive and intrusive attitude. In the 
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socialist context, media are invested with the explicit function to participate in the 
education and formation of ‘new man,’ in accordance with the norms and values of 
the state. The media are supposed to create an environment that will further the 
‘correct behaviour’ of this ‘new man’ and protect him from sliding back into his old 
habits. This drastic intervention into the definition of the media’s role and into their 
work is legitimized by the projection of a utopian goal, the construction of socialism 
and finally, the achieving of communism. It is further justified by the party’s claim 
to represent an avant-garde of such ‘new men;’ since this process of reform is not 
self-sustaining, the party will intervene by way of the media to assist the process. 
 This particular view on the media, as it is found in the PRC, can be traced 
back to Marxist roots. That is what chapter two does. To reconstruct the main 
sources of influence, I will work with a number of key texts – texts whose 
authoritative nature can be established because they are frequently quoted in 
China, or because they are officially named as key texts and advertised for cadre 
study. Among these are Lenin’s 1902 article “What is to be Done?” and the History 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, 
commissioned by Stalin in 1938 and consequently translated and distributed in 
numerous languages and countries, including China. 
Marxist-Leninist ideas thus have been received in China not directly, but 
more often in mediated form, especially in their Stalinist version. Apart from the 
Short Course, the popularizing works of Ai Siqi 艾思奇, himself heavily influenced 
by Stalin’s version of Marxism-Leninism, stand out for their influence on Mao 
Zedong and other CCP leaders. Proceeding from these key texts, I will extrapolate 
the main positions of the CCP towards the media from a close reading of Party 
documents, newspaper articles, and speeches by the Party leadership in the 
crucial Yan’an years. In several steps, the modern Chinese media concept thus 
emerges as the product of these positions derived from a sinified form of Marxism-
Leninism-Stalinism. At the centre of the concept stands a highly elitist position: 
while they are destined to be the future masters of society, the workers in their 
current situation are handicapped by illiteracy and long labour days that prevent 
them from effective self-organisation. They are unable to move beyond trade-
unionist goals, which are in effect but compromises for the satisfaction of selfish 
short-term needs. To proceed to the revolutionary position, revolutionary 
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consciousness must be carried into the proletariat from outside – only the 
professional revolutionaries organized in the party can do so, they are the avant-
garde of the proletariat. The immature people’s masses and the enlightened 
position of the party, educating the rest of the population in the population’s own 
interest (even preventing the masses from doing harm to their own interests), are 
key elements of the Leninist world view. The media play a crucial role in this 
process of enlightenment and education; they disseminate the party’s world view 
and mould the workers into a cohesive revolutionary block under the party’s 
leadership. This central position has dominated the CCP’s thinking from earliest 
times and has also shaped the Party’s media concept. 
However, this instrumental approach to the media and the world view that 
informs it is by no means unique to the CCP. Rather, in the first half of the 
twentieth century, parties and governments worldwide, from the far right to the left, 
all subscribed to the idea of the media as propaganda tools in a modern polity. 
Concepts of party press and state press organs dominated the international 
marketplace of ideas at the time when the CCP defined the Party’s media 
philosophy. The CCP leaders could refer to the GMD press as models as much as 
to the Japanese, Soviet, French, or British press in China – or, to the advanced 
war time propaganda techniques of the U.S. Committee on Public Information. 
The various elements that in their totality make up the media concept do 
thus come from different periods, different historical contexts, and different 
traditions of thought. As a consequence, the modern Chinese media concept is no 
monolithic bloc: while the different influences were merged in the Yan’an era to 
form a coherent whole, these elements remain recognizable within the concept 
itself. Thus, the media concept is characterized by a latent inherent tension 
between the single elements. The heterogeneity of the media concept is 
responsible for its flexibility and resilience, and has allowed for different 
interpretations when changing circumstances forced the Party to do so, with 
alternative stress on different components. Yet the tension within the media 
concept has also triggered violent confrontations when alternative interpretations 
of the concept clashed. The most prominent such examples were the debate on 
the press during the Hundred Flowers movement, and the Cultural Revolution. 
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 Chapter three turns to the importance of the legacies of traditional Chinese 
thought and statecraft for the evolution of the modern Chinese media concept. The 
CCP did not import Soviet media thinking lock, stock, and barrel. Rather, theories 
and concepts of Soviet and other origin had to compete with various incarnations 
of Chinese tradition transformed by modern influences. The CCP thus borrowed 
from the Soviet Union in a highly selective manner. In this chapter I argue that 
those elements of the Leninist-Stalinist complex of ideas were easier absorbed 
that could be explained and imagined from the perspective of pre-modern Chinese 
thinking – or from ideas that had been introduced to China at earlier stages. I will 
show that certain elements of the modern media concept proved to be acceptable, 
because the lines of argumentation sounded familiar. To do so, I will turn to the 
closest functional equivalents in late imperial China of the modern propagandistic 
media: the Kangxi emperor’s Sacred Edict (Shengyu 圣谕) of 1670, the religious 
propaganda of the Taiping rebellion, and the indigenized early press in China. The 
CCP leadership (most of whom had received a classical education in their youth) 
thus felt familiar with a number of issues they found in the Soviet press theory; it is 
these elements that came to figure large in the Chinese media concept. 
Before proceeding to the case studies of the second part of this study, 
chapter four introduces the mechanics of control that shape the structure of public 
communication in the PRC, as these will be essential for the diachronic analysis in 
the second part. These features include: a binding ideological framework of 
reference (the party’s “general line”); a hierarchical administrative structure that 
can direct and control the media at any given point in the hierarchy; control of the 
flow in information (e.g., the Xinhua monopoly on certain kinds of information); 
control of information access (access to less stratified information for personnel in 
higher echelons of the social hierarchy); language control; and control of discourse 
through prescribed ‘master texts.’ Not all of these are directly or exclusively related 
to the control of the media, but in their entirety they form a comprehensive system 
of public communication, of which the media is but one, albeit an important, 
element. 
 The second part of the study transposes the modern Chinese media 
concept into the empirical reality of practical media work in the PRC. The objective 
of this strategy is to account for the actual relevance of the theoretical conceptions 
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for everyday work in the sphere of the media. The research interest here centres 
on two interrelated questions: In how far does the modern Chinese media concept 
determine media behaviour under changing circumstances in the state-society 
matrix?, and, How do these changes in the larger parameters affect the stability of 
the concept itself? Finally, we must try to determine what the shifting 
interpretations of the media concept tell us about the changes in the CCP’s overall 
approach to governance. 
To provide answers for these questions, media practice in the PRC is 
investigated in a number of case studies. The cases have been selected so as to 
represent a variety of important media and to illuminate different historical periods 
in the PRC’s history. This selection does intend, however, to deliver a linear 
historical account of media performance in the PRC, neither does it imply a claim 
to completeness with regard to the respective media. Rather, both the periods and 
the media have been chosen for their representative character. A further selection 
criterion has been to focus on such moments when the established media concept 
has come under particular stress: periods of intense political, social, and economic 
change or debate. Such periods of high pressure should be particularly apt to 
identify the main lines of argument that in ‘normal’ times might be buried under the 
everyday-distortions (from power struggles and factional quarrels to thinly veiled 
suppression of dissent or corruption) that characterize every major sub-system in 
complex societies. 
 The first such point occurred in 1949/1950, when the CCP was forced, in a 
relatively short time, with limited manpower, and with myriad other issues to be 
resolved, to transfer the media concept developed in rural war-time Yan’an to the 
predominantly urban-based media industries of the entire country. The first case 
study, chapter five, investigates the dismantling of the Party-controlled Sanlian 三
联 bookstore in order to build up the monolithic Xinhua shudian 新华书店 chain 
that came to dominate the Chinese book publishing industry as early as 1951. 
 A second study will turn to the newspaper sector, in this case the Shanghai 
daily Wenhuibao 文汇报, a non-Party paper. Reopened in October 1956 after a 
shut-down earlier that year, the paper adopted a liberal policy in the Hundred 
Flower movement and in May 1957 called for improvements in the treatment of 
Chinese journalists. In the Anti-Rightist campaign that started in June 1957 
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Wenhuibao was a prime target and suffered heavily for its outspokenness. The 
case illustrates the self-perception of journalists and the problems into which the 
media concept ran as early as the 1950s, as well as the limits of discourse in the 
media. 
While the Anti-Rightist campaign targeted journalists and intellectuals 
across the nation, they were criticized as individuals, while the basic structure of 
the media sector remained in place. The start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
however, fundamentally changed the institutional landscape. Chapter seven thus 
deals with a paradox: how and why did the Party’s control of the media continue to 
function once the mechanics of control – in particular the institutional apparatus 
led by the Propaganda Department – broke down under the attacks of the Red 
Guards? This chapter investigates the Red Guard newspapers that appeared 
since fall 1966 and were published autonomously, in the absence of a unified 
infrastructure of control. My findings suggest that the media concept itself was 
stronger than the institutions that were initially built to support it. The Red Guard 
press distanced itself from the latter and pledged their loyalty to the former. The 
result was an interpretation of the media concept that was more stricter than at 
any time before the Cultural Revolution. 
 The next turning point was the introduction of economic reforms and the 
liberalization of the political climate that followed the Third Plenum in December 
1978. In April 1979, Dushu magazine 读书 published its first issue, setting out on a 
ticket of intellectual freedom, unhindered discussion, and pluralism of debate. Far 
from being a marginal publication, Dushu had support in the highest echelons of 
the propaganda sector and was launched to give a voice to the supporters of 
reform-minded politicians. Magazines and journals, which mushroomed after 1978, 
were the key platform of practically all major discussions taking place in the 1980s. 
 In chapter nine, I will address the boom in television broadcasting in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, with stress on the issue of commercialization: under 
pressure to become financially viable and to create profits, TV stations at central 
and local levels were struggling to find a format that would fit both their commercial 
interests (and thus, the tastes of the audience), and the demands of their political 
mission, defined in the Party’s propaganda department. 
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 The final issue to be discussed is the explosion of the Internet in China 
since 1997. Thus carrying the study of the Chinese media to the present, the case 
study sheds light on the particular problems that resulted from the introduction of 
new technologies: the fusion of telecommunications, a sector traditionally under 
the economics xitong, and the media sector, situated in the propaganda xitong, 
challenged the Party’s structures of control; the resulting problems took several 
years to resolve. Notwithstanding the popularity of the Internet and its commercial 
potential, however, the Party has refused to let control of the medium slip away. 
The CCP has worked hard, and increasingly successful, to impose the same kind 
of controls and restrictions on the Internet industry that have applied to the rest of 
the media sector for half a century. The heavy-handed state control of modern 
digital public communication serves especially well to illustrate that the core tenets 
of the media concept developed in the 1940s have survived through all 
transformations and do form the foundation of the Chinese state’s attitude toward 
the media even in the 21st century. 
Chapter One 
A Functional Approach to the Chinese Media 
 
“The media constitute a separate ‘social institution’ within society, with its 
own rules and practices, but subject to definition and limitation by the wider 
society. Thus, the media are ultimately dependent on society...” 
(Denis McQuail. McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory) 
 
“What is the mission of this newspaper? It can be summed up in one single 
sentence: to unite the people of the entire nation in their fight to defeat 
Japanese imperialism. This is the general line of the Chinese Communist 
Party, and it is also the mission of this newspaper” 
(Mao Zedong. “Publication foreword to the Yan’an ‘Jiefang ribao’”) 
 
 
The CCP has never formulated a comprehensive, unitary theory of the 
media. This finding comes as a surprise: the remarkable continuity in the Party’s1 
approach to the media and the definition of their suggests a comprehensive, 
coherent body of ideas about the media, and an implicit media concept. In chapter 
two, I will make this concept explicit, through extrapolation from a broad range of 
the Party’s own writings and publications. In the present chapter, I am going to 
work towards a definition of the subject matter under study, and of the social and 
political factors that determine Chinese thinking on the media. The central 
question in this chapter is: What are the conditions that led to the formation of a 
genuine Chinese media concept? 
The media are firmly rooted in society. It is impossible to conceive of the 
media as anything but a component of a more complex social and political reality; 
consequently, the media cannot be discussed but in their proper context, their 
social environment. The relationship between the media and their environment is 
reciprocal in nature: their particular conceptualization and formation is dependent 
on social forces and ideas. At the same time, the media themselves influence and 
shape society, and they are used expressly for these purposes. This reciprocity 
comes as a burden insofar as it precludes any attempt to gain an understanding of 
the media in isolation. All the same, the interrelationship between media and 
society carries great analytical potential, since a more comprehensive approach to 
the subject enables us to draw further conclusions with regard to the general 
nature of the state-society relationship, as I hope to do in later chapters. 
                                             
1 The capitalized Party here is an abbreviation, usually, for the CCP, and will be used in this way 
throughout the present study; it corresponds with the Chinese dang 党. In contrast, party refers to 
any political party, as do the Chinese words dangpai 党派 or zhengdang 政党. 
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Positions concerning the nature of the relationship between the media and 
society may vary substantially. For a long time, theoretical approaches in Euro-
American media studies have tended to stress the media’s dependence on society: 
as an institution within a complex social body, they are subject to multiple kinds of 
external influences that shape the behaviour of the actors involved and ultimately 
define the role of the media themselves.2 On the other hand, emphasis may be 
placed on the opposite aspect: the media’s role in shaping the mental outlook and 
the normative environment of the very society that surrounds them. This latter 
aspect has been highlighted in the media critique of contemporary Marxist critics, 
but it has been the point of departure also in all Socialist political systems. In the 
quotation at the beginning of this chapter, Mao Zedong argues that during the war 
of resistance against Japan, the media are to take a proactive stance, they must 
offer a guide for people’s life.3 According to this view, it is not primarily society that 
determines the media, but rather the other way round; they are a tool for purposes 
defined otherwise. While both of the above positions do also acknowledge the 
possibility of influence in the other direction, each stresses one particular aspect of 
the relationship.4 For the purposes of the present study, both positions are 
important, since they shed light on general tendencies: contemporary “Western” or 
“liberal” media theory is generally more inclined to emphasize the social roots of 
the media and thus provides us with important information concerning their 
dependence on social input, whereas media theory in socialist countries stresses 
the media’s propaganda character, an approach that helps us to understand the 
inner logic of the system under consideration, here the socialist Chinese media. 
It is possible to explain the disagreement of these positions with their 
respective views on the fundamental nature of society and the degree of autonomy 
that individual members of society can claim for themselves. A closer examination 
of these issues in the following two chapters will reveal how the particular world 
                                             
2 Many of these approaches are discussed in Denis McQuail. McQuail’s Mass Communication 
Theory, 4th ed. London: Sage Publications, 2000, passim. See also the quotation at the beginning 
of this chapter, which is taken from McQuail’s “Introduction” (p. 5), where the author confesses his 
basic beliefs concerning the media’s nature. 
3 The publication foreword (fakanci 发刊词) appeared on May 16, 1941 in Jiefang ribao 解放日报, 
and is reproduced in Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983, p. 
55-57. The section quoted is the very first sentence of this foreword. 
4 For a medium position see Michael Schudson. The Power of News. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995. 
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view of the CCP and its conception of governance determine the Party’s media 
concept. It is nonetheless crucial to acknowledge from the start of this 
investigation that the media do not operate in a social, political, or conceptual 
vacuum: the Chinese media as an institution have a distinctly social character – in 
both the sense of the media being dependent on society, and with regard to their 
normative mission to shape this society’s mental environment. 
In this chapter I argue that the investigation into the Chinese media faces a 
challenge that is due to the incongruence of conceptual terminology in English and 
Chinese. First of all, until recently there has been no equivalent term or concept for 
the English “media” in Chinese. While the institutions usually subsumed under 
“media” – books, newspapers, magazines, television, etc. – do certainly exist in 
the PRC, they are discussed in the Chinese context under different conceptual 
categories, especially those associated with “propaganda.” The first thing to do is 
therefore to establish these categories. These considerations are very important, 
as they allow us to reconstruct the inner logic behind the organization and 
functioning of the media in the PRC. This leads me to a functional approach: 
concentrating on the basic function of public communication, a general 
interdependence of the various media can indeed be confirmed, albeit with a 
different structuring. Thus, even in the absence of such a term itself, it is justified 
to speak of “Chinese media” (I will continue to do so throughout this study for 
reasons of convenience), if proper attention is given to the actual arrangements 
that place these media in a particular conceptual space. 
This space cannot easily be grasped with Western theories of media and 
communication, although approaches such as the Habermasian “public sphere,” 
can be helpful to some degree. The conceptual space that contains the media in 
China is the propaganda sector, or xitong 系统. This xitong is historically grown, as 
I will show by tracing the evolution of the institutional developments leading up the 
Yan’an era, when the xitong stabilized as a functionally integrated hierarchy. The 
propaganda xitong, though, is not identical with the media sector, as it comprises 
other functions, too: education, literature and art, the sciences, and even public 
health do all belong to the propaganda sector, as a look at institutional structures 
will show. Any investigation into the Chinese media should therefore take into 
account this peculiar construct, the media’s institutional neighbourhood. It is in this 
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environment where the media unfold their must fundamental function: the 
nourishing of the spiritual health of the people. 
 
 
The Chinese “Media” 
The study of mass media in China meets with a major problem: it deals with 
a phantom. The term “media” is used throughout this book to circumscribe the 
subject covered in this study. “Media” is a relatively young term, signifying books, 
journals, newspapers, broadcasting etc., in short, the carriers of mass 
communication in modern society.5 No such term, however, has existed in 
Chinese until the most recent past.6 The incongruence of the terminology used in 
Chinese and the English translation terms employed by Western scholars is all too 
often neglected. It must be seriously asked if this study – and many others – are 
searching for a product of fantasy, created by the projection into China of a 
concept of Euro-American origin. Does there exist such a thing as “the media,” 
however defined, in China? Is it a meaningful undertaking, after all, to look for the 
“Chinese media?” 
The Chinese word meiti 媒体 is a translation term for the English “media.” A 
very fine choice, meiti is both a phonetic loan and an explanation of the English 
term: consisting of mei 媒, that is a go-between or matchmaker, and ti 体, a body 
or substance, meiti is a mediating tool that explicitly invokes the notion of 
communication. Ingenious as the term may be, it is a loan of very recent origin: it 
was the process of reform and opening that has led to the rapid proliferation of the 
word meiti since the 1980s, when it first came into use. Etymological inquiries 
show that the word was first used in the mid-1980s, and entered the Chinese 
mainstream vocabulary not before the early 1990s.7 Other terms signifying the 
media such as meijie 媒介 and chuanmei 传媒 (an abbreviation for chuanbo meijie 
                                             
5 The word has older roots (esp. in the singular form) but came into use, carrying the above 
meaning, in the mid 20th century only. For etymology and meanings see Raymond Williams. 
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
6 As far as I can see, none of the major dictionaries and encyclopaedias has an entry on “meiti,” the 
single exception being Wu Guanghua (ed.). Han-Ying dacidian. Shanghai: Jiaotong daxue 
chubanshe, 1993. 
7 A survey of article titles in the Fuyin baokan ziliao database (1978-1997) has found no use of the 
word meiti before 1987, and only sporadic uses thereafter. Only since 1994 the term is used 
frequently (15-20 titles per year). 
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传播媒介) are of recent origin, too.8 Meiti, a term that probably originated in 
Taiwan,9 is now in the process of replacing the other two terms in both Chinese 
mainland newspapers and scholarly publications.10 
The above finding – that the Chinese word meiti has emerged only recently 
as a translation term – means that for most of the period covered in this study, no 
generic term has existed that would refer directly to the English “media” and cover 
the entirety of newspapers, books, the periodical press, and broadcasting. The 
resulting problem, however, is not limited to a merely linguistic level but has more 
far-reaching consequences: beyond the level of linguistic denotation, words are 
also responsible for the organization and classification of the phenomena of reality. 
Words consist of two layers, one being the term, a linguistic notation of an object 
or phenomenon. The second is the idea associated with that term, and can be 
called concept. It is these concepts that form the categories in which we think and 
which we use to distinguish between different objects and phenomena. Michel 
Foucault has characterized this relationship:11 
[Language] is to thought and to signs what algebra is to geometry: it replaces the 
simultaneous comparisons of parts (or magnitudes) with an order whose degrees must 
be traversed one after the other. It is in this strict sense that language is an analysis of 
thought: not a simple patterning, but a profound establishment of order in space. 
 
In this order, generic terms occupy an important position, since they – as concepts 
– structure other concepts of a lower level. It is the category part of a word that 
decides what can be called a “fish” and what not, or, in our case, what belongs to 
                                             
8 The survey of article titles found 68 hits for meiti, of which 61 were from the period 1992-1997. Of 
24 hits for chuanmei, the first occurred in 1986, the second in 1992, and 19 of the total between 
1995 and 1997. There were 96 hits for meijie, starting from 1980; hits ranged between 5-12 from 
1986 to 1997, in the later period thus producing significantly less results than meiti; of the total for 
meijie, about 30% were unrelated to “media.” The general increase in frequency for the three terms 
documents the proliferation of new terminology in the Chinese language; it is unrelated to the 
structure of the database itself, since searches for baozhi 报纸, dianshi 电视, and xuanchuan 宣传 
produced a relatively even distribution of hits over the 1978-1997 period. 
9 There is not enough evidence to prove this point. However, all book titles containing the word 
meiti in the OPACs of both the Library of Congress and the Chinese University of Hong Kong for 
books from before 1991 were Taiwanese publications. 
10 A survey with the Chinese version of the Google search engine (http://www.google.com/intl/zh-
CN/) has found significantly more hits for meiti (1,630,000) than for meijie (400,000) or chuanmei 
(238,000). The results for meijie included meanings other than “media.” Date of survey: Feb. 20, 
2003.  
11 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Vintage Books, 1973, 
p. 83. For an alternative explanation see Ferdinand de Saussure’s terms parole and langue, 
roughly corresponding to what I have called the linguistic and conceptual levels of language, 
respectively. Cours de la linguistique générale. Paris: Payot, 1916. 
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“media” and what not. The fixed relationships between words function by way of 
the category-part of the words; and it is these relationships that structure human 
knowledge and construct the order of the world we live in.12 We feel it to be 
obvious that the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today are 
“dailies,” that dailies are “newspapers,” that newspapers belong to the “press,” 
which in turn is part of the “media.” Theoretically, however, it may very well be 
possible to construct a different chain of meaning, for example to group USA 
Today with plastic bags and waste paper into the category “wrappings for your 
shopping.”13 Usually, however, we would follow the first meaning chain, since the 
construction of our reality follows fixed logical structures.14 These meaning 
structures may evolve over time, yet as a rule they are very stable. 
This stability, however, may break down, the most obvious such case being 
that of translation: the meaning structure of two languages may differ significantly. 
So when two terms are translated, their relationship in the target language may not 
necessarily be the same as in the source language, because the categories 
involved are interconnected differently – or simply because certain categories do 
not exist in the target language. The translation thus leads to deviations not only 
from the original meaning, that is, on a purely linguistic plane, but also from the 
structures and hierarchies of categories. In the target language, we not only find 
different expressions for the original words (or none at all), but also differing 
structural relationships of particular terms that may lead, in some cases, to varying 
approaches to the concrete manifestations of these terms; different terminological 
conventions lead to different perceptions of reality.15 
                                             
12 I am using here partly concepts from structuralist linguistics. A good discussion can be found in 
Umberto Eco. Einführung in die Semiotik. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, p. 357ff. 
13 Such a classification is, of course, not limited to USA Today. In 1942, a CCP document 
complained: “Some party members ... do not pay attention to studying and discussing [the Party 
paper], or even use it to clean their windows or wrap their shopping – instead of giving it to other 
people for reading!” See “Zhonggong zhongyang Xibeiju guanyu Jiefang ribao gongzuo wenti de 
jueding” (dated Sept. 9. 1942) in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan xinwen yanjiusuo (ed.). Zhongguo 
gongchandang xinwen gongzuo wenjian huibian. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1980, 3 vols. 
(hereafter XGWH), 1.132-34, here p. 132. Italics added. 
14 These structures are in fact a result of learning and education in a social context. On this issue 
see the study by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday, 1966, to which I will return later in 
this chapter. 
15 For an elaborate discussion of this issue see Lydia H. Liu. Translingual Practice: Literature, 
National Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900-1937. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University 
Press, 1995, ch. 1. 
 19
With the massive import of Western writings into China and the interaction 
with Western ideas since the late 1970s, the emergence of new categories first in 
linguistic space, and then in the structural and conceptual organization of things 
has accelerated significantly in many areas. The media sector has not been 
exempted from this trend. The introduction of a new generic term for the media, 
meiti, is a case in point. As shown above, however, this term has not been used 
before the 1980s, and it is absent for an even longer time in Party documents and 
other PRC official publications:16 the conservative attitude towards innovations in 
lexicon gives testimony to the rigidity of language control within official discourse.17 
Relying on a long-established Chinese conceptual framework for the linguistic 
structuring of the space covered by the English category “media” – structures 
different from those in the English language and in Western imagination – the 
Party and government organs responsible for the media sector have resisted a 
new, all-embracing concept that would upset an established order. It is exactly this 
established order that a study of media in the PRC must be interested in.18 
 
 
Media and Communication: Functional Approaches 
So does it make sense to speak of the Chinese “media,” after all? In order 
to answer this question, we must step back for a moment and look at some of the 
general features that are associated with the media. Since we have confirmed that 
the institutions subsumed under the generic English term “media” exist in the PRC, 
we must search for alternative categories that might be used as a generic. To find 
these categories, in the following discussion I have opted for a functional approach. 
Although the media have been discussed broadly as a category of the 
social sciences, there is no standard definition of what media are. The theoretical 
                                             
16 Search in major databases of CCP documents confirmed this point: well over 1800 documents in 
Zhongguo gongchandang wenxian ziliaoku. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 
(CD-ROM edition) produced more than 600 hits for xuanchuan, but only 7 for meiti, the earliest 
from 1994. A search in another database, Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). Zhongguo 
gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhongyang dang’anguan (CD-ROM edition) (hereafter 
Zuzhishi ziliao), did not produce a single hit for the term meiti. 
17 On this topic see chapter four. 
18 Unfortunately, only very few authors of Western literature on the Chinese media have paid 
attention to methodological problems. Only Daniel Lynch has addressed some of the 
methodological issues involved in the research of the Chinese media. See his After the 
Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford 
University Press, 1999, ch.1. 
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literature of Western origin provides no simple answer,19 and recent Chinese 
definitions remain equally vague. Even a definition of media in the broadest of 
terms thus runs into problems. Some general approximations to the subject, 
however, are possible at this point. 
In the most general terms, media are essentially about communication. 
Communication, that is “a process of increased commonality or sharing between 
participants, on the basis of sending and receiving ‘messages,’”20 is a primary 
function of human life. For Jürgen Habermas, for instance, communication is a 
precondition of rational behaviour; it is the means through which people set up 
“Weltbezüge” with their environment.21 A very broad category, communication can 
be discussed from a range of different angles:  
• scope: communication may extend from the most intimate personal 
conversation among two individuals right up to the mass penetration 
reached by public broadcasting, with many layers in between. The most 
essential differentiation here is that between public and private 
communication. 
• content: messages conveyed in the communication process include private, 
political, professional, economic, and entertaining contents, to name but a 
few. Communication content is at least partly related to the scope of 
communication. 
• direction: communication can be classified into top-down, bottom-up, 
bidirectional, multidirectional (interactive), vertical, horizontal, centralized, 
decentralized, specific (defined receiver), non-specific (no defined receiver) 
and many more options. All these directions are linked to the context in 
which communication takes place. 
When scope, content, and direction are combined, a number of communicative 
functions emerge. These functions may be served by different communicative 
tools, such as face-to-face conversations, telecommunication, or the media. Wider 
definitions of communication (such as the Chinese word jiaotong 交通, often used 
                                             
19 The first two chapters of McQuail. Theory, discuss problems related to this complex; yet even 
McQuail stops short of an easy, practical definition of the term. 
20 Definition taken from McQuail. Theory, p. 492. 
21 Jürgen Habermas. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995, vol. 1, p. 
148 and passim. 
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as a translation term) would even include the physical infrastructure of traffic. 
While media are not the only means of communication, they occupy a central 
position within the communicative network of modern societies.22  
As implied by the term, media (from ‘mediating’) are carriers of information. 
In order to distinguish them from other sources of information mediation, the media, 
in the sense in which they are discussed in the present study, are labelled ‘mass 
media’ in most of the literature on the subject. Mass communication is understood 
to be a special case of public communication, whereby all (or theoretically all) 
members of society are included or addressed.23 For example, the readership of a 
mainstream newspaper such as Renmin ribao 人民日报 (hereafter RMRB) is not 
limited legally or technically; only illiteracy or lack of availability may limit its 
distribution, while the paper explicitly targets a “nation-wide” (quanguo xing 全国性) 
audience.24 Anhui ribao 安徽日报 has the same function on a limited geographical 
scale. Both papers can thus be classified as mass media. The concept of mass 
media, however, fails to account for structural similarities of mass media and other 
media of non-mass character, by overemphasizing a single criterion, that of scope. 
As a result of this rather narrow focus, the mass media are made more unique 
than they are within the larger field of media.25 A target-group medium (such as a 
fashion magazine or a professional bulletin) may claim the same functions as a 
mass circulation daily; the exclusion of such media from the discussion is therefore 
analytically not justified. This point will become obvious in the discussion of the 
Chinese media: the explanatory value extends to forms of media other than mass 
media. Therefore, I propose to use the concept of public communication, rather 
than mass communication, for the analysis of the Chinese media, thus widening 
the scope of investigation. 
Public communication is not identical with mass communication in that it is 
defined in an inclusive, not an exclusive way. The advantages of a public 
                                             
22 Compare also the entry “Communication” in Williams. Keywords, p. 62f. 
23 For a model of the “levels of communication” using a higher differentiation than taken here see 
McQuail. Theory, p. 10-12. 
24 Chinese newspapers are usually classified into nation-wide circulated papers, regional 
(difangxing 地方性), and professional (zhuanyexing 专业性) newspapers. See, for example, the 
tables in the annual Zhongguo xinwen nianjian. 
25 This is a common problem of Western literature on the Chinese media that show a strong bias 
for newspapers and television, the “mass media.” The relevance of non-mass media, such as 
journals and books, and the impact in the media landscape, are often overlooked. 
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communication concept are obvious: the journals Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 中共
党史研究 and Lilun dongtai 理论动态 are tools of public communication, but have 
no mass character. Their distribution is limited to specified target groups either by 
way of specialization, or, as in the latter case, through restricted circulation that is 
enforced by Party guidelines. Both journals, however, discuss issues that may also 
appear in the mass circulation media; they are tools of information that contribute 
to communication processes and to discussions within their respective circles.26 
Private communication, in contrast, takes place between individuals and is 
not intended for any public, i.e. participants in communication are limited to those 
personally known and addressed by the speakers. This does not necessarily mean 
that the information transmitted by way of private communication is of private 
concern only: a political debate between two speakers addresses non-private 
issues that may even enter the sphere of public communication if one of the 
speakers decides to write an editorial on the subject discussed. Up to this point, 
though, the communication remains private, even if it may merge into public 
communication later. Letters, telephone calls, and e-mail messages belong to 
private communication.27 While the Chinese state has, at various times in history, 
made efforts to extend its control to include private communication, too, for 
reasons and along lines of logic that are discussed in the following two chapters, 
private communication does still have a character distinct from public 
communication and is not covered in the present study.28 
Borders between mass, public and private communication have been fluent 
at all times, and in all places. They have become even more blurred towards the 
end of the 20th century due to the introduction of new media into the overall 
communication process and the transformation of older media forms: newspapers 
have gone online and have incorporated interactive elements, or offer 
                                             
26 For more on restricted distribution media, their distinct rules of discourse, and the layered public 
sphere(s) created thereby see chapter 4. 
27 Naturally, exceptions to all the categorizations introduced above can be found, such as letters to 
the editor or “open” letters (the name implies the public character), becoming part of public 
communication. 
28 This is not to say that private communication and the messages communicated are irrelevant to 
society and to social processes, the contrary being true. Private communication is excluded from 
discussion here because it is structured in ways very different from public communication. On the 
question of privacy see Bonnie S. McDougall, Anders Hansson. Chinese Concepts of Privacy. 
Leiden: Brill, 2002, and Bonnie S. McDougall. Love-letters and Privacy in Modern China: The 
Intimate Lives of Lu Xun and Xu Guangping. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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customization to their readers’ particular (private) needs. In how far an online 
newspaper is still a mass medium is arguable; yet it remains clearly within the 
realm of public communication. On a different note, the emergence of email 
discussion groups has blurred the lines between private and public communication. 
A solution to this problem has been proposed by John Thompson in form of the 
concept of a dialogical ‘mediated interaction’ that refers to messaging, email etc., 
as opposed to ‘mediated quasi-interaction’ that is “not oriented towards specific 
others” but rather has an “indefinite range of potential recipients”, and is thus 
‘monological’ in character.29 The general problem, that the borders between public 
and private communication are increasingly difficult to define, is certain to keep 
growing as further technological l innovation is introduced. One case, the 
emergence of the Internet as a new medium, and the difficulties of the Chinese 
authorities to come to terms with the challenges posed by technical innovation, is 
being discussed in detail in chapter 9. 
 The very same trends of technical innovation and globalization do also 
challenge the perspective of a communication or media network based on the 
nation-state. China has never been secluded entirely from the outside world; 
rather, communication in China has acted and reacted to flows of information from 
beyond its borders.30 These information flows have played a crucial role especially 
in times of crisis (cf. the role of the Voice of America and BBC broadcastings 
during the democracy movement of Spring 1989).31 China thus operates within a 
global public – a trend that has accelerated in the past twenty years due to reform 
politics and the proliferation of new media forms. International and global (cross-
border) communication, both public and private, is thus an integral part of Chinese 
communication, a fact that should be taken account of: put more bluntly, the New 
York Times is part of the Chinese media landscape in much the same way that 
                                             
29 John B. Thompson. The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Stanford, Ca.: 
Stanford University Press, 1995. For a short discussion of Thompson’s concept see McQuail. 
Theory, p. 65. Quotations are taken from ibid. 
30 Rudolf Wagner has drawn attention to this point in “The Flow of News. Interactions between the 
Official Chinese Gazettes, the Chinese-language Commercial Papers, and English-language China 
Reporting in China and London,” talk at the XIV EACS Conference, Moscow, Aug. 26-28, 2002 See 
also the special issue of China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China 4.2 (Spring 
2004). 
31 The role of the foreign media in spring 1989 is discussed, albeit only in passing, in Linda 
Jakobsen. “Lies in Ink, Truth in Blood: the Role and Impact of the Chinese Media during the Beijing 
Spring ‘89”, Discussion paper, Harvard University, 1990. Available at 
http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/liesink.html (downloaded Sept. 17, 2003). 
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Beijing ribao 北京日报 is – this fact is all too often forgotten.32 The following 
chapters will attempt to take account of the international character of the Chinese 
media landscape, although the focus remains on those media produced 
domestically for a domestic audience.33 
 One more distinction must be introduced at this point. Media have so far 
been defined as carriers of public communication. Public communication is not 
identical with political communication. Public communication is any communication 
that addresses an anonymous, non-private public with matters of concern for a not 
further defined number of people. Political communication, in contrast, is only one 
subgroup of public communication, albeit an important one. Political 
communication is concerned with matters of politics (in the broadest sense). Thus, 
it also belongs to public communication, in so far as it is a reflection of the general 
public’s concerns. It is, however, more limited in terms of content and function. 
Political communication is of special relevance to the government and in China 
has moved – at certain periods – to a paramount position. During the Cultural 
Revolution, for example, political communication dominated all other 
communication; put differently, all communication had to be politicized if it was to 
assume legitimacy. 
Political communication is but one function of communication. Media are 
able to cover a number of communicative functions (defined by scope, content, 
and direction) at the same time, if not all of them. Their actual function, however, is 
usually more limited, and related to specific contexts. Thus, media are usually not 
single-purpose, but multi-purpose tools of communication. A newspaper may carry, 
besides news reporting – and even on the same page – government 
announcements, advertisements (i.e. communication of economic information from 
an enterprise to potential consumers), entertainment, letters to the editor,34 job 
                                             
32 I know of not a single serious effort to take such a holistic perspective on the Chinese media. 
The tendency to strictly separate things Chinese and others, so common in Chinese studies, is 
partly due to the official Chinese position that argues likewise. Since the Chinese government can 
control the content of foreign publications only to a very limited degree, it attempts aggressively to 
restrict access to these publications. 
33 Very little information has been made available in print on the issue of interaction between 
Chinese and foreign media, while anecdotal evidence abounds. Making use of whatever 
information available, supported by targeted interviews (see appendix). 
34 Letters to the editor are especially interesting in their nature: rooting in private communication, 
they are a double reversal of the direction of the communication process. The usual top-down 
direction of a newspaper is being turned around by a letter that expresses the opinion of a reader 
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openings, and many other pieces of information. The number of functions defined 
as legitimate for the media may be reduced (such as in China during the Cultural 
Revolution), but the media per se are not limited to a single purpose. 
Functional approaches to communication have been regarded as old-
fashioned in media theory in recent years.35 In the context of Stalinist media 
systems, however, the functional approach remains a useful tool of analysis. Such 
an approach is legitimized first and foremost by the political authorities and the 
Party leadership in those countries: the media are explicitly called upon to ‘serve’ 
(fuwu 服务) political purposes. While more liberal concepts of the media’s nature, 
usually of Western origin, are beginning to find audiences in China, the idea of a 
politically defined “mission” of the media is still the mainstream voice. Even recent 
Chinese textbooks on the media stress the functional approach.36 
Most of the literature on the Chinese media, however, fails to consider this 
problem, which leads us to a major shortcoming of the existing general literature 
on media and communication: an obvious bias against the state. Media theory 
developed in Europe and the U.S. usually takes for granted that media operate in 
a quasi-autonomous space of public communication, such as the ‘public sphere’ in 
Jürgen Habermas’ writings.37 The observation that the media are situated in a 
space between the private sphere and that of politics which serves as a room for 
                                                                                                                                      
(i.e., bottom-up communication), yet through the selection and ultimately publication, the letter 
becomes part of the overall message of the newspaper, returning to the top-down stream of 
communication. In fact, the CCP leadership was conscious of the bidirectional flow of information 
early on. Compare Bo Gu’s fall 1944 lecture “Dangbao jizhe yao zhuyi xie shenme wenti,” in 
XGWH 3.203-05. Bo Gu in particular stresses the role of newspapers for intelligence gathering. 
35 See McQuail. Theory, p. 78ff. 
36 For a most recent discussion see Xie Haiguang (ed.). Hulianwang yu sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo 
anli. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2002. See also Yuan Jun. Xinwen meijie tonglun. Beijing: 
Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe, 2000, ch. 3: “The social function of news media” (Xinwen 
meijie de shehui gongneng). Alternative voices come mostly from the Chinese academia and 
intelligentsia, rather than from the media establishment. A provocative article calling for the 
abolition of the Propaganda Department, for example, was written by a Beijing University 
journalism professor. Jiao Guobiao. “Taofa Zhongxuanbu,” 
http://msittig.freshell.org/docs/jiao_guobiao_essay_utf8.html (downloaded Oct. 25, 2004). 
37 Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1989. (Originally published as 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit in 1962). Habermas does not claim to be a communication 
scientist, but his position is exemplary for the majority of literature in the field that tends to neglect 
or deny any positive (i.e. active) role of the state; for this reason I have refrained from quoting any 
more books that may take different positions concerning the media but are beset with the same 
problem in this aspect. To mention but one example: McQuail’s Theory mentions the state only in 
passing and does not consider it to be a player of any importance in the media field. 
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“reason” (“öffentliches Räsonnement”)38 has contributed tremendously to the 
conceptualization of the role that an articulate public has played ever since early 
modern times. Habermas defines the public sphere as follows:39 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public: they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from 
above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the 
general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere 
of commodity exchange and social labor. 
 
The public discourse that characterizes this sphere was located in teahouses and 
cafés only in its earliest times, and moved soon into the press that has ever since 
served as the primary carrier of this “reasoning.” 
The problem with this conception becomes obvious in the few lines cited 
above. Habermas places the “private people” and the state in opposition to each 
other; the former use the public sphere as the arena for their argument. This 
implies a fundamentally negative view of the state: an emancipated and 
enlightened citizenry fights to defend their interests against an intrusive and 
oppressive state. The deeply liberal desire to fend off state infringement on 
individual liberty has historical roots, but is one-sided with regard to the modern 
state. Furthermore, it fails to provide sufficient explanations for the role of the state 
in settings dominated by very strong states that actively try to shape society, such 
as the Leninist state.40 In the Chinese case, Daniel Lynch has used the idea of a 
“praetorian” public sphere to describe a state that protrudes deeply into the day-to-
day affairs of the press institutions.41 In this way, he can account for a more 
prominent role of the state, but the praetorian public sphere approach does not 
solve the fundamental problem: the state remains in a passive position, being 
mainly occupied with efforts to block the evolution of a ‘free’ public sphere.42 
                                             
38 Ibid., p. 27. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Rudolf Wagner has criticised this point, among other shortcomings of Habermas’ approach in 
“The role of the foreign community in the Chinese public sphere” in CQ 142 (June 1995), p. 423-43. 
Barbara Mittler. A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 
1872-1912. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2004; and Natascha Vittinghoff. Freier 
Fluss. Zur Kulturgeschichte des frühen chinesischen Journalismus (1862 - 1911). Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2002, p. 3ff, do also comment on the weaknesses of the Habermasian concept. 
41 See his After the Propaganda State. The idea of a ‘praetorian’ public sphere borrows from 
Samuel Huntington’s concept of “praetorian” settings of “uninstitutionalized and chaotic patterns of 
political participation” (ibid., p. 5). Compare Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968. 
42 Lynch is not alone here. The authors in Gabór T. Rittersporn, Malte Rolf, Jan C. Behrends (eds.). 
Sphären von Öffentlichkeit in Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs: Public Spheres in Soviet-Type 
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Such a view, however, is compatible neither with the self-perception of the 
Chinese state regarding the media, nor with the empirical findings presented later 
in this volume. The Chinese state and the ruling Party claim a central position in 
the mediascape of the PRC. The CCP’s media concept that I will develop in the 
next chapters will make this point clear. For the moment, we must start to take a 
closer look at the organization of media thinking in China. After having defined the 
main function of the media – public communication – in general terms, we can now 
go on to determine the context in which public communication takes place in the 
Chinese political imaginaire. The functional approach thus leads us to the 
organization of the political space, to the propaganda sector, or xitong. 
 
 
The Propaganda Sector 
It has proven impossible to approach the Chinese conception of the media 
on a purely linguistic plane by using translation terminology. Yet despite the 
apparent lack of a comprehensive term or conceptual category corresponding to 
the word ‘media,’ the entities grouped as ‘media’ in English are clearly being 
perceived of as closely linked to each other in China through their role and their 
function in public communication. Books, newspapers, film etc. have a common 
framework of reference in Chinese – propaganda. This framework becomes most 
obvious when we turn to the logic of the institutional structuring of political space. It 
is here, in the area of political organization, that we find a reflection of the 
organization of thought. 
An organizational approach must follow the particular institutional logic from 
the perspective of system insiders, since the analysis of formal institutional 
patterns can be of use only if these formal patterns match the categories in which 
the actors think and speak of their environment. The informal language that has 
been used to describe the structural arrangements in the Chinese political space 
deviates significantly from the terminology of formal organizational charts. In this 
language, the Chinese political body is structured into several macrosystems 
                                                                                                                                      
Societies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003, struggle throughout this volume with their inclination to the 
– attractive but in this context inappropriate – concept of the Habermasian public sphere. 
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called xitong 系统.43 Xitong are vertically integrated functional systems of related 
bureaucracies.44 In recent times, they have been led by small groups, each of 
which is headed by one member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Xitong are 
considered to be the largest building blocks of the PRC’s political landscape. 
Usually, about six xitong can be identified that cover the areas “party affairs,” 
“organization affairs,” “propaganda and education,” “political and legal affairs,” 
“finance and economics,” and “military affairs.” Notably, the xitong cross the lines 
of the Party / government divide that is more of a theoretical nature than of 
practical relevance even today; the most important decisions have always been 
made within Party. A study of organizational patterns in the media sector must 
therefore focus on the Party bodies in question.45  
Within this framework, all institutions covered by the English term “media” 
are organized within one distinct xitong, the propaganda xitong (xuanchuan xitong 
宣传系统). This is remarkable since other arrangements could be imagined, too: if 
the media were understood primarily to be economic enterprises, they should be 
grouped, as an industry, under the financial and economic affairs xitong. The very 
fact that entities from publishing houses to newspapers to TV stations are 
considered to belong to the propaganda xitong indicates their proper place within 
the Chinese political imaginaire, as well as in the structural organization of things 
in the mental world order. In the absence of a category “media,” the category 
“propaganda institutions” provides the common ground that unites newspapers, 
films, and television. All these are thought to be parts of “propaganda.” They are 
thought to be so by all actors involved: by the Party and government bodies 
                                             
43 Xitong in other contexts is translated simply as ‘system.’ In the above context, however, ‘system’ 
is no satisfying equivalent for xitong, given the rather lose and informal nature of the political 
entities called xitong. I will therefore stick to the Chinese terms, stressing the indigenous coinage of 
this concept. 
44 See Kenneth Lieberthal. Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1995, p. 194-95 and 207-08. In his chapter 7, Lieberthal gives a good outline of the 
informal categories employed by insiders to describe the institutional structure in the PRC, as 
opposed to the formal organizational charts (his chapter 6). See also Yan Huai. “Organizational 
Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System” in Carol Lee Hamrin, Zhao Suisheng (eds.). 
Decision-making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 39-
50. 
45 The xitong concept is in fact of rather recent origin and has appeared in the relevant Chinese 
literature only in the 1980s. However, evidence from the history of institutions in the PRC and 
within the CCP clearly shows that xitong is but a new way to describe a phenomenon that dates 
back for decades. Macrosystems of related bureaucracies with distinguishable borders, delegated 
to the responsibility of one or two top cadres, can be traced back as far as the early 1940s, as I will 
show below. I am grateful to Thomas Kampen for pointing out this problem to me. 
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overseeing the operations of press and broadcasting, by the journalists and 
employees of the propaganda sector, and by the audiences. The chapters in the 
second part of this study will provide ample evidence for this fact. The “media” 
have been thought to belong to the propaganda sector since the formation of the 
CCP’s “media concept” (in these early times at least by the Party) and they 
continue to be classified in this way to the present day. The difficulty of the word 
and concept of “media” / meiti to get a foothold in China illustrates the resilience 
and the persuasiveness of the established logic.46 The importance of this finding is 
obvious: if the Chinese media (or rather “media”) are to be analyzed with view to 
their self-perception, and if the uncritical transposition of foreign concepts and 
theories into a distinct social and cultural context is to be avoided, then it is 
impossible to think of the media in terms other than those of propaganda.47  
Chinese uses of “propaganda” differ markedly from those in English. First of 
all, “propaganda” has come to bear a negative connotation in recent times. A 
modern Western textbook defines propaganda as follows:48 
The process and product of deliberate attempts to influence collective behaviour and 
opinion by the use of multiple means of communication in ways that are systematic and 
one-sided. Propaganda is carried in the interest of the source or sender, not the 
recipient. It is almost certain to be in some respects misleading or not fully truthful and 
can be entirely untrue, as with certain kinds of disinformation. It can also be 
psychologically aggressive and distorted in its representation of reality. Its 
effectiveness is variable depending on the context and dispositions of the target 
audience more than on ‘message’ characteristics. 
 
The two central issues associated with propaganda are the communication of a 
particular world view or philosophy to a large audience, and the legitimacy of using 
                                             
46 I will come back to this issue in chapter nine during the discussion of the CCP’s (more or less 
successful) efforts to deal with the advent of new technology and new thinking that were 
challenging the established order. 
47 The only recent study that makes an effort to explain the Chinese media in their own terms is 
Lynch’s After the Propaganda State. Lynch refers to the indigenous concept of ‘thought work’ 
(sixiang gongzuo 思想工作) to discuss the media sector. However, ‘thought work,’ or more correctly 
‘political thought work’ (sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo 思想政治工作), is a technical concept of more 
recent origin: it was first used by Mao in his 1957 speech “On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People.” See Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1977, vol. 5, p. 405. ‘Thought work’ refers to a process and is not used in the 
structuring of political space; within the Chinese body politic it is subordinated to the larger space of 
propaganda. While the Party has allowed thought work to slip in recent years, the propaganda 
sector as a whole has retained its important position. As a consequence of this rather narrow 
approach, Lynch arrives at findings that are often contrary to those presented in this study. I will 
expand on this point later in Part Two.  
48 McQuail. Theory, p. 501. 
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about any means necessary to achieve this goal, including “improper” means.49 
Chinese standard definitions for xuanchuan do not differ all too much from the 
above English definition, minus the negative connotation:50 
[Xuanchuan means] to instil into men and to spread certain ideas; a goal-oriented 
social behaviour that aims to persuade the recipient. It is composed of the following 
factors: the propagandist, the propaganda content, the medium of transmission, and 
the object of propaganda. Its characteristics are purpose-orientation, social nature, 
class nature, and dependence [on the propagandist]. It is a process of influencing the 
social disposition of individuals and groups. 
 
The spread of a prescribed worldview and the top-down nature of the process of 
propaganda feature in this PRC definition, too. The Chinese definition goes into 
more detail concerning the relationship between message and sender: the 
message corresponds to the sender’s class interests, thus playing a social as well 
as a political role. While this definition argues within a Marxist framework, the 
elements mentioned are not uniquely those of the CCP, as the short, elegant 
definition of xuanchuan in Zhao Yuanren’s 赵元任 Guoyu cidian 国语辞典 shows: 
“To disseminate, by speech or written word, one’s own position or the 
circumstances of one’s own country, in order to make them popular among the 
masses.”51 Again, we find similar arguments: a top-down process centred around 
the sender, a message of ideological character, and the effort to reach and 
influence a large number of addressees all feature prominently in this GMD-
supported publication. These elements can therefore be identified as the main 
characteristics of the Chinese term xuanchuan. Most importantly, however, the 
negative connotation that dominates the modern imagination of propaganda in 
most Western languages, is entirely absent from the Chinese definition (in that of 
the CCP as well as in that of the GMD).52 
                                             
49 Propaganda was discussed in generally negative terms by Western intellectuals since at least 
World War II. See, for example, the essay on the subject in Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno. 
Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente. Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988, 
p. 274f. 
50 Cihai. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe,1989, p. 2663. For reasons unknown, neither the 
original 1965 Cihai edition, nor the modified 1979 version contain an entry for “xuanchuan.” 
51 Zhao Yuanren (ed.). Guoyu cidian. Zhongguo cidian bianzuanchu, 1943, vol. 4, p. 2512. Guoyu 
cidian was an officially sponsored project and has seen many revised editions in Taiwan, 
supervised by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of China. 
52 Apparently it were foreigners who confronted the Chinese with the idea of propaganda bearing 
negative connotations. An editorial in Xinhua ribao, published Sept. 1, 1943, dismissed charges 
that propaganda had anything to do with lying, and defined it as but another sort of education. 
Xinhua ribao was the CCP newspaper in the wartime capital of Chongqing, where foreign 
influences were particularly strong. “Jizhejie tan jizhe zuofeng,” repr. in XGWH 3.59-61, here p. 60f. 
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The term xuanchuan has acquired its modern meaning (the transmission of 
messages or ideologies with the goal of transforming the audiences’ thinking) only 
in the 20th century.53 This usage has come from Europe, where ‘propaganda’ has 
been referring to the transmission of religious ideas since the 17th century. Since 
the Japanese senden 宣传 appears at approximately the same time as a 
translation term for ‘propaganda,’ it is likely that the modern meaning of the word 
was defined in Japan and came to China from there.54 
The most natural source for the Chinese Communist use of xuanchuan 
would supposedly be the propaganda concepts current in the Soviet Union. 
However, this turns out not to be the case here. A closer look at the terminology 
reveals that the terms used in Chinese and Russian are not congruent: Soviet 
sources make a clear distinction between “propaganda” (propaganda) and 
“agitation” (agitatsiia). Propaganda is the broader and less specific category: “... 
the propagandist conveys many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator 
conveys only one or a few ideas, but to a great mass of people.”55 Agitation thus 
refers to “the spreading of a certain idea or slogan that arouses the masses to 
action,”56 while propaganda is “the dissemination of political, philosophical, 
scientific, artistic, or other views or ideas, with the aim of instilling them in the 
public consciousness...”57 
                                             
53 Early uses of xuanchuan can be found in the Sanguo zhi. In premodern texts, xuanchuan usually 
means “to transmit verbally” and also “to explain;” it is often used in conjunction with imperial 
orders and edicts. It does not, however, refer to the modern uses discussed above. Compare 
standard dictionaries such as Hanyu da cidian or Zhongwen da cidian, that list both modern and 
premodern uses. Chinese dictionaries from the early 20th century do not yet list the modern use. 
54 Xuanchuan is not listed in Federico Masini’s The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its 
Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898. Rome: Department of 
Oriental Studies, 1993, neither does it appear in the appendices to Lydia Liu. Translingual Practice. 
It is not listed in the missionary dictionaries from the 19th and early 20th centuries, which use the 
term xuanjiang for the spread of the Christian gospel instead. A survey of Japanese dictionaries, 
though, reveals a lexicographical proximity that makes a common root (via translation) very likely. 
The entry “xuanchuan” in Zhongguo da baike quanshu. Beijing: Zhongguo da baike quanshu 
chubanshe, 1990 (hereafter ZDBQ), gives 1898 for the modern use of the word but provides no 
textual evidence. 
55 Bol’shaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopedia (hereafter BSE), quoting G.V. Plekhanov. See Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1973, vol. 1, p. 137 (italics 
in the original). The propaganda principles were thus introduced into Russia at a very early time, 
probably around 1890. Plekhanov is also quoted verbatim by Lenin as the authoritative voice for 
this definition. See „Was Tun?“ in W.I. Lenin. Werke. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1976, vol. 5, p. 422. 
56 BSE, vol. 1, p. 137. 
57 Ibid., vol. 21, p. 269. 
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 The CCP rejected this differentiation – in contrast to other socialist parties, 
such as that of Eastern Germany, which leaned closer to the Soviet model.58 A 
Chinese dictionary of the early 1950s translates “agitation” with gudong 鼓动 and 
“propaganda” with xuanchuan and distinguishes both in almost the same terms as 
the Soviet Encyclopaedia.59 Yet gudong never became popular with the CCP, 
which preferred the word xuanchuan for all its propagandistic and agitatory 
activities. Over the years, gudong as a translation term for agitatsiia became all 
but forgotten: as early as 1959, the standard Russian-Chinese dictionary used 
xuanchuan to explain both Russian terms,60 and a later Chinese-Russian 
dictionary noted both ‘propaganda’ and ‘agitation’ under the entry xuanchuan.61 
The Chinese preference for xuanchuan may also be seen in the fact that the large 
Chinese encyclopaedia does not even have an entry for gudong.62 The Soviets, in 
contrast, always preferred the term ‘agitation’ in their work and their writings. The 
lack of distinction between the two terms in their Chinese use, however, does not 
mean that agitation did not exist in China – to the contrary: agitation among 
workers and peasants has always been an area of crucial concern for the CCP. It 
is only with regard to terminology that the CCP did not follow the Soviets, and 
xuanchuan has simply absorbed the meanings of both Russian words. 
This observation provides us with an important hint regarding the origins of 
CCP thinking on propaganda. Soviet models certainly played a crucial role in the 
1920s and 1930s for the conceptualization of the meaning and role of propaganda 
in China, yet there were other models available as well. The terminology problem, 
I argue, suggests the importance of these alternative influences on Chinese 
                                             
58 On the German Democratic Republic (GDR) see Gunter Holzweißig. Die schärfste Waffe der 
Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR. Köln: Böhlau, 2002. The GDR learned from the Russian 
model through translations such as Issak S. Zvavic. Presse und Verlagswesen in der UdSSR. 
Berlin: SWA-Verlag, 1948. An abridged Serbian version was published in Belgrade: Stampa I 
izdavacka delatnost u SSSR. Beograd: Privredni pregled, 1947; however, I am unaware of a 
Chinese translation. I am grateful to Thomas Kampen for making his copy of the Berlin edition 
available to me. 
59 Xinding Xin mingci cidian. Shanghai: Chunming chubanshe, 1952 (1st ed. 1949). See p. 5076 for 
the entry “gudong – shandong – xuanchuan.” The compilers of this dictionary did very likely rely on 
BSE, the first edition of which was published 1926-1947. 
60 E-Han xin cidian. Beijing: Shidai chubanshe, 1959, vol. 1, p. 7, vol. 2, p.1479. 
61 Bol’shoi Kitaisko-Russkii slovar’. Moskva: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochioi literatur’i, 1983, vol. 1, p. 
45. 
62 ZDBQ has, however, entries for xuanchuan in three different volumes: Xinwen chuban juan, p. 
427-29; Shehuixue juan, p. 448-49; Xinlixue juan, p. 475-76. The three entries are not identical, but 
stress the same points. That propaganda is discussed in the media, sociology, and psychology 
volumes of the encyclopaedia is itself an indication of its basic character. 
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concepts of propaganda: the world market in the interwar years was awash with 
ideas concerning uses of the press and propaganda that were in clear variation of 
the free press model: propaganda had become a respectable element of the 
political cultures in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, as well as in Japan. In each of 
these instances, negative connotations of propaganda gave way to its being 
perceived as a necessity for successful politics. The attraction of the fascist model, 
for example on the GMD, as a path of development, has been well documented.63 
This includes notions of state propaganda.64 Even the U.S. government became 
active on the international propaganda stage in the waning years of the first world 
war through the Committee on Public Information, whose experience in turn 
influenced propagandists in Japan.65 Thus, sources for conceptions of propaganda 
could be found also beyond the immediate model of the Soviet Union. The transfer 
process was more complex, as the question of terminology demonstrates. I will 
expand on these international connections in chapter three.66 
Propaganda has been a key concern of the CCP in the Party’s efforts to 
defeat the GMD, to build socialism in the PRC, and to shape the minds of its 
citizens. It is here, in the propaganda sector, that we find assembled all those 
institutions that are commonly called “the media.” The macro sector responsible 
                                             
63 See Lloyd E. Eastman. The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937. 
Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990; Maria Hsia Chang. The 
Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism. Berkeley: Institute of East 
Asian Studies, 1985.  
64 The most elaborate study of the goals and ideas of GMD propaganda is John Fitzgerald. 
Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996, ch. 6-7 and passim. 
65 See Hans Schmidt. “Democracy for China: American Propaganda and the May Fourth 
Movement” in Diplomatic History 22.1 (1998), p. 1-28, as well as the documentation in United 
States Committee on Public Information. The Creel Report: Complete Report of the Chairman of 
the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919. New York: Da Capo Press, 1972 (repr.). Carl 
Crow. I Speak for the Chinese. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1937, p. 15f. See also 
Tanifuji Etushi. “H.D. Razuriwru no seijigaku to seiji senden kenkyu no iso” in Interijensu 5 (2005), 
p. 74-83. I am grateful to Rudolf Wagner for bringing these materials to my attention. 
66 A cautionary note seems appropriate here: the discussion above and in the following sections of 
this chapter is concerned with normative issues and the conceptions of propaganda as understood 
by the CCP. The effectiveness of propaganda and its actual impact on the receivers of propaganda 
messages are an entirely different set of questions. These questions will arise time and again in 
later chapters of this study, in particular in those of Part II, and will be dealt with there. With growing 
sophistication, audiences tend to outgrow the expectations of the senders of propaganda 
messages, developing “differential encodings” (compare David Morley. The Nationwide Audience: 
Structure and Decoding. London: British Film Institute, 1980) of propaganda, including irony, 
amusement, and kitsch; audiences can thus acquire a significant amount of semiotic power. For 
numerous examples of this kind see Géremie R. Barmé. Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of 
the Great Leader. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. For the time being, however, I am interested 
only in the normative perspective on propaganda from the angle of the CCP’s point of view. 
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for propaganda, though, is itself an historical product that has constituted itself in 
the course of the emergence of other modern Chinese institutions. On the search 
for the modern Chinese media concept I will now inspect the process of the 
formation of the CCP’s propaganda sector. 
 
 
The Evolution of the Propaganda Xitong 
The propaganda sector has been a key area of concern for the CCP. 
Propaganda activities have figured prominently on the agenda of major Chinese 
Communist leaders since the founding of the Party in 1921. The propaganda 
macro sector, or xitong, however, took shape only gradually in a protracted 
process of evolution: it was first constituted as a relatively integrated sector with 
discernible boundaries, a high degree of coherence, and specialized cadres in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, as I will show with reference to a network of 
institutions linked by concurrent personnel appointments. On the same account, 
while important ideas about propaganda existed in the 1920s and 1930s, they 
were moulded into a coherent body only in Yan’an (see the discussion in chapter 
two). The CCP’s Yan’an years are thus the formative period both in the process of 
institution building, and in the evolution of a number of key CCP strategies, 
patterns of work, and concepts – including the Party’s media concept.67 The 
                                             
67 On the Yan’an period see Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de: Yan’an zhengfeng 
yundong de lailong-qumai. Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 2000, the best and most 
detailed study that has yet been written on this period. Compare also Raymond F. Wylie. The 
Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Chen Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory, 1935-1945. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980. Thomas Kampen. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the 
Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 
2000. David E. Apter, Tony Saich. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994. Chen Yongfa. Yan’an de yinying. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi 
yanjiusuo, 1990. Mark Selden. China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited. Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995. For a discussion evaluating this literature see ch. 2. The earliest book on the Yan’an 
period is Boyd Compton. Mao’s China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1952 (“Introduction”). A number of detailed studied throw light on important 
single aspects of Yan’an: Peter Schran. Guerrilla Economy: The Development of the Shensi-
Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, 1937-1945. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976. 
Pauline B. Keating. Two Revolutions: Village Reconstruction and the Cooperative Movement in 
Northern Shaanxi, 1934-1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Chen Yung-fa. “The 
Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade” in Tony Saich, Hans 
J. van de Ven (ed.). New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1994, p. 263-98. 
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formation of the propaganda sector in the Yan’an period is thus an issue of central 
concern.68  
Teleological historiography such as that employed by the CCP suggests 
continuities even where there are none. This is the case with Party-sponsored 
accounts of the CCP’s activities and organisation in the media sector.69 In the 
early years of the CCP, activities of single Party members or Party bodies, more or 
less coordinated, are certainly visible in those areas later identified as belonging to 
the propaganda sector. These activities alone, however, do not per se constitute 
anything like a organized propaganda xitong. Rather, for the first two decades, 
CCP activities in the various fields of publishing, printing, oral agitation, or 
literature and art were uncoordinated, intermittent, and decentralized, and there 
existed no coordinating authoritative body in charge of these activities. While the 
GMD provided a model for coherent and reflected policies or concepts guiding 
these diverse areas of propaganda, CCP propaganda activities in the 1920s were 
generally initiated by individual Party figures or local Party cells, usually in 
response to the ad hoc needs of the situation. The CCP did not develop a 
coherent and systematic approach to propaganda until the Yan’an era. A short 
examination of these early institutions will show this.70 
In 1921, when the CCP was founded in Shanghai, the Party’s Central 
Bureau (Zhongyangju 中央局) had only three members: Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 was 
elected secretary (shuji 书记), while Zhang Guotao 张国焘 and Li Da 李达 were 
                                             
68 The GMD after its 1923 restructuring provided an important model for emulation by the CCP. 
Built along Leninist lines of organization just as the CCP, it became a training ground for senior 
CCP propagandists, such as Mao Zedong, who headed the Propaganda Department under the 
GMD Central Executive Committee. See Fitzgerald. Awakening China, ch.6. In the Yan’an era, the 
CCP relied heavily upon the GMD model, as I will show in chapter three below. Before the Northern 
Expedition, however, the CCP lacked the resources for constructing a similarly cohesive and 
elaborate propaganda infrastructure; conditions after 1927 were even less favourable to such 
efforts. 
69 Such an attempt can be found in Lin Zhida (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi. 
Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1990, which invents the prehistory of CCP propaganda from 
a latter-day perspective. Compare also collections of sources such as Zhonggong zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu bangongting, Zhongyang dang’anguan bianyanbu (ed). Zhongguo gongchandang 
xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (hereafter XGWX). Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1996, 4 vols.  
70 The following section relies heavily on Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangshi yanjiushi, Zhongyang dang’anguan (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000, 19 vols. (hereafter Zuzhishi ziliao). I have consulted both 
the print and the CD-ROM editions. This is the only compilation giving detailed information on the 
party organs of propaganda. Some useful information can also be found scattered in Lin Zhida. 
Xuanchuan shi. Compare also Thomas Kampen. “The CCP’s Central Committee Departments, 
1921-1991: A Study of their Evolution” in China Report 29.3 (1993), p. 299-317. 
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entrusted with the organization and propaganda portfolios, respectively. The 
amount of attention that the issue of propaganda received is quite remarkable: 
from the very first hours of the CCP two core areas of competence were 
established that consequently have been of outstanding importance up to the 
present day. Organization (zuzhi 组织) and propaganda are conceived to be 
complementary activities and have been likened to “the two wings of a bird or the 
two wheels of a chariot, both are indispensable.”71 The party’s Organization 
Department, in charge of all personnel matters, and the Propaganda Department 
(Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu 中共中央宣传部 or Zhongxuanbu 中宣部, 
hereafter PD) were later to become two loci of power within the CCP. For the 
earliest time after the CCP’s founding, however, little information is available on 
the PD’s role and activities. 
In setting up a PD, the founders of the CCP were in fact reacting to external 
pressures, in particular from the Communist International (Comintern). The 
guidelines issued by the Comintern in Moscow for all its members (and 
prospective members), the “Terms of Admission into the Third Communist 
International” (July 1920) stated that “the periodical and non-periodical press, and 
all publishing enterprises, must likewise be fully subordinate to the Party Central 
Committee, whether the Party as a whole is legal or illegal at the time. Publishing 
enterprises should not be allowed to abuse their autonomy and pursue any 
policies that are not in full accord with that of the Party” (article 12).72 The naming 
of a propaganda director was a demonstration of the CCP’s willingness to 
coordinate the activities of the various leftist publications in China. 
Li Da had been a natural choice for the propaganda portfolio as he was the 
editor of the journal Gongchandang 共产党.73 Li was also put in charge of the 
People’s Publishing House (Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社), an underground 
publisher set up in Shanghai as the party’s “propaganda organ.”74 In the earliest 
                                             
71 See “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu dang de xuanchuan gudong gongzuo tigang” (June 20, 
1941) in XGWX, vol. 2, p. 250-60, here p. 258. 
72 “The Terms of Admission into the Third International” in V. I. Lenin. Collected Works (4th English 
ed.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966, vol. 31, pp. 206-11, here p. 210. 
73 Gongchandang was a short-lived journal in Shanghai that existed from late 1920 to July 1921. 
74 Lin Zhida. Xuanchuan shi, p. 43. Renmin chubanshe existed from 1921 until 1922, when Li Da 
left Shanghai. It was merged with Xin qingnian she in Guangzhou in 1923. Among its publications 
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days of the Party, both the periodical and the non-periodical print media were thus 
placed under unified control; however, both were dependent on the person of Li 
Da, who fell out with Chen Duxiu in September 1923 and consequently left the 
CCP.75 At the CCP’s second congress a year later, Cai Hesen 蔡和森, editor of the 
journal Xiangdao 向导 was put in charge of propaganda affairs. 
After the third party congress in 1923, a reorganization of the Party’s 
portfolios was decided: instead of a propaganda bureau, an Education and 
Propaganda Commission (Jiaoyu xuanchuan weiyuanhui 宣传教育委员会) was to 
be established. The “Organization guidelines”76 for this committee list subordinate 
departments for Editing (Bianjibu 编辑部), Correspondence (Hanshoubu 函授部), 
Communication (Tongxunbu 通讯部), Printing and distribution (Yinxingbu 印行部), 
and a Library. It is remarkable that education and press, the two major 
components of the propaganda xitong, were organized in a single hierarchy; 
comparable efforts were not again undertaken until fifteen years later. The young 
CCP, however, apparently was too weak for such an elaborate organizational 
structure, and the “Organization guidelines” were never implemented. Instead, a 
Propaganda and Press Department (Xuanchuan baokanbu 宣传报刊部) and a 
separate Publishing Department (Chubanbu 出版部) existed from 1924-1925 
under Luo Zhanglong 罗章龙 and Zhang Bojian 张伯简, respectively. The Party’s 
major publications, however, were under direct guidance of the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC, Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui 中央执行委员会): Xiangdao, the 
CEC organ was led by Cai Hesen, while Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白 was editor of Qianfeng 
前锋. The journal Zhongguo gongchandang dangbao 中国共产党党报 was 
published by Chen Duxiu.77 The various propaganda activities were thus once 
again scattered over a number of institutions, with different individuals in charge, 
                                                                                                                                      
were the first complete translation of the Communist Manifesto, and Lenin’s State and Revolution. 
See Xiong Zongshan, Li Qiju. “Li Da yu chuban gongzuo” in Chuban shiliao 6 (1986), p. 74-79. 
75 See Arif Dirlik. The Origins of Chinese Communism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 
246-52. 
76 “Jiaoyu xuanchuan weiyuanhui zuzhifa” in XGWX, vol. 1, p. 554-59. 
77 Xiangdao existed from 1922 until 1927 as the organ of the CCP C(E)C. Qianfeng, also a CC 
organ, saw only three issues in 1923 and 1924. Zhongguo gongchandang dangbao was an internal 
Party publication. 
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all of them strong characters. Cai, Qu, and Chen were Party figures much senior 
to Luo and Zhang. 
In 1925, a Propaganda Department was established under the leadership of 
Peng Shuzhi 彭述之,78 with Cai Hesen and Qiu Qiubai as members, both of whom 
have played prominent roles in the CCP’s propaganda in the early years until 
1927.79 A short-lived Publishing Department also existed until October of that year 
under the leadership of Cai Hesen, who also controlled the weekly Xiangdao. The 
Party’s major journal thus remained beyond the authority of the formal 
Propaganda Department. This organizational arrangement was practiced also in 
later years, especially after the establishment of the PRC, yet only for a very small 
number of publications, such as RMRB, Qiushi zazhi 求是杂志, and Guangming 
ribao 光明日报 (hereafter GMRB), which by 1997 were the only publications under 
direct leadership of the CCP Central Committee (hereafter CC); their status 
reflects the special importance of these papers. The organizational separation in 
1927, in contrast, when Xiangdao was the only major Party periodical, rather 
attests to the instability of the formal organizational structure of the CCP. 
All the same, prominent members of the Communist Party played an 
important role in the propaganda organs of the GMD under the roof of the United 
Front, 1923-1927. The most prominent example is Mao Zedong, who headed the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee from October 1925 
to March 1926. Particularly influential during that period was Zhengzhi zhoubao 政
治周报, a journal sponsored by the GMD Political Council and controlled by Mao. 
He used the journal and his position ruthlessly to further the leftist line within the 
GMD and did his best to suppress the voices of his inner-Party (GMD) opponents. 
Other Communists in propaganda-related positions included Zhou Enlai and Deng 
                                             
78 Peng, a leading Chinese Trotskist, was later expelled from the CCP. On his person and the 
Chinese Trotskist movement see Gregor Benton. China’s Urban Revolutionaries: Explorations in 
the History of Chinese Trotskyism, 1921-1952. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996. Compare 
also Peng’s autobiography: Claude Cadart, Cheng Yingxiang (ed.). L’envol du communisme en 
Chine. Mémoires de Peng Shuzhi. Paris: Gallimard, 1983. 
79 Both died too early to play any roles in the later CCP organization: Cai was captured and killed in 
1931, and Qu died in 1935 after his failed escape from the Jiangxi Soviet. Li Da and Luo 
Zhanglong, who both left the CCP organization early (in 1923 and 1931, respectively), remained 
active in the field of education and later became distinguished professors. On Li Da see 
Zhonggong dangshi renwu yanjiuhui (ed.). Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan. Xi’an: Shaanxi 
renmin chubanshe, 1983, vol. 11, p. 1-75. Luo Zhanglong wrote and published busily until his death 
in 1995, at age 99. 
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Yingchao.80 All in all, CCP propaganda work through the GMD institutional 
apparatus may have been considerably more important and influential than the 
activities of CCP’s own organizations.81 
Institutionalization was downgraded further when the CCP moved 
underground as a result of GMD suppression which started in 1927. Very little 
concrete information is available on the Party’s formal working procedures of that 
period. In the Shanghai underground, departments and bureaus in the propaganda 
sector frequently changed names and affiliations. While responsibility for the 
CCP’s propaganda activities rested with some of the Party’s most prominent and 
experienced leaders, such as Qu Qiubai, Cai Hesen, and Li Lisan 李立三, the 
institutional arrangements of this period reflect an even higher degree of 
fragmentation, when most publications depended entirely on the personalities of 
the individuals publishing them, more often than not collapsing in the wake of 
arrests or defections. The arrangement of keeping the major Party papers under 
direct CC control seems to have been continued – as far as formal organizations 
and institutions did play any significant role in the underground years.82 
During the underground years, two trends emerge: with mounting difficulties 
in the CCP’s publishing efforts, oral propaganda assumed higher importance; the 
Party increasingly organized propaganda teams that were to address workers and 
peasants directly. A reflection of this can be seen in a decision of the CC Politburo 
initiated by Qu Qiubai to split the PD into two separate organs: one responsible for 
propaganda and education work (xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo 宣传教育工作), the 
other for agitation work among the masses (qunzhong gudong gongzuo 群众鼓动
工作).83 Agitation has been a crucial component of Communist propaganda in the 
                                             
80 On Mao’s tenure at the Propaganda Department see Fitzgerald. Awakening China, ch.6, esp. p. 
213-14, 236-41; the launch of Zhengzhi zhoubao is discussed on p. 238. For Zhou Enlai, then in 
charge of the army’s General Political Bureau with its extensive propaganda activities, and Deng 
Yingchao, secretary of the GMD Guangdong provincial women’s bureau, see ibid, p. 240 and 285, 
respectively. 
81 None of these activities is mentioned in PRC accounts of the CCP’s propaganda activities. 
82 On the CCP after 1927 see Patricia Stranahan. Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party 
and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. See also Marcia R. 
Ristaino. China’s Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1987. 
83 See Zuzhishi ziliao 2.74-76. I could not locate a respective Party document; the split is not 
mentioned in the documents of the 3rd Plenum of the 6th CC that convened a week earlier. However, 
Zhou Yongxiang confirms a Politburo meeting on the day in question, Oct. 3, 1930. See Qu Qiubai 
nianpu xinbian. Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1992, p. 293. 
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entire pre-1949 period (in practice, if not in the terminological sense); this aspect 
of CCP propaganda efforts is all too often overseen from the post-1949 
perspective, when propaganda became more institutionalized because the Party 
controlled all formal channels of communication.84 The second trend concerns 
regionalization: in the late 1920s and early 1930s the CCP set up numerous base 
areas across China; the army units in these areas as well as the provisional 
government organs engaged in intensive propaganda work. Many even published 
newspapers and other pamphlets. Little is known about the organizational 
structures of these ad hoc bodies. The idea of an integrated propaganda sector 
thus seems even harder to imagine for the decade of 1927-37. 
The most stable Communist base area was the Central Soviet (Zhongyang 
Suqu 中央苏区) in Jiangxi . The Jiangxi Soviet set up a more elaborate institutional 
structure than most other areas but information on the organization of the 
propaganda sector is sketchy nevertheless.85 However, in the relatively stable 
environment, the CCP was able to develop a lively publishing industry that 
produced several newspapers, including the famous Hongse Zhonghua 红色中
华,86 many periodicals and a significant number of books.87 In Jiangxi, the CCP 
also set up its first broadcasting station and the Hongse Zhonghua she 红色中华社 
news agency. The Central Soviet area gained further strength when the Central 
Committee moved there from Shanghai in January 1933. Jiangxi became a 
laboratory for administration and policies, in the propaganda sector and many 
other fields. However, the frequent military campaigns of the GMD forces on the 
one hand, and disruption caused by internal strife (in particular the bloody purges 
against the “Anti-Bolshevik League”)88 on the other, prevented the evolution of 
                                             
84 A study focusing on the Chinese media cannot in any detail address this issue that to some 
degree also figured prominently after 1949: especially in rural areas, but also in the factories, the 
CCP devoted large resources to grass-roots agitation. While this issue has not drawn the attention 
of Western scholars, it figures prominently in Chinese publications that see it as a source of pride. 
See, for example, Lin Zhida. Xuanchuan shi, passim. 
85 According to Yan Fan, responsibility for news and publishing work rested with the Ministry of 
Culture of the Central Soviet government. See Zhongyang geming genjudi xinwen chuban shi. 
Nanchang: Jiangxi gaoxiao chubanshe, 1991, p.35. This book is the major source for the 
propaganda activities in the Jiangxi Soviet. 
86 Hongse Zhonghua was founded in Ruijin in December 1931 and was the CCP’s organ in the 
Soviet until October 1934, when the Long March began. 
87 A complete list of the publications produced in the Jiangxi Soviet can be found in section two of 
Yan Fan. Zhongyang geming genjudi xinwen chuban shi.  
88 See Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, ch.1. 
 41
more stable and permanent structures. It was only at Yan’an that such a structure 
emerged. When the CCP was forced to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet area and set 
out on the Long March in November 1934, most of the propaganda work in Jiangxi 
was discontinued or destroyed.89 
It was in Yan’an that the CCP was provided with all the necessary 
conditions to develop a unified propaganda sector with both sufficient 
centralization and the differentiation necessary for institutional depth, and it was 
here that the Chinese media concept took shape. First and foremost, the CCP 
controlled a sizeable geographical area, the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Area 
(Shaan-Gan-Ning bianqu 陕甘宁边区), inhabited by a population that amounted to 
1.5 million in the early 1940s.90 Secondly, the Party enjoyed the benefits of the 
armistice peace with the GMD, result of December, 1936, Xi’an incident and of the 
outbreak of the war with Japan. While the alliance with the GMD was shaky at best 
and hostilities, both armed and in word, were the order of the day, the GMD had to 
refrain from major advances against the CCP’s main base area in Northern 
Shaanxi, a situation very different from the constant campaigns against the Jiangxi 
Soviet in the early 1930s. Furthermore, the participation in the coalition 
government provided the CCP with a degree of legality that also made possible, 
for example, the publication of Xinhua ribao 新华日报 in Chongqing as the official 
CCP newspaper in the GMD-controlled areas.91 The willingness of both sides to 
respect the mutual agreements was rather low, and the CCP reacted to GMD 
censorship of its Chongqing press with a ban on GMD newspapers in the Yan’an 
area.92 The third factor that contributed to the rapid and vigorous development of 
Yan’an was, paradoxically, the showdown taking place within the CCP leadership, 
                                             
89 While Chinese sources such as Zuzhishi ziliao list the Party structures that were decided at 
various conferences during the Long March, I consider these to be rather theoretical in nature, 
serving mainly to clarify the power relationships among the leadership. On the march, the CCP did 
not find the conditions to set up the long-term bureaucratic structures in the propaganda sector that 
this section is concerned with. 
90 See Schran. Guerrilla Economy, p. 15-21 and table on p. 20. 
91 Xinhua ribao, an official organ of the CCP, was founded in Wuhan in January 1938 and was 
closed down by GMD authorities in February 1947. During most of the period of CCP-GMD 
cooperation, Xinhua ribao was the only legal publication of the Communist Party. 
92 On the constant disputes in Chongqing see “Kangzhan shiqi chubanjie fan chajin jinian (1937-
1945)” in Song Yuanfang (ed.). Zhongguo chuban shiliao: Xiandai bufen. Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 2001, vol. 2, p. 73-86; see esp. the years 1941-1945. On the close supervision of the 
press circulating in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border area see “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu kang 
Ri genjudi baozhi zazhi de zhishi” in XGWX, vol. 2, p. 263-65. 
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as Mao moved aggressively to consolidate his position by redefining policy 
packages and reshuffling the institutional structure of the CCP.93 The above 
factors found in Northern Shaanxi provided favourable conditions for the CCP. The 
Yan’an era became a time of intensive Party-building and theoretical reflection and 
evolution;94 Yan’an served as a laboratory for all kinds of institutional and policy 
experiments.95 
From the institutional perspective, the most important development in the 
CCP’s evolution in the Yan’an era was an organizational reshuffle decided at a 
Politburo meeting on March 16-20, 1943. The reorganization, consolidating the 
outcomes of the Rectification Campaign (Zhengfeng yundong 整风运动),96 
radically reduced the confusing number of CCP organizations and institutions that 
had grown since 1937 into a labyrinth of all kinds of departments, committees, and 
commissions, many of them short-lived and with overlapping functions, thus 
reduplicating other bodies. The restructuring, part of the movement “to streamline 
the military and administrative structure” (jing bing jian zheng 精兵简政), was 
intended to “make the setup of the Central organs simpler and more flexible, and 
to unify and concentrate [their] power, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of 
the Centre’s leadership.”97 The 1943 reorganization was a key event in the Party-
building efforts of the Yan’an era. 
                                             
93 A precondition for this to happen was that the most important CCP leaders had, for the first time 
in a decade, the chance to meet face-to-face. This argument is made in Kampen. The Chinese 
Communist Leadership, ch. 5. The December conference of 1937 brought together, for the first 
time in more than a decade, the entire Politburo (with the exception of Kai Feng, who was 
overseeing the CCP’s Wuhan bureau, and Wang Jiaxiang, who was still in Moscow). The 6th CC 
plenum in fall 1938 again united the Party leadership (Ren Bishi was in Moscow and Zhang Guotao 
had already left Yan’an after falling out with the rest of the CCP leaders. 
94 Institution building, however, took time. In 1940, an observer who had just returned from a 
lengthy stay in the Soviet Union was appalled by the improvised manner in which the Central Party 
apparatus was run, speaking of a “mobile-war kind of work style” (youji zuofeng). See Shi Zhe. Zai 
lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991, p. 163f. 
95 This point is made in Mark Selden. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge, Ma.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, and Selden. China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.  
96 On the Yan’an Rectification Campaign see Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de; 
Compton. Mao’s China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44; Selden. China in Revolution: The 
Yenan Way Revisited, ch. 6; Saich. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, ch. G; 
See also Kampen. The Chinese Communist Leadership, ch. 6. The next chapter will discuss the 
campaign and its impact on the CCP media in more detail. 
97 See “Zhongyang guanyu Zhongyang jigou tiaozheng ji jingjian de jueding” (dated March 20, 1943) 
in Zuzhishi ziliao 13.619-23, here p. 619.  
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A main result of the restructuring was the introduction of two new 
committees directly under the Politburo, the Organization Committee (Zuzhi 
weiyuanhui 组织委员会) and the Propaganda Committee (Xuanchuan weiyuanhui 
宣传委员会). All other organs were disbanded or merged, and the remaining ten 
bodies were placed under the guidance of the two new, all-powerful bodies (see 
chart 1).98 The “two wings” of Party work now emerged in form of two compact, 
authoritative policy formulation and decision making centres.99 Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 
was named secretary of the Organization Committee, and Mao Zedong assumed 
the leading position in the Propaganda Committee, thus consolidating his power 
after the Rectification Campaign.100 
                                             
98 The Organization Committee and the Propaganda Committee appear to be extraordinarily 
powerful at least formally. According to Gao Hua, however, real power rested with the General 
Study Committee (Zong xuexi weiyuanhui 总学习委员会) and its delegate committees within 
numerous other danweis in Yan’an. This informal and secretive body has received only scant 
attention in Zuzhishi ziliao (5.55); yet it is said to have been the actual centre of power and 
decision-making after the beginning of the Rectification Campaign, when most other organs ceased 
to function regularly. See Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 470. With Mao Zedong in 
charge of both the General Study Committee and the Propaganda Committee, the result my have 
been the same. 
99 From the 1930s through the 1950s, committees (weiyuanhui 委员会) play a different role in CCP 
politics than departments (bu 部) or bureaus (ju 局). With the single exception of the CC, 
committees are rather informal bodies; they to have a larger number of members with a broader 
background, often coming from a number of other institutions that are in some way concerned by 
the work of the committee in question. For example, the Party Paper Committee (Dangbao 
weiyuanhui 党报委员会, 1939-1943) was composed of leading cadres from the PD, all major Party 
papers, and from the Cultural Work Committee (Wenhua gongzuo weiyuanhui 文化工作委员会). 
Sometimes committees have been single-issue commissions, not much different from working 
conferences. A seven-member Propaganda Committee (Xuanchuan weiyuanhui 宣传委员会, not to 
be confused with the powerful 1943 body of the same name) is said to have been established in 
November 1938. Zuzhishi ziliao, however, is unable to provide a date for the abolition of this body – 
its existence was probably simply forgotten in the organizational jungle of the early Yan’an era. The 
fact that committees normally do not issue official documents – these are relegated to the 
departments and bureaus in question – confirms their less institutionalized character, showing that 
committees normally do not have permanent working staff. The same seems to be true for the 
powerful Organization and Propaganda Committees that are organs of oversight and control rather 
than permanent working bodies; as such, they are similar in structure and function to the “leading 
(small) groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组) in the PRC. As gremiums of consultation and policy-
making, however, the influence of these committees should not be underestimated. Fitzgerald 
makes a similar point for the GMD in the mid-1920s. See Awakening China, p. 238. 
100 The meeting of March 16-20, 1943, not only reformed the institutional structure of the CCP, but 
also appointed a new leadership; it was thus “one of the most important meetings in CCP history.” 
See Kampen. The Chinese Communist Leadership, p. 104. 
 44
Chart 1: CCP CC working bodies, 1937-1945 
 
 
Source: Zuzhishi ziliao (CD-ROM edition). Compare the print ed., vol. 5 p. 64. 
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The Propaganda Committee exercised control over five major institutions: 
the Xinhua News Agency; Jiefang ribao 解放日报, the organ of the CC; the 
Publishing Bureau (Chubanju 出版局); the PD, now with the Compilation and 
Translation Bureau (Bianyisuo 编译所) as a subordinate agency; and the Party 
school (Dangxiao 党校). The PD was instructed to “give guidance to propaganda 
and education, to [oversee] the work of the Compilation and Translation Bureau, 
and to directly manage the [cadre] studies in the Yan’an Rectification [Campaign] 
and the education of active cadres,”101 promoting the PD to special importance. 
Another organ, the Cultural Work Committee (Wenhua gongzuo weiyuanhui 文化
工作委员会), responsible for questions of literature and art, is said to have been 
placed under the authority of the Propaganda Committee.102 The Committee was 
designed as a small, compact leading group with only four members: Mao Zedong 
as head; Bo Gu 博古 (Qin Bangxian 秦邦宪), who was nominally in charge of the 
Xinhua news agency and Jiefang ribao; Wang Jiaxiang 王稼祥; and Kai Feng 凯丰, 
who had headed the Cultural Work Committee before the 1943 reshuffle.  
The Propaganda Committee’s task was outlined in the March 20 
“Decision:”103 
To unify and concentrate the management of propaganda and education affairs, to 
study all kinds of concrete policies in the field of propaganda and education, and, 
according to the nature [of these issues], to provide the Politburo and the Secretariat 
with proposals and suggestions concerning propaganda and education policy. [The 
Propaganda Committee] has decision-making power concerning day-to-day questions 
of propaganda and education; it will delegate the implementation [of these decisions] to 
the different departments and committees under its supervision, and report to the [CC] 
Secretariat those questions that have already been decided. 
 
                                             
101 “Zhongyang guanyu Zhongyang jigou tiaozheng ji jingjian de jueding” in Zuzhishi ziliao 13.619. 
According to Gao Hua, actual power on matters of study rested with the General Study 
Commission. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 470-79. 
102 See Zuzhishi ziliao 5.57. The Cultural Work Committee (shorthand Wenwei 文委) had existed 
since November 1938 and had been led since July 1941 by Kai Feng, who assumed a position on 
the Propaganda Committee in 1943. There is, however, no information available on the 
composition and leadership of the Wenwei, neither is it included in the general organization charts, 
so it may have ceased to function after 1943, when the Rectification moved into the high-pitched 
“rescue phase” (see Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, ch.13). The Wenwei was 
entrusted to “manage [the activities] of the [All-China federation of anti-Japanese literature and art 
circles (Quanguo wenyijie kang Ri lianhehui 全国文艺界抗日联合会)] in support of the [Shaan-Gan-
Ning] border area” (Wenkang yuan bianqu guanli 文抗援边区管理). “Zhongyang guanyu 
Zhongyang jigou tiaozheng ji jingjian de jueding” in Zuzhishi ziliao 13.619. 
103 Ibid. 
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The Propaganda Committee thus assumed the highest authority over the entire 
field of propaganda and over all institutions involved; in addition, responsibility for 
all questions of education, and, most importantly, cadre education, was handed 
over to the Committee. The decision to merge the propaganda and education 
policy fields came at a crucial point of time: to be in charge of both sectors at the 
height of the Rectification Campaign provided the Committee with a decisive 
leverage of power. In effect, however, the March 1943 reforms handed the highest 
control to Mao himself: since the other three members were still under attack or 
had taken lengthy sick leaves, Mao controlled the Propaganda Committee, and 
thus, all subordinate organs, almost single-handedly.104 Propaganda and 
education were now under the effective and unified control of the propaganda 
authorities for the first time; they were to remain a combined portfolio for decades 
to come: while the Propaganda Committee was formerly abolished at the Seventh 
Party Congress in 1945, the functions of the PD were upgraded and thereafter 
comprised the control over issues of education, textbooks, and cadre training. The 
departments and bureaus that were united under the Propaganda Committee in 
Yan’an have remained closely related, mostly through personnel serving in 
concurrent positions, and have since been part of what is generally referred to as 
the propaganda xitong, as introduced above. 
The institutional restructuring of March 1943 certainly is a road mark in the 
evolution of the propaganda sector. However, to identify this date as the beginning 
of an integrated set of institutions held together by the idea of a propaganda 
concept would go too far. Rather, the propaganda sector had emerged gradually 
since the late 1930s. This becomes evident when we examine the personnel 
structure of the various departments, committees, bureaus, and other institutions 
that were merged in 1943 and put under the control of the Propaganda 
Department: the practice of CCP cadres to hold concurrent posts allows us to 
                                             
104 Bo Gu had been severely criticised and was in a passive position; Wang Jiaxiang had been 
attacked, too, and had taken ill leave in Feb. 1943 (see Xu Zehao (ed.). Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, 
1906-1974. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2001, p. 333f); Kai Feng had been attacked 
and was ill at the time in question, thus leaving Mao alone in command of the propaganda sector. 
See Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 617f. Kai Feng’s sickness is confirmed by 
Cao Jinjie. “Mao Zedong chu shi Tian Jiaying” in Mishu zhi you 2004.3, p. 39f. According to Hu 
Qiaomu (secretary of the Propaganda Committee), it was himself who was in charge of day-to-day 
affairs on behalf of Wang Jiaxiang and Mao. “Hu Qiaomu huiyi Yan’an zhengfeng (xia)” in Dang de 
wenxian, 1994.2, p. 59-71, here p. 60. 
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draw conclusions concerning the coherence of the formerly distinct propaganda 
institutions. Chart 2 is based on the posts held by leading members of twenty 
institutions from the period of July 1937 to March 1943. It reveals a relatively small 
number of 29 persons in key positions in these twenty institutions over the given 
period. More importantly, two personnel clusters emerge, roughly divided by the 
Yan’an Rectification Campaign in 1941 and 1942, when personnel changes 
Chart 2: Leading Personnel of CCP Propaganda Institutions, 1937-1943 
Name 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 After 
1943 
Liao Chengzhi 廖承志 x        
Luo Ruiqing 罗瑞卿  x       
Pan Hannian 潘汉年  x x      
Chen Changhao 陈昌浩 x xx x      
Wang Xuewen 王学文  x x      
Sha Kefu 沙可夫 x xx x x x    
Xiang Zhonghua 向仲华 x x x xx xx    
Wang Ming 王明  x x x x x   
Kang Sheng 康生  x x x x x   
Chen Yun 陈云  x x x x    
Cheng Fangwu 成仿吾  x x x x    
Li Fuchun 李富春  x x x x x x  
Zhou Yang 周扬  x xx x x x x  
Zhang Wentian 张闻天 xx xxxx xxxxx
xx 
xxxxx xxxxx xx   
Wang Jiaxiang 王稼祥  xx xx xx xx x  o 
Li Weihan 李维汉 x x xxxx xxx xxx x x x 
Yang Song 杨松 x xxxx xxx xx xxx xx   
Wu Liangping 吴亮平 x xxxx xx x xxx xxx xx  
Ai Siqi 艾思奇  x x x xxx xxx xxx x 
Chen Boda 陈伯达  xx x x xx xxx xx  
Kai Feng 凯丰 x    xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx o 
Bo Gu 博古     xxx xxxx xxxx xxo 
Xu Teli 徐特立      xx xx x 
Lu Dingyi 陆定一      xxx xx xx 
Mao Zedong 毛泽东   x  x x x xo 
Zhao Yimin 赵毅敏   x x x   x 
Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木      x x  
Deng Fa 邓发      x x  
Tao Zhu 陶铸      x   
Source: compiled after Zuzhishi ziliao 5.35-64 and CD-ROM edition. 
Note: 
Each X stands for one position the person in question held in the respective year in the institutions 
belonging to the propaganda xitong. 
The members of the 1943 Propaganda Committee are marked by an O. 
The last column (After 1943) indicates the situation after the March 20, 1943 organizational 
restructuring. 
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occurred in several key institutions, resulting from the power struggles within the 
CCP and the consolidation of Mao’s power.105 
The earlier cluster is composed of five persons holding usually two to four 
posts at any given time between 1938 and 1941 (Zhang Wentian 张闻天 held up to 
seven positions); together, they formed a network linking all important propaganda 
institutions of that time, with the exception of the Xinhua news agency and the Xin 
Zhonghua bao 新中华报 newspaper that were both led by Xiang Zhonghua 向仲华 
(who had no posts otherwise),106 and the Party school. The Party school, with 
Deng Fa 邓发 in charge,107 was part of the organization xitong, and was not 
formally included in the propaganda sector until 1943. Only during the Rectification 
Campaign, when propaganda and cadre education worked hand in hand, did the 
Party’s highest organ of education come under the control of the propaganda 
authorities.108 With these two exceptions, the entire press and publishing 
operations of the CCP, as well as the PD and the institutions responsible for 
education, were linked by a few leading cadres, most notably by Zhang Wentian, 
who was nominally still the Party leader. This kind of linkage can be traced back to 
as early as 1938.109 
                                             
105 Reshuffles occurred in the Xinhua News Agency in November 1941, in the Party Newspaper 
Committee in March 1942, for Jiefang ribao with its inception in May 1941, in the Publishing 
Department in December 1941, in the Editorial Committee in September 1941, in the Propaganda 
Department in January 1942, in the Party school in February 1942, and in the Wenwei in August 
1941. These changes confirm Thomas Kampen’s argument that the Rectification Movement had 
started long before Mao made his key rectification speeches in spring 1942. 
106 Xiang Zhonghua (1911-1981) had led the Hongse Zhonghua newspaper in the Jiangxi Soviet 
and continued in this position in Yan’an; however, he was too junior a figure to exert real influence. 
After 1941 he was appointed to military positions and withdrew from civil propaganda affairs. 
107 Deng Fa (1906-1946) was one of the few CCP leaders with a worker background. His star had 
been in decline within the Party ever since 1935, and his appointment to the Party school, an 
institution of minor importance in the early Yan’an era, was seen as another act of demotion. See 
Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zanyang shengqi de, p. 377-82. 
108 In informal arrangements, however, the Party School could be found in the propaganda sector 
as early as 1940, with Zhang Wentian in charge. See Shi Zhe. Zai lishi juren shenbian, p. 163. The 
importance of the Party school was raised at the start of the Rectification movement, when it was 
made the centre of rectification for medium and high-level cadres, many of whom had been 
recalled to Yan’an in the wake of the campaign, presumably to participate in the 7th Party congress. 
Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 377-78; 527-34. After 1949, the Central Party 
school moved back to the organization apparatus; all other educational institutions, however, 
remained in the propaganda xitong. 
109 Chart 2 shows the distribution of portfolios and responsibilities; it does not, however, reflect the 
power structure within the CCP as a whole. As Stalin’s unofficial emissary, Wang Ming, after his 
return from Moscow in Nov. 1937, enjoyed considerably more prestige than the tabulation of the 
propaganda institutions suggest. During the second period, Kang Sheng’s influence in top decision-
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Personnel changes started in the second half of 1941. At the enlarged 
Politburo meeting in September, Zhang Wentian was forced to admit political 
errors (Zhang and Wang Ming 王明 were the main targets of criticism during this 
stage of the campaign). Shortly thereafter, he enlisted to become head of a rural 
inspection team and left Yan’an in January 1942 for a tour of the rural areas of the 
border region, thus avoiding further criticism. He consequently gave up most of his 
posts.110 Wang Jiaxiang was active into early 1943 when deteriorating health 
forced him to abandon most of his work; he did not participate in political work 
since summer 1943.111 Li Weihan 李维汉 continued to serve on the PD and was 
confirmed as vice-head of the PD after the reorganization in March 1943. He gave 
up, however, his other posts in the propaganda sector, as the focus of his attention 
shifted to united front work, the portfolio with which he has been identified after 
1946.112 The other two persons in the earlier cluster, Yang Song 杨松 and Wu 
Liangping 吴亮平 were not senior enough to occupy top positions; both usually 
served as vice-heads or members of committees and departments in the 
propaganda sector and thus had important coordinating functions. Yang died in 
1942 from tuberculosis, while Wu Liangping continued to work in medium-level 
positions. He survived the Rectification campaign and was indeed the only person 
                                                                                                                                      
making was crucial; his power base was located in the Social Affairs Department (Shehui bu 社会
部), not in the propaganda xitong. 
110 His reports on these tours are collected in Zhang Wentian xuanji zhuanji zu et al (ed.). Zhang 
Wentian Jin Shan diaocha wenji. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1994. Zhang was 
allowed to remain on the PB even after the 7th Party Congress but was given no positions of 
responsibility. His last posts were that as head of the Party Newspaper Committee, which he ceded 
to Bo Gu in February 1942, and as chief of the PD, where Kai Feng took over in January the same 
year. On his self-criticism see his biography in Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan, vol. 52, p. 1-86, 
here p. 51. See also Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 284. 
111 See Xu Zehao. Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, p. 332ff. Compare also. Shi Changwang. Wang Jiaxiang 
zhuan. Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2003.  Wang did not fall out with Mao, however. According 
to an often-cited anecdote, it was Mao who urged the delegates of the 7th Party congress in 1945 to 
elevate Wang to alternate membership on the CC when he had initially failed to be re-elected due 
to his long absence from the political stage. 
112 In Yan’an, United Front Work (tongyi zhanxian gongzuo 统一战线工作) meant chiefly the 
cooperation with the GMD. Since 1949, the CCP’s United Front Work Department (Tongzhanbu 统
战部) coordinates the cooperation with the “democratic” parties in the CCP’s “coalition government” 
and those sectors of the bourgeoisie classified as the “national bourgeoisie.” United Front Work 
was of paramount importance under Mao’s concept of “New Democracy” but declined in 
significance after the mid-1950s. Li Weihan, in Yan’an a staunch supporter of Mao, headed the 
United Front Work Department from 1948 until late 1964. Cf. his memoirs: Huiyi yu yanjiu. Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986, 2 vols. 
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of the first cluster who can be found in the second cluster. In August 1942, 
however, he was assigned work in Shanxi and transferred out of Yan’an.113 
With seven persons, the second cluster is slightly larger than the first. Of 
these, only three had been identified in positions in the area of propaganda before 
1941. Both Chen Boda 陈伯达 and Ai Siqi 艾思奇 owed their rise to their 
performance in the Rectification Campaign.114 None of the four others had been in 
propaganda functions in the central Party leadership prior to 1941. Kai Feng and 
Bo Gu had been in Chongqing, where they had led the Propaganda Department 
and the Organization Department, respectively, of the CCP South China Bureau 
(Nanfangju 南方局); they were transferred back to Yan’an in November 1940, a 
transfer that did not extend but rather curtail their influence.115 Lu Dingyi, in 
contrast, was a close follower of Mao. He had fought with the Eighth Route Army 
in the Taihang 太行 area, where he was responsible for propaganda. He was 
recalled to Yan’an only in early 1941.116 Xu Teli, one of the Party elders and a one-
time teacher of Mao in Hunan, was recalled to Yan’an in summer 1940 to build up 
several institutions of higher education until he was promoted to positions in the 
propaganda sector, yet he did never exercise real power there.117 
For the second period in question, from the beginning of the Rectification 
Campaign to the PB meeting on March 20, 1943, that established the Propaganda 
Committee, a pattern similar to that of the earlier period emerges: a small number 
of key personnel in medium and top-positions of practically all institutions of the 
propaganda sector; these institutions are linked together into a tight network 
through concurrent appointments.118 After March 1943, a degree of continuity was 
                                             
113 See Yang Song’s biography in Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan, vol. 25, p. 176-95. Yang had 
worked closely with Bo Gu. There is little biographical material on Wu Liangping. 
114 Chen Boda had been Mao’s Political Secretary (Zhengzhi mishu 政治秘书) since 1937. On him 
see Wylie. The Emergence of Maoism. On Ai Siqi see Joshua Fogel. Ai Ssu-ch’i’s Contribution to 
the Development of Chinese Marxism. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
115 On Kai Feng see Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan, vol. 52, p. 166-189; Bo Gu’s biography is in 
ibid., vol. 53, p. 1-51. 
116 See Chen Qingquan, Song Guangwei. Lu Dingyi zhuan. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi 
chubanshe, 1999, p. 221-92. This volume gives much information on Lu’s activities in publishing 
and propaganda. 
117 Xu Teli had been in Yan’an before; prior to his August 1940 move there, he had frequently 
travelled between Yan’an, Chongqing, Hengyang, and Changsha. See Chen Zhiming. Xu Teli 
zhuan. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1984, ch. 10. On his activities in Yan’an see Wang 
Yunfeng (ed.). Xu Teli zai Yan’an. Xi’an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1991. 
118 An exception again was the Party School that was formally included into the propaganda 
apparatus only after March 20th, 1943. 
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achieved, as the people of the second cluster assumed the top positions in the 
Propaganda Committee and the organs under its supervision, and held these 
through the turbulent later phases of the Rectification campaign until the 7th Party 
congress in 1945. After 1949, at least four of the second group continued to work 
in high-level positions in the propaganda sector: Lu Dingyi was head of the PD 
until the eve of the Cultural Revolution in 1966; both Xu Teli and Chen Boda were 
PD vice-heads for the same period; and Kai Feng, who had initially served in 
Northeast China after the founding of the PRC, was made a PD vice-head, too, 
from 1952 until his death in early 1955 (he concurrently served as head of the 
Marxism-Leninism Institute). The ideologue Ai Siqi moved from his positions at 
Jiefang ribao further into the field of theory and became vice-head of the Higher 
Party School in 1959. Bo Gu, whom Mao had forgiven his earlier “mistakes,” died 
in the tragic airplane accident of April 1946 that also killed Deng Fa 邓发, Wang 
Ruofei 王若飞, and Ye Ting 叶挺, the “April 8 martyrs.” 
We thus find in the Yan’an period an accumulation of institutions that 
gradually grew closer and by 1943 were identified as the propaganda sector, 
placed under the unified leadership of the Propaganda Committee and Mao, and 
integrated through concurrent personnel appointments.119 This matrix of 
institutions and personnel reached a much higher degree of integration than had 
been the case in earlier times, when individual Party leaders had unified different 
propaganda-related functions, yet without the surrounding institutional apparatus. 
Within the propaganda portfolio, from the Yan’an era until the present, we thus find 
the daily and the periodical press, publishing, broadcasting and film – the 
institutions usually identified as the media.120 
 
 
 
                                             
119 The CCP took much longer to arrive at such a point than other socialist nations, where the 
Soviet Union exercised more direct influence on the process of institution building. In Eastern 
Germany, for example, an institutional structure controlling the media was in place 1947, two years 
after the end of Wold War II, and even before the founding of the German Democratic Republic. 
See Gunter Holzweißig. Die schärfste Waffe der Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR. Köln: 
Böhlau, 2002; on the formation of the organs of media control see ch. 1, as well as the chart on p. 
217. 
120 This construction continues into the present. Compare chart 3: Organizational makeup of the 
CCP PD after 1994. 
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Dimensions of Propaganda 
In the preceding section, I have explained why it is necessary to take a 
different approach to the Chinese media, and I have introduced the propaganda 
xitong and traced its development. I will now go on to examine the components of 
this xitong: this section will investigate the different media and their particular 
characteristics in the Chinese imaginaire, while the last section will turn to those 
areas of the propaganda xitong that are not covered by the English term “media.” 
These elements are, however, crucial to understand the Chinese conception of 
what the media are and what they are supposed to be. 
The propaganda xitong that had emerged in the 1940s has in general been 
characterized by organizational stability. While institutions have been in flux 
throughout the PRC, the propaganda sector as such has remained relatively 
stable. The highest political body in the propaganda xitong after 1945 has been 
the Propaganda Department of the Party’s Central Committee, one of the “five big 
departments” under the CC.121 The PD oversees a vast number of activities, as 
can be seen from its substructure. While the PD’s organizational composition has 
changed over time, a number of key competences can be isolated that have been 
relatively stable; usually, a bureau (ju 局) is entrusted with the coordination of 
activities of a distinct field. The activities normally associated with the concept of 
“media” are found in the bureaus for news, publishing, broadcasting, and film. I will 
now turn to these functions within the PD. In the course of the discussion I will pay 
attention to a problem noted earlier: differences in terminology between Chinese 
and English can indicate problems of conceptualization in different contexts. 
Although most of the Chinese terms in this field are Western imports (via Japan), 
they cannot be regarded as direct substitutions for the Western terms in question. 
In some cases, the differences created by translation are minimal; in other cases, 
however, they are quite substantial. In the light of the organization chart of the  
                                             
121 The “five big departments” are the PD, the Organization Department, the United Front Work 
Department, the International Liaison Department (Duiwai lianluobu 对外联络部), and the Central 
Investigation Department (Zhongyang diaochabu 中央调查部). Personal conversation with Michael 
Schoenhals. See also Kampen “The CCP’s Central Committee Departments.” Not all of the five 
departments did already exist in 1945. 
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Chart 3: Organizational Makeup of the CCP PD (1994) 
 
 
 
Source: compiled after Zuzhishi ziliao 11.231 
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CCP PD,122 a number of key terms used in English literature on the media 
therefore need to be discussed such as to determine the exact meaning of the 
Chinese terms. 
The Xinwen ju 新闻局 is responsible mainly for newspapers. There is a 
problem with the word xinwen, usually translated as “news.” Xinwen is used in two 
different ways: first, it indicates a specific kind of content that may appear in a 
newspaper, such as in guoji xinwen 国际新闻 (International news). It is in this way 
that Chinese dictionaries usually define xinwen: “a report on events happened 
recently. To become news, events must undergo selection by the person 
transmitting them and be spread in a timely fashion through language, writing, 
pictures and other carriers. ‘Event,’ ‘report,’ and ‘timeliness’ are the three factors 
that compose news.”123 The second usage is similar to the English “news” in 
“news media,” yet with the important difference that it indicates newspapers only 
(sometimes also the periodical press), but not broadcasting. Xinwen is thus a 
generic term that figures on a higher plane than newspapers, as table 4b tries to 
visualize. The function of the CCP PD xinwen ju, or the News Bureau, must be 
understood in this way. In Chinese official use, such as in xinwen chuban 新闻出版, 
xinwen refers to the print news media only (for this and the following distinctions, 
see Chart 4a and 4b: Media Terminology in English and Chinese). Xinwen had 
been an autochthonous term that had acquired the meaning “news” in the 19th 
century. It must be considered a semantic loan in the same way as xinwenzhi 新闻
纸, a literal translation of “news-paper.” In analogy to xinwenzhi, the word baozhi 
报纸 was formed, a term that replaced xinwenzhi only in the late 19th century.124 In 
modern China, baozhi is defined as “a periodical publication carrying primarily 
news and commentaries. As a rule, it is published daily. It is an important tool for 
class struggle, propaganda, and education.”125  
                                             
122 For the following discussion, compare both chart 3 (organization of the PD since 1997) and 
chart 5 (the PD 1951-1954). Both are based on Zuzhishi ziliao, where more information on 
institutional evolution of the PD can be found. 
123 See ZDBQ, Xinwen chuban juan, p. 395. Other definitions, such as those in Cihai, do also 
stress the class character of news. 
124 On the evolution of these terms see Masini. The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon, p. 143-
44, and p. 159. 
125 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 1264. The 1965 edition is particularly interesting, 
as it reflects the official positions and definitions of the early 1960s. Due to the onslaught of the 
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The terminological and organizational subordination of the periodical press 
(excluding newspapers) in China has been less clear than that of newspapers. In 
CCP terminology, the former are referred to as qikan 期刊 (periodicals) or zazhi 杂
志 (magazines), qikan being the more official term.126 Sometimes the periodical 
press is also called baokan 报刊, a term that more often serves as a generic term 
for newspapers and periodicals (shorthand for baozhi qikan 报纸期刊), especially 
when periodicals were subsumed under the category of “news” (see chart 4b). 
The publishing bureau (Chuban ju 出版局) has jurisdiction over the 
production of books, and generally also over the periodical press. The word 
chuban 出版 is a loan first used in Japan (Jap. shuppan);127 according to Chinese 
dictionaries it means “to edit and print writings [zhuzuowu 著作物] so that they 
become books and periodicals [tushu baokan 图书报刊].”128 This dictionary 
definition is misleading, however, since chuban as a technical term never 
comprises newspapers (baokan is here used in the first of the two meanings given 
in the preceding paragraph). The translation “publishing” is therefore not really 
satisfactory. Books are usually called shu 书 or shuji 书籍, both terms of ancient 
origin but with a rather recent meaning: the mostly thin, thread-bound and wood-
printed juan 卷 of traditional China had rather little resemblance of the modern 
commodity of books.129 The revolution that transformed the traditional shu into 
books in the modern sense was set in motion in the mid-19th century and was 
completed by the May Fourth era.130 The modern Chinese shu, at least in the 
official use, does not show much difference from the English ‘book,’ although in  
                                                                                                                                      
Cultural Revolution, it was printed only in 1979 in Hong Kong. The official mainland 1979 edition 
was modified significantly. 
126 Zazhi is a return loan that was “an autochthonous neologism invented in China in the 1860s, 
which later disappeared and was brought back to China from Japan.” Masini. The Formation of 
Modern Chinese Lexicon, p. 212. Qikan is modern word that was not in use before the 1940s. 
127 Ibid., p. 163. 
128 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 2076. 
129 It may be called to memory that in classical Chinese shu usually means “to write” or refers to a 
piece of calligraphy or a letter (i.e., something written), rather than to a book. 
130 Foreigners in China played a significant role in the changes of the Chinese publishing market, 
the Shanghai Shenbaoguan 申报馆, run by Ernest Major, being the most active and innovative in 
this respect. See Rudolf G. Wagner. “Ernest Major’s Shenbaoguan and the Formation of Late Qing 
Print Culture.” MS, Heidelberg, 1998. Similar revolutions had taken place earlier in Europe, when 
books in the modern sense replaced the hand-copied and leather-bound foliants of the late Middle 
Ages. See Lucien Febvre, Henri-Jean Martin. The Coming of the Book: the Impact of Printing, 
1450-1800. London: Verso, 1997. 
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Chart 4a: Media Terminology in English 
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C  =  Commercials 
E  =  Entertainment 
 
 
Chart 4b: Media Terminology in Chinese 
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colloquial language, single periodical issues also might be called shu.131 In 
Bureaucratese books and periodicals are often referred to as chubanwu 出版物, 
an awkward term that must be rendered as “publications.” It is interesting to see 
that books are considered to belong to the “Chinese media sector.” The English 
concept of “mass media” explicitly excludes books, and they are not normally 
thought to be part of the “media” proper at all. The different treatment in Chinese 
imagination would not be understandable from a purely linguistic definition of 
“media,” but becomes visible from the organizational structuring of the political 
space, dominated by the xuanchuan concept.132 
Within the propaganda sector, the fields of news and publishing have been 
administered separately for a long time. They were united under a single 
leadership during certain historical periods, such as in the government apparatus 
after 1987, when a combined News and Publication Administration (Xinwen 
chuban shu 新闻出版署) was formed that answers to the State Council. In the 
Party organization, however, the separation has been upheld (probably because 
the two sectors do still receive different degrees of attention in the policy 
formulation process, which is the domain of the Party,). The organizational 
arrangements reflect shifts in the relative importance of the sectors and changes in 
the general political atmosphere. 
Apart from the media organized in the news and publishing categories, a 
number of new media have emerged over time, especially after 1949. These were 
consequently integrated into the existing structures of the PD. The earliest new 
medium gaining prominence was broadcasting. There had been small radio 
stations in both the Jiangxi Soviet and in Yan’an that were closely integrated with 
the local newspapers and news agencies.133 It was therefore never called into 
question that radio was part of the propaganda field when the impact of 
                                             
131 For a particularly elaborate and thoughtful definition of books see Zheng Ruqi, Xiao Dongfa. 
Zhongguo shushi. Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1987, p. 1f. 
132 Even in recent Chinese media literature, such as Pan Zhichang, Lin Wei. Dazhong chuanmei yu 
dazhong wenhua. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2002, books are still listed among the 
media.  
133 On broadcasting in Yan’an see Zhao Yuming. Zhongguo xiandai guangbo jianshi, 1923-1949. 
Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1999 (2nd ed.), p. 54-72, and the rich source 
materials collected in this volume. See also Yang Bo (ed.). Zhongyang renmin guangbo diantai 
jianshi. Beijing: Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe, 2000, p. 1-12. In these early years, however, 
the main function of the Xinhua news and broadcasting service was the collection and transmission 
of intelligence, as my reading of propaganda sources from the 1930s and 1940s has shown. 
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broadcasting began to expand with the proliferation of receivers in the late 1950s 
and it became a mass medium.134 The same can be said of television, which is 
very similar to radio broadcasting in technical terms, and which was therefore 
included in the propaganda sector when it first emerged (see also chapter eight). 
Under the PD, a Broadcasting Bureau (guangbo ju 广播局) has existed 
during certain periods (from 1951-1954 in the form of a Newspaper and 
Broadcasting Bureau (Baozhi guangbo chu 报纸广播处), which was put in charge 
of radio and TV. Etymological definitions are easier in this case since both 
guangbo 广播 (broadcasting) and dianshi 电视 (television) are terms of modern 
origin. A rather unique feature was the development of wired radio (you xian 
guangbo 有线广播) that was promoted throughout the PRC since 1953 to make up 
for the lack of expensive equipment. Before and during the Cultural Revolution it 
became the primary propaganda tool, especially in the countryside.135 Wired radio, 
which receives broadcasts aired by far-away radio stations and transmits them to 
a limited number of households using wire-corded loudspeakers, has always been 
managed by the Broadcasting bureau. The Bureau also overlooks television 
broadcasting (including cable and satellite TV). Both radio and TV are 
characterized by their high efficiency as media that can reach large numbers of 
recipients (including illiterate recipients that cannot be reached by other media), by 
the technical and financial expense required (high upfront investments that pay off 
with increasing numbers of receivers), and by the relative ease with which they 
can be controlled. 
With a similar logic, film (dianying 电影)136 had been placed under the 
control of the propaganda authorities ever since the CCP’s first productions in 
Yan’an.137 The nature of film is ambiguous: it is located on the borderline of news 
media and the field of literature and art. Yet since both had been made part of the 
                                             
134 See the table on the production figures for radio sets in China in Alan P. Liu. Radio 
Broadcasting in Communist China. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT, 1964, p. 26. 
135 Early Western observers in the PRC comment on this technique which has faded into oblivion 
by most contemporary foreign scholars of the media field. See Alan P. Liu. Radio Broadcasting in 
Communist China, p. 11-20. George P. Jan. “Radio Propaganda in Chinese Villages” in Asian 
Survey 7.5 (1967), p. 305-15. 
136 There are no significant terminological differences between the English “film” and the Chinese 
dianying. 
137 As early as 1938 the CCP had organized a film team in Yan’an that produced mainly 
documentaries. See Hu Xingliang. Zhongguo dianying shi. Beijing: Zhongyang guangbo dianshi 
daxue chubanshe, 1995, p. 100f. 
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propaganda sector since the 1940s, the latter through the Yan’an Wenwei and the 
Literature and Art Bureau (Wenyiju 文艺局) of the PD today, film has been defined 
as a medium of propaganda: “Film is the broadest and most popular propaganda 
and education tool; it is one of the most powerful weapons on the cultural front, 
that serves proletarian politics, serves the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and 
serves socialism.”138 Attracting large audiences, film has been especially important 
for the propaganda sector, yet films also require even higher upfront investments 
than radio and TV, and need more technical sophistication. For all these reasons, 
film production in the PRC has always been tightly controlled by the central 
authorities. Film is indeed the medium most closely watched by the Party.139 
A pattern of graded control thus emerges from the discussion above: 
among the different media forms that the single bureaus of the PD oversee, a 
hierarchy is discernible. At the top of this hierarchy is film, to which the strictest 
controls apply.140 The criteria for the severity of control are evidently the number of 
potential audiences and the popularity of the media. On the next lower level in 
public impact and popularity ranges TV, with radio closely following. Newspapers 
range even lower in the hierarchy of controls. They exist in a grey area: successful 
newspapers can have a very large impact, and especially during high-profile 
political events the Party imposes strict controls on all central and local 
newspapers.141 Especially regional newspapers, however, often manage to 
achieve a considerable amount of freedom.142 Editors of journals and magazines, 
                                             
138 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 4081. 
139 The potential of the medium of film for propagandistic purposes had been recognized by 
authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. 
140 The same observation can be made in almost any country. Even in the U.S. and Europe, film is 
under severe pressure of censorship (for puritanical or other reasons), significantly more so than 
other media forms. The arguments brought forward are almost exactly the same as those applying 
in China. Cf. McQuail. Theory, p. 153, who quotes the “Motion Picture Code of Conduct” introduced 
in the U.S. in 1933. 
141 The closing ceremony of the 16th Party Congress is a case in point. On Nov. 15, 2002, in a rare 
show of unity, all central and local newspapers presented an identical front-page: it contained a 
unison report, supplied by the Xinhua news agency, accompanied by identical photographs at 
exactly the same positions on the page. See John Gittings. “New China uses old tactics” in The 
Observer, Nov. 17, 2002. 
142 In the 1990s, newspapers in Guangdong province have profited from the laissez-faire climate 
the government has advocated there to stimulate economic growth. Newspapers such as the 
Yangcheng wanbao 羊城晚报 and especially Nanfang zhoumo 南方周末 have established a 
reputation for courageous, independent-minded reporting. Yet even these newspapers must move 
with caution and are otherwise subject to punishments – Nanfang zhoumo has seen several purges 
of its leadership in recent years. On the paper’s frequent troubles see, for example, Matthew 
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in turn, have much more leeway in their work: the highly fragmented market, 
dominated by rather specialized publications makes all-out control less feasible 
and less necessary. Books are found at the bottom of the hierarchy, for largely the 
same reasons. The impact that books can make on the public psyche is reduced 
by the fact that books are usually consumed in privacy (as opposed to watching 
TV, for example), and through the sheer number of books that reach market every 
year: reading preferences are so diverse that books are considered much less 
prone to exert public influence. Consequently, the controls for them are less 
severe than for any other medium. Much of what can be written and published in 
books would be deemed unfit for publication in the other media.143 
In recent years, a growing number of new media had to be accommodated 
by the grown structure of the propaganda apparatus. Audiovisual media were few 
in number before the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, they were incorporated 
into the publishing sector: specialized publishing houses are responsible for the 
production of music cassettes and compact discs, and these items are listed in 
government regulations for the publishing sector. The Bureaucratese generic term 
for audiovisual media is yinxiang chubanwu 音像出版物.144 In the same way, 
digital publications (dianzi chubanwu 电子出版物) were handled. Neither music nor 
film (in whatever format) nor digital books and compilations are allowed to be 
published by any unit (danwei 单位) other than a registered publishing house that 
must at least be listed as a co-sponsor.145 It might be a point of contention whether 
the music and video industry should be considered part of the media in Western 
countries; in China, the government has opted to integrate both into existing 
structures of administration and control as a rather convenient way to 
accommodate to technical evolution. Only the advent of the Internet has 
challenged these structures, and chapter nine will explore the ways the Party and 
government have tried to deal with this challenge. 
                                                                                                                                      
Forney. “Killing the Messenger” in Time, 18 June, 2001. Compare also Zhu Defu. Yi wu fan gu: 
Nanfang zhoumo jizhe zhuizong wu nian bu xi zuji. Shijiazhuang: Huashan wenyi chubanshe, 2000. 
143 This hierarchy has been confirmed by several interviewees. Chapter four will discuss the 
relative impact of different media on varying ‘publics.’ 
144 See for example the most authoritative guidelines for the publishing sector, “Chuban guanli 
tiaoli,” in effect since 1997 (there is no publishing law in the PRC). Zhongguo chuban gongzuozhe 
xiehui (ed.). Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1999, p. 230-33. 
145 See ibid., p. 230 (article 8). 
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The Chinese media sector as outlined above is structured in ways different 
from the same sector in the United States or Europe. An important difference that 
is not immediately visible concerns the integrated production chain that all sub-
sectors in the media sector practice. In the vertical organizational makeup of the 
PRC, sectors like publishing or news do not just consist of publishing proper, but 
include practically all the logistics that belong to the same chain of production. In 
the case of books, for example, this means that publishing (chuban, 
terminologically as well as organizationally) means not only the process of editing 
a book, but includes its physical production (printing and binding) as well as sales. 
Thus, among the work units (danwei) in the publishing sector, there are not only 
publishing houses, but also printing plants and enterprises of the entire distribution 
chain down to retailers. None of the latter would be considered part of the media in 
the West; yet in the PRC they are part of the overall system of controls, The 
integrated production chain was introduced into the Chinese media sector in the 
early 1950s, modelled after the Soviet Union.146 
Summing up, we can thus say that all of the institutions covered by the 
English term “media” are organized within the propaganda sector. The makeup of 
this sector as well as the conceptual structures that were introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter, are defined along lines different from those in the U.S. 
and Europe – the structure and the logic of the Chinese media is determined by 
the propaganda concept. Consequently, the language used to define the individual 
media differs from the English usages (see chart 4a and 4b). Considering these 
particularities, which are crucial to understanding the internal dynamics of the 
Chinese media sector, it might be justified to stick to the Chinese terms throughout 
in order to avoid their being confused with the foreign concepts. However, since a 
Pinyinization would make this study all but unreadable, I will leave in place the 
English terminology. The particular terminological arrangements for key terms 
which structure the propaganda sector should be kept in mind nevertheless. 
 
 
 
                                             
146 The emergence of the integrated production chain in the publishing sector will be discussed in 
detail in chapter five. 
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The Construction of Chinese Reality 
In the preceding section I have identified all those elements that are usually 
thought to belong to the media (and even a few more), all of which are organized 
in the Chinese propaganda sector. This discussion, however, has taken us only so 
far: to understand the Chinese media in the way they are seen by practitioners as 
well as by the CCP itself, it is absolutely necessary to reconstruct at this point the 
entirety of the propaganda sector, to establish the institutional neighbourhood of 
the media sector. Policies for the various components within the propaganda 
xitong parallel each other, since they originate from the same logic and have the 
same objectives. To understand the logic that drives the Chinese media, we thus 
need a comprehensive perspective of the propaganda xitong. In what follows I will 
give a short overview of the other components that make up the propaganda 
sector that is designed to merely illustrate parallels to the CCP’s approach to the 
media. 
Within the propaganda sector, a number of fields can be found that may 
seem loosely or even unrelated to propaganda. These fields include education, 
science, public hygiene and medicine, and sports. With the exception of some 
short periods, these functions were not administered by the PD, but were 
delegated to other organs; institutionally, however, they have always belonged to 
the same portfolio as propaganda in the informal organizational arrangements that 
dominate Chinese politics – the xitong. For the following discussion, I will look into 
one of the exceptional periods, November 1951 to ca. November 1953, when all 
fields of the propaganda portfolio were actually placed under the united control of 
the PD, thus providing us with a full panorama of the propaganda xitong (see chart 
5). Of particular interest here are literature and art, theory, science, sport, and 
public hygiene.147 
                                             
147 As said above, this particular construction existed only for a short period. At other times, the PD 
exerted far less direct influence. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in particular, the CCP has 
gradually withdrawn from a number of functions, and administration of these areas was relegated 
to government bodies; the corresponding bureaus and departments of the Party were abolished. 
Apparently, these areas were no longer classified as core issues, and close supervision of day-to-
day affairs was no longer considered to be necessary. The Party did not, however, renounce the 
claim to decision-making power and general guidance in these areas. Rather, these changes attest 
to a shift in the CCP’s general approach to governance, which moved from micro-level control to 
macro-level management. In the propaganda sector, education, science and research, and health 
are today no longer coordinated by bureaus within the Propaganda Department; yet nevertheless 
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Chart 5: Bureaus and Subdivisions of the Propaganda Department 
(Nov. 1951-late 1954)  
Office 办公室 
Theory Propaganda Bureau 理论宣传处 
Political Education Bureau 政治教育处 
Current Affairs Propaganda Bureau 时事宣传处 
Mass Propaganda Bureau 群众宣传处 
International Propaganda Bureau 国际宣传处 
Literature and Art Bureau 文学艺术处 
Film Bureau 电影处 
Schools and Education Bureau 学校教育处 
Science and Public Hygiene Bureau 科学卫生处 
Publishing Bureau 出版处 
Newspaper and Broadcasting Bureau 报纸广播处 
Cadres Bureau 干部处 
Bureau of Administration 行政处 
Party History Materials Office 党史资料室 
Complete Works of Stalin Translation Bureau 斯大林全集翻译室 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong English Translation Office 毛泽东选集英译室 
Training Class for Propaganda Cadres 宣传干部训练班 
Source: compiled after Zuzhishi ziliao 9.62f 
Firstly, the field of literature and art (including all literary genres, music, 
painting, sculpture, and the performing arts) had been brought under the auspices 
of the CCP’s propaganda apparatus at an early date through the Yan’an Wenwei, 
as mentioned above. Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature 
and Art” called upon literature to “serve politics” (wei zhengzhi fuwu 为政治服务)148, 
at exactly the same time when the media’s function was redefined. While political 
uses of literature were not new in 1942, the “Yan’an talks” submitted literature and 
the arts to much closer political control than had been the case before, a point 
stressed in PRC definitions of literature: “Literature is the product of the reflection 
of concrete social life in people’s minds, it belongs to the superstructure. In a class 
society, literature is a powerful weapon of class struggle. Writers of different 
classes or strata have a different understanding and a different reflection of real 
life; their works serve the interests of different classes, and [consequently] have 
                                                                                                                                      
they continue to be part of the propaganda macro sector, with decision-making power resting at the 
top of the xitong. Insofar, the propaganda portfolio has been stable for over sixty years. 
148 See Li Shiwen. “‘Wenyi wei zhengzhi fuwu’ kouhao de xingcheng pingshu” in Anhui wenxue 
1980.12, p. 88ff. 
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different social impact and educational functions.”149 The definition of literature 
(and other art forms) closely parallels the functional political aspect that also 
dominates the ideas behind the media concept. 
Another key field within the propaganda xitong has been that of theory, 
namely studies in Marxism-Leninism. Since all Party policies had to be explained 
and promoted in the terms of “scientific Marxism” in order to prove their legitimacy, 
political theory and propaganda have been working hand in hand since the 1940s. 
In Yan’an, the Party’s popularizer of Marxist theory, Ai Siqi, was invited to join both 
the Wenwei and the Jiefang ribao. After 1949, a theory bureau of one kind or 
another (usually called Lilunju 理论局) has existed under the PD with extraordinary 
consistency. Other strongholds of theory research, such as the Marxism-Leninism 
Institute (Ma-Lie xueyuan 马列学院), renamed into Higher Party School (Gaoji 
dangxiao 高级党校) in 1955, were also closely tied to the propaganda xitong.150 
Similarly, the education sector had been merged with the propaganda 
sector in the 1940s, first for cadre education, and later for general education as 
well.151 Consequently the xitong has often been identified as “Propaganda-
education” xitong (Xuan-jiao xitong 宣教系统). Again, the relationship becomes 
clear through the personnel structure: PD head Lu Dingyi concurrently was vice-
head of the important Government Administrative Council Culture and Education 
Commission (Zhengwuyuan wenhua jiaoyu weiyuanhui 政务院文化教育委员会) 
from 1949 until the Commission’s abolition in 1954. Education and propaganda 
share the objective to transform people’s mind and thinking, and were thus 
grouped together in the same xitong. 
In the early 1950s makeup of the PD, we find a Science and Public Hygiene 
Bureau (Kexue weisheng chu 科学卫生处). Scientific research in the PRC is 
centralized at the Chinese Academy of Science (Zhongguo kexueyuan 中国科学院, 
shorthand CAS) and the academy’s local branches. The centre for research in the 
humanities (which in China have been called “social sciences:” shehui kexue 社会
                                             
149 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 2939. 
150 The Higher Party School was merged during the Cultural Revolution with the Central Party 
School. See Zuzhishi ziliao 10.73. Among its heads and vice-heads, the institution counted Kai 
Feng, Chen Boda, and Ai Siqi, all leading cadres in the propaganda field. 
151 On the scope of the Party’s educational efforts in Yan’an see Mao’s remarks in “Fan touxiang 
tigang” in XGWX 2.58-64, here p. 64. 
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科学) was the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department (Zhexue shehui kexue 
xuebu 哲学社会科学学部) of CAS and formed the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 中国社会科学院, short CASS) in 1977.152 
CAS was linked to the Propaganda sector through the person of Chen Boda, who 
served as its vice-head from 1949 to 1966, and held concurrently the position of a 
vice-head of the Party’s PD. The first president of CASS was Hu Qiaomu, another 
propaganda veteran. Vice-president Yu Guangyuan 于广远 had supervised CAS 
social science work as director of the PD Science Bureau in the 1950s; two other 
vice-presidents, Zhou Yang 周扬 and Deng Liqun 邓力群, were veteran 
propaganda officials.153 In an even more direct link, the CAS Philosophy and 
Social Sciences Department had been placed under the direct leadership of the 
PD in 1960.154 The mainstay of Chinese scientific research was thus closely tied to 
the propaganda authorities.155 
The most puzzling arrangement concerns public hygiene and sports. What 
do hospitals, newspapers, and schools have in common?156 The entire field of 
health, public hygiene, and medicine (usually summed up by the Chinese term 
weisheng 卫生), as well as sports have belonged to the propaganda portfolio since 
the early 1950s. Hygiene was to promote the health of the Chinese people. The 
official definition of sports also provides important clues: “[Sports is] an integral 
element of a society’s culture and education. Sports is a product of labour and has 
developed along with social development; it serves the political and economic 
                                             
152 On CAS and CASS see  Hans Kühner. Die chinesische Akademie der Wissenschaften und ihre 
Vorläufer, 1928-1985. Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1986. Pan Gangye (ed.). Zhongguo 
kexueyuan biannianshi, 1949-1999. Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999. See also H. 
Lyman Miller. Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: the Politics of Knowledge. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1996, p. 87-106. 
153 See Miller. Science and Dissent, p. 102 f. 
154 Pan Gangye. Zhongguo kexueyuan biannianshi, p. 240. 
155 There are numerous other bodies of scientific research subordinated to various government 
ministries, such as the research institutes for aviation, agriculture, or meteorology. Since the 
ministries in question belong to the finance and economics xitong, these research bodies are not 
controlled by the propaganda xitong. They are defined as institutions of applied research, and do 
not enjoy the same prestige as CAS and CASS. 
156 The Foucauldian paradigm regarding the function of public health does not stand the test of 
practice in the case of the CCP, as other important mechanisms producing social power, such as 
prisons, a central component of Foucault’s project, are clearly not located within the confines of the 
Chinese propaganda sector, but rather in the political and legal affairs xitong (prisons) and the 
security xitong (re-education-through-labour camps run by the Public Security apparatus). 
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[purposes] of a given society.”157 By linking the nature of sport to physical labour 
and to the categories of culture and education, the definition stresses the social 
character that underlies both the fields of physical and mental activities. 
So what is it that unites newspapers, literature, political theory, education, 
and hygiene? In short, they all aim at improving of the psychological and physical 
health of man (shen-xin jiankang 身心健康). The idea of unifying mental and 
physical aspects of health158 assumes new significance in the context of the CCP’s 
overall objective: the formal organizational structure of the propaganda xitong 
reflects in effect an enormously ambitious project of social engineering. As the 
sector’s institutional composition shows, it is the aim of the Party to form a socialist 
man who is free from pathologies of both physical and mental kind (both of which 
are caused by oppression forces in the “old” society),159 a man healthy both in his 
thinking and his body who participates in and is devoted entirely to the cause led 
by the Communist Party.160 To fundamentally transform man, he must be provided 
with an environment that allows his body to develop its full potential, and that 
feeds his mind with only the healthiest nourishment. The Chinese media are thus 
embedded in a project with much larger objectives that can be identified properly 
only if full account is taken of their environment; this is what the perspective of the 
propaganda xitong does – the space where the Party’s concerns for the people’s 
mind and for their body meet. 
To understand the motivations and the mechanisms at work in the project 
sketched above, I find it helpful to draw on a sociological model developed by 
Berger and Luckmann. In their words, reality is a social construct that must be 
institutionalized, internalized, as well as constantly maintained.161 It is defined as 
                                             
157 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 384f.  
158 The reciprocity of body and mind is an ancient concept central to traditional Chinese medicine 
TCM).  See Paul U. Unschuld. Medicine in China: A History of Ideas. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985. On the discussions of TCM in the PRC see Volker Scheid. Chinese 
Medicine in Contemporary China: Plurality and Synthesis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2002, esp. ch. 3. 
159 The entry “health” in BSE relates these pathologies to the economic exploitation of classes: 
“Factors that determine the health of a population are the amount of real wages, the length of the 
working day, the degree of intensity and conditions of work, the presence of occupational hazards, 
nutrition, the housing conditions...” (vol. 9, p. 235). 
160 “Unhealthy thinking” (Bu jiankang de sixiang 不健康的思想) has been a common accusation of 
targets in political campaigns from the 1950s through the 1990s. 
161 The Social Construction of Reality. The Berger / Luckmann approach is only to a degree able to 
explain the understanding of man and his environment that has informed the Chinese media 
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“a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being 
independent of our own volition”162 and is thus generally socially constructed, 
which means that man’s knowledge about his environment is dependent on the 
mediation of this environment to him by means such as conversation with others 
living in and accepting the same reality. This assumption is basically informed by 
the Marxist proposition that “man’s consciousness is determined by his social 
being,”163 which is related to the (economic) base. The most basic mediators for 
the transmission of reality are signs and language: language has the capability to 
transcend an individual’s situation-bound knowledge and to stabilize the personal 
subjectivity by making possible the transfer of experiences between different 
persons. When this process multiplies, a shared repository of generally accepted 
knowledge builds up that sustains the reality of everyday life. 
Beyond language and signs, both of which operate on the lowest order of 
human interaction, I would argue that the media serve the very same processes: 
first of all, they confirm to man that his own knowledge corresponds to a reality 
generally accepted. More importantly, they tell him how to adjust his individual 
subjectivity, if necessary, so as to conform to this reality. Beyond the confirmation 
of reality, media can also be employed in the original socialization process: they 
act as a tool in the effort to convince people of a particular version of reality and 
work towards the internalization of this reality by the addressees (Berger and 
Luckmann define internalization as “‘taking over’ the world in which others already 
live”).164 The media are capable of transporting a vision of reality shared by one 
group to much larger audiences and make this vision into the binding explanation 
of the human environment.165 In analogy to the observation, “knowledge is a social 
product and knowledge is a factor in social change,”166 a similar dialectical 
relationship can be established for the media’s function: they are result of social 
                                                                                                                                      
concept of the 1940s; helpful is the fact that Berger and Luckmann proceed from a generally 
Marxist framework. Their concept is able to provide some basic explanations for the processes that 
underlie the workings of the Chinese propaganda apparatus and the mechanics of the media 
concept. 
162 Ibid., p. 1. 
163 Ibid., p. 5f. 
164 Ibid., p. 130. 
165 Berger and Luckmann do not speak about the media and their function since their interest 
focuses primarily on the most fundamental issues of a sociology of knowledge. I have extrapolated 
the conclusions concerning the role of the media in the process of the construction of reality from 
Berger and Luckmann’s general arguments. 
166 Berger, Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality, p. 87. 
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processes as well as agent for the transformation of society – they contribute to 
the institution of a healthy vision of the world. This is what the Chinese media are 
supposed to do.167 
If social reality can be constructed, at least partly, through active and 
conscious involvement of man, it is also prone to deterioration due to outside 
influences or pathologies (coming from competing “universes of meaning”). Social 
reality remains instable and is under the constant threat of being undermined. It 
needs to be confirmed continually if it is to remain stable and reliable. Two 
important processes work towards this goal: firstly, the media themselves (and all 
the other components of the propaganda sector) assume the function of “reality 
maintenance.” The confirmation of the individual’s status in his environment is a 
key function of the media, since “every viable society must develop procedures of 
reality-maintenance to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and 
subjective reality.”168 Reaching out to broad audiences, the media do best suit this 
purpose. Secondly, the state (a player of central importance, whose functions are 
not directly addressed by Berger and Luckmann) can exercise its power to 
guarantee that challenges to reality are minimized; it can intervene on behalf of the 
existing version of social reality and work towards the elimination of media 
containing alternative realities (for example, the “bourgeois” media). Coercion – 
both as supervision (control) and active intervention – thus becomes a key 
element in the “procedures of reality-maintenance” in contexts such as the PRC, 
where the governing Party assumes a paramount position insofar as it defines the 
orthodox vision of reality and tries to steer the complex processes that work 
towards the implementation of that reality. 
                                             
167 That is, of course, the perspective of the sender of the message, with which I am concerned 
primarily in this study. From the position of the receiver, however, the uses of the media may look 
very differently, as alternative readings and differential decoding may produce altogether difference 
outcomes, as I have remarked above. See also Michael Schudon. The Power of News. 
168 Berger, Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality, p. 147. 
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It is in this context that we must understand the complementarity of fields as 
diverse as publishing, news, film, science, education, and health: they are part of 
the project to construct a new man by providing him with a healthy environment. 
There is perhaps no 
better illustration of 
what this merging of 
the physical and 
psychological aspects 
of health means than 
those ubiquitous 
propaganda posters 
that have been 
produced for public 
display from the 
earliest days of the  
Ill. 1: “Turn philosophy into a sharp weapon in the hands of the 
masses, 1971,” courtesy of the Stefan Landsberger Collection: 
http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/ll.html. 
 
PRC to the present time.169 The visual representation of the model worker (farmer, 
soldier etc.) has changed remarkably little: both men and women are able-bodied 
if not athletic, they have internalized through education the values prescribed by 
the Party, and they display bold optimism about their future. The most extreme 
examples of psycho-physical sanity are from the Cultural Revolution decade: the 
exaggeratedly muscular forearm, holding the Mao’s Collected Works, symbolizes 
better than anything else the goal that the Party’s propaganda efforts hope to 
achieve: bursting with strength and fully steeled, not only through physical training, 
but also through ideological conviction. 
The men (and, very importantly, women) on the propaganda posters 
represent a new kind of personality: the socialist man that has liberated himself 
from the bondages of the earlier “capitalist” society, he has achieved freedom in 
the way defined by the Communist Party. This process of reform and self-reform 
                                             
169 See Harriet Evans, Stephanie Donald (ed.). Picturing Power in the People’s Republic of China: 
Posters of the Cultural Revolution. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999; Stefan Landsberger. 
Chinese Propaganda Posters: from Revolution to Modernization. Amsterdam: The Pepin Press, 
1995. Parts of Landsberger’s collection are online at http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/. 
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could not succeed without the intervention of the CCP which fights for this 
“liberation” (jiefang 解放, the term that has even become the synonym for the CCP 
takeover in 1949) and introduces changes in the economic realm, the “basis” in 
orthodox Marxism. The “superstructure” to which the institutions of the propaganda 
sector belong, plays a crucial assisting role: before the revolution, when 
overthrowing the ruling classes is the main goal, the Party works in the realm of 
the superstructure to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the people.170 After 
revolution, the main goal shifts to economic construction and to defending the 
power of the new ruling classes.171 Since the power of the proletariat is 
consolidated at the economic base, attacks from class enemies can be directed 
only at the superstructure. Beyond the task of making the mental world outlook of 
the people fit the new economic and political realities that have emerged after 
revolution, work in all those fields that belong to the superstructure assumes a 
crucially important position as the bulwark of defending the socialist system 
against its enemies.172 To prevent an erosion of the system from inside, the 
superstructure, represented by the propaganda xitong, is engaged in nothing short 
of a “cultural revolution.”173 
The media are thus designed to be part of a much larger project in social 
engineering and political struggle. This construction has deeply influenced not only 
the way in which the media have been perceived of – and, to a degree, are still 
perceived – but also the way in which the media have been managed in the 
                                             
170 The Communists effort to raise people’s consciousness through work in the realm of the 
superstructure figures prominently in Lenin’s “What is to be Done?,” one of the core texts to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
171 The exact definition of the main goal after revolution, of course, has been hotly debated during 
the 1950s and ever since. While Soviet orthodoxy prescribed economic construction to be the task 
of the day, and the main contradiction under the conditions of socialism were supposed to be that 
between man and nature, Mao Zedong, under the influence of Stalin’s policies from the 1930s, 
began to place increasing emphasis on the continuation of class struggle. The rise of class struggle 
reached the apex in 1962 when Mao proclaimed “Never forget class struggle!” (Qianwan bu yao 
wangji jieji douzheng 千万不要忘记阶级斗争). On the debate see Stuart R. Schram. “Mao Tse-
tung’s Thought from 1949 to 1976” in Roderick MacFarquhar, John K. Fairbank (ed.). The 
Cambridge History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, vol. 15, p. 1-106. 
172 The following two chapters will provide evidence for this understanding of the media’s role. I am 
grateful to Rudolf Wagner for pointing out this argument to me. 
173 Revolutions in culture had been launched since the May Fourth Movement. After 1949, the goal 
of a cultural revolution was to bring the cultural realm, supposedly a stronghold of “feudalism,” into 
line with the advanced productive forces. Consequently, the initial onslaught of the “Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution” did indeed target the entire cultural realm, ranging from literature 
and art to historical research. Not surprisingly, the first major institution to come tumbling down 
under the siege was the PD. 
 71
course of the second half of the twentieth century. We must now proceed from the 
institutional evidence for the peculiar Chinese conception of what the media are 
and should be to more concrete textual evidence, turning to the contents of this 
conception. In the next chapter, I will reconstruct the CCP’s media concept. 
 
* * * 
 
In this chapter, I have been looking for the conditions that influenced the 
formation the CCP’s media thinking. An investigation of the Chinese media is first 
of all confronted with the problem that the concept of the “media” – a generic term 
of Western origin – has entered the Chinese language only recently. While the 
institutions usually defined as media do definitely exist in China, they are 
conceived of and categorized in a way that differs significantly from Western 
media concepts. These crucial differences have received too little attention in the 
literature on the field. 
To define the Chinese media sector, I have chosen a functional approach 
that stresses the role of the media as a carrier of public communication. Such an 
approach must necessarily look at the media from the broad perspective of the 
social environment in which they are embedded. Media do not exist in a 
conceptual vacuum but are firmly rooted in social reality. They are formed by this 
environment but can also be employed to shape their surroundings. 
The Chinese media are part of a larger complex that can be identified 
through an investigation of the political organizational structures. The 
organizational perspective has found the institutions we are used to call “media” to 
be assembled under the propaganda xitong or sector. Under the auspices of the 
CCP Propaganda Department, the most important institution in the propaganda 
xitong, there also can be found a number of media that are not usually considered 
to be “mass” media in English, such as books, but that are undeniable part of the 
Chinese media sector. 
The Chinese media in turn find themselves within the propaganda xitong in 
an environment with an even more peculiar pattern: literature, the arts, education, 
science, and public hygiene, among others, do belong all to this xitong as well. 
The organizational structure of the xitong thus provide information concerning the 
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functions and the logic that govern the propaganda xitong in general and the 
media in particular: they are supposed to reshape the mental outlook of the people 
along the lines defined by the CCP. The media are thus “serving” the particular 
purposes of the Party. 
The Chinese propaganda xitong is a historical product. The institutions that 
make up the propaganda xitong grew only gradually into a coherent and 
interconnected network of political and administrative agencies. This matrix took 
shape in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, and has been a stable entity in the 
institutional landscape in the PRC ever since. 
As the CCP’s Yan’an era is the period in which the propaganda xitong first 
emerged in the Party’s organizational landscape, this period is also of crucial 
importance for the formation of the ideas, strategies, and concepts that have 
guided the Party’s propaganda activities throughout the PRC. The next chapter will 
therefore take a closer look at the Yan’an period and investigate how the modern 
Chinese media concept was formed, what sources of inspiration it drew on, and by 
what kind of worldview and what an image of man it was informed. It is the very 
special nature of the modern Chinese media concept that has brought about the 
control of the media in the People’s Republic of China. 
  
Chapter Two 
The Yan’an Laboratory: The Formation of the CCP’s Media Concept  
 
“The party paper is not just a collective propagandist and agitator, 
but also a collective organizer” 
(Lenin) 
 
“The party paper is our sharpest and most powerful weapon” 
(Stalin)1 
 
The CCP has never formulated a coherent media theory. This does not 
mean that the Party’s media work is unreflected or that it lacks conceptual 
considerations. As the chapters in part two of this study show, the CCP has very 
clear ideas of what the media are, how they are supposed to function, and how 
they relate to the Party-state and to the population. While these ideas fall short of 
the reflected and systematic rigour of what could be called a theory, they do add 
up to a logically coherent concept. Since the CCP did never write down in explicit 
terms the media concept that took shape during the Yan’an period, my aim in this 
chapter is to make these implicit features explicit.2 
Yan’an, the capital of the CCP’s base area in Northern Shaanxi, became 
the laboratory where the Party conducted a wide range of experiments in 
governance and administration. Regrouping after the Long March and the loss of 
most of the other base areas, the CCP entered a period of introspection: 
unresolved issues had accumulated over almost a decade in areas as diverse as 
leadership, personnel, ideology, strategy, and policies in numerous fields. 
Propaganda and the media were but one issue that was, however, closely 
interrelated with almost all other questions. After the arrival in Yan’an, the CCP 
rapidly built up a thriving press and publishing sector, notwithstanding the difficult 
material conditions in the Shaan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia) Border 
Region. Even more important were the reflections that led to a conceptualization of 
the Party’s media, a concept both theoretically informed and tested in practical 
application. The CCP’s media concept merged recent ideological imports from the 
Soviet Union with influences from other foreign sources and traditional Chinese 
                                             
1 Quoted after “To our readers,” editorial, Jiefang ribao (JFRB), Apr. 1, 1942. 
2 Gao Hua sees the Yan’an era as the time of the formation of “Mao’s news principles” (Mao shi 
xinwenxue yuanze 毛氏新闻学原则). See Hong taiyang shi zenyang sheng qi de: Yan’an 
zhengfeng yundong de lailong-qumai. Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 2000, p. 372-77. 
For reasons that will become clear in the course of this chapter, I consider it inappropriate to 
attribute the formation of the media concept to Mao alone. 
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ideas about the communication between those in power and the people (these 
influences and ideas will be discussed in chapter 3). The CCP emerged from 
Yan’an strengthened, with administrative experience and with a set of policy 
options that were put into practice after 1949. As is the case for other policy fields, 
the most crucial moment for the formulation of the media concept was the Yan’an 
Rectification Campaign. 
No single factor explanation suffices to describe adequately either the 
causes or the course of the Rectification Campaign (Zhengfeng yundong 政风运动, 
zhengfeng being a shorthand for “zhengdun dangde zuofeng” 整顿党的作风, 
“rectify the working styles of the Party”).3 Most often cited are the constant and 
complex power struggles that accompanied the rise of Mao and the consolidation 
of his power; an approach, however, that is problematic. Historians such as 
Kampen and Chen Yongfa overemphasize this argument, reducing their narrative 
to a single factor. Gao Hua’s account, too, is driven primarily by the desire to 
understand the legacies produced by Mao’s rise to power; all the same, his study 
shows clearest of all that factional disputes and infighting always arouse out of 
differences over policy and strategy. To discount the heated debates over diverse 
policy packages, from approaches to the economic administration of the border 
region to the correct degree of cooperation with the GMD, can only obscure the 
complexity of the CCP’s evolution in the Yan’an era, and doing so misjudges the 
importance of these policy choices for the path taken after 1949. The decisions 
reached in Yan’an had far-reaching consequences for the development of the 
PRC, as this study aims to show. On the other end of the spectrum, Apter and 
Saich discount the power struggle in favour of a linguistic model. Their discursive 
approach is an important contribution for drawing attention to the issue and the 
uses of language, yet their hypothesis discredits itself when the authors portray 
Yan’an as a happy “learning community,” ignoring the later phases of the 
Rectification Campaign. Chen Yongfa, Gao Hua, and the biographers of Kang 
                                             
3 For studies dealing with the Rectification Campaign see the works of Gao Hua, Kampen, Chen 
Yongfa, Apter and Saich, Compton, Wylie, and Selden mentioned in ch.1. Compare also Frederick 
C. Teiwes. “The Origins of Rectification: Inner-Party Purges and Education before Liberation” in CQ 
65 (1976), p. 15-53; Patricia Stranahan. Molding the Medium: The Chinese Communist Party and 
the Liberation Daily. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990, and “The Last Battle: Mao and the 
Internationalists’ Fight for the Liberation Daily” in CQ 123 (1990), p. 522-37; Merle Goldman. 
Literary Dissent in Communist China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, ch. 2. 
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Sheng have shown in minute detail that more often than not “study” was a disguise 
for hard-core indoctrination, endless rounds of criticism and self-criticism under 
maximum psychological pressure, and in many cases outright “red terror.” In light 
of the Rescue Campaign (the bloody later stage of Rectification since spring 1943), 
the “revolutionary simulacrum” is a euphemism. The account of Apter and Saich 
therefore remains an exercise of primarily theoretical nature. 
Besides the issue of power, other problems factored into the mix of 
unresolved questions the Party faced in Yan’an: according to Kampen, the CCP’s 
history still was still awaiting an authoritative assessment. Wylie stresses Mao’s 
desire to enthrone himself as the Party’s main theoretician. Goldman sees the 
need to impose discipline on the large number of intellectuals that had arrived 
relatively recently in Yan’an, and the circumstances reinforcing this need: a difficult 
economic situation caused by GMD and Japanese blockades of the border area, 
and by setbacks in CCP economic policies that put a strain on the supply situation 
of Yan’an, exacerbated by natural calamities and bad harvests.4 In addition, the 
national and international situation in 1941 needs to be mentioned: the CCP had 
suffered great losses in the Southern Anhui incident (Wannan shibian 皖南事变), 
where GMD forces had betrayed and almost completely wiped out the Communist 
New Fourth Army. Consequently, the future of the United Front (and the United 
Front policy, a policy closely linked to Mao) was in greater doubt than ever. The 
Soviet Union was engaged in the European war and devoted less and less 
attention to the Far East. The United States still hesitated to enter the war, 
allowing the Japanese to increase their pressure on all fronts. In view of these 
circumstances, Selden speaks of “crippling defeats verging on annihilation.”5 The 
situation was of grave concern in any case. The Rectification Campaign was 
designed to address these difficulties, to resolve the leadership problem, and to 
promote intra-Party discipline, thus preparing the CCP for a time when it could 
once again take the initiative. 
                                             
4 As Chen Yongfa has shown, the CCP was desperate enough to encourage poppy production in 
the border area, exporting significant amounts of opium to other areas of China in order to finance 
its government operations. “The Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the 
Opium Trade” in Tony Saich, Hans van de Ven. New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 263-98. 
5 Selden. China in Revolution, p. 144. 
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The campaign’s high tide in spring and summer 1942 has drawn most 
attention. The drive against dissident writers was carried out in public and received 
ample press coverage in the Party media. The rectification drive, however, had 
started much earlier: on May 19, 1941, Mao delivered a speech to a conference of 
high-level cadres that has become known as “Reform Our Study” (“Gaizao women 
de xuexi” 改造我们的学习). Most Western and Chinese scholars agree that this 
speech signalled the beginning of a major ideological campaign that was carried 
out on two levels: both high cadres (gaoji ganbu 高级干部) and normal cadres and 
Party members (yiban ganbu he putong dangyuan 一般干部和普通党员) had to 
undergo rectification.6 The Yan’an press played a key role from the very start of 
the campaign. Only four days before Mao’s speech, the CC had announced a 
major reshuffle of the Party newspapers, and the next morning, Jiefang ribao 解放
日报 (JFRB), the new official organ of the CCP CC,7 published its first issue. JFRB 
played a crucial role in the Rectification Campaign: it became the platform where 
practically all important discussions of the campaign were publicized. Not only 
were the speeches of Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders on the campaign 
issues published in JFRB, but the paper also printed and reprinted most of the 
officially defined rectification documents.8 Furthermore, the voices of the main 
targets of the campaign’s second phase, the writers Ding Ling 丁玲 and Wang 
Shiwei 王实唯, had appeared on its pages. This made JFRB itself into an object of 
criticism during the campaign. The paper’s reorganization, effective from April 1, 
1942, was accompanied by an elaborate discussion of the role and the functions 
of a Party newspaper. 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the discussions concerning the Party 
media before, during, and after the JFRB reshuffle. The events of spring 1942 
                                             
6 This is the characterization given in the most recent official history of the CCP: Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, 1921-1949. Beijing: Zhonggong 
dangshi chubanshe, 2002, vol. 1.2, p. 780. 
7 See “Zhongyang guanyu chuban Jiefang ribao deng wenti de tongzhi” in Zhonggong zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu bangongting, Zhongyang dang’anguan bianyanbu (ed). Zhongguo gongchandang 
xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (hereafter XGWX). Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1996, 4 vols., 
here vol. 2, p. 227: “All policies of the Party shall be transmitted to the entire nation through JFRB 
and the Xinhua news agency.” 
8 19 out of 22 officially designated rectification documents were published on JFRB’s pages. 
Fifteen of these are translated in Compton. Party Reform Documents. 
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were the result of a protracted process rather than a sudden innovation.9 It is 
therefore necessary to investigate the CCP’s propaganda work in the Yan’an era 
in a more comprehensive fashion. I will reconstruct the development of the major 
arguments by relying chiefly on Party documents, statements of the Party leaders, 
and JFRB editorials concerning propaganda;10 as these sources do most directly 
reflect the normative concepts and the visions that the Party leadership developed 
in the Yan’an period, the analysis of key documents will take precedence over an 
analysis of newspaper contents.11 Over the course of several years, a number of 
issues crystallized – the media’s “Party character,” their educational mission, their 
mass character, as well as their function in class struggle – that all became parts 
of the media concept. I will illustrate this gradual process by short summaries of 
the media concept (as it can be extrapolated from the documents analyzed in its 
different stages) at the end of the sections of this chapter. Furthermore, I will relate 
the ideas found in the CCP documents to their sources in the Marxist-Leninist 
canon. I propose that the ideas imported from the Soviet Union were not 
homogenous in nature; rather, the incorporation into the CCP’s media concept of 
ideas borrowed from Plekhanov to Lenin to Stalin, created a tension within the 
concept that was responsible for the concept’s flexibility, but also for the conflicts 
arising from its implementation in later years. 
 
 
 
                                             
9 In this point, I contend with Patricia Stranahan’s argument that the discussions surrounding JFRB 
were but a power struggle in disguise. Thomas Kampen has expressed serious doubts concerning 
Stranahan’s general assumption of a two-line struggle within the Party between the so-called 
“Bolsheviks” or “Internationalists,” and the “Maoists.” In my own readings on the propaganda sector, 
I have found no compelling evidence of such a struggle, which seems to me primarily a product of 
the CCP’s own historiography. 
10 Several collections of documents have recently become available to the researcher, including 
XGWX and Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan xinwen yanjiusuo (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen 
gongzuo wenjian huibian. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1980, 3 vols. (hereafter XGWH). However, 
since these collections, because of their selection criteria, do themselves contain an official 
narrative, they must be backed up by other documents found, for example, in the various collected 
works (wenji 文集) editions of CCP politicians. The Yan’an rectification documents collected and 
translated by Compton are an important source, too. Another problem is that much of the material 
in the official collections has been heavily edited, especially in cases where the texts in question 
have already been published elsewhere (such as the speeches of Mao Zedong). It is thus 
necessary to use the originals (often from JFRB) where possible, or to double-check the 
documents with the originals, if these were published. 
11 An extensive content analysis is found in Stranahan. Moulding the Medium. 
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Media and Education: The Chinese Leninist Perspective 
JFRB and its predecessors, the weekly Jiefang 解放 and the Xin Zhonghua 
bao 新中华报 newspaper,12 were not the only papers published by the CCP. After 
the CC had established itself in Yan’an, the number of publications there gradually 
increased. Several specialised journals and magazines were founded that focused 
on the needs of various target groups: Zhongguo qingnian 中国青年 addressed the 
youth, Zhongguo gongren 中国工人 was dedicated to the workers, and Zhongguo 
funü 中国妇女 to women.13 The journal Gongchandang ren 共产党人 was a 
restricted circulation publication directed to Party members.14 Several more 
journals appeared in Yan’an and in other CCP base areas.15 The United Front with 
the GMD allowed the CCP – at least initially – to extend its publishing activities. 
In the field of theory, the CCP had since its earliest days followed a number 
of more or less reflected ideas about the media that guided all of its publications, 
both internal (neibu 内部) and openly circulated (gongkai 公开) journals, 
notwithstanding their particular content and respective audiences. It was on these 
ideas that the conceptualizing efforts in Yan’an built on. The most prominent was 
“party character” (dangxing 党性, or partiinost in Russian).16 In the “Terms of 
                                             
12 Not to be confused with Xinhua ribao, the official CCP newspaper published in Wuhan and later 
in Chongqing. Xin Zhonghua bao was founded in January 1937 as the organ of the Shaan-Gan-
Ning border region government and became the CCP CC organ on Feb. 7, 1939. Since this 
reorganization, the paper was published every three days (previously every five days). See “Jinian 
Xin Zhonghua bao xin kan yi zhounian” in Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan 
(hereafter MZDXGW). Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983, p. 49-51. 
13 Zhongguo qingnian was founded on April 16, 1939 (See “Zhongguo qingnian fakanci” in XGWX 
2.29-30). Zhongguo gongren published its first issue on February 7, 1940 (See “Zhongguo gongren 
fakanci,” written by Mao Zedong, in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 2), and Zhongguo funü appeared on 
June 1, 1939. All three were closed due to “limited technical conditions” March 1941. The main 
newspapers, however, kept operating. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tiaozheng qikan wenti 
de jueding” (March 26, 1941) in XGWH 1.96. Gao Hua links this step directly to Mao Zedong and 
his desire to silence inner-Party voices he did not agree with, yet I believe that the difficult 
economic situation of the border area at that time played a role, too. See Hong taiyang shi zenyang 
shengqi de, p. 367. 
14 Gongchandang ren was founded in October 1939 and published the last issue in August 1941. 
The “Fakanci” was written by Mao Zedong. An edited version of this was included in Mao Zedong 
xuanji, vol. 2. 
15 About twenty are listed for Yan’an alone in the period 1938-1945 in Cao Guohui. “Yan’an shiqi de 
chuban gongzuo gaishu” in Song Yuanfang (ed.). Zhongguo chuban shiliao: xiandai bufen. Ji’nan: 
Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, vol. 2, p. 282-316, esp. p. 293-97. For the CCP’s propaganda 
activities in the Jin-Cha-Ji 晋察冀 region see Timothy Cheek. Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s 
China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, ch. 2. 
16 ‘Party character’ is defined as the natural tendency of all people to further and to defend the 
interests of their particular class. In this understanding, all human activities are permanently 
determined by their class (or party) character. Partiinost applies especially to social sciences, 
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Admission into the Third Communist International” (July 1920), the Comintern had 
required all prospective member parties to place all their publications under direct 
Party control.17 The CCP’s authority over newspapers and journals published 
under its auspices was thereafter never called into question. In 1930, for example, 
Li Lisan commented: “the function of the Party paper is to expound on the Party’s 
programme and its political line, to gather all people who share the same political 
position and support the same political line, and to merge them into a united Party 
with orderly ranks that carries out a unanimous struggle.”18 Li Lisan emphasizes 
the crucial importance of Party papers for the work of the Party in an underground 
setting like that of the early 1930s: it would be almost impossible to hold together 
the fragmented and decentralized Party without the help of newspapers. The Party 
newspapers are the means whereby the Party’s directives, policies, and 
programmes can reach lower level cadres in the most reliable fashion; distortions 
and misrepresentations that result from oral transmission can thus be minimized. 
A precondition, however, is that the papers closely follow the Party’s prescriptions 
and remain under its direct supervision.  
In Yan’an, the same general principles applied to the Party press that were 
effective in the early 1930s. The first major CCP directive on newspaper work in 
the Yan’an area underlined points very similar to those stressed by Li Lisan:19 
“The Party papers are reflecting all Party policies; from now on, the local Party organs 
must draw upon the articles of important responsible comrades in the Party papers and 
journals, take them as the Party’s policies and working guidelines, and study them. The 
following [kinds of] articles from the Party papers must be discussed and studied in the 
[Party] branches and in Party committees on all levels: 
(1) editorials in [Xinhua ribao];  
(2) articles of the responsible cadres of the Politburo in Xinhua [ribao],20 Jiefang, and 
Qunzhong. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
philosophy, and literature and art – and, of course, to propaganda. For details see the entry 
‘partiinost’ in Bol’shaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopedia (hereafter BSE). See Great Soviet Encyclopedia: 
A Translation of the Third Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1973, vol. 19, p. 295-97. 
17 See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works (4th English ed.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966, vol. 31, p. 
206-11. 
18 “Dangbao,” published on May 10th, 1930, in the CCP organ Hongqi. Repr. in XGWH 3.126-27. Li 
echoes here ideas expressed by Lenin in “What is to be Done?”, see below. 
19 “Zhongyang guanyu dangbao wenti gei difang dang de zhishi” (dated Apr. 2, 1938) in Jiefang 36, 
p. 21. Repr. in XGWX 2.16. 
20 The directive is unclear when it speaks of “the Xinhua newspaper” (“Xinhuabao”) in (1) and 
simply “Xinhua” (2): the text might also refer to Xin Zhonghua bao. I consider it more plausible, 
however, that the paper in question was the Wuhan (and later Chongqing) Xinhua ribao, because 
in 1938, Xin Zhonghua bao still was the organ of the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region government, 
and not that of the CC. 
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The party paper acts as the voice of the Party, especially of the Politburo, and 
communicates policies down to the Party branches, where they are to be studied, 
adopted to concrete problems, and implemented. Under United Front conditions, 
communication was easier than during the civil war, when the CCP acted from 
underground:21 
Since in the past the Party was for a long time working in secret and could not 
distribute a national Party paper, [information] concerning the Party’s different policies 
could be transmitted only in secret mimeographed publications; this has led to the 
comrades not understanding the function of the Party papers. Under the new 
conditions prevailing today the Party has already set up nationwide newspapers and 
journals, and therefore it is necessary to correct these old ideas and to make every 
comrade take seriously the Party papers, read them, and discuss the important articles 
in them. 
 
Under the new circumstances that the Party found in Yan’an, there is a slight shift 
in focus: while bringing and holding together the Party members was a key 
concern in Li Lisan’s explanation of the paper’s purpose, the stress now lies on 
reading and studying the paper to understand the correct Party policies, and thus 
to unify the Party membership ideologically. 
This latter point became more pronounced as the CCP moved to 
consolidate its ideological line and to demand conformity from its members. The 
Party papers’ proper function became even more pronounced three years after the 
1938 directive, in 1941, when Xin Zhonghua bao’s anniversary editorial proclaimed: 
“Only because of the implementation of a real new democratic polity in the Border 
Region and because human rights enjoyed full legal protection, our paper was 
able to give full scope to its sacred duty of directing opinion.”22 This “sacred duty” 
has found its most pronounced expression in the formulation “mouthpiece,” literally 
“throat and tongue” (houshe 喉舌): the newspapers became the organs that gave 
a voice to the Party – without this voice a mute Party leadership would be unable 
to address its members.23 Xin Zhonghua bao thus was “not only one of the organs 
of the CCP CC, but also the organ of the Border Region Party [Committee], and 
                                             
21 “Zhongyang guanyu dangbao wenti gei difang dang de zhishi,” p. 21. Repr. in XGWX 2.16. 
22 “Jinian ben bao xin kan liang zhounian” in Xin Zhonghua bao, Feb. 6, 1941. Repr. in XGWH 
3.47-49. 
23 The “throat and tongue” formulation seems to be an indigenous Chinese invention that has older 
roots; it has been used at least since the late Qing period in relation to the press I am grateful to 
Barbara Mittler for this information. There is no direct equivalent in Russian or Japanese. 
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the mouthpiece of the Border Region government.”24 The mission of the 
newspapers under CCP control is not to print individual opinions, but rather to 
represent the collective opinion, the line of the Party leadership. Even when 
individuals are writing on its pages, they speak for the Party, and not for 
themselves.25 
These core elements of Communist newspaper theory had been imported 
from the Soviet Union. In their writings, the CCP officials in charge of propaganda 
claim legitimacy for their concepts by quoting from the highest authorities in the 
international Communist movement, namely Lenin and Stalin. The number of texts 
quoted by the CCP leadership is surprisingly small: a limited core of texts 
constitutes the canon that informed the CCP’s thinking in the area of the media. 
For Lenin, these were his “What is to be Done?” and “The Character of our 
Newspapers.”26 A few texts associated with Stalin, such as the History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course rounded up the 
compendium. Taking frequency of citation as an indicator, by far the most 
important of these texts is Lenin’s long tractate “What is to be Done?” 
The polemics “What is to be Done?” was first published in March 1902. 
According to Lenin’s original plan, the booklet “was to have been devoted to a 
detailed development of the ideas expressed in the article ‘Where to Begin’ (Iskra, 
No. 4, May 1901).”27 Iskra (“The Spark”) was an émigré journal founded in Munich 
in 1900. Lenin elaborated many of his core ideas in this early period in Iskra; the 
journal itself thus plays a prominent role in Leninist press history.28 For the 
Chinese Communists, “What is to be Done?” became a must-read article and one 
of the most frequently quoted writings of Lenin. It was first translated into Chinese 
in Moscow, where it appeared in the third volume of the 1933 Chinese edition of 
                                             
24 “Jinian ben bao xin kan liang zhounian” in Xin Zhonghua bao, Feb. 6, 1941. Italics added. 
25 As John Fitzgerald has detailed in his study on GMD propaganda, the same principles also made 
a significant impact on Nationalist media theory and practice – not least through the CCP’s 
presence in the GMD propaganda institutions during the First United Front. Awakening China: 
Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, 
esp. ch. 6-7. 
26 V.I. Lenin. Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960. For “What is to be Done?” see 
vol. 5, p. 347-529. “The Character of our Newspapers” can be found in ibid., vol. 28, p. 96-98. 
27 “What is to be Done?” p. 349. 
28 Even a Chinese mainstream dictionary such as Cihai contains an entry on Iskra: “The first 
Marxist, national, political newspaper founded and led by Lenin.” See Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben 
(1979 printing), p. 2978, entry ‘Huoxingbao.’ 
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Lenin’s Selected Works.29 Yet even prior to this edition, “What is to be Done?” was 
part of the repertoire Chinese communists quoted from, which suggests that it 
belonged to the curriculum taught at the Moscow academies where much of the 
Chinese leadership of the 1930s had undergone training.30 The function of the 
press figures prominently in “What is to be Done?;” it is therefore understandable 
that the Chinese Communists referred to Lenin’s text to claim legitimacy for their 
own press activities.  
In the booklet’s last chapter, “The ‘Plan’ for an All-Russian Political 
Newspaper,” Lenin sketches his ideas of a newspaper in the service of Party 
propaganda. Lenin is engaged in a dialogue with opponents who had attacked his 
“Where to Begin”31 as an abstract intellectual exercise. Against this accusation, 
Lenin holds that the considerations concerning the character of a proletarian 
newspaper must take precedence over practical organizational work at the 
grassroots level. He defends his earlier positions and stresses: “...the whole point 
is that there is no other way of training strong political organisations except 
through the medium of an All-Russian newspaper.”32 According to Lenin, a 
powerful propaganda organ is the precondition for the construction of a 
revolutionary party, and not a result of these construction efforts: “The publication 
of an All-Russian political newspaper must be the main line by which we may 
unswervingly develop, deepen, and expand the organization.”33 The creation of 
party newspapers is an essential step in the organizational construction of the 
party and in the political struggle towards the party’s revolutionary goal. By 
speaking of “the main line,” Lenin elevates the importance of propaganda work in 
the overall context of party work. In a quote from the earlier Iskra article, Lenin 
illustrates his point:34 
 
 
                                             
29 Published by the Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers. For this information see 
Cao Honglong (ed.). Liening zhuzuo zai Zhongguo: 1919-1992 nian wenxian diaoyan baogao. 
Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1994, p. 13-14. 
30 Unfortunately, I have never seen a detailed description of the curriculum taught at Zhongshan 
University or the other Comintern schools in Moscow. 
31 See “Where to Begin” (orig. published in Iskra 4, May 1901), in Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 13-24. 
32 “What is to be Done?” p. 499. Italics in the original. 
33 Ibid., p. 501. 
34 Ibid., p. 502f. Italics in the original. 
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A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a 
collective organiser. In this respect it may be compared to the scaffolding erected 
round a building under construction; it marks the contours of the structure and 
facilitates communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work 
and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour. 
 
Two important arguments are presented here: the collective character of the 
newspaper’s voice, and the precedence of propaganda over organizational affairs. 
 The party newspaper is the voice of the party in a collective sense: it does 
not express the opinion of an individual party member, but rather that of the entire 
party collective. The CCP used this argument, for example, to criticize the Party 
journals of the 1920s that were led by strong individuals and were accused of 
promoting but the particular opinions of their patrons. In the Leninist understanding, 
the party press could give expression only to the positions of the collective 
leadership.35 This is the case even when individual party figures are writing in the 
party press: they do not voice their particular opinions but speak in the name of the 
party.36 A party paper thus is not even a collection of different opinions within the 
party, but must give expression to the party’s singular, unified voice. This latter 
interpretation came to prevail in the Soviet Union as well as in China. 
The relationship between the “two wings” of Party work, organization and 
propaganda, had always been problematic in China. Internal criticism routinely 
lamented the lack of interest that many Party cadres showed in propaganda 
affairs.37 Party organization, dealing with personnel questions, is much more 
suitable than propaganda as a battleground for Party infighting and jockeying for 
leadership posts, and has been seen by many cadres as a road to get ahead 
politically. Lenin’s text, and especially the formulation of the newspaper being “not 
only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but also a collective 
organiser” thus has become the locus classicus in all references concerning the 
relationship between organization and propaganda in the communist party’s work. 
                                             
35 Imagination and reality are prone to conflict. Iskra was in its own time very much the platform for 
Lenin’s particular opinions. The reasons why this fact could be glossed over so completely in later 
historiography are discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
36 The most prominent example is, of course, Mao Zedong Thought, which has been treated in the 
PRC not simply as Mao’s writings, but as the collective product and heritage of the Party. For this 
purpose, Mao’s speeches and articles underwent significant revisions in the early 1950s before 
their inclusion in the Selected Works volumes. The logic behind this effort was to purge traces of 
Mao’s personal style. 
37 See for example “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu chongshi he jianquan ge ji xuanchuan 
bumen de zuzhi ji gongzuo de jueding” (dated Oct. 14, 1940), which is discussed in detail below. 
 84
A May 1930 article in the journal Hongqi, for example, started with the Lenin 
quote to remind CCP members of their responsibilities towards the Party paper:38 
Lenin has said: the party paper is not only a collective propagandist and agitator, it is 
also a collective organizer. From this sentence of Lenin we can understand what an 
important function the party paper has. 
Our Party is the vanguard of the proletariat, and the Party paper is the banner of this 
vanguard, it is the lighthouse of the entire Party. Every single member of our Party shall 
not only support our banner, but shall strive to increase the influence of this banner 
even more and to let it shine even brighter, so that its rays reach right into the middle of 
the broad toiling masses of workers and peasants. 
 
In this rhetorically powerful piece, the party press is defined as an instrument that 
is directed outwards – to the working classes; the article stresses its function as 
the Party’s propagandist and agitator. The very same quotation has been repeated 
over and over in more or less bombastic language. Deng Yingchao refers to Lenin 
on the occasion of the 100th issue of Hongse Zhonghua in 1933.39 Bo Gu, too, 
quotes Lenin in a long article of the same year.40 Another quote from the same 
Lenin text gained prominence in China: “Without revolutionary theory there can be 
no revolutionary movement.”41 This statement corresponds with the former quote 
when it defines theory, in a dialectical relationship, as a precondition for action, 
just as propaganda is a necessary precondition for the organization of a 
revolutionary party. Chen Yun refers to this latter quote from Lenin in 1939,42 and 
a year later Mao Zedong uses it in his “On New Democracy” (see below).43 By the 
early Yan’an era, Lenin’s text – used across all factional divides – had become a 
cornerstone of the CCP’s propaganda thinking.44 
While the “propagandist und organizer” quote was frequently used in CCP 
documents to stress the importance of propaganda work and to increase the 
                                             
38 “Dangyuan dui dangbao de zeren” in Hongqi, May 10, 1930. Repr. in XGWH 3.131-33. 
39 “Ba Hong Zhong huoyue feiwu dao quan Zhongguo” in XGWH 3.157-59. 
40 “Women yinggai zenyang yonghu Hongjun de shengli: ping women duiyu yonghu Hongjun de 
xuanchuan gudong gongzuo” (1933) in XGWH 3.165-74; the quote appears on p. 169 bottom. For 
another 1933 article, called “Yuan Hongse Zhonghua cheng wei jiti de xuanchuanzhe he jiti de 
zuzhizhe” (dated 10 Aug. 1933). See Wu Baopu, Li Zhiying, Zhu Yupeng. Bo Gu wenxuan – nianpu. 
Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1997, p. 92f. 
41 “What is to be Done?,” p. 369. 
42 “Xuexi shi gongchandang ren de zeren” (dated Dec. 1939), in Chen Yun wenxuan. Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1995, vol. 1, p. 121-23. 
43 “Xin minzhuzhuyi lun.” Orig. published in Zhongguo wenhua 1940.1, p. 1-24, as “Xin 
minzhuzhuyi de zhengzhi yu xin minzhuzhuyi de wenhua.” The quote appears on p. 24. 
44 “What is to be Done?” was a standard reference not only in China, but also in the Soviet Union. 
The definition for ‘newspaper’ in BSE contains the ubiquitous “propagandist and organizer” quote. 
See vol. 5, p. 302. 
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Party’s grip of the press, the influence of “What is to be Done” on CCP 
propaganda work goes much further. Rather than being used just as a quarry 
exploited to lend ideological legitimacy the Chinese leaders’ arguments, the world 
view and the definition of the Party’s role and character that figure so prominently 
in Lenin’s text, profoundly influenced the CCP. “What is to be Done?” must be 
seen as a key document for the understanding of the CCP’s self-perception. 
Lenin’s polemics are directed against two competing currents within the 
Russian social-democratic movement. On the one hand, Lenin attacks the 
“revisionists,” the Russian followers of Eduard Bernstein who insist on focussing 
their work on the issue of social reforms. The other group, whom Lenin calls 
“Economists,” promote agitation at the grassroots level, in the factories, and 
oppose Lenin’s position as elitist, theoretical, and doctrinaire. Rejecting both 
groups, Lenin argues for a powerful, centralised party that is able to coordinate the 
various local activities and thus to create synergies in the revolutionary struggle. 
This party must be led by professional, experienced revolutionaries, as he explains 
in his principles of party organisation:45 
I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organisation 
of leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the broader the popular masses drawn 
spontaneously into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and 
participates in it, the more urgent the need for such an organisation, and the more solid 
this organization must be …; (3) that such an organization must consist chiefly or 
people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state, 
the more we confine the membership of such an organization to people who are 
professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally 
trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth 
the organisation; and (5) the greater will be the number of people from the working 
class and from the other social classes who will be able to join the movement and 
perform active work in it. 
 
In this crucial passage, Lenin develops the model of an “avant-garde within the 
avant-garde:” the labour movement is led not by workers’ committees set up 
spontaneously, but rather by professional revolutionaries. These professional 
revolutionaries may originally come from the working class (such as August Bebel, 
leader of the German Social Democratic Party in the 1890s) but also from the 
intelligentsia (such as Marx and Engels, Lenin himself, and also the overwhelming 
                                             
45 “What is to be Done?,” p. 464. Italics in the original. 
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majority of the Chinese Party leaders).46 There are simple, practical reasons for 
the need for such an avant-garde: a factory worker with an eleven hour labour day 
will not have the time and the energy to do revolutionary work. The professional 
revolutionaries in the party, in contrast, devote all their attention to the enterprise 
of the revolution; they consolidate their political consciousness, and only then can 
this consciousness be carried into the working class: due to their lack of insight, 
the workers are capable of spontaneous actions only that have a trade-unionistic 
character, but are not genuinely social-democratic. On their own, the broad 
masses of the workers are unable to reach revolutionary consciousness and must 
be enlightened from without.47 
 Lenin’s remarks concerning the role of the press must be seen in this 
context. As a tool in the hands of an avant-garde organisation, the Leninist press 
assumes an enlightening function: it supplies the working classes with the 
intellectual material needed to raise the worker’s consciousness. In the course of 
this enlightenment process, the press thus figures prominently in its role as 
agitator and propagator. At the same time, the press is the bond that holds 
together the elite itself through its organizational functions. A deeply hierarchical 
world view speaks from the Leninist party concept: a professional revolutionary 
elite faces a proletariat caught in ignorance and stupor that are constantly 
reinforced through the mechanisms of exploitation. Only the party and its 
propaganda can help the working classes, by way of education, to liberate itself. 
The Leninist concepts presented in “What is to be Done?” were positively 
received by the Chinese Communists because they were well suited to the 
Chinese situation. In the early 1930s, the CCP found itself in a precarious situation 
very similar to the underground fight of the Russian social-democrats. Lenin 
himself wrote from abroad, and that is where many prominent Chinese 
Communists lived in the late 1920s and early 1930s – the personal identification 
with Lenin and the Russian revolution must have boosted the CCP leaders’ 
confidence. In Yan’an, the CCP found itself in a rural backwater, living among an 
illiterate, superstitious peasant population. For the Chinese Communists, most of 
                                             
46 On the origins and class background of many of the Soviet-trained CCP leaders see Kampen. 
The Chinese Communist Leadership, p. 19-23 
47 Uses of the press for purposes of enlightenment were common worldwide in the first half of the 
20th century. I will expand on this issue in chapter 3. 
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whom had lived in the cosmopolitan urban settings of Shanghai or Beijing, not to 
speak of Moscow, for most of the previous fifteen years, Lenin’s portrayal of the 
party as an enlightened elite, with a mission to educate the working classes and 
thus to slowly raise their political consciousness, must have been an argument 
even more convincing to the CCP in this new setting. When large numbers of 
peasants were recruited as Party members, the need for education within the 
Party became an urgent problem.48 
Thus, the link between education and propaganda was established in China 
with even more emphasis than in the Soviet Union. It was not until the Yan’an era 
that the idea of education to transform the people’s consciousness of their social 
being emerged as a key function of propaganda (see also chapter one). In the 
propaganda documents of the early 1930s the issue of education still ranges 
rather low. This changed in Yan’an, as earlier CCP propaganda policies came 
under fire. In October 1940, Gongchandang ren published a PD document that 
contained harsh criticism of the CCP’s propaganda policies and the attitude of 
many cadres towards propaganda, and that gave an outline of the new line in this 
field.49 
As is usual for Party documents as well as newspaper articles, the 
document sets out on an affirmative note but immediately thereafter addresses the 
main problem and its causes:50 
Since the beginning of the war of resistance [against Japan], and as a consequence of 
the development of the Chinese revolution and the Party’s organizational capacity, the 
Party’s propaganda work has ventured into a very broad area, and the Party’s 
propaganda organs have done much work and have yielded some notable results. 
However, strictly speaking, the Party’s propaganda work lags very far behind the 
development of the revolution and the Party organization. 
With view to our latest inspection of the propaganda work within the entire Party 
organization, the CC PD considers the organization of the propaganda departments on 
the various levels insufficient, and their work to be incomplete; this is one important 
reason for the relative backwardness of the Party’s propaganda work. 
 
 
                                             
48 Donald J. Munro discusses the CCP’s adaptation of the Leninist principle of a Party avant-garde 
in The Concept of Man in Contemporary China. University of Michigan Press, 1980; see esp. ch.4. 
Lenin’s approach also resonated well with the self-perception of the traditional Chinese literati elite. 
I will elaborate on this issue in chapter three. 
49 See “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu chongshi he jianquan ge ji xuanchuan bumen de zuzhi ji 
gongzuo de jueding” (dated Oct. 14, 1940) in Gongchandang ren 12; repr. in XGWX 2.166-70. The 
authorship of this document is unclear. 
50 Ibid., p. 166. 
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The assessment “lagging very far behind” (luohou... hen yuande 落后……很远的) 
is an unusually drastic description of the state of CCP propaganda work; it gives a 
sense of urgency: the Party press should not lag behind, but rather be a vanguard 
and play a leading role in the revolution. The Party thus thought immediate action 
to be necessary. The document goes on to list the failures of the Party cadres and 
blames not just the propaganda cadres, but rather a general trend within the Party: 
“In the Party, there exists a tendency to ‘stress organization and take propaganda 
lightly.’”51 Bookish intellectuals or Party members who had committed mistakes 
were transferred to propaganda positions and regarded this as a form of 
punishment. This trend was especially serious in the Party’s lower ranks:52 
Within the Party, there are still many comrades, and even comrades taking part in the 
work of the propaganda departments (especially those comrades in the medium and 
lower level organizations), who lack a clear understanding of the scope of the work of 
the propaganda departments. As a consequence, a fairly serious one-sidedness 
becomes manifest in the work of the propaganda departments, such as the neglect of 
civic education and cultural activities, the ignorance of the [Japanese] enemies and 
[Wang Jingwei] puppets’ policy of enslavement, and the lack of attention to and 
analysis of the political movements and propaganda policies of the different parties and 
factions. For these reasons it is necessary to provide a better definition and explanation 
of the scope of the propaganda departments’ work. 
 
This is what the document now turns to: a detailed account of the CCP’s 
propaganda work that was in place until the Rectification Movement gained 
momentum in fall 1941:53 
Our Party’s propaganda work basically comprises two aspects: one concerns directing 
and carrying out propaganda of revolutionary theory and revolutionary policies (this 
includes the rejection and criticism of enemy theory and policies, as well as work in all 
aspects of culture and education); the other concerns directing and carrying out mass 
agitation of the day-to-day kind (this includes rejecting and exposing enemy instigation). 
In concrete terms, our propaganda work includes the following points: 
(a) leading and carrying out external propaganda and agitation (including propaganda 
and agitation against the [Japanese] enemy and the [Wang Jingwei] puppet 
[government]); 
(b) leading and carrying out education work within the Party: education of regular 
Party members and cadre education (including Party schools, cadre training classes, 
etc.); 
(c) directing and promoting civic education; 
(d) directing and promoting cultural activities (that is, activities in culture, literature and 
arts, and scholarship); 
                                             
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p. 166f. 
53 Ibid., p. 167. 
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(e) leading and organizing publication and distribution of the Party papers, as well as 
the compilation and publication of all kinds of books, textbooks, and propaganda 
materials; 
(f) studying the political trends and the propaganda policies of both our enemies and 
our allies, as well as to propose propaganda counterstrategies for us in a timely 
manner; 
(g) influencing and directing non-Party cultural, educational, propaganda and agitation 
institutions or organizations. 
 
Thus, all means of propaganda, including the press, are subordinated to the 
Party’s main objective of the day, the anti-Japanese war, and to the mobilization of 
the people. The issue that becomes increasingly prominent is that of education: 
education of cadres, education of rank-and-file Party members, and civic 
education. As the CCP embarked on one study movement after another (the first 
had begun in May 1939 and included 4,000 cadres from the Yan’an area),54 
propaganda and education were increasingly identified. The Party claims authority 
over all elements of the propaganda sector – literature and arts, newspapers, 
books – that will be used as tools for education and study. Thus, the CCP hoped 
to educate the Party members as well as the people: to raise their revolutionary 
consciousness in the struggles ahead. 
 Mao Zedong placed even more emphasis on this point in his January 1940 
article “On New Democracy” (Xin minzhuzhuyi lun 新民主主义论). In the last 
section, “A National, Scientific, and Mass Culture,” he explains:55 
We must separate as well as combine the degree of knowledge we teach the 
revolutionary cadres, and the knowledge we teach the revolutionary masses; and we 
must separate as well as combine the raising [of cultural standards], and popularization. 
For the people’s masses, revolutionary culture is a powerful weapon of the revolution. 
Before the revolution, revolutionary culture is the ideological preparation of the 
revolution; during the revolution, it is an essential and important front in the overall 
revolutionary battle. And the revolutionary cultural workers are the officers at various 
levels on this cultural front. 
 
While Mao acknowledges the need for differentiated education for the avant-garde 
and for the masses, he urges his comrades to bridge the gap and create a unified 
revolutionary culture. When he declares “before the revolution, revolutionary 
culture is the ideological preparation of the revolution,” Mao echoes Lenin’s idea of 
                                             
54 Mao had outlined the rationale of the movement in an important speech on May 20, 1939: “Zai 
Yan’an zai zhi ganbu jiaoyu dongyuan dahui shang de jianghua.” See Zhonggong zhongyang 
wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Mao Zedong wenji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, vol. 2, p. 176-86.  
55 Mao Zedong. “Xin minzhuzhiyi lun,” p. 24. The original text carries no section headings, which 
were added later.  
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the role of the newspapers (he quotes “What is to be Done?” immediately after the 
section translated above); but Mao goes further in the second half of the sentence: 
the struggle in the cultural realm, that is the realm of the superstructure, is itself an 
essential battle in the overall revolutionary fight. If in Lenin’s text the newspapers 
were but the “scaffolding” – a provisional structure and temporary means to 
achieve the goal of preparing the Party for its revolutionary task – the components 
of the field of ideology (newspapers, books, propaganda booklets, education, etc., 
as outlined in the October 1940 PD decision) form a battlefield of their own in 
Mao’s understanding. It is in this field where the major battle against the old ideas 
will occur, and the study campaigns must be understood as steps in this direction. 
 The study campaigns advocated by Mao and other leading CCP personnel 
were aimed at transforming the personalities of the cadres involved, with the goal 
of binding the cadres solidly to the Party and its leadership. The Party press was 
to play a crucial role in this transformation process that was conducted through 
study and indoctrination meetings. Cadres were reminded of their duties time and 
again since 1940: “Current affairs are a compulsory item of regular study for all 
office-holding cadres (the Party papers are the main [study] material).”56 A note on 
Zhongguo qingnian stressed the journal’s role as a textbook for cadre study:57 
(1) Zhongguo qingnian is a youth journal led by the Party; recently, its editorial policy 
has changed, and it has [now] become a study journal addressing the areas of theory, 
strategy, work, and cultural life, aimed at young cadres. Because the majority of the 
Party’s mid-level cadres are young [cadres], and because the Party has no other 
suitable journal for the mid-level [cadre] study, Zhongguo qingnian is also a study 
journal for the Party’s regular mid-level cadres. ... 
(3) ... The fundamental task of the youth organization is education, and therefore the 
fundamental task of the youth journal is: to become a weapon helping in cadre 
education and civic education. 
 
The CCP press was thus assuming a more important role as it advanced to 
become a crucial part of the curriculum for study on all layers of the Party. As a 
consequence, it was in JFRB where in April 1942 most of the twenty-two texts 
appeared that were officially designated as study material in the Rectification 
Campaign. The newspapers moved into the centre of CCP politics. 
                                             
56 “Zhongyang guanyu zai zhi ganbu jiaoyu de zhishi” (dated March 20, 1940) in Gongchandang 
ren  6 (1940); repr. in XGWX 2.142-44.  
57 “Zhongxuanbu guanyu Zhongguo qingnian de tongzhi” (dated Oct. 22, 1940) in Gongchandang 
ren 12 (1940); repr. in XGWH 1.95.  
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Albeit, the CCP newspapers were as yet less than well-prepared for such a 
momentous task. The October 1940 “Decision” of the PD that has been cited 
above had criticized the shortcomings of the Party’s propaganda work at length. 
The Party newspapers, that were to play a crucial role in the study and rectification 
campaign unfolding in mid-1941, were beset with problems and inadequacies. 
Furthermore, disagreement about the proper principles for newspaper making had 
emerged in the run-up to the campaign. A shake-up of the CCP media apparatus 
in Yan’an was thus inevitable. In April 1942, when rectification moved into high 
gear, the time had come for major reforms across the media sector: on April 15, 
1942, the CCP Secretariat ordered a general restructuring of the publishing sector 
in Yan’an. Even more importantly, two weeks earlier, on April 1, the Party’s 
flagship organ, JFRB, had appeared with an overhauled make-up. From the 
charges levelled against the Party paper JFRB, we can reconstruct the evolving 
media concept that lay behind these moves. This is what the next section will do. 
Before moving on, however, we can make a first, preliminary attempt to 
sum up the core points that have emerged as central elements of the CCP’s 
understanding of the media in the early Yan’an period: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media for the Masses: Reshaping the Party Media 
 The reorganization in April 1942 of JFRB, the CC organ, was a crucial event 
in CCP newspaper history. The restructuring (gaiban 改版) that was announced on 
April 1 in the form of an editorial entitled “To our readers” has been canonized in 
 
(1) The media speak with the unified voice of the party; 
(2) they are indispensable tools of party propaganda and party building; 
(3) they assist the party, the avant-garde of the working class, to raise the 
consciousness of the people; 
(4) the media are essentially about education. 
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official writings on media and propaganda.58 For three reasons, the reshuffle of the 
Party’s flagship newspaper in Yan’an was indeed a decisive moment: firstly, it 
signalled a shift in the power constellation in Yan’an that significantly weakened 
the group of Moscow-returned students who had controlled the Party’s media and 
propaganda apparatus for almost a decade.59 Secondly, the reorganization 
introduced obvious changes in the practice of newspaper making in Yan’an.60 
Finally, it led to a general reformulation of media thinking and provided the basis 
for a new conception of the media’s function in the CCP’s overall project.61 
All the while, it is important to view the JFRB reorganization in context. 
Some observers have overemphasized the importance of the April 1, 1942, 
restructuring. The reshuffle was not an isolated event; it was neither the turning 
point in Mao Zedong’s struggle for intra-Party power, nor was it the key event in 
the Party’s Rectification Campaign.62 Rather, the overhaul of the CCP’s foremost 
propaganda organ was one episode in a much broader political process that saw 
                                             
58 “Zhi duzhe” in JFRB, Apr. 1, 1942. Repr. in XGWH 3.50-53. The April 1 editorial and the March 
16 “Circular” that ordered the reshuffle, established an enduring legacy in CCP media history. It is 
certainly no coincidence that RMRB chose the same title (“To our readers”) for a seminal editorial 
on July 1, 1956, that announced a new direction for the Party’s most prominent newspaper. The 
March 16 “Circular” was reprinted in 1990 in Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu xinwenju (ed.). 
Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen gongzuo wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe (for 
internal publication). This hastily compiled collection was published in the course of the Party’s 
efforts to strengthen control of the media in the wake of the Democracy Movement of spring 1989. 
The fact that the “Circular” is one of only three documents from the pre-1949 period in this 
collection underlines its importance and indicates that the basic lines of argument were accepted 
by the Party to be valid for the media sector even after fifty years. On the background of the April 1 
reforms see further Yang Fangzhi. “Jiefang ribao gaiban yu Yan’an zhengfeng” in Xinwen yanjiu 
ziliao 18 (1983.3), p. 1-5, and Wang Jing. “Dangbao shi shang di yi ci xinwen gaige: jinian Yan’an 
Jiefang ribao gaiban 50 zhounian” in Xinwen yanjiu ziliao 57 (1992.2), p. 132-54. 
59 Compare the discussion of personnel clusters in chapter 1. Zhang Wentian had been sidelined in 
the Propaganda Department after a PB meeting on Jan. 12 that “approved” his plans for a tour of 
the rural areas. The meeting handed over the PD to Kai Feng; day-to-day operations were to be 
handled by Li Weihan. See Mao Zedong nianpu, vol. 2, p. 354. Zhang left on 26 January and gave 
up active involvement in the propaganda sector. See Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi 
(ed.). Zhang Wentian nianpu. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000, 2 vols., here vol. 2, p. 
665. At JFRB, Bo Gu bore the brunt of the criticism. The infighting in the Party during the time 
surrounding the JFRB overhaul has been discussed extensively in Kampen. Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai, and the Chinese Communist Leadership; and Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi 
de, passim. 
60 See the empirical sections of Stranahan. Molding the Medium. 
61 This point is stressed in Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 372-77. However, I 
disagree with Gao’s summary of five “Maoist news principles.” The list neglects the emphasis on 
“mass character” (see below) and the importance of the pre-1942 evolution of CCP thinking on the 
media. Furthermore, Gao tends to overemphasize the role of Mao Zedong, who had decisive 
influence on the formulation of the CCP’s media concept, but did not work out the principles on his 
own. It is more accurate, I believe, to speak of the CCP’s media concept, than of Mao’s. 
62 I am taking issue here with Patricia Stranahan’s argument in both “The Last Battle” and her 
Molding the Medium. I will detail my criticism on the following pages. 
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the Party’s ideological and organizational make-over in the first half of the 1940s; 
JFRB was but one of many battlefields of the Rectification Campaign, and the 
campaign was not about propaganda and the media in the first place. It is with the 
evolution of the Party’s media concept in mind that we must turn our attention to 
discussions surrounding the JFRB overhaul. 
The reorganization that was announced on April 1 had a considerable 
prehistory (see Chart 1). Since its founding in May 1941, JFRB had established 
working routines and a distinct style that are attributed by most observers to the 
ambition of Bo Gu, the paper’s editor-in-chief, to emulate Pravda, the mouthpiece 
of the CPSU. Not all quarters of the Party had been satisfied with this decision, 
and criticism had been voiced occasionally (the older arguments were repeated 
during the critique of the paper after April 1, used as evidence of JFRB’s refusal to 
reform). The issue became critical sometime in January 1942, when Shi Zhe 師哲, 
nominally the personal secretary of Ren Bishi and de facto Mao’s translator for 
Russian, brought the matter to the attention of Mao Zedong.63 Mao is said to have 
read Shi Zhe’s letter to his colleagues at a PB meeting on January 24. The PB 
issued a decision (jueyi 决议) on newspaper work that corresponded with Mao’s 
opinions.64 Thus JFRB had moved into the line of fire, at a crucial point in the 
intensifying Rectification Campaign. 
Over the next weeks, the state of the propaganda sector became a major 
concern for Mao. Only two days after the January 24 document, he personally 
drafted a set of “propaganda key points” (Xuanchuan yaodian 宣传要点) for the 
PD.65 On February 1, he encouraged a young cadre to criticize JFRB’s style which 
he called “party eight-legged essays” (党八股),66 a formulation he would use a  
 
                                             
63 This information is given in Li Zhiying. Bo Gu zhuan, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 
1994, p. 402. The letter is mentioned in none of the three published memoirs of Shi Zhe, Zai lishi 
juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991 (the official version); 
Feng yu gu: Shi Zhe huiyilu. Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992 (the unofficial account); Wode yi 
sheng: Shi Zhe huiyilu. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001. For reasons unknown, Shi Zhe hardly 
mentions Bo Gu at all. 
64 See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Mao Zedong nianpu. Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 2002, 3 vols., here vol. 2, p. 356-57, where a paraphrase of Mao’s arguments 
can be found. The meeting is also mentioned in Xu Zehao (ed.). Wang Jiaxiang nianpu. Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2001, p. 124. 
65 Reprinted in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed). Mao Zedong wenji. Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1993, vol. 2, p. 389-91. 
66 See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Mao Zedong nianpu, vol. 2, p. 360. 
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Chart 2.1 Timeline for the JFRB reshuffle 
 
Jan. Shi Zhe letter to Mao Zedong 
24 Jan. Mao speaks at PB meeting, criticizing JFRB 
26 Jan. Mao drafts “Xuanchuan yaodian” 
1 Feb. Mao letter to young cadre Zhou Wen 
Feb. Lu Dingyi sent to JFRB 
11 Feb. Mao speaks at PB meeting, criticizing JFRB 
8 March Mao calligraphy published in JFRB 
11 March PB meeting, Mao attacks JFRB 
13 March JFRB publishes Wang Shiwei’s Wild Lilies, Part I 
14 March Mao note to Zhou Enlai, mentioning discussions on JFRB 
16 March PD issues “Wei gaijin dangbao de tongzhi” 
26 March JFRB publishes Wang Shiwei’s Wild Lilies, Part II 
31 March JFRB reform meeting; Mao speaks 
1 Apr. JFRB announces reform, publ. March 16 “Tongzhi” 
2 Apr. JFRB publ. Mao’s March 31 speech 
Chart 1: Timeline of the discussions surrounding the JFRB reshuffle 
 
week later in a major rectification speech that has become known under the title 
Fandui dang bagu 反对党八股.67 In a related move, Mao reportedly sent Lu Dingyi 
to oversee work at JFRB sometime in February.68 During several Politburo 
meetings in the next two months, Mao picked up the JFRB issue, and attacks on 
the paper and its leadership escalated. At a conference on February 11, Mao 
presented a long list of JFRB’s shortcomings and called for improvements in the 
paper.69 Bo’s biographers remark that Mao’s scathing criticism greatly affected Bo, 
who was a man with much experience in Party journalism.70 Yet the meeting 
agreed with Mao’s criticism and Bo Gu was forced to make amendments to his 
                                             
67 Published in JFRB on June 18 that year. “Party eight-legged essays” and the issue of style in 
newspaper articles are discussed later in this section. 
68 See Gao Hua. Taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, p. 369. This is confirmed in Xinwen yanjiusuo 
Zhongguo baokan shi yanjiushi. “Yan’an Jiefang ribao shi dagang (zhengqiu yijian gao) in Xinwen 
yanjiu ziliao 17, p. 5-47, here p. 15. Wu Baopu et al. Bo Gu wenxuan – nianpu, p. 489, further 
confirms that on April 3 Lu Dingyi started the column “Study” (Xuexi 学习), a crucial section of the 
reformed paper that carried many materials related to the Rectification Campaign over the next 
months. Lu was officially installed as JFRB’s editor-in-chief on 15 August 1942. See also 
Stranahan, p. 533 (however, Stranahan does not mention his earlier presence and his crucial role 
in founding the new column Xuexi). 
69 See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Mao Zedong nianpu, vol. 2, p. 362-63, 
where Mao’s words are paraphrased. The language used here is much sharper than that adopted 
in the PD directive issued the same day (see below). 
70 Chen Xi. “Bo Gu” in Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan. Xi’an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1983, 
vol. 53, p. 1-51, here p. 43. Adding insult to injury, Mao forced Bo Gu to publish on March 8 a 
calligraphy he had written for the paper, reading: “immerse with the masses, stop empty talking.” 
See Li Zhiying. Bo Gu zhuan, p. 402. Confirmed by Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). 
Mao Zedong nianpu, vol. 2, p. 367. 
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editorial policies. An indication of Mao’s concerns was included in a PD directive of 
the same day.71 The directive said that72 
this anti-subjectivist, anti-factionalist, anti-dang bagu thinking of the [Party] Center has 
not been implemented in the work of the entire Party, and especially in the propaganda 
and education organs, the implementation of these ideas of the Party has not been 
made the key task in our current propaganda and education work. Therefore, ... it is 
necessary, under [the guidance of] these ideas, to transform our propaganda and 
education work, to examine the education in the cadre schools as well as the education 
of cadres on-the-job, and to examine our newspapers and journals; it is necessary to 
achieve the implementation of these ideas of the Centre in the entire work of the Party. 
 
Bo Gu was entrusted with the preparation of a draft paper on the reform of JFRB 
that he presented at a second Politburo meeting a month later, on March 11. 
Again, Mao addressed the meeting and formulated his criticism in very blunt 
language.73 The debate had now reached a point where a new consensus over the 
future of JFRB began to emerge. On March 14, Mao informed Zhou Enlai in 
Chongqing of the discussions over the past weeks, indicating a reshuffle at the CC 
organ,74 and on March 16, five days after the PB meeting, the PD issued an 
important document entitled “Circular concerning the reform of the Party papers” 
(Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu wei gaizao dangbao de tongzhi 中共中央宣
传部为改造党报的通知).75 The circular endorsed Mao’s arguments and outlined a 
new course for the paper. JFRB’s reorganization was imminent. 
Around this time, two events happened that provided Mao with concrete 
material to demonstrate to the PB the urgency of the JFRB overhaul: on March 9, 
JFRB had published “Thoughts on March Eighth” (San-ba jie you gan 三八节有感), 
an essay by the prominent woman writer Ding Ling who was in charge of JFRB’s 
literature and arts section.76 On the occasion of Women’s Day (March 8), Ding 
Ling reflected on the situation of women in Yan’an society and came to sobering 
conclusions. Even more upsetting was the publication, in the same section of the 
                                             
71 “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu jinxing fan zhuguanzhuyi, fan jiaotiaozhuyi, fan zongpaizhuyi, 
fan dang bagu gei ge ji xuanchuanbu de zhishi” (dated Feb. 11, 1942) in XGWX 2.339-41. 
72 Ibid., p. 339-40. 
73 Mao’s remarks at the March 11 meeting have not been published. For paraphrases of the most 
important arguments see Mao Zedong nianpu 2.368. 
74 Mao Zedong nianpu 2.369. For the text of the telegram see “Dangbao ying xishou dangwai 
renyuan fabiao yanlun” in MZDXGW, p. 93. Mao wrote: “There are already discussions on the 
improving of JFRB that shall strengthen its Party character and its [ability] to reflect the masses’ 
[concerns].” 
75 XGWX 2.357-58. The “Circular” was finally published on April 1 on the paper’s first page, right 
next to the editorial “To our readers.” 
76 For a discussion see Merle Goldman. Literary Dissent in Communist China, p. 23f. 
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paper, of Wang Shiwei’s essay “Wild Lilies” (Ye bai hehua 野百荷花), that 
catapulted the writer to his tragic fame. In “Wild Lilies” Wang Shiwei gave a 
scathing critique of the CCP and described Yan’an as a class society with an 
impenetrable hierarchy and a top leadership lacking in concern for the ordinary 
people.77 
While some of Wang’s accusations may have even matched Mao’s own 
criticism of his colleagues, the prescriptions he indicated to cure the Party’s ills did 
certainly not. Because of its bluntness, Wang Shiwei’s essay came as a handy 
argument to shake up the literature and arts establishment in Yan’an, and also to 
accuse the JFRB leadership, and Bo Gu in particular, of tolerating erroneous 
tendencies on the pages of the CC’s mouthpiece. All the while, the Wang Shiwei 
affair was but an alibi, and one among many. It was certainly not the cause and 
the reason that triggered the JFRB reshuffle in the first place, as has become clear 
from the discussion above.78 
Bo Gu’s leadership of JFRB was soon coming to an end. He submitted an 
internal self-criticism to the editorial committee, and repeated his mistakes in 
public at a large conference on March 31 that had been convened to discuss the 
reorganization of the paper.79 The meeting was attended by about seventy people, 
including the newspaper’s staff, and presided over by Mao Zedong.80 In particular, 
Bo Gu presented the finalized draft, that had been read and revised by Mao 
Zedong, of the editorial “To our readers” that was to appear the next morning.81 
While it did not carry the name of its author, it must be read not only as an 
authoritative statement of those ideas that Mao Zedong had formulated for the 
                                             
77 Wang Shiwei. “Ye bai hehua” in JFRB, March 13, 1942 (first part) and March 26 (second part) 
(the articles are signed “Shiwei”). Repr. in Zhu Hongzhao (ed.). Wang Shiwei wencun. Shanghai: 
Shanghai Sanlian shudian, 1998, p. 125-32. On the Wang Shiwei affair see further Dai Qing. Wang 
Shiwei and “Wild Lilies:” Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
78 Patricia Stranahan directly links the Wang Shiwei affair with Mao’s decision to overhaul the 
newspaper. This was certainly not the case. Rather, the JFRB reshuffle had a prehistory (almost 
entirely absent in Stranahan’s account) of at least three months, as the record of PB meetings and 
communications shows that I have reconstructed above. 
79 For Bo Gu’s self-criticism see Wu Baopu et al. Bo Gu wenxuan – nianpu, p. 488f. 
80 On this meeting see Wang Jing. “Dangbao shi shang di yi ci xinwen gaige,” p. 135f. Mao’s 
speech at the meeting was published in JFRB on April 2, 1942. 
81 For Bo’s authorship of the April 1 editorial see his biography in Renwu zhuan, p. 43-44. It has 
been included in Wu Baopu et al. Bo Gu wenxuan – nianpu, p. 304. On Mao’s redaction of Bo’s 
draft see the note ibid., p. 304. 
 97
media in the course of the Rectification campaign, but also as Bo Gu’s personal 
self-criticism, a humiliating public confession of his mistakes. 
In the discussion above I have focused on the background of the April 1942 
reorganization of JFRB and on the personnel changes in the CCP’s propaganda 
sector. I will now turn to the consequences of the reshuffle for the emergence of a 
new conception of newspaper making, both in practice and in theory. The editorial 
“To our readers” begins with the words: “Today, our paper respectfully presents 
our readers with a new layout; we want to use this opportunity to summarize our 
work of the past ten months and to put forward the future direction of this paper.”82 
JFRB’s self-criticism presents the most systematic analysis of the mistakes of the 
Party media; furthermore, it is an important source for the investigation into those 
themes in the media field that emerged in the Yan’an Rectification Campaign and 
that became factors shaping the Party’s media concept. In what follows, I will 
deliver a close reading of the editorial.83 
“To our readers” is an unusually elegant and rhetorically powerful text, 
hinting to the care with which it was prepared. It sets out with a number of 
questions:84 
What is a party paper? Whenever this question is raised, everyone will certainly think of 
such well-known words as “the party paper is not just a collective propagandist and 
agitator, but also a collective organizer” (Lenin) or “the party paper is our sharpest and 
most powerful weapon” (Stalin). But we may be forgiven to ask: how can a newspaper 
actually become a collective propagandist, agitator, or organizer? And how exactly can 
it become the sharpest and most powerful weapon in the hands of our Party? 
 
Confronting the reader with the Lenin and Stalin quotations right at the beginning 
is an economical approach to the problem. The quotation from “What is to be 
Done?” was widely known among the Chinese Communists, and the Stalin quote 
is being used almost as often.85 Yet, and this the editorial shows, it had become a 
                                             
82 “Zhi duzhe” in JFRB, Apr. 1, 1942. Repr. in XGWH 3.50-53. 
83 The editorial also sums up most of the points made by Mao in his speeches at the February 11 
and March 31 meetings. I will comment on these earlier remarks by Mao wherever the comparison 
offers insights in the development of his ideas concerning the press in the months leading up to the 
JFRB reshuffle. 
84 “To our readers,” JFRB, April 1, 1942. 
85 Taken from Stalin’s organizational report to the CPSU’s 12th Party Congress (dated 17 Apr. 
1923). In Chinese see Li Qingfang (ed.). Sidalin lun baokan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1985, p. 
194-95, here p. 194.The quote has been used all over the Socialist world. In February 1950 the 
SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the ruling Party in the GDR) convened a seminal 
conference on the press under the same slogan. See Gunter Holzweißig. Die schärfste Waffe der 
Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002, p. vii. 
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habit to quote the classic authors of Marxism in a mechanical way, devoid of 
concrete content. It is this mistake, elsewhere termed “formalism,” that the editorial 
hopes to make good for by elaborating on four points for a Party newspaper:86 
So [a good Party newspaper] must: firstly, carry through a firm party character. It is not 
enough to “directly and openly adopt the standpoint of a definite social group in any 
assessment of events” (Lenin);87 it is not enough to take the Party’s point of view, the 
Party’s opinion on all pages [of the newspaper], in every single article, every report, 
and every news item – but, and even more importantly so, the newspaper must be 
closely linked to all the Party’s principles, all policies, and all trends; it must breathe 
together with the Party. The newspaper must become the trailblazer and the vanguard 
carrying out the Party’s every policy and every call. 
Secondly, [the newspaper must] establish close ties with the masses, reflect the 
masses’ feelings, their needs and demands; record the moments of their heroic 
struggle both happy and tragic, and reflect the suffering and bitterness they are 
enduring; it must convey their opinions and voices. The newspaper’s task is not only to 
enrich the masses’ knowledge, to expand their horizon, to raise their consciousness, 
and to teach and organize them, but rather it must become their mirror and their 
mouthpiece, the friend sharing weal and woe. 
Thirdly, [the newspaper must] be brimming with combat character. The Party paper 
must be a fighter struggling for the Party’s revolutionary principles and line. It must 
engage in zealous agitation, as political events before us require – and the success of 
this agitation depends on its exposing all darkness and corruption forthrightly and 
pointedly, on its attacking all schemes and manoeuvres harmful to our anti-Japanese 
unity. And particularly on the ideological front the newspapers must engage in the 
continual and persistent struggle of ideas, must propagate Communist and democratic 
thought, must combat all reaction and restoration, darkness and ignorance. But at the 
same time, the newspapers must also be a powerful weapon of self-criticism in the 
hands of our Party. With a matter-of-fact attitude, with the attitude of comrades, the 
Party paper must criticize and censure the mistakes and weaknesses within our ranks; 
it must help us in overcoming and correcting them. 
Fourthly, [the newspaper must] respond to the calls of Party and government, or in line 
with the Party’s principles spearhead the different kinds of popular movements, and 
continuously oversee and direct the movement’s unfolding; it must lend concrete 
assistance to the different kinds of popular movements and to the struggle of the great 
masses of workers and peasants. Under no circumstances can the Party paper 
become a passive recorder of what happens; rather, it must be an active advocate and 
organizer of all kinds of movements. 
 
The above section shows the powerful rhetoric of the editorial; its language was 
crafted carefully in order to underline the importance of its message. In particular, 
the section sums up several arguments that figure prominently in many other 
writings of the Yan’an period. The CCP Party newspapers are to fulfil four 
requirements: party character, mass character, combat character, and 
organization character. “Party character” is a little satisfactory translation of 
                                             
86 “To our readers.” 
87 This quotation is from “The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve’s 
Book,” where Lenin speaks about the partisan character of the materialist worldview. See Collected 
Works, vol. 1, p. 333-507, here p. 401, with minor changes. 
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dangxing 党性, (or partiinost), that had been an integral element in CCP media 
thinking for two decades. The other three terms (which are even more difficult to 
translate), however, are of more or less indigenous origin. “Mass character” 
(qunzhong xing 群众性) manifests itself in “establish[ing] close ties with the 
masses.” It is with regard to this requirement that Mao attested JFRB major 
shortcomings and the need for improvements. Under the heading “combat 
character” (zhandou xing 战斗性), the editorial calls for a more aggressive style: a 
Party paper is not supposed to report from the sidelines (not even from a partisan 
perspective), but to throw itself actively into the political and ideological struggles 
of the Party. Obviously, JFRB had not shown enough edge in the promotion of the 
Party’s propaganda. The last point, “organization character” (zuzhi xing 组织性) 
remains the most obscure of the four requirements in the April 1 editorial. In a 
speech two years later, Bo Gu summed “organization character” up: “to not simply 
reflect reality, but rather to transform reality, to organize [mass] movements, and to 
direct an assigned work.”88 “Organization character” is an effort to put Lenin’s 
remarks concerning the organizational capabilities of the Party paper into more 
concrete terms, it refers directly to the guiding and mobilizing function of the press 
in political campaigns, such as the Rectification Movement then under way. 
JFRB had failed on all four fronts during the period from May 1941 to March 
1942; the paper had not fulfilled its mission as the organ and the mouthpiece of 
the CCP CC. What follows in the April 1 editorial is an extensive self-criticism: “It 
must be said that JFRB has been unable to fulfil the task of becoming a truly 
militant party organ, it has not yet become the sharp weapon of the Party Centre 
that disseminates the Party line, prosecutes the Party’s policies, and delivers 
propaganda and organization to the masses.”89 What exactly were the 
shortcomings of the paper? JFRB acknowledged,90 
we have allocated the most space to international news while failing to record in any 
systematic manner the life and the struggle of the people of the whole country and the 
various base areas; we have carried the Centre’s decisions and directives, as well as 
the articles of our leading comrades, yet did so in an isolated fashion and without 
                                             
88 “Dangbao jizhe yao zhuyi xie shenme wenti” (dated fall 1944) in XGWH 3.203-05, here p. 204. 
The original reads “to direct reality” (zhidao xianshi 指导现实), but that doesn’t seem to make sense. 
Since the text is based on a transcript by Hong Liu 洪流 (pseudonym?) of a speech Bo Gu gave, I 
assume that “transform reality” comes nearer to what the speaker had in mind. 
89 “To our readers.” 
90 Ibid. 
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attaching elaborations and explanations; and [we provided] almost no feedback of the 
implementation of and experiences learned from these policies and decisions. We have 
given enormous amounts of space to dull and dry articles and translations, but failed to 
explain problems of an urgent nature in a language lively and vivid, popular and easy to 
understand. We did fall short of criticizing hostile ideology in an appropriate way. 
 
JFRB admitted to being guilty of an attitude of aloofness from the masses – it had 
not sufficiently served the needs of the cadres and people of the border region. A 
particularly interesting confession is, of course, that of excessively stressing 
international news. As the Communist movement defined itself in internationalist 
terms, the CCP’s inward-looking turn to local concerns reflects a decisive shift in 
attitude. It is a critique in particular of Bo Gu and others with experience abroad 
that made them alert to international developments and to directives from the 
Communist International – influence that Mao tried to reduce. These issues were 
now said to be of limited interest to a mainly rural population in a secluded base 
area (and to the cadres working there); consequently, the coverage of foreign 
affairs was to be downgraded. Mao’s influence is discernible not only in this point. 
Several of the above points in the paper’s self-criticism echo Mao Zedong’s 
rectification talks: “given … space to dull and dry articles and translations” takes 
up what Mao had mocked as “Party eight-legged essays” (dang bagu 党八股).91 
Even when the Rectification Campaign gathered momentum, JFRB had not rid 
itself of old habits:92 
In our Party papers, we have not given to the rectification of the three styles [i.e. the 
style of learning (xuefeng 学风), the style of the Party (dangfeng 党风), and the writing 
style (wenfeng 文风)] the attention and place it deserves; this practice has grown into a 
trend, and the trend into a tide, [with the result that] important Party news have been 
relegated to the most inconspicuous places [on the page]. A number of explanatory 
articles and comments was either superficial and devoid of content, with tough 
language but vague meaning, or were sticking to a single point to the neglect of all 
others, thus distorting the original meaning, or were even full of hollow phrases – 
opposing the eight-legged essay with nothing else but the eight-legged essay. 
 
                                             
91 “Fandui dang bagu,” based on Mao’s speech from Feb. 8, 1942, was one the 22 Rectification 
Documents and appeared in JFRB on June 18 that year. In this text, Mao attacks the writing style 
(wenfeng 文风) of his colleagues as dry, repetitive, and dogmatic. Dang bagu was said to be a 
symptom of subjectivist and factionalist tendencies in the Party. To counter dang bagu, Mao had 
the Party study a small booklet called Xuanchuan zhinan 宣传指南 that contained, next to texts 
from Lenin, Dimitrov and Mao, a short excerpt from Lu Xun, where the writer gives advice on 
writing style. Xuanchuan zhinan is recommended in Mao’s “Fandui dang bagu” and was distributed 
on the day Mao made his speech. It appeared in JFRB on Feb. 15, 1942, and became one of the 
22 rectification documents. 
92 “To our readers.” 
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While pronouncing the “death sentence” on dang bagu,93 the paper had failed to 
come up with credible evidence that it was prepared to become a model for an 
improved writing style. And not only with regard to its style of writing had JFRB 
failed: “In order to become the vanguard of anti-subjectivism, anti-factionalism, and 
anti-dang bagu, [the newspaper] itself first must become a model [in the 
rectification struggle], because only a model can be a vanguard.”94 Yet exactly that 
had not happened; instead, JFRB had lagged behind the general trend. The Party 
paper was supposed to perform a model function in all the Party’s political 
campaigns: as the foremost propaganda tool, the Party organs were to set the 
tone for the rest of the Party. It was in this way that Lenin’s dictum of the Party 
paper’s double function as propagandist and organizer was to be understood. 
To illustrate these mistakes, the editorial quoted several examples of 
JFRB’s failures in recent months: 
Subjectivism (for example, the assessment of the German-Turkish agreement on the 
eve of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany),95 factionalism (like the 
rejection of certain article manuscripts and [the paper’s] inability to avoid narrow-
minded thinking), and dang bagu (like certain editorials, specialized articles, and 
columns) can be found all over our pages. Consequently, [our paper] has been unable 
to assume its proper function in the reform of the entire Party through ideological 
revolution. 
 
Subjectivism is a grave political error: a form of idealism, it had led the Party to 
incorrect assessments under the leadership of Wang Ming and Bo Gu.96 The 
editorial pleads guilty of committing subjectivist errors as late as June 1941: the 
paper’s failure to anticipate the German invasion of the Soviet Union and other 
miscalculations had convinced the PD of the need to distribute “Propaganda 
essentials” (Xuanchuan yaodian 宣传要点) since August 1941.97 However, even 
                                             
93 In an editorial “Xuanbu dang bagu de sixing” in JFRB, Feb. 11, 1942. 
94 “To our readers.” 
95 The “Treaty of Friendship between Germany and Turkey” was signed on June 18, 1941, four 
days prior to Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, and allowed Germany to concentrate its 
troops to attack its former ally. 
96 This accusation has been upheld in later years: in the 1945 “Resolution on some questions 
concerning the history of our Party” Wang Ming and Bo Gu were criticized for subjectivism. 
According to Kampen. The Chinese Communist Leadership, p. 112, the original “Resolution” 
contained the accusations, but did not mention the names of Wang Ming and Bo Gu. These were 
added only in 1953, when the “Resolution” was included in volume 3 of Mao’s Selected Works. 
97 See “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu xuanchuan yaodian,” Aug. 2, Aug. 16, Aug. 26, 1941, in XGWX 
2.277-78, 281, 282-83, all of which contain the Party leadership’s assessment of the war in Europe 
and the Far East, thus directly prescribing the editorial line. For the April 1 editorial, it did not matter 
that the Soviet leadership had been subject to the same miscalculations (without being guilty of 
subjectivism, of course). 
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then subjectivism apparently had not been overcome, so that by late March 1942, 
when JFRB’s reform was decided upon, JFRB was still failing “to assume its 
proper function in the reform of the entire Party through ideological revolution.” 
Factionalism (zongpaizhuyi 宗派主义) was an equally serious accusation. 
The editorial suggests that JFRB had been hijacked – at least during certain times 
– by groups within the Party and had refused access to its pages to others;98 the 
result was “narrow-minded thinking.” The editorial, however, does not call for more 
democratic procedures by giving equal access to different opinions: factionalism is 
itself an evil that the Rectification Campaign was to fight, in order to create a 
unified, centralized Party that would speak with a single, unified voice (but now, 
the correct single voice). 
Concrete manifestations of dang bagu had been found in editorials, but also 
in the columns (fukan 副刊), especially the “eight specialized columns” (ba da 
zhuanlan 八大专栏).99 Apparently, some of the articles in the regular columns were 
found to be overly academic and detached from the concerns of the border region 
population and the average cadres in Yan’an. The column that had most incurred 
the leadership’s wrath was Ding Ling’s “Literature and Art,” where Wang Shiwei’s 
essays had appeared, but also Ding’s own controversial “Thoughts on March 
Eighth.” Only three of the eight columns resumed publication after April 1, 1942, 
yet with less frequency than before.100 
The new layout that was introduced after April 1, 1942 reacted on the 
charges levelled against JFRB. For more than half a year, since the paper’s 
expansion from two to four pages in September 1941, it had as a rule devoted the 
first page to important news from the European war, domestic news, and editorials. 
Page two had seen more international news, page three national news, and the 
last page was usually divided between local news of the Border Region and 
                                             
98 For example, reporting on Mao’s Feb. 8 speech on the “Party eight-legged essay” was delayed 
until Feb. 10, when a short note appeared on the bottom of page three. Only on Feb. 11, three 
days after the speech, the paper came up with a belated editorial “Xuanbu dang bagu de sixing.” 
99 For a discussion of the columns see Stranahan. “The Last Battle,” p. 525ff. 
100 “Enemy” (Diqing 敌情), “Science” (Kexue yuandi 科学园地), and “Health” (Weisheng 卫生) were 
the only columns to survive the reshuffle. They were joined in May 1942 by a new column: “Study” 
(Xuexi 学习), edited by Lu Dingyi. 
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columns.101 After April 1, the first page contained important national, international, 
and local news, and editorials.102 Page two featured news from the Border Region, 
page three international news, and page four a few columns, study materials, 
documents, and the occasional literary item. All these changes can be traced to 
the accusations and to the paper’s confession of its mistakes. Albeit, they are just 
the surface reflection of much more profound changes taking place. An alteration 
of layout was certainly not what Mao and the rest of the Party leadership present 
at the February 11, March 11, and March 31 meetings on JFRB’s reforms had in 
mind. 
Towards the end of the April 1 editorial, a sketch of the paper’s new 
conception of its own role is emerging:103 
Our Party is a Party representing the people; for us, there are no other interests than 
those of the people. We want to make our newspaper the common platform for all 
people and all parties of the entire nation resisting against Japan; we welcome all anti-
Japanese individuals and parties to use our pages so as to advance all proposals and 
measures that might be beneficial to our unity against Japan, and to eliminate all 
obstacles harmful to the great enterprise of resistance and reconstruction. 
 
The crucial point in this passage is the word “people” – renmin 人民. Mao had 
indicated that he thought of a “people’s newspaper” – renmin de baozhi 人民的报
纸 – in a much more literal sense than most of his colleagues: “Our newspapers 
must localize, must reflect the local situation. The Party papers must reflect the 
masses and [thus] carry out the Party’s policies.”104 The masses mentioned by 
Mao are in a very concrete sense the people living in the Border Region, and it is 
for this reason that the paper must “localize” (difanghua 地方化) in order to 
become the people’s paper. In an equally literal sense we must understand the 
term “reflect” (fanying 反映): the newspaper is part of a two-way process: ying 映 is 
to be understood as the bright sunlight that shines on the people in form of the 
Party’s policies – which are carried by the paper because of its party character. 
The paper’s mass character now reverses this direction and informs the Party of 
                                             
101 See Stranahan, who has carried out an extensive content analysis of JFRB. “The Last Battle,” p. 
524. On the period after April 1, 1942, see Molding the Medium, p. 7. 
102 In imitation of the practice of Pravda, JFRB had run daily editorials before the reshuffle. This 
practice had been criticized and it was discontinued under the new editorial line. 
103 “To our readers.” 
104 Taken from Mao Zedong nianpu, p. 368. Mao’s remarks from March 11 have not been 
published and are not marked as a quotation in Nianpu, but the language suggests strongly that 
the compilators are quoting literally from the meeting transcript. 
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the effects its policies have on the masses. In the concept of the “mass character” 
of the newspapers we can find a dialectical argument similar to that of democratic 
centralism, where the people are to provide input for the Party, which crystallizes 
these inputs, moulds them into policies, and returns them to the people. 
Of the four requirements for a newspaper – party character, mass character, 
combat character, and organization character – two stand out in importance: party 
and mass character. The demand that newspapers adhere closely to Party 
policies and follow the prescriptions of the Party centre, the requirement to speak 
with a unified voice for the entire Party, seems hardly an innovation. It had in fact 
been a key feature of Communist media policy since the founding of the CCP105 
and had been made a requirement in the Communist movement outside China at 
a much earlier date. Yet Mao’s insistence on party character, a central theme in 
his addresses to the Politburo meetings preceding the JFRB reforms,106 was more 
than just a matter of degree, as the theme of class struggle became ever more 
important for Mao.107 The Yan’an Rectification Campaign thus gave a new 
interpretation of a trend that has been noted above as one of the features of media 
thinking in Yan’an. 
The most innovative of the four elements listed in the April 1 editorial was 
mass character. Party character and mass character were closely interrelated. 
Mao had indicated this when he remarked:108 
Newspapers must concentrate on the affairs of their own country. This is one 
expression of party character. Now our JFRB has not yet sufficiently manifested our 
Party character; the most obvious sign of this is that our newspapers have allotted 
most space to reprinting news from foreign and domestic bourgeois news agencies and 
[thus] have spread their influence. Propagation of our Party’s policies and of the 
masses’ activities, in contrast, has been few and far between, or has been assigned to 
the least important places [of the page]. JFRB must focus its attention chiefly on 
China’s war of resistance, on the activities of our Party, and on the construction of our 
base areas; it must reflect the masses’ activities and substantiate [the flow of] 
information for the lower levels. 
 
The newspaper’s Party character lies exactly in its concern for local affairs and the 
affairs of the masses of the Border Region, supposed to be its primary readership. 
The slogan that was coined in the Yan’an era to give expression to this approach 
                                             
105 Compare chapter one for this point. 
106 See Mao Zedong nianpu, p. 362, 368. 
107 I will comment on the growing Influence of Stalin’s thinking on Mao in the next section of this 
chapter. 
108 Mao’s remarks at the February 11 politburo meeting, in Mao Zedong nianpu, p. 362. 
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was “a newspaper run by the entire party” (quan dang ban bao 全党办报) – as 
opposed to “a newspaper run by journalists” (jizhe ban bao 记者办报). Writing from 
hindsight, the JFRB editorial commemorating the newspaper’s 1000th issue, in 
February 1944, stressed this point. With a long quote from the April 1, 1942 
editorial, the general political line of the reshuffle is confirmed. The reforms have 
brought about the desired results: “After the reshuffle, our paper has carried out 
reforms in line with the Centre’s principles. Our most important experience from 
the twenty-two months since then can be summed up in just one sentence: ‘a 
newspaper run by the entire Party.’”109 The demand that the newspapers get 
involved with the masses and go down to the masses had been put into more 
concrete terms since 1942. The reshuffle had – at least partly – succeeded in 
shaking up the mindset of the Yan’an newspaper corps, not few of whom had 
come from the cosmopolitan professional journalism of Shanghai and elsewhere. 
Where intellectuals were allowed to remain in their positions, the message that 
they must reach out to their audiences had been driven home. The 1944 editorial 
declared:110 
Our newspaper is the newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, is the newspaper of 
the great people’s masses; this is the first characteristic of our paper. Our journalists 
must work for the anti-Japanese people’s masses, and in the first place work for the 
workers, peasants, and soldiers. This means that we are different from certain other 
newspapers, we do not bow and scrape for the interests of a few people, or for their 
tastes. And this means that we do not tolerate any contempt for the workers, peasants, 
and soldiers, and the anti-Japanese great people’s masses, or any misrepresentations 
of their activities. We demand a truthful coverage of their lives, their activities, and their 
views. 
We are running a newspaper in the countryside, this is very different from running a 
paper in the large cities; this is the second characteristic of our paper. And just 
because of this point, certain methods appropriate for [newspapers in] the cities cannot 
likewise be used here. 
 
Again, “mass character” in the very concrete sense means that the Party paper 
must focus its work on the concerns of the local population, in this case a rural, 
unsophisticated population. The overwhelming majority of basic level cadres in the 
Border Region were peasants themselves who had been newly recruited into the 
Party. The CCP was struggling to raise levels of literacy and introduce a basic 
                                             
109 “Ben bao chuangkan yiqian qi,” JFRB editorial, Feb. 16, 1944. Repr. in XGWH 3.65-69. 
110 Ibid. 
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understanding of Marxist principles. Intellectual exercises were unsuited for a 
newspaper that was intended to serve as a medium of instruction on a large scale. 
The first step towards the implementation of the “mass character” concept 
was to call on CCP members to participate in the work of the Party papers: 
“mobilize the entire Party to [take part in] running the newspaper” was the slogan 
driven home by another JFRB editorial with the programmatic title “The Party and 
the Party Paper.”111 After admonishing the paper’s own staff to adhere strictly to 
the Party’s line and policies, to be vigilant in the face of the political enemy, and to 
“breathe the air the Party leadership breathes, breathe the air the entire Party 
collective breathes,”112 the editorial cautions: “But in order to produce a good Party 
paper, to make the Party paper a collective propagandist and collective organizer, 
the above measures alone are not enough. There is another aspect, another 
important condition: the Party must mobilize the entire Party [membership] to join 
in running the newspaper.”113 The CCP now rushed to fill Lenin’s famous dictum 
with concrete content and urged its members to devote more attention to their 
newspapers. The goal the Party had in mind was to make readers and authors 
become one: the hierarchical relationship implicit in the character of the 
newspaper should be eliminated as far as possible, in favour of a more 
participatory concept. Since 1942, the CCP leadership issued numerous 
statements and circulars that urged the Party members to become more actively 
involved in the production of the Party papers, and especially JFRB. In a JFRB 
editorial, Hu Qiaomu urged his fellow comrades:114 
The responsible cadres of all the Party’s departments, every Party member, and all of 
our supporters, please keep in mind: making our newspaper better and better – this is 
also your inescapable responsibility! It is your responsibility to change your passive 
attitude towards the Party paper; it is your responsibility to supply the Party paper with 
the manuscripts it needs and to arrange the masses to write contributions; it is your 
responsibility to train yourself and the people surrounding you, to become competent 
correspondents. Only if everybody roll up their sleeves will we be able to produce an 
                                             
111 “Dang yu dangbao,” JFRB editorial, Sept. 22, 1942. Repr. in XGWH 3.54-58. The editorial was 
written by Bo Gu. See Wu Baopu. Bo Gu wenxuan – nianpu, p. 312-16. 
112 “Dang yu dangbao.” 
113 Ibid. 
114 “Ba women baozhi ban de geng hao xie,” JFRB editorial, July 18, 1942. Repr. in Hu Qiaomu 
wenji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992, vol. 1, p. 76-79. For similar statements see “Zhonggong 
zhongyang Xibeiju guanyu JFRB gongzuo wenti de jueding” (dated Sept. 9, 1942), in XGWH 
1.132-34, here p. 133. The Sept. 22 editorial written by Bo Gu is a reaction to this directive. 
Another example is “Zhonggong zhongyang Jin-Sui fenju guanyu Kangzhan ribao gongzuo de 
jueding” (dated Oct. 1, 1942), in XGWH 1.135-36, here p. 136. 
 107
even better newspaper, and only then can we make headway with our struggle on this 
front. 
 
The frequency of these calls to the journalistic frontlines, however, also shows the 
reluctance of the majority of rank and file Party members to accept the 
cumbersome task of journalistic work. In an effort to make the Party leadership set 
a good example, the CC resorted to rather desperate methods, such as asking its 
high-ranking cadres to deliver fixed monthly quotas of articles to the Party papers: 
in September 1942, Mao drafted a proposal that assigned Peng Zhen a monthly 
workload of 15,000 characters in articles (on Party building), and 12,000 
characters each to Chen Boda (on politics, economics, and international affairs) 
and Chen Huangmei 陈荒煤 (literature). Mao requested: “in principle, no article 
should exceed 4,000 characters in length; any articles longer than that should be 
the exception.”115 In anticipation of the sixth anniversary of the Lugouqiao 卢沟桥 
incident that marks the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, the CC Secretariat 
ordered Lin Biao 林彪, Peng Dehuai 彭德怀, Liu Bocheng 刘伯承, Deng Xiaoping, 
and other generals of the Communist armed forces to write commemorative 
articles and instructed them: “you will be notified later on the subject of your 
articles from the Xinhua news agency; they should normally not exceed 5,000 
characters in length. Please make lively and vivid descriptions and analytical 
conclusions; avoid dull and boring tables and statistics. Please send the articles to 
the Xinhua main branch by way of the Xinhua broadcastings before June 20.”116 
The articles were to be inspected and approved (shending 审定) by the CC and 
then broadcast to the various base areas for use in the local newspapers. 
Yet having only the high-level cadres take more seriously their 
responsibilities towards the Party press was not enough. To increase the “mass 
character” of JFRB, it was necessary that “everybody roll up their sleeves,”117 and 
in particular the Party rank and file in the (few) factories and the villages were 
called upon to join the CCP newspaper work. The strategy developed to bring the 
newspaper down into the villages and onto the factory floor was the system of 
                                             
115 “JFRB di si ban zheng gao banfa” in MZDXGW, p. 101-03. Altogether sixteen cadres were 
assigned fixed monthly quotas. 
116 “Zhongyang shujichu guanyu jinian kangzhan liu zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo de zhishi” 
(dated May 31, 1943), in XGWX 2.503. 
117 Hu Qiaomu. “Ba women baozhi ban de geng hao xie.” 
 108
“worker and peasant correspondents,” or gong-nong tongxuanyuan 工农通讯员. Of 
all the CCP strategies adopted after the April 1942 reshuffle to strengthen the 
newspaper’s “mass character”, the promotion of the correspondents system was 
by far the most important, and that with the most lasting impact.118 
Correspondents were literate workers or peasants, often ordinary Party 
members, who received basic training in journalistic writing but remained on their 
regular posts. They would contribute reports, articles, and observations from their 
own perspective. The material they provided would be processed by editors at the 
newspaper desk and rewritten into articles prior to publication. The rationale 
behind this strategy was the supposed authenticity of these reports from the basic 
level. In 1944, Deng Tuo explained to propaganda workers of the Jin-Cha-Ji 
border region: “only when the masses themselves write about their lives and their 
struggle will [the articles] be really truthful and lively; and only when the masses 
can by themselves write correspondents reports, will our correspondents system 
reach its apex.”119 A maximum of authenticity was to be guaranteed through this 
mode of writing:120 
In this process, we first of all demand from our correspondents that all reports and 
correspondences should, as far as possible, be approved by the masses; if you write 
about some place and some people, you should read it to these people or let them 
read it, and thus get their corrections and revisions, and only if you can make sure that 
your report or correspondence really comes from the masses, only then can you be 
satisfied. 
 
By setting up correspondent networks the CCP tried to integrate as large as 
possible a number of people from “the masses” into journalistic work. The 
newspapers should focus on the masses as its readers, and the best way to do so 
was to make them write about what was of concern to them. 
 
                                             
118 On tongxunyuan see Lorenz Bichler. “Organized Spontaneity: The Chinese Communist Party 
and its Grassroots Correspondents” in Asiatische Studien 51.4 (1997), p. 963-69; and the same 
author’s “Public Secrets: Propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party and Correspondents 
(tongxun yuan) in Shanghai after 1949” in Gabór T. Rittersporn, Malte Rolf, Jan C. Behrends (eds.). 
Sphären von Öffentlichkeit in Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs: Public Spheres in Soviet-Type 
Societies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003, p. 357-85. 
119 “Gaizao women de tongxun gongzuo he baodao fangfa” in XGWH 3.216-23, here p. 218. Deng, 
who was in charge of Jin-Cha-Ji ribao, gave his speech on April 14, 1944; it appeared in a 
supplement (zengkan 增刊) of that paper on May 16 the same year. 
120 Ibid. 
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The mass line of newspaper work, however, would go only that far. A 
democratization of the Party papers was intended only within the limits of 
“democratic centralism.” Professional propagandists always had to polish the 
material provided by the basis. Even more importantly, they were responsible for 
the “correctness” of the resulting articles, i.e. for the correspondents’ reports being 
in agreement with the Party line and the current policies. Lu Dingyi indicated the 
need for refinement publicly in an article in JFRB, where he reminded the Party’s 
professional journalists: “With regard to manuscripts from people who are either 
labouring themselves or are leading [ordinary] labour, you must bear in mind that it 
is only natural that their writing skills are not good; your task is, on the one hand, 
to learn from them and to respect the facts they write down, and on the other hand 
to be their teacher or ‘hairdresser.’”121 Other, internal documents are more blunt 
with regard to the role of this “hairdresser” (lifayuan 理发员). A directive of the CC 
Jin-Cha-Ji Branch Bureau (fenju 分局) gave detailed instructions on methods and 
procedures of censorship of correspondents’ articles:122 
In order to guarantee the correctness and truthfulness of the articles published in our 
Party papers, the paper’s office will refuse any article of importance that has not been 
inspected [shencha 审查] by the [CC] Branch Bureau PD (the same applies to 
important manuscripts coming from reporters dispatched by the paper itself or to 
manuscripts received from various sources). The Party committees and organizations 
on the various layers must take seriously the inspection of correspondents manuscripts; 
The [CC] Branch Bureau PD [in turn] will return any manuscript that is not signed and 
stamped by the responsible cadre in the Party committee or government (such as 
county head or chairman of the Anti-[Japanese] Union [kanglian 抗联]). While the focus 
of censorship varies on the different levels, all must pay attention to correctness (for 
example: is [the article] in accordance with the Party policies? Does it reveal any 
secrets? Does it really deserve the praise of the Party paper?), and truthfulness (for 
example: are there any exaggerations? Are the [numbers in reports on] battle 
successes of the militia correct and not exaggerated? The county level bears the main 
responsibility for this [latter] point). 
 
The directive establishes several layers of censorship at both local and branch 
bureau levels. Censorship comprises both political and military aspects, as well as 
journalistic questions. While rank and file Party members were encouraged to join 
Party journalism, and local newspapers and propaganda bureaus were urged to 
                                             
121 “Women duiyu xinwenxue de jiben guandian” in JFRB, Sept. 1, 1943, repr. in Lu Dingyi wenji. 
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992, p. 331-40. 
122 “Zhonggong zhongyang Jin-Cha-Ji fenju guanyu dangbao gongzuo de zhishi” (dated Feb. 3, 
1944) in XGWH 1.145-47, here p. 146. 
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establish “correspondents networks” (tongxun wang 通讯网),123 the 
implementation of the mass line did not automatically mean that “the masses” had 
more of a say in the paper’s content. 
The correspondents system was no invention of the Yan’an era. Worker 
and peasant correspondents had been supposed to “reflect the demands of the 
worker and peasant masses” and to “represent the voices of the broad labouring 
masses”124 since at least the early 1930s. In the difficult environment of the Jiangxi 
Soviet, Hongse Zhonghua, the CC organ, had relied on an extensive system of 
correspondents spanning the entire Soviet: “Our Hongse Zhonghua... has 
established correspondents and distribution networks; [thus] it can reflect the 
militant mood of the masses from the entire Soviet, and it can reach any place on 
the map of our Soviet – the masses fall over one another to read it. It has already 
become the broadcaster arousing the fighting enthusiasm of the millions of 
masses in the Soviet, and it has received the support of the broad masses!”125 The 
correspondents network and the distribution network of the CCP organ were 
closely interrelated in order to expand the reach of the paper in rural south-eastern 
Jiangxi to a maximum. However, the correspondents system had not been 
developed to its full potential in Yan’an. When Mao Zedong and the CCP set out to 
search for ways to reform the mode of newspaper making, they decided to push to 
prominence a strategy that had been successfully applied in the Jiangxi Soviet.126  
The roots of this strategy, however, must be sought in the Soviet Union. 
Pravda, the CPSU organ, had made extensive use of correspondents throughout 
its history and was praised as a model for China:127 
If Pravda, before the [October] Revolution, was able to publish over 11,000 reports 
from worker correspondents in a single year, then the number of correspondents 
reports in our papers must be called poor and meagre – not to mention their quality. 
This is, first of all, because of the poor guidance and organization from our editorial 
                                             
123 Tao Zhu, who was in charge of propaganda at the army’s General Political Department, for 
example, urged the army to emulate the model of JFRB in expanding its base of contributors. See 
“Guanyu budui de baozhi gongzuo,” where Tao promoted the slogan “the entire army runs 
newspapers” (quan jun ban bao 全军办报). See XGWH 3.206-15. 
124 See “Dangyuan dui dangbao de zeren,” an article published in the CCP organ Hongqi in its May 
10, 1930 issue. Repr. in XGWH 3.131-133. The quotations appear on p. 131. 
125 “‘Hong Zhong’ bai qi de zhandou jinian,” in Hongse Zhonghua, Aug. 10, 1933. Repr. in XGWH 
3.151-54. The article was written by Li Fuchun, the secretary of the CCP Jiangxi Provincial 
Committee. Li had held several propaganda posts in his early career. 
126 On worker-peasant correspondents in the Jiangxi Soviet see also Yan Fan. Zhongyang geming 
genjudi xinwen chuban shi, p. 39. 
127 “Ba women de baozhi ban de geng hao xie,” by Hu Qiaomu, JFRB editorial, July 18, 1942. 
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office; yet it is also true that many of our journalists, our correspondents, and the 
personnel in the offices and departments are not yet good in taking the things that 
happen every day, so rich and full of educational value, and to make news articles and 
reports of them for the newspapers. 
 
In this JFRB editorial, Hu Qiaomu laments both the reluctance of basic-level 
cadres to join the making of the Party paper, and the hesitation of professional 
journalists to embrace the Soviet model. Worker and peasant correspondents had 
been part of the Russian Communist newspaper system. A “Worker-peasant 
correspondent movement” started after 1924 which increased their number into 
the hundreds of thousands.128 The function of correspondents in the Soviet Union 
was the same as in China. In the editorial, Hu Qiaomu quotes Lenin’s text “The 
Character of our Newspapers” as a reference lending authority to his arguments in 
favour of the correspondents system: “Less political ballyhoo. Fewer highbrow 
discussions. Closer to life. More attention to the way in which the workers and 
peasants are actually building the new in their everyday work, and more 
verification so as to ascertain the extent to which the new community is 
communistic.”129 This is the last paragraph of an article written in 1918 where 
Lenin criticizes newspaper work in the Soviet Union and urges the Soviet papers 
to give more stress to work at the basic level. Hu is less interested in Lenin’s 
critique than in his vision of the ideal newspaper: Lenin’s proposals did fit the 
Chinese concerns of 1942 remarkably well; a translation of this article appeared in 
JFRB just two days after Hu Qiaomu’s editorial.130 Lenin’s stress on popular issues 
seemed to confirm the mass line promoted by the CCP in newspaper work, part of 
which was the correspondents system. 
It was the “mass character” that received most attention in Yan’an 
newspaper theory. The “mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群众路线) emerged as a key 
feature of CCP media thinking in Yan’an and was implemented across the 
propaganda sector. Not just the newspapers were urged by various means to give 
up what was perceived as intellectualism and detachment from the rank-and-file. 
                                             
128 See Artur W. Just. Die Presse der Sowjetunion: Methoden diktatorischer Massenführung. Berlin: 
Carl Juncker, 1931, p. 72-106, and the statistical material there. I am grateful to Lorenz Bichler for 
drawing my attention to this volume. Useful information on worker-peasant correspondents is also 
found in Maerkusi. Sulian de chuban. Shanghai: Shidai chubanshe, 1950, passim. 
129 Lenin. Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 96-98, here p. 98. Italics in the original. 
130 “Lun women de baozhi,” in JFRB, July 20, 1942 (Title in later translations changed to “Lun 
women baozhi de xingzhi”). 
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Only weeks after the JFRB reshuffle, the Party convened the “Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art.” In his two addresses to the conference, Mao Zedong put 
forward what became the foundations of CCP policy for the entire sector of 
literature and art, an important sub-sector of the propaganda xitong.131 The core 
idea of Mao’s addresses, that literature and art are to “serve the people” (wei 
renmin fuwu 为人民服务) could not be called into question for approximately four 
decades (interpretations varied over time, yet always more in degree than in 
substance). The mass line for literature and art parallels that in the newspaper 
sector in both its formulation and in the ways it was implemented.132 
The “mass character” has emerged as the most prominent characteristic of 
the Yan’an newspaper reforms of 1942. “Mass-ization” (dazhonghua 大众化) had 
reached, besides newspapers, practically all other elements of the propaganda 
sector. The focus on the people of the border region as the main newspaper 
audience, and their integration into the process of newspaper making, however, 
did not compromise the other major concerns of CCP media thinking: Party control, 
and the media’s mission as an educational and enlightening tool. The different 
demands, resulting from different ideological sources, that were combined in the 
media concept could still be moulded into a coherent whole; as a result, the 
Party’s grip over the media was strengthened by the 1942 reshuffle at JFRB. Yet 
simultaneously other ideas were imported into China that subsequently became 
parts of the media concept: Stalinist ideology had a decisive impact on Chinese 
media thinking of the Yan’an era. Before moving on to address this latter complex, 
which in fact proved much more difficult to play in concert with the other elements 
of the Chinese media concept, I will try to supplement the earlier outline of the 
concept in the light of the elements discussed in this section (in italics): 
                                             
131 “Zai Yan’an wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua.” Originally published in JFRB, Oct. 19, 1943. 
Translated in Bonnie MacDougall. Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature 
and Art:” A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 
1980. The literature on Mao’s Yan’an talks is too numerous to be listed here. For one discussion 
see Goldman. Literary Dissent, ch. two. 
132 The similarity of the language used to convince both news workers and writers and artists to “go 
down” to the masses, to participate in their daily lives, and to learn from them, is striking. For but a 
few examples see Kai Feng: “Guanyu wenyi gongzuozhe xia xiang de wenti,” in JFRB, March 28, 
1943; repr. in XGWX 2.469-80; Chen Yun: “Guanyu dang de wenyi gongzuozhe de liang ge 
qingxiang wenti,” in JFRB, March 29, 1943; repr. in XGWX 2.481-88; and Nie Rongzhen: “Guanyu 
budui wenyi gongzuo zhu wenti,” in Qunzhong 9.2 (Jan. 25, 1944); repr. in XGWX 2.549-55. 
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Media for the Party: Control and Class Struggle 
“Party character,” or dangxing, is the first of the four points in the list of the 
April 1 editorial explaining the JFRB reshuffle. This is no coincidence. The “mass 
character” of the paper had been the point where JFRB showed the biggest 
deficits and it does therefore feature prominently in the discussion surrounding the 
emergence of the new media concept. Partiinost was much less controversial: the 
paramount role of the Party in media issues had long since been accepted; there 
was little need to drive home this point. However, since a central concern of the 
Yan’an Rectification Campaign was to strengthen discipline and control over all 
provinces of Party life, the centralization and streamlining of the command 
structures in the media sector was one of the key goals of the Party. 
These efforts, and the Rectification Campaign itself, were driven to a 
considerable degree by another ideological import from the Soviet Union: Stalin’s 
vision of history and the centrality of class struggle. Under the influence of the 
radical ideas that arrived in Yan’an since the late 1930s, the CCP came to an 
interpretation of the role of the media that was even more radical than that of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), since it was translated from the 
post-revolutionary Soviet state into the pre-revolutionary setting of China. These 
ideas were to have enduring influence on the CCP’s conception of the media. 
 
 
(1) The media speak with the unified voice of the party; 
(2) they are indispensable tools of party propaganda and party building; 
(3) they assist the party, the avant-garde of the working class, to raise the 
consciousness of the people; 
(4) they do so by focussing on the concrete concerns of the masses and 
becoming one with the masses; 
(5) the media are essentially about education.  
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The Party’s efforts to put in place a more rigid system of control figures 
prominently in both the newspaper and the publishing sector. In contrast to 
newspapers, the area of book publishing was much less suited for popularization. 
Books require higher reading skills and more sophistication from readers than 
newspapers do, and their production is even more dependent on skilled 
intellectual labour. Mass participation, such as through the correspondents system, 
was not an option for the CCP’s publishing sector. Since 1937, the CCP had built 
up publishing structures in Yan’an, though these were of rather small scale. 
Xinhua shudian 新华书店, the Party’s publishing outlet in the capital of the border 
region, had initially been formed around the distribution activities of the Jiefang 
magazine and maintained close contact with the journal, and later with JFRB.133 
Xinhua published many translations of the writings of Lenin and Stalin, pamphlets 
of the CCP CC and the Chinese Party leadership, but also translations of other 
works of mostly Soviet origin such as Leontev’s introduction Political Economy 
(Nachal'nyi kurs politicheskii ekonomii).134 One of the first advertised publications 
was a series on Leninism (Liening congshu).135 
When the Rectification Campaign gathered speed in spring 1942, pressure 
on Xinhua shudian increased, and in April that year the Party decided a major 
overhaul of all the publishing activities in Yan’an. The official decision to do so, 
however, came only a month after the crucial meeting that ordered the JFRB 
reshuffle; the immediacy given to the JFRB issue indicates the higher importance 
that the CCP attached to newspapers, as opposed to books. Nonetheless, grave 
faults had been found in the publishing sector as well, as the “Circular on the 
Unification of Publishing Work in Yan’an,” issued on April 15, 1942, made clear:136 
 
The publishing work in Yan’an currently lacks an organ for unified planning and unified 
administration; for this reason, in [publishing] work, there have occurred many 
instances of [publications] not being in accordance with the propaganda policies of the 
[Party] Center, and of one-sided emphasis, waste and replication, and confusion and 
                                             
133 On the origins of Xinhua shudian see ch.5 of this study. 
134 See the useful bibliography of titles distributed by Xinhua in Zhao Shengming. Xinhua shudian 
dansheng zai Yan’an, p. 266-75. 
135 A reproduction of this ad from April 1937 can be found in Zhao Shengming. Xinhua shudian 
dansheng zai Yan’an, plates. The Liening congshu series was published in 1937 and included Two 
Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (Dve taktiki sotsialdemokratii v 
demokraticheskoii revoliutii), and State and Revolution (Gosudarstvo i revoliutsiia), among others. 
136 “Zhongyang shujichu guanyu tongyi Yan’an chuban gongzuo de tongzhi” in XGWX 2.367. 
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ineffectiveness. Thus, it has been decided that the Central Publishing Bureau 
[Zhongyang chubanju 中央出版局] will unify the responsibility of guiding, planning, and 
organizing the regular editorial, publishing, and distribution work of the different sectors 
[xitong] in all of Yan’an; the Central Propaganda Department will be responsible for the 
unification of the inspection [shencha] of all regular books and newspapers published 
and distributed in Yan’an (with the exception of books and newspapers published 
directly by the Central Committee Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the [CC] 
Northwestern Bureau). In agreement with the Central Propaganda Department and the 
respective departments concerned, the Central Publishing Bureau shall decide in 
proper time on the general direction and the concrete plans for editorial, publishing, 
and distribution work, and guarantee their fulfilment. Yet the correct principle for 
editorial, publishing, and distribution work is centralized leadership and decentralized 
management; consequently, the independent work of the different organs mustn’t be 
weakened in the future, but should rather be strengthened. 
 
The problems identified by the “Circular” can be summed up in two points: non-
compliance with central policies, and a lack of systematic, rational organization of 
work. The latter certainly was a nuisance, and the Party’s ire about what it 
perceived to be waste caused by a lack of coordination is understandable under 
the strained material conditions of war-time Yan’an. The “lack of coordination” 
caused by a market system became an important argument several years later, 
when the Party put in place a planned economy.137 More disturbing, though, was 
the accusation that Xinhua was not in line with the policies of the Party Center. In 
the course of the Rectification Campaign, strict compliance with all of the Party’s 
policies featured ever more prominently on the agenda. The publishing sector, as 
an element of the Party’s propaganda machine, was a crucial field where the need 
to speak with a unified voice was particularly important. 
Unity (tongyi 统一) consequently is the most conspicuous argument in the 
April 15 “Circular:” the very first sentence demands unified planning and unified 
management. ‘Unity’ here is to be understood as a form of rational organization, 
whereby the rational element is provided by the Party’s leadership. The pre-
eminence of Party policies is to be established in the entire publishing sector. At 
the same time, however, the “Circular” cautions of too high a degree of 
centralization: the concept of “centralized leadership and decentralized 
management” (jizhong zhidao, fensan jingying 集中指导，分散经营) is a 
repudiation of bureaucratic forms of management. Too much centralization of 
tasks is not desirable; rather, the implementation of decisions reached centrally is 
                                             
137 The shift towards a planned economy in the publishing industry will be discussed in chapter five. 
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left to autonomous agencies. In this way, responsibility is devolved, while the 
Centre reserves for itself the potential of control and direction. It is remarkable that 
this strategy of limited decentralization and responsibility emerged so early – 
possibly a consequence of the bad experiences some in the Party leadership, 
notably Mao Zedong, had made with the monopolization of power in the hands of 
an all-intrusive leadership group detached from base level work, and with the 
bureaucratic structures associated therewith. The CCP never set up the vast kind 
of bureaucratic propaganda apparatus that centrally controlled all aspects of the 
media in the Soviet Union. The principle of “centralized leadership and 
decentralized management,” as an economical mode of management with a high 
potential of control, is a feature of the Chinese media sector that will appear time 
and again in later chapters of this study. 
In concrete terms, the administration of the publishing sector was entrusted 
to not one, but two agencies. This arrangement reflects very well the “centralized 
leadership and decentralized management” principle. The CC Publishing Bureau 
was to oversee the technical aspects of publishing, but was not to exert political 
control. Its task was to coordinate the various publishing activities by the multiple 
bodies in Yan’an that produced their own pamphlets, and, first of all, to provide a 
planned environment for Xinhua, the Party’s main publisher. Political control 
(“leadership”) was the PD’s exclusive sphere of responsibility, thus confirming its 
authoritative position in the propaganda sector. The division of “administrative” 
(xingzheng 行政) and “leadership” (lingdao 领导) tasks later became the general 
organizational pattern in the PRC. 
Control of publishing meant, in the first place, censorship (shencha 审查). 
Through centralized censorship, the PD was to ensure that publications emerging 
from Yan’an would henceforth be in compliance with central policies. All 
publications in Yan’an were subject to the PD’s direct censorship, with the 
exception of those books and periodicals published directly by the CC (apparently, 
the CC had its own publications under close scrutiny).138 Censorship was the 
                                             
138 It must be remarked that the universal censorship mentioned here, if indeed it was implemented 
according to the letter of the April 15 “Circular,” was one of the very few periods when the CCP 
practiced full-scale pre-publication censorship. As I will discuss in later chapters, during most of the 
time, the PD was satisfied with just having the potential to intervene, and trusted lower level organs 
to play by the rules. Compliance, of course, had to be generated by other means. 
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ultimate means to strengthen Party control over the media, to enforce their “Party 
character.” The Rectification Campaign led to the tightening of the Party’s grip 
over the media. The Party was to speak with a unified voice to its own Party 
members, to the population of the Border Region, and to both people and enemy 
beyond the CCP base area’s borders. 
The creation of such a unified voice was the rationale behind the 
restructuring of Xinhua shudian and the Yan’an publishing industry in April 
1942.139 It was also the reason for the introduction of more explicit means of 
control in other parts of the propaganda sector, to which I will return now. In the 
last section, we have noted the strict and elaborate rules of censorship that 
applied to the handling of contributions from worker peasant correspondents. 
However, censorship and other control measures appeared in the course of the 
Rectification Campaign also for other kinds of reporting. The stress on the “mass 
character” of newspapers was counterbalanced by the insistence on their “party 
character.” 
Non-compliance with policies of the Party Center had been quoted as one 
of the reasons for the structural reforms of the publishing sector in the April 15 
“Circular.” The CCP repeatedly voiced the same complaints with regard to 
newspapers, especially those published at lower levels. In October 1942, Mao 
Zedong instructed the secretary of the CC Jin-Sui Branch Bureau on the following 
affair:140 
 
 
                                             
139 Very little information is available on the events immediately preceding and following the 
structural reforms, which apparently took effect on May 1, 1942, the day when the Shaan-Gan-Ning 
Border Region Xinhua Bookstore’s new offices were inaugurated outside Yan’an’s Southern gate 
(See Zheng Shide. “Wushi chunqiu hua Xinhua,” p. 115). The importance of the event was 
underlined by a visit of Mao Zedong to Xinhua (confirmed in Zhao Shengming. Xinhua shudian 
dansheng zai Yan’an, p. 75. This source relies on eyewitness accounts; Mao Zedong nianpu 
doesn’t mention Mao’s visit). However, neither Zheng Shide nor Zhao Shengmeng mentions the 
April 15 “Circular,” which was probably published for the first time in 1996, and even then only in 
the neibu collection XGWX. In the absence of additional sources, the reasons for the secrecy 
surrounding the “Circular,” and the fate of Xinhua in the Rectification Campaign must remain 
speculation. 
140 “Jingchang zhuyi zhangwo xinwen zhengce he shelun fangzhen” (dated Oct. 28, 1942) in 
MZDXGW, p. 98. 
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The Northwest Shanxi branch of the Xinhua news agency on [October] 18 has 
transmitted to Yan’an Deng Baoshan’s 邓宝珊141 congratulatory telegram on the 
occasion of the New Army’s142 fifth anniversary. In addition to ordering the [Xinhua] 
Yan’an main branch not to publish it, we ask you to strengthen your guidance of the 
Northwest Shanxi branch and the Jin-Xi ribao 晋西日报. Telegrams like this one can be 
transmitted orally only, but cannot appear in print, in order to avoid negatively 
influencing Deng Baoshan’s position. Moreover, the Branch Bureau must pay constant 
attention to all the news policies and the editorial direction of the news agency and the 
newspaper; it must strengthen its grip, so that our propaganda is entirely in keeping 
with the Party’s policies. 
 
The CCP’s relationship with the GMD in the coalition government was a volatile 
issue that required many diplomatic skills. The local propaganda cadres had 
ignored the policy mandating distance to the GMD. By giving publicity to 
commander Deng’s favourable view towards a CCP-affiliated militia, the paper 
might cause trouble for Deng, who could be regarded (by the GMD authorities) as 
too close to the Communists. Likewise, the CCP might be seen as making 
compromises with GMD generals – an argument that Mao does not make explicit 
in his telegram, but that sounds plausible in light of his remark that news of the 
kind of Deng’s telegram “can be transmitted orally only, but cannot appear in 
print.” Mao feared damage to the CCP as well as for Deng; the cooperation with 
parts of the GMD military was to be kept secret. 
A directive of the CC Secretariat from October 1942 lists a series of 
incidents, where local newspapers where at variance with central policies:143 
Recently, there have been, in the propaganda of various localities, several cases [of 
articles being] not in accordance with current Party policies, such as a report from the 
Xinhua Taihang 太行 Branch Bureau on the Consultative Conference’s [Canzhenghui 
参政会] telegram calling to convene a national affairs conference [guoshi huiyi 国是会
议],144 or a report of the [Xinhua] Shandong Branch Bureau on the 111th division of the 
Northeast Army opposing GMD personnel, or an anti-GMD news article of the [Xinhua] 
Subei [= Northern Jiangsu] Branch Bureau... . None of the above is in accordance with 
the current policies of our Party. 
 
                                             
141 “Deng Baoshan was commander of the GMD army’s 21st army group [juntuan 军团], stationed 
with his troops in Yulin 榆林, Shaanxi province.” Note in MZDXGW. 
142 “The New Army [Xinjun 新军] was an anti-Japanese militia of the people of Shanxi province, 
recruited under the leadership and the influence of the CCP in the early period of the anti-Japanese 
war.“ Note in MZDXGW. 
143 “Zhongyang shujichu guanyu baozhi tongxunshe gongzuo de zhishi” (dated Oct. 28, 1942) in 
XGWX 2.467. The directive is based – almost verbatim – on a draft by Mao Zedong. For the draft 
see MZDXGW, p. 97. 
144 After the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941, the CCP had begun to withdraw from this United 
Front organ; Yan’an’s anger probably resulted from the Taihang branch’s breach of the boycott. 
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All of these reports concerned the sensitive CCP-GMD relationship. The directive 
advised local Party organs: “The CC Northwestern Branch Bureau has already 
issued a decision on newspaper work, and the various local [CCP organs] should 
act likewise... to make sure that the news agencies’ and newspapers’ propaganda 
absolutely corresponds to Party policy, to ensure the strengthening of the Party 
character of our propaganda..., and to overcome the mistaken trend of 
disobedience among propaganda personnel.”145 Closely following the Party line 
and the particular Party policies was a matter of partiinost. The strong language of 
the “Directive” which accused the newspapers in question of disobedience, literally 
of “clamouring for independence” (nao dulixing 闹独立性) underlines the 
seriousness of this issue in the eyes of the Party leadership. Since the onset of the 
Rectification Campaign, the CCP gradually moved to tighten the control over the 
media. 
While the discussion of the guiding principles for the Party media and the 
motivations driving them remains rather abstract in the openly published media 
and even in many Party documents, there is a harsher ideological reality in the 
background. The context is provided by the “Rescue Campaign,” the cruel and 
bloody witch-hunt into which the Rectification Campaign had evolved in its later 
stages.146 A short essay written by Li Weihan sometime in late 1943 sheds light on 
the worldview that shaped and drove the evolution of the CCP’s media concept in 
the Yan’an era. This essay, entitled “On Propaganda War and Disclosures [on the 
Enemy]”147 deserves closer investigation, since it addresses a number of 
questions that loom in the background of many of the documents analyzed above; 
it thus provides the link to the worldview the CCP was subscribing to an increasing 
degree in the Yan’an era: the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. 
In his essay, Li Weihan discusses the “strategic principles” of propaganda. 
Most of these, such as the creative use of both established and innovative means 
of propaganda, the insistence on truthfulness of CCP propaganda, and the 
                                             
145 “Zhongyang shujichu guanyu baozhi tongxunshe gongzuo de zhishi.” 
146 The most revealing accounts of this dark chapter of the CCP’s Yan’an era are Chen Yongfa. 
Yan’an de yinying; and Gao Hua. Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de, ch. 11-13. 
147 “Guanyu xuanchuan zhan yu jielu,” in XGWH 3.197-202. The compilers provide neither a clear 
source nor a date for this essay, which suggests that it was not published; however, it seems to 
have been circulated in Yan’an, since the author is given with Luo Mai 罗迈, a pseudonym Li did 
not use after 1949 and that would hardly have been attached to the document if it were notes of an 
entirely private nature. In 1943 Li was a CCP PD vice-head.  
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technique of exposing and making use of the enemy’s internal contradiction, all 
sound rather familiar. Yet Li goes beyond the usual framework when he provides a 
new definition of the context, “propaganda war:”148 
Propaganda war means not simply normal propaganda, but also includes day-to-day 
agitation. Propaganda war means not simply normal ideological and political activities, 
but also includes activities in culture, education, and literature and art. The propaganda 
war is carried out not only in the ideological and political realms, but also in all [other] 
areas such as military affairs, the economy, and culture. In the propaganda war, one 
must not just propagate, explain, and disseminate one’s own stuff [dongxi 东西] (i.e. 
that of one’s class, party, nation or country), but also unmask and oppose the stuff of 
others. 
 
Propaganda war combines all the areas that have been identified in chapter one 
as belonging to the propaganda xitong: “It is not hard to imagine that a 
propaganda war cannot prevail if it is limited to one field or one aspect. Therefore, 
propaganda war is a comprehensive war in the ideological realm.”149 Li wants to 
mobilize the entire realm of the superstructure into a comprehensive political effort, 
an effort he simply designates as “war.” By explicitly calling the struggles on the 
propaganda front a “war,” Li Weihan equates their importance with that of the 
ongoing anti-Japanese war. This might sound presumptuous at a time when the 
CCP had mobilized thousands of troops in the bloody war against Japan (and, 
against the GMD). Yet this is exactly what Li Weihan had in mind. He quotes an 
anonymous Japanese source to the effect that “propaganda war and military war 
are equally important.”150 The equation of the military and propaganda sides of the 
conflict is justified: “Propaganda war generally is a war between different classes, 
different political parties (that represent different classes), different nations 
(suppressing nations and suppressed nations or coalitions of different nations), 
and different countries, in ideology, thinking, and ideas.”151 With the introduction of 
class struggle, Li Weihan proposes a new rationale for the acuteness of the 
propaganda war. Propaganda serves not only to advertise the Communist Party’s 
ideological position, to educate and unite the masses in preparation of the struggle 
with the CCP’s enemies (as Lenin’s concept of a Party newspaper had mandated 
in his “What is to be Done”). Rather, the ideological realm, the superstructure, is a 
battlefield no less important than others in the revolutionary war that is the mission 
                                             
148 Ibid., p. 197. 
149 Ibid., p. 197f. 
150 Ibid., p. 198. 
151 Ibid., p. 197. 
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of the CCP. The revolution is being won – and lost – on the political and military as 
well as on the ideological frontlines. Class struggle moved into the centre of Party 
propaganda. 
The Yan’an Rectification Movement did not only aim to strengthen the 
Party’s organizational structure and discipline, it also promoted an ideological view 
at least partly at difference with the CCP’s previous interpretations of Marxism. 
The campaign installed Mao Zedong thought as the Party’s guiding ideology152 
and thus brought to the fore a thinker with considerably less background and 
reading in the original writings of Marx and Lenin. It was Mao’s writings that 
dominated the reading canon of the movement: no less than seven of the twenty-
two official Rectification Documents were works of Mao, while none was from Marx 
and only one fragment of the “Propaganda Guide” was from Lenin. Yet in this 
official canon, Stalin’s works featured much more prominently (four texts), as did 
another work of Stalinist provenience: the History of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (Istoria Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi 
partii, Bol’shevikov). The Short Course has exercised an influence on Chinese 
Communist thinking that can hardly be overestimated.153 The worldview advertised 
in this product of Stalin’s historians has penetrated not only CCP Party 
historiography, but many other fields, including the media sector.154 
To be sure, Stalinism was not entirely new to China and at least Mao 
Zedong had been profoundly influenced by some theories associated with Stalin. 
Probably the most influential theoretical booklet of its kind was Ai Siqi’s Dazhong 
                                             
152 It was Wang Jiaxiang who finally elevated Mao to the position of pre-eminent ideologue in his 
article “Zhongguo gongchandang yu Zhongguo minzu jiefang de daolu,” which appeared in JFRB, 
July 5, 1943. In this eulogy, Wang not only speaks of the “wise leader” (yingming de lingxiu 英明的
领袖) Mao Zedong, but also identifies Mao Zedong thought as “Chinese Marxism.” Repr. in XGWX 
2.505-15. 
153 On the influence of the Short Course in China see Rudolf G. Wagner. “The History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, in Mainland Chinese and East 
German Historiography and Historical Action.” Unpublished MS, Heidelberg, 2002. I am grateful to 
the author for allowing me to quote from his MS, and, in the first place, for bringing to my attention 
the Short Course. On the subject see further Wang Chaomei. “Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming 
jiaocheng dui Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue he yanjiu de yingxiang (zuotanhui fayan zhaideng)” in 
Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu 1989.1, p. 7-16, and Lou Shenghua. “Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming 
jiaocheng zai Zhongguo de yingxiang” in Dangshi yanjiu ziliao 1997.1, p. 24-29. On the Short 
Course in general see N.N. Maslov. “Short Course of the History of the All-Russian Communist 
Party (Bolshevik): An Encyclopedia of Stalin’s Personality Cult” in Soviet Studies in History 28.3 
(Winter 1989-90). 
154 I am grateful to Rudolf Wagner for pointing out to me the particular significance of the Stalinist 
vision of class struggle for the CCP’s media thinking, and for helping me to understand the basic 
logic of Stalin’s ideas. 
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zhexue 大众哲学 (Philosophy for the Broad Masses).155 This short book first 
appeared serialized in the leftist journal Dushu shenghuo 读书生活 in 1934-35 and 
was published in book form in 1936. Ai Siqi explains key concepts of Marxist 
theory (called “new philosophy” throughout the book to mislead the GMD censors) 
in an easy, accessible language and illustrates them with examples from everyday 
life. The volume proved to be highly approachable for readers not trained in 
philosophy or theory and thus saw numerous printings and editions in the period 
from 1936 to 1950. One of Ai Siqi’s avid readers was Mao Zedong: according to 
Joshua Fogel, Mao read Dazhong zhexue and consequently organized Ai’s move 
to Yan’an, where he lectured at the Marxism-Leninism Institute.156 Dazhong 
zhexue contains many Stalinist influences, the most important of which is the 
stress on the theory of “two-line struggle,” to be discussed below.157 The concept 
was closely associated with Stalin and became an integral part of the theoretical 
framework of Chinese socialism. The strength of Ai Siqi’s book, however, was also 
its weakness. While its popular character made it a useful introduction to Marxism-
Leninism, it could not be more. It was not suited for the education of cadres, who 
were expected to meet higher standards of sophistication. Consequently, Dazhong 
zhexue is mentioned in none of the numerous Party documents from the Yan’an 
period containing reading lists and study recommendations. The CCP-affiliated 
Dushu chubanshe published more than a dozen editions of the book, with the last 
appearing in 1950. Thereafter other, more sound introductions into Marxist theory 
were at hand, and Dazhong zhexue was considered outdated.158 Among the 
theoretical works with a more lasting impact on China, and also on Chinese media 
theory, was the Short Course. 
                                             
155 Shanghai: Dushu shenghuo she, 1936. Original title Zhexue jianghua 哲学讲话, changed into 
the later title since the fourth printing in 1936. A reprint of the 10th edition (1938) can be found in 
“Minguo congshu” bianweihui. Minguo congshu, 1st series, vol. 1. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 
1989. 
156 Joshua A. Fogel. Ai Ssu-ch’i’s Contribution to the Development of Chinese Marxism. Cambridge, 
Ma.: The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987, p. 61-71. On Mao reading 
Dazhong zhexue “by the light of an oil lamp in his Yenan cave” see p. 62. The book is mentioned 
repeatedly in Gong Yuzhi, Jiang Xianzhi, Shi Zhongquan. Mao Zedong de dushu shenghuo. Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian, 1996 (2nd ed.), for example p. 61, p. 66f. 
157 See Dazhong zhexue, ch. 19. 
158 Joshua Fogel also notes that by 1950 Mao’s own thought had evolved and many of Ai’s 
conclusions were no longer entirely in line with current interpretations of Marxism. Ai Ssu-ch’i’s 
Contribution, p. 59. 
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The compilation of an authoritative Party history had been decreed by Stalin 
in 1932 and was commissioned, not to professional historians, but rather to high-
level Party leaders and propagandists.159 When it appeared in 1938, the Short 
Course carried the remark “Edited by a Committee of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU(B) and approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), a remark 
added in reaction to an intervention by Stalin himself.” The volume thus acquired 
an official status of authority unmatched by any other publication. The CCP 
reacted suit to the publicity given the Short Course in the Soviet Union and started 
serialization in Jiefang, the CCP CC organ, in 1939; in the same year Xinhua 
shudian published a two-volume edition of the book.160 
Apart from the Comintern’s promotion of the Short Course, the interest of 
the CCP leadership in the book was responsible for its rapid proliferation in China. 
The Short Course became one of the most-quoted Soviet works in Yan’an. An 
April 15, 1939 article in Jiefang written by Kai Feng, a PD vice-head, stressed the 
“historical and international meaning of the History of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course.”161 In December of the same year, Chen 
Yun advocated the study of the “Conclusion” of the Short Course,162 and this 
proposal was supported by Mao in 1941: “In the study of Marxism-Leninism, the 
CPSU Party History [Liangong dangshi 联共党史, the standard Chinese acronym 
for the Short Course] is to be used as principal material [zhongxin cailiao 中心材
料], everything else is supplementary material. The CPSU Party History is the best 
synthesis and conclusion of the world Communist movement of the past hundred 
years, it is a model of how to combine theory and practice, and so far the only 
perfect model of its kind in the world.”163 Mao reiterated his support for the 
intensive study of the Short Course a little later: “Implement the reform of our study 
system, smash all the old stuff. Study theory and methodology of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin, with the CPSU Party History as the centre of our study; read 
                                             
159 The following paragraph is based on Wagner, “Short Course.” 
160 See Zhao Shengming. Xinhua shudian dansheng zai Yan’an, Appendix, p. 268. 
161 Kai Feng. “Liangong (bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng de lishi yiyi he guoji yiyi” in Jiefang 69 
(April 15, 1939), p. 1ff. 
162 Chen Yun. “Xuexi shi gongchandangyuan de zeren” in Chen Yun wenxuan, vol. 1, p. 121-23. 
163 “Gaizao women de xuexi” (May 19, 1941) in JFRB, March 27, 1942. Rudolf Wagner has 
observed that in the Mao Zedong xuanji edition the phrase “everything else is supplementary 
material” has been deleted. See “Short Course,” n. 18. 
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many speeches and articles opposing subjectivism.”164 It is remarkable that Mao 
wanted the Short Course to become “the centre of our study” (xuexi de zhongxin 
学习的中心). In later speeches, such as “Fandui dang bagu,” Mao quoted the 
Short Course, and in April 1942, its last chapter, “Conclusion” was included in the 
22 rectification documents; it was reprinted in JFRB on April 11 with an 
accompanying note: “Because there have not been printed enough [copies] of the 
CPSU Party History, we publish here today the six points of the Conclusion.” The 
Short Course had thus become part of the official canon of the Rectification 
Campaign. 
The Short Course is an account of the history of the CPSU from its origins 
to 1936, the eve of the Great Purges. The book’s historical importance, however, 
looms much larger, and is related to the peculiar perspective adopted in the Short 
Course and to the worldview that informed this perspective. The Short Course 
portrays the CPSU’s history as a series of political struggles between two lines, 
one being the correct line represented by the paramount Party leader (Lenin and, 
after Lenin’s death, Stalin), and the other that of the Party’s enemies. In this 
bipolar model, there is no room for discussions or competition of opinions: written 
with hindsight from the winner’s perspective, all opinions deviating from that of the 
leader are denounced as plots intended to undermine the Party. Since as a 
general rule the Party has one and only one correct opinion, all other opinions are 
manifestations of class struggle: they belong to representatives of the bourgeoisie 
who either oppose the Party from without, or, especially after the successful 
revolution, have sneaked into the Party to undermine it from within. Advocates of 
political positions identified as conflicting with that of the main Party leader are 
thus unmasked as that of traitors who may have wormed their way into the Party 
and lived there unrecognized for decades; such people may have even risen to 
positions high in the party leadership, as did Trotsky and Bukharin. It is especially 
after the revolution that class struggle thus sharpens, because the bourgeoisie has 
                                             
164 “Fandui zhuguanzhuyi he zongpaizhuyi” (dated September 9, 1941). This little-known text, a 
speech Mao gave at an enlarged conference of the Politburo, contains many arguments Mao later 
elaborated upon in his rectification speeches. It was first published in Wenxian he yanjiu 1985.1. 
Repr. in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Wenxian he yanjiu: 1985 nian huibianben. 
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986, p. 1-6.  
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been weakened and can no longer openly confront the proletariat; it consequently 
redoubles its efforts to destroy the Party from within.165 
The Short Course explicitly stresses its authoritative nature in being more 
than a mere account of history. Rather, the Short Course is a textbook of Marxist-
Leninist theory in its own right. From the volume’s narrative, section two of chapter 
four stands out both by its unusual length (with thirty pages, this section is about 
as long as most of the chapters in the Short Course) and by its character. Totally 
dissociated from the surrounding discussion of the CPSU’s experience under the 
repressive Stolypin government (1907-1912), this section bears the title 
“Dialectical materialism and historic materialism.” It is a highly condensed 
summary of the most important elements of Marxist theory. While Stalin paid close 
attention to the writing group that produced the Short Course, this section is said 
to have been written by Stalin personally.166 It gives the book its very Stalinist note 
in coming forth with Stalin’s master interpretation of the entire complex of 
Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese Communists thus held in their hands a 
manifestation of orthodoxy coming directly from the very leader of the international 
Communist movement. 
With the emphasis on the sharpening of class struggle, the Short Course 
presents a version of Marxist-Leninist theory more radical and more aggressive 
than the kind of Marxism-Leninism that had hitherto been known in China. The 
most prolific translators and mediators of Marxist theory, many of whom later were 
(falsely167) labelled the “Twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” were trained in the Soviet Union 
at a time when internationalist influences were still widespread at the Comintern-
controlled schools – before the elevation of Stalin’s writings to their later 
paramount position, and before the bloody purges that were justified by Stalin’s 
theories. The Short Course thus brought to China the Stalinized version of 
                                             
165 Stalin seems to have drawn in part on Lenin’s “The State and Revolution” (another text that was 
widely read in China). See Collected Works, vol. 25, p. 385-497, esp. the passage on p. 417 where 
Lenin speaks of the time after the revolution as “a period of an unprecedentedly violent class 
struggle in unprecedentedly acute forms” (this passage was inserted into the text by Lenin for the 
second edition in 1918). The interpretation of the above ideas as class struggle becoming more 
fierce after the revolution than before, however, seems to be Stalin’s. 
166 See Rudolf Wagner. “Short Course.” Stalin’s authorship is confirmed by Isaac Deutscher. Stalin: 
A Political Biography. New York: Vintage Books, 1960, p. 381-82. 
167 The existence of any such group has been denied by Yang Shangkun, supposedly a member of 
this group himself. See “Guanyu ‘Ershiba ge ban Buershiweike’” in Bai nian chao 2001.8, p. 10-22. 
Thomas Kampen has proven wrong the myth of the “Twenty-eight Bolsheviks” in much detail in 
The Chinese Communist Leadership, passim. 
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Marxism-Leninism in a crystallized form, and it did so not in a political vacuum, but 
in the context of intense political infighting in both the Soviet Union and in the CCP. 
Far from being pure ideology, the Short Course came to serve as a guide to action: 
due to the time lag, the CCP was only now approaching historical stages the 
Russian party had lived through much earlier; the CCP thus would make use of 
these experiences, taking a “shortcut,” especially with view to the current and 
future struggles in the Party.168 
The section of the Short Course that was made part of the must-read canon 
of the Rectification Campaign was the “Conclusion.” This point is indeed very 
significant for the Chinese reading of the Short Course: as a party still engaged in 
revolutionary struggle, the most important part of the volume should supposedly 
be those chapters dealing with the CPSU’s pre-1917 experience. The Conclusion, 
however, sums up the entire experience of the CPSU; by reprinting the Conclusion 
and making it mandatory study material, the CCP hoped to learn from the entire 
experience of the CPSU – both pre- and post-revolution. Performing a leap in time, 
the CCP leaders hoped to profit from the hindsight of their Soviet brethren and 
carried into their own revolutionary struggle elements that were supposed to play a 
role not until much later. This interpretation is confirmed by Mao Zedong. In his 
“Fandui dang bagu,” Mao mentions the Short Course and its Conclusion: “It often 
happens that enemies and hostile thinking infiltrate into the Party, just like the forth 
point in the “Conclusion” of the CPSU Party History says. It is beyond doubt that 
we must confront such people with methods of ruthless struggle and relentless 
attack, because these scoundrels are about to use these very methods against the 
Party; [so] if we practice lenience towards them, we just walk into their poisonous 
trap.”169 Both the third and the fourth of altogether six points made in the 
Conclusion deal with the need to “smash” (in the Chinese translation fensui 粉碎) 
the Communist Party’s enemies – with the important distinction that point three 
speaks about petit-bourgeois groups and parties outside the CPSU, and before 
the revolution, whereas point four deals with enemies inside the Party in the post-
revolutionary setting: “We cannot possibly tolerate opportunists in our middle, just 
                                             
168 This argument is advanced by Rudolf Wagner in “Short Course.” 
169 “Fandui dang bagu,” in JFRB, June 18, 1942. 
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as a healthy organism cannot tolerate cancers.”170 Mao thus calls upon the CCP to 
take as a guide to action in the Rectification Campaign the Stalinist visions of 
sharpened class struggle: he hopes to ferret out the enemies that have sneaked 
into the CCP even before they may be able to start their subversive activities and 
do harm to the CCP. Mao calls on the Party to engage in “ruthless struggle” 
against the enemies wherever they may be found – that is, especially in the 
superstructure. 
As a part of the superstructure, the media assume a crucial position within 
the Stalinist ideological framework. Stalin’s often-quoted bon mot that the 
newspapers were the “sharpest weapon of class struggle” must be extended: the 
media were not only a weapon but also an arena of class struggle. When the 
bourgeoisie is too weak to confront the proletariat openly, that is in the economic 
realm (that is, after revolution), then class struggle shifts to the superstructure. In 
China, this argument was extended to the period before the revolution: in addition 
to economic and military assaults, the CCP has to guard against being 
undermined in the realm of the superstructure. Three years later, the 1945 
“Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party” confirmed this reading, 
explaining the CCP’s history as a series of line struggles between a correct 
position (that of Mao) and other, incorrect positions that were associated with 
influences of bourgeois thinking, called “tendencies” (qingxiang 倾向). The CCP 
did not wait until after revolution to sum up the experiences of its history, as the 
CPSU had done. Rather, it set out to identify the internal enemies at a much 
earlier point: why allow traitors and enemies to lie dormant within the Party until 
after the revolution, when they will inflict harm on their colleagues and the 
revolutionary enterprise? The fear of enemies within the own ranks, I argue, 
contributed significantly to the fierceness of the Rectification Campaign,171 and it 
did also account for the tightening of the Party’s grip on the media: if it is the media 
where the assault of the bourgeoisie will occur after revolution, then these attacks 
must be anticipated and prevented from their very beginnings through heightened 
                                             
170 Translated from the Chinese edition of the “Conclusion” appearing in JFRB, April 11, 1942. 
171 Compare in particular the documentation of the campaign’s excesses in Gao Hua. Hong taiyng 
shi zenyang shengqi de, and Chen Yongfa. Yan’an de yinying. Many of the excesses of the 
campaign are attributed to Kang Sheng, who is said to have been a particularly diligent student of 
Stalin’s conspiracy theories. 
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control of the Party media. Intensified class struggle thus had reached the CCP’s 
Yan’an media apparatus. 
Once the struggle between two lines, representing too classes, was defined 
as the central factor in politics, the role of the media was imagined in a new 
fashion. The CCP would henceforth concentrate an unprecedented degree of 
vigilance on the media: by demanding the strengthening the media’s “Party 
character,” the CCP hoped to use the media under its control as a tool in the 
increasingly fierce class struggle, while at the same time trying to prevent any 
attempts to undermine the Party from within, through the media. This 
understanding of the media’s nature, however, goes beyond earlier 
conceptualizations: with the element of class struggle, distinctly Leninist notions 
(such as the educational approach), rather indigenous concerns (the mass 
character), and a strong Stalinist argument (sharpened class struggle) came 
together. These elements did not necessarily conflict, but they produced an 
inherent tension within the media concept. As I will show in the chapters in part 
two of this thesis, varying interpretations of the media concept resulted mainly 
from stress placed on different elements of the media concept. When these 
interpretations came to clash, the results could be disastrous. 
With the double nature of the media, resulting from the vision of sharpening 
class struggle and the Stalinist rationale behind it, all major elements of the 
modern Chinese media concept have been identified. We can now update once 
again the earlier, preliminary summary of the core points. From the CCP 
documents and writings on propaganda from the crucial Yan’an era, we thus have 
reconstructed the modern Chinese media concept, whose final version reads: 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have identified the key arguments in the CCP’s media 
thinking that were developed in the Yan’an period. These include the media’s 
“party character” (dangxing, or partiinost), their “mass character,” their generally 
normative mission as a tool for enlightenment of the population in the hands of an 
avant-garde party, and finally the dual role of the media in the context of class 
struggle: while they are a “sharp weapon” in the hands of the Party, they are also 
the Party’s vulnerable point, because the realm of the superstructure is especially 
exposed to attacks of the enemy. Tight control of the media is thus the only way to 
prevent severe harm being done to the Party’s mission. All of the above themes 
have figured prominently in the Leninist and Stalinist interpretations of Marxism 
and have come to China by way of translation and mediation. Yet all efforts to 
“sinify” it notwithstanding, Marxism-Leninism has been an imported ideology. 
The discussion in this and the preceding chapter has revealed a form of 
eclecticism at work: Soviet concepts of agitation, propaganda, and the use of the 
media were not transferred lock, stock, and barrel from the Soviet Union to China. 
Rather, the CCP emphasized some aspects of Soviet propaganda politics, but did 
not or only reluctantly draw on others. Differences of emphasis are clearly 
 
(1) The media must represent the unified, single voice of the party; 
(2) they are indispensable tools of party propaganda and party building; 
(3) they assist the party, the avant-garde of the working class, to raise the 
consciousness of the people; 
(4) they do so by focussing on the concrete concerns of the masses and 
becoming one with the masses; 
(5) the media are essentially about education; 
(6) they are a weapon as well as a battleground of class struggle and must 
fight against any attempt of the enemy to gain ground in the 
superstructure. 
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discernible. Soviet observers, especially after the ideological break between the 
two nations that occurred in the late 1950s, have treated these differences as 
“deficiencies” – as failures to grasp the complex nature of the Soviet propaganda 
apparatus.172 In the 1950s, there had been tendencies to bring the CCP’s 
governing apparatus more in line with the Soviet model, as I will demonstrate in 
chapter five. Yet over the longer term, the particularities of the Chinese media 
system and of Chinese media thinking have prevailed; as a result, the Chinese 
propaganda sector has never been an exact copy of its Soviet counterpart. The 
“deficiencies” hypothesis is therefore little satisfactory. 
Instead, I propose that we must ask why some aspects of Marxist media 
theory were accepted in China with more ease than others. Why would the 
Chinese Communists so willingly accept the avant-garde nature of the Party in 
relation to the people? What appeal did the Stalinist methods hold for the Chinese 
Communists? To answer these questions, I argue, we must look closer at the 
other end of the interaction between China and the Soviet Union, we must 
investigate the nature of the soil in which the Marxist seeds were planted. We thus 
need to further examine the Chinese polity of the 1920s outside of the CCP’s 
realm, the international environment of modern China, and finally those elements 
of traditional Chinese political culture still at work in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The goal of this strategy will be to identify possible factors that might have 
contributed to the adoption of particular aspects of Marxist media thinking in China. 
I will attempt to do so in the next chapter will do. 
 
                                             
172 The most elaborate collection of the arguments of both sides is The Polemic on the General 
Line of the International Communist Movement. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. 
Chapter Three 
Selection, Imagination, Transnational Flows: 
The Media Concept and the Legacy of Traditional Political Culture 
 
But if you regard [the Xiangyue lectures] as mere conventionalities ... then 
above there will be no praising of the Son of Heaven’s [effort to] transform 
the people through enlightenment, and below the masses of ordinary 
people will not be prompted to renew their ways...1 
 
Publication of newspapers originated among Westerners, and has been 
introduced to China. We have seen the Hong Kong newspapers printed in 
Chinese characters, and their form and content are excellent. Now we 
emulate the idea...2 
 
In the last chapter, I have established the core elements of what I call the 
“Modern Chinese Media Concept.” I have throughout related them to sources from 
the Marxist-Leninist tradition, thus suggesting that media thinking in the PRC is 
rooted firmly within the world of Marxist philosophy and its practical application, as 
realized in the Soviet Union. There seems to be no other single most important 
source for Chinese media thinking. Nonetheless, the modern media concept did 
not emerge in a conceptual vacuum, and the process of importing an ideology 
from a foreign source cannot but leave its traces on the ideology itself: existing 
alternative models in the host environment, linguistic and cultural diversity, as well 
as immediate local circumstances, all bear on the product that is finally emerging, 
in this case the Chinese media concept. In chapters one and two I have pointed at 
some of the intricacies of this process, such as when commenting on the Chinese 
preference for the term “propaganda” where Soviet sources place emphasis on 
“agitation,” or with view to the particular importance of the Stalinist interpretation in 
China over other streams of Marxist philosophy. However, I have not yet tried to 
address the crucially important questions: why a party paper, why “propaganda,” 
and why Stalinism? 
In this chapter, I will attempt to do two things. On the one hand, I will try to 
situate the debates in the CCP that were tracked in chapter two within a broader 
national and international context that will allow us to understand the emergence 
of the Chinese media concept in relation with journalistic and political trends 
beyond the framework of the interwar-era Communist International. This widening 
                                             
1 Tian Wenjing. Zhouxian shiyi, p. 9a. Repr. in Guanzhen shu jicheng bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.). 
Guanzhen shu jicheng. Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1997, vol. 3, p. 666. 
2 “Ben guan gaobai” in Shenbao, April 30, 1872. 
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of the scope shows that the model of the press developed by the CCP, rather than 
being a propagandistic aberration from a global liberal-press mainstream, was in 
fact very much in tune with the times; it reflects opinions common in China at that 
time, as well as an awareness of international trends (beyond the Soviet model) of 
media thinking. On the other hand, a very different set of factors was instrumental 
in shaping modern Chinese thinking about the nature of the media and their 
function. I am speaking here of aspects of traditional Chinese political culture. 
If we accept that Chinese media thinking is not a one-to-one copy of Soviet 
or otherwise inspired concepts, but rather a Chinese version developed from these 
models (or, a “sinified” version), if we treat Chinese media thinking as a product in 
its own right rather than a variety of a binding stereotype, then further explanation 
is necessary: what is it that makes the Chinese media thinking Chinese? Or, to be 
more precise, why have some elements of the broader horizon of Marxist thought 
found their way into China and into the Chinese media concept, while others were 
transformed, watered down or simply rejected?3 The discussion in chapter two is 
unable to provide answers for these questions. The present chapter will therefore 
attempt to explain the genesis of modern Chinese media thinking in terms of its 
indigenous roots, of its cultural configuration in Chinese tradition. I am interested 
here less in the long-term continuities of the modern-day PRC with its imperial 
predecessors than in the processes that made some Marxist-Leninist concepts 
and ideas surrounding the media acceptable in China as plausible answers to 
concerns that had long predated their arrival. Different components of the 
“package” of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism corresponded to a larger or smaller 
degree with ideas, perceptions, or concerns of traditional Chinese thinking. I thus 
argue that especially those elements of imported media thinking were accepted in 
China (or were stressed by Chinese theoreticians and practitioners) that could be 
imagined within the context of traditional Chinese thought. 
In this chapter I will map one influential element of the political culture of 
late imperial China, the Sacred Edict (Shengyu), that prescribed a model of ethical 
propaganda and moral reformation that provided important points of departure for 
modern political thinking. Two later sections of this chapter discuss the importation 
                                             
3 These issues are also crucial in the debate concerning the emergence of Maoism as a Chinese 
form of Marxism, or, as CCP orthodoxy will have it, as “the combination of Marxism-Leninism with 
the practice of the Chinese revolution.” 
 133
to China in the nineteenth century of modern ideas that were indispensable for the 
development of those figures of thought that shaped the CCP’s media concept. 
The instances discussed are the emergence of “sinified” religious propaganda in 
the course of the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), and the emergence of a modern 
Chinese press in Shanghai and Hong Kong since the 1870s. First, however, I will 
attempt to briefly map some aspects of the international dimension of discussions 
concerning the nature of the media, and the way these discussions were received 
in China. 
 
 
Persuasion: The National and International Marketplace of Ideas 
The CCP’s media concept is unique in its selective appropriation of certain 
lines of the Marxist tradition, mediated through Leninism and Stalinism, and 
forging these various ideas into a coherent whole that took into account the CCP’s 
concrete needs in the remote, rural border region of Northern Shaanxi. All the 
while, the CCP did not exist in a vacuum; while it tried to isolate the majority of its 
cadres and the population in Yan’an from influences beyond its control, the Party 
itself interacted constantly with the external environment, both on political, social, 
and economic levels, and on the marketplace of ideas. The functionalist, elitist, 
and propagandist nature of the CCP’s media concept rejects another ideal type of 
the press – the classic liberal press, the commercial, non-partisan, reasoning 
press that characterizes Habermas’ public sphere and that is portrayed in Fred 
Siebert’s Four Theories of the Press.4 It is, however, hard to find such a press in 
China at the time when the CCP formed its media concept. In fact, it is difficult to 
find even isolated proponents of such a press model in the 1930s and early 1940s, 
and arguably throughout the first third of the 20th century.5 The CCP polemics were 
                                             
4 Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. Fred S. Siebert et al. Four Theories of the 
Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of 
what the Press Should Be and Do. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956. 
5 There were exceptions, however, such as the often-praised Dagong bao (1902-1938), led by 
Zhang Jiluan and Wang Yunsheng – to mention but one example. On Dagong bao see Sopia L. 
Wang. “The Independent Press and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the Dagong bao in 
Republican China,” in Pacific Affairs 67.2 (1994), p. 216-41; Hung Chang-Tai. “Paper Bullets: Fan 
Changjiang and New Journalism in Wartime China,” in Modern China 17.4 (1991), p. 427-68; Wang 
Ke-wen. “Zhang Jiluan, the Dagongbao, and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941,” paper presented 
at the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China meeting, Singapore, 26-28 June, 2005. 
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directed at a press concept that enjoyed little support in China, and in many 
foreign nations at the time. 
The CCP shared many ideas and a significant part of its world outlook with 
its foremost political and ideological rival. The GMD, itself a Leninist party, had 
established press structures after its 1924 reforms that were in line with Comintern 
recommendations. In particular, the GMD had centralized control over the Party 
press, and in 1928, Zhongyang ribao became not only the organ of the Central 
Executive Committee, but also the mouthpiece of the national government.6 At the 
same time, the GMD became increasingly intolerant of alternative opinion, trying to 
suppress dissent through a harsh censorship regime. 
Before the Northern Expedition (1926-27), during the period of cooperation 
between GMD and CCP, both parties shared common goals, including the 
perception for the need for unity and discipline in propaganda affairs. They 
disagreed only on propaganda content.7 In 1925, Mao Zedong was named head of 
the GMD propaganda department, a position from which he tried to unify the 
various Party newspapers through means such as “propaganda outlines.”8 
Prescriptive terminology and analyses of current affairs were to become a 
common feature in Yan’an. In short, his tenure9 as the head of GMD propaganda 
affairs provided Mao with an apprenticeship that offered valuable lessons for the 
organization of the CCP press in Yan’an. 
In the 1930s, the GMD gradually tightened control over a commercially 
driven, but often partisan and politically connected press10 through legislative and 
administrative means. In December 1930, a press law was promulgated that 
banned attacks on the governing GMD, subversion of the national government, as 
well as any book and article upsetting public order and morality from appearing in 
                                                                                                                                      
However, Zhang’s efforts to protect his paper against harassment forced him to cultivate “a warm, 
personal relationship with Chiang Kai-shek.” See  Stephen R. MacKinnon. “Toward a History of the 
Chinese Press in the Republican Period,” in Modern China 23.1 (1997), p. 3-32, here p. 10 
6 On the emergence of the GMD Party press see John Fitzgerald. “The Origins of the Illiberal Party 
Newspaper: Print Journalism in China’s Nationalist Revolution,” in Republican China 21.2 (1996), p. 
1-22. Compare also Fitzgerald. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist 
Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; and MacKinnon. “Toward a History of the 
Chinese Press in the Republican Period.”. 
7 See Fitzgerald. Awakening China, p. 237f. 
8 Ibid., p. 239-42. These “Outlines” must be regarded as direct precursors of the “Propaganda 
Essentials” distributed in Yan’an, which I have discussed in chapter two. 
9 Mao was dismissed from his post after only five months, in March 1926, after Chiang Kai-shek 
became the GMD party leader. 
10 Compare MacKinnon, “Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period,” p. 8-11.  
 135
print.11 More laws were to follow, with increasing severity of punishment. In 1935, 
the GMD set up a Censorship Committee under its Propaganda Department, and 
in 1939, the Wartime Press Censorship Bureau of the National Military Council 
was set up. It was followed in 1940 by the Central Commission for the Censorship 
of Books and Periodicals.12 Press control reached an all-time high during the war 
years, as the GMD tried to make sure that no other voice beyond its own might be 
heard in China.13 
The ultimate goal of GMD propaganda and press control was, as John 
Fitzgerald has argued, to build cohesion first within the Party, and then across the 
entire nation, to awaken the Chinese people, transform them, and forge them into 
a modern nation state.14 In the process, tutelage of this backward people was 
deemed indispensable, as were controls that would stem corrupting and dissonant 
influences, such as those of the CCP. The ideas that guided GMD propaganda in 
the 1920s and 1930s ring a familiar tone.15 
The GMD press, however, was just part of the larger context in which the 
CCP media developed. The media industry in China in the 1920s and 1930s was 
dazzling with foreign interests.16 Some of these were driven primarily by business 
                                             
11 An English translation is reprinted in Thomas Ming-Heng Chao. The Foreign Press in China. 
Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931, p. 107-14. 
12 On these institutions see Lee-hsia Hsu Ting. Government Control of the Press in Modern China, 
1900-1949. Foreign journalists, too, were subjected to Chinese censorship. See Chinese Ministry 
of Information (ed.). China Handbook 1937-1945: a Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments 
in China in Eight Years of War. New York: Macmillan Press, 1947, Chapter XVIII: The Press, p. 
506-20, esp. p. 511, 516-20. For a careful study of literary censorship in Republican China see 
Michel Hockx. Questions of Style: Literary Societies and Literary Journals in Modern China, 1911-
1937. Leiden: Brill, 2003, ch. 7. 
13 The GMD referred to other coercive measures as well. The assassination in 1934 of Shi Liangcai, 
the editor of the Shenbao, is but one example. Comp. also Chiang Kai-shek’s July 1932 conflict 
with the Shenbao, in MacKinnon, “Toward a History of the Chinese Press,” p 16f. 
14 Awakening China, passim. 
15 Andrew Nathan traces these ideas back to Liang Qichao: “The natural harmony of the political 
order could not be realized immediately if the people were backward. They must be trained as 
citizens first; until then, freedom would lead only to disorder. Liang thus laid down the rationale that 
would be used to justify authoritarianism, and the acceptance of authoritarianism, throughout 
China’s democratic era.” Chinese Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 59-
66. Quotation taken from p. 62f. I will return briefly to Liang Qichao at the end of this chapter. 
16 On the foreign press see the special issue of China Review 4.1 (2004), especially the 
contributions by Bryna Goodman, “Networks of News: Power, Language, and Transnational 
Dimensions of the Chinese Press, 1850-1949,” in ibid. p. 1-10; and “Semi-Colonialism, 
Transnational Networks and News Flows in Early Republican Shanghai,” in ibid. p. 55-88. A good 
first-hand account is Chao. The Foreign Press in China; see further Stephen R. MacKinnon and 
Oris Friesen. China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, esp. ch.2; Peter Rand. China Hands: The 
Adventures and Ordeals of the American Journalists who Joined Forces with the Great Chinese 
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motives, others by political and propaganda agendas; more often than not, it is 
hard to draw a line between the two. While ideas of a liberal press and editorial 
independence were promoted in China by foreigners and Chinese graduates from 
American journalism schools alike,17 the foreign owned press in China was often a 
bad example to go by. 
First of all, none of the Chinese newspapers stationed correspondents 
abroad to gather news.18 Rather, they received news dispatches from foreign 
news agencies operating in China.19 The British Reuters and the United Press in 
particular were formidable players on the market; yet especially in North China, the 
Japanese agencies – in succession: Kokusai, Rengo, Nippon Dempo, and 
Domei – had a large market share. The professional power of a giant such as 
Reuters, and the high transmission costs for cables within China, however, meant 
that well into the 1930s many Chinese newspapers received not just their foreign 
news, but also the bulk of their domestic news from a foreign provider.20 In this 
situation, Reuters was never far from being accused of biased reporting and 
influence peddling – similar allegations had been made as early as World War I by 
enemy nations such as Germany.21 The Japanese news agencies were funded by 
the Foreign Ministry’s Information Department and engaged into an aggressive 
price war with Reuters in the 1930s.22 Rengo, for example, was formed in 1926 as 
a joint venture between the Toho agency and the Kokusai News Agency, the latter 
being a consortium of major Japanese newspapers and subsidized by the 
                                                                                                                                      
Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995; Rudolf G. Wagner. “The Flow of News: 
Interactions Between the Official Chinese Gazettes, the Chinese-Language Commercial Papers, 
and English-language China Reporting in China and London,” paper presented at the XIVth EACS 
Conference, Moscow, 26-28 Aug., 2002. On foreign involvement in the early Chinese press of the 
Qing period see Wagner. “The Early Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Public Sphere,” In 
European Journal of East Asian Studies 1.1 (2001), p. 1-33, here p. 15; and Wagner. “The Role of 
the Foreign Community in the Chinese Public Sphere,” in China Quarterly 142 (1995), p. 423-43. 
17 See especially Luo Wenhui. “Misuli daxue xinwen xueyuan dui Zhonghua minguo xinwen jiaoyu 
yu xinwen shiye de yingxiang,” in Xinwenxue yanjiu 41 (1989), p. 201-10. 
18 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Chao. The Foreign Press in China. 
19 The Central News Agency (Zhongyang she) was founded in 1924 and later became the official 
news agency of the Nanjing government; however, because of its closeness to the GMD it was 
widely treated with suspicion. Since it delivered news in Chinese only, it failed to make much of an 
impact, as both Chinese and foreign papers regarded the English dispatches as more credible. See 
Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 6. 
20 On foreign news organs as catalysts for information from China for Chinese citizens in 
nineteenth and twentieth century China see Wagner. “The Early Chinese Newspapers and the 
Chinese Public Sphere,” p. 15. 
21 Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 41f. 
22 See Peter O’Connor. “Endgame: The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia in the Run-
up to War, 1936-1941,” in Japan Forum 13.1 (Apr. 2001), p. 63-76, here p. 69. 
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Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To better penetrate the Chinese market, 
Rengo operated a Chinese service in Shanghai that directly supplied the Chinese 
language papers for much below market rates.23 
The involvement of foreign interests on the newspaper market is even more 
complicated. To avoid persecution from the government, virtually all Chinese 
newspapers had been registered as foreign companies in the concessions of 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and other cities. All the while, Chinese-language and 
English-language publications were closely connected.24 The English-language 
press in China has been described as consisting of three large, informal 
transitional networks that tied foreign-owned publications in China (British, 
American, and Japanese) closely to their counterparts in Japan.25 The actual 
ownership patterns were in many cases instable, with frequent sales and 
consequent changes in the editorial line. The Shanghai Mercury was founded in 
1879 as a British-owned evening paper, but was acquired by a Japanese 
consortium in 1903; in 1931, it was sold to the Shanghai Evening Post, an 
American paper.26 An especially curious case is the North China Standard, an 
influential English-language, Japanese-controlled paper in China; it was founded 
in Beijing in 1919 to promote Japanese interests in China and to compete with the 
American-owned Peking Leader.27 Japanese direct investments in Chinese press 
operations were probably the most visible, such as in the Beijing-based Shuntian 
shibao and the Shengjing shibao in Mukden, but other nations invested heavily in 
the press sector as well: the French authorities in Shanghai subsidized several 
papers as well, so as to make the official French voice heard in China, as did other 
nations.28 The Soviet TASS, banned in China since 1929, distributed its 
dispatches secretly and free of charge to newspapers in Beijing and Harbin.29 
Chinese readers in the 1920s and 1930s had every reason to have doubts 
about the ideal of a liberal and non-partisan press. When the Shanghai Evening 
                                             
23 Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 32-37. 
24 MacKinnon writes that “the relationship between the Chinese press and the Western 
correspondents became so symbiotic that it is impossible to conclude who influenced whom most.” 
“Toward a History of the Chinese Press,” p. 14. The best treatment of this issue is Goodman. 
“Semi-Colonialism, Transnational Networks and News Flows in Early Republican Shanghai.” 
25 See O’Connor. “Endgame.” 
26 Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 89. 
27 Ibid., p. 28. On the Japanese English-language press in China see also O’Connor. “Endgame.” 
28 Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 89. 
29 Ibid., p. 105f. 
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Post was acquired by an American consortium in 1928, the new owners let it be 
known that their only aim was “establishing it as an independent journal, with no 
especial purpose of propaganda and policy to serve except that of giving correct, 
unbiased information.”30 The need for such an announcement itself reflects better 
than anything else the natural and experience-based expectation with which 
readers approached foreign-owned – and probably Chinese – newspapers.  
The sometimes complicated ownership structure of the media in China 
allows not many conclusions as to editorial positions. Especially the commercially 
oriented publications with a larger circulations, Chinese and English alike, were 
often critical their respective governments.31 Nonetheless, the partisan press had 
been growing since the early twentieth century, and by the 1920s and 1930s an 
increasing number of publications acted as mouthpieces for British, Japanese, 
Chinese, and other interests.32 Even more importantly, foreign-owned newspapers 
were often perceived to represent the interests of their own government, even 
when they were not. Theories of propaganda had gained worldwide currency since 
World War I; the spread of fascism in particular furthered the interest in 
propaganda, publicity, and the ideological justifications for political interventions 
into the public sphere. The most aggressive theories of propaganda came from 
Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, countries that also demonstrated how theory 
could be translated into the everyday practice of press management.33 Yet 
reflections were under way in the U.S. and elsewhere, too, as to how to respond to 
the developments in the press sector in continental Europe.34 
                                             
30 Quoted after Chao. The Foreign Press in China, p. 65. 
31 The United Press representative in Beijing, Randall Gould, was at one time banned from the 
weekly news briefings for American reporters by the American minister in China. Gould had 
angered the embassy repeatedly with his news dispatches. See Chao. The Foreign Press in China, 
p. 83. For earlier examples Goodman. “Networks of News,” p.2; and the detailed study of Rudolf 
Wagner. “The Shenbao in Crisis: The International Environment and the Conflict Between Guo 
Songtao and the Shenbao,” in Late Imperial China 20.1 (1999), p. 107-38.  
32 Chao, a contemporary observer employed by Reuters, provides numerous examples. 
33 For an early discussion of these activities see the contributions of Marx (on Germany), Zurcher 
(Italy), and Maxwell (Soviet Union) in Harwood Lawrence Childs (ed.). Propaganda and 
Dictatorship: A Collection of Papers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936. 
34 See the essay of George Catlin in ibid. A pioneer of the implications of propaganda for modern 
democratic nations is Harold D. Lasswell. See his Propaganda Technique in the World War. 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1927. For a much longer and more systematic study 
of the origins, the methods, and the techniques of propaganda see Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy 
Blumenstock. World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1939. 
For an overview over the enormous literature on the subject existing by that time see Harold D. 
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These international theorizations were an outcome of the war itself. 
Analysts on both sides tried to find explanations for success and failure in part in 
the warring parties’ efforts in publicity, propaganda, and public opinion leadership. 
At the same time, experiences from the practice of commercial persuasion, that is 
advertising, played a significant role in the formulation of new approaches to 
“public opinion leadership.” An especially interesting example is the experience of 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and its influence in China and Japan. 
The CPI was founded in April 1917 as an agency in charge of domestic and 
external public relations for the U.S. government.35 Its creation was a compromise 
formula at the height of the war, when American military commanders called for 
strict censorship regulations. The agency under its chairman George Creel was 
nonetheless mistrusted by wide segments of the U.S. public and was abolished in 
1919. The CPI conducted propaganda (a term that itself avoided) on behalf of the 
U.S. government, explaining the war effort to a reluctant public at home, and to 
allies and enemy nations abroad. In China, the CPI was represented by Carl Crow, 
who later used his experiences as a publicity manager to set up a highly 
successful advertising agency in Shanghai.36 
In the course of disputes with his domestic critics, Creel developed 
elaborate arguments for a proactive form of publicity work that made use of latest 
technologies (film and radio) and popular appeal to influence public opinion.37 It is 
for these rather modern features that the CPI drew the attention of propagandists 
                                                                                                                                      
Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith. Propaganda and Promotional Activities: an 
Annotated Bibliography. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 
35 On the CPI see George Creel. How we Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing 
Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every 
Corner of the Globe. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920; James R. Mock, Cedric Larson. Words 
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36 On Carl Crow see Paul French. Carl Crow: A Tough Old China Hand. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2006. Crow writes about his work for the CPI in I Speak for the Chinese. New 
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37 These ideas are spelled out in the “Preface” and ch. 1 of How we Advertised America. 
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abroad, including those of Japan and China. For observers in Shanghai and 
Yan’an, even the United States, the paragon of the liberal press model, thus 
seemed to endorse forms of state-managed publicity and propaganda if doing so 
benefited the overall strategic needs and the interests of the government. Such 
perceptions of overseas trends blended nicely with the practice of partisan 
newspaper making and overt and covert propaganda that characterized the 
Chinese public sphere in the 1920s and 1930s. In this context, the adoption of a 
Leninist press model by the CCP seems like a rather natural choice. 
The underlying reasons for the worldwide prevalence of illiberal theories of 
the press and propaganda in the interwar years must be sought in the widespread 
belief in the transformative power of ideas, in the positivist endeavour to transform 
man itself and his basic nature. The spread of social Darwinism, biologism and 
eugenics that gave rise to the CCP’s project of the “socialist new man” (as 
discussed in chapter one) was not limited to China, but was a global phenomenon. 
The faith in the changeability of man, and in particular the positivist belief in the 
power of the state and its ability to mold its citizens according to its ways, had 
worldwide currency.38 Once people’s minds were regarded not as autonomous 
and sovereign entities, but rather as inherently formable, they were subject to the 
increasingly refined techniques of specialists including advertisement agents, 
public relations officers, and party propagandists. In this setting, the idea of a 
liberal, bipartisan press was obviously on the defensive.39 
The proper environment in which the modern Chinese media concept took 
shape, however, can go only so far in explaining the peculiar model adopted by 
the CCP in the Yan’an period. As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, it is 
necessary to look at the ideas, concepts, and patterns of thought in traditional 
Chinese political culture that favoured the importation of some elements of 
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist political philosophy over others. While some aspects of 
the canon easily found their way into CCP thinking and were “sinified,” others were 
rejected, or at least faced an uphill battle in China. I argue that those elements of 
foreign media thinking were most likely to be incorporated in the CCP’s press 
                                             
38 For a discussion of these ideas compare Giorgio Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
39 Some of these concerns are echoed in Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, part VI (ch. 20-23). 
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theories that could be imagined within the parameters of premodern political 
culture, and that seemed to provide novel answers to problems predating their 
arrival in China. Other components of the “original” that lacked some sort of 
pendant facilitating their conception and acceptance in China were not necessarily 
refused, but found it much harder to explain their relevance and their purpose, and 
thus gain acceptance in China. In the next section, I will look into one crucial 
element of Chinese political culture, the Sacred Edict (Shengyu) and its relevance 
for the imagining the role of the press in the twentieth century. 
 
 
Propaganda in the Service of Imperial Confucianism: the Shengyu 
Can a political movement as fiercely anti-traditionalist as that of the Chinese 
Communists be analyzed in terms of traditional thinking? Most of the CCP leaders 
came from the radical wing of the May Fourth movement and had received their 
dose of iconoclastic enlightenment. However, no matter what their particular 
attitude towards the Chinese cultural heritage was (which for the most part was 
openly hostile; more sympathetic views of China’s past sometimes took decades 
to emerge, such as in the case of Mao Zedong), a significant part of the CCP 
leadership was familiar with traditional Chinese political culture and thinking. Some 
of them were born in the final years of the 19th century and received at least some 
classical education in their early youth.40 Others came to maturity amidst the 
intense cultural debates of the May Fourth Movement and, through the arguments 
brought forward against what was now denounced as “feudal” thinking, got some 
understanding of the object under attack. Education thus provided most of the 
individuals involved in the formation of the modern Chinese media concept with an 
understanding of the traditional roots of Chinese thinking and its main concepts, 
especially those regarding the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
people, the obligations of the state, and the patterns of communication in this 
relationship. I thus argue that, other factors aside (such as the needs of day-to-day 
                                             
40 For example, the biographers of Mao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping report of the 
youngsters being educated in the Chinese classics. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 
(ed.). Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893-1949, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993 3 vols., here 
vol. 1, p. 2. Hu Hua. The Early Life of Zhou Enlai. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980, p. 2. 
Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Zhu De nianpu. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980, 
p. 4-5. Maomao. Wo de fuqin Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993, p. 55. 
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politics), this general cultural predisposition facilitated their choices, conscious or 
unconscious, in the politics of the media sector under consideration here. 
In the following discussion, I will stay as close as possible to the general 
object of this study, namely the media of normative propaganda. The nearest we 
can get to in late imperial China, I suggest, is the famous “Sacred Edict,” or 
Shengyu 圣谕. Since the discussion in the last chapter has drawn heavily on 
administrative documents advising the Party’s propaganda organs in their work, I 
will try to use the closest traditional equivalents at hand for my discussion of the 
Shengyu, these being Qing administrative handbooks on governance compiled for 
local officials, and especially the sections on normative propaganda therein.41 
The Manchu Qing dynasty had taken over from its Ming predecessors the 
vision of a centralized, autocratic state.42 After assuming power in 1644, the Qing 
rulers set out to address many of the evils that had plagued the last decades of the 
Ming and that had been the object of wide-spread criticism of the intellectual elite: 
corruption, violent factional infighting that threatened the effectiveness of the 
bureaucracy, and the excessive power of the imperial eunuchs. In the ideological 
realm, the early Qing emperors pushed back the influence of Daoist and Buddhist 
teaching and reinstated a version of Neo-Confucianism that they claimed was 
closer to the ideas of the Song dynasty thinkers like Zhu Xi 朱熹. The foundations 
of a Neo-Confucian state ideology had been laid in their home state in the 
Northeast even before the Manchu’s ascendancy to imperial power; after 1644 
they brought their vision back into the Chinese heartland and made their version of 
“Imperial Confucianism”43 into the universal ideology of the empire. The scholarly 
elite, many of whom had been fiercely anti-Qing and had supported the resistance 
of the Ming loyalists in the South, was won over to the new dynasty by the sheer 
successes of Qing governance, and by the integration of ever larger numbers of 
scholars into ambitious, state-sponsored projects of intellectual effort such as the 
                                             
41 I am grateful to Pierre-Étienne Will, who has brought to my attention this kind of material. My 
choice of the handbooks discussed relies heavily on Prof. Will’s as yet unpublished guide to late 
imperial administrative handbooks. 
42 William T. de Bary. “Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: A Seventeenth Century View” 
in John K. Fairbank (ed.). Chinese Thought and Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1957, p. 163-203. 
43 James Legge’s phrase. See “Imperial Confucianism” in China Review IV (1876), p. 147ff, 223ff, 
299ff, 363ff. 
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compilation of the official Mingshi 明史 (1682-1735), the Gujin tushu jicheng 古今
图书集成 (1706-25), and the Si ku quanshu 四库全书 (1772-82).44 
On the local level, the Qing rulers extended their power into the villages by 
enforcing the system of local governance.45 The Baojia 保甲 and Lijia 里家 
systems were an attempt to organize on the village-level local self-defence and the 
collection of taxes and duties, respectively.46 Both systems had roots going back 
as far as the Song dynasty, but were implemented with new vigour under the early 
Qing emperors. On the ideological level the Shunzhi 顺治 emperor (r. 1644-61) 
introduced the system of the Xiangyue 乡约 lectures as early as 1652.47 Officially 
adopted in 1659, the system required the public reading of imperially sanctioned 
moral principles and exhortations in all villages in the empire on the first and 
fifteenth day of every lunar month. Going back to a suggestion from Zhu Xi, the 
Xiangyue system could claim highest ideological legitimacy.48 The lectures’ 
content, however, was of contemporary nature: the Liu yu 六谕 (“Six [Maxims] 
Hortatory Edict”) was a creation of the Shunzhi emperor and admonished the 
people:49  
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Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China. 
Cambridge, Ma.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984. R. Kent Guy. The 
Emperor’s Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ien-lung Era. Cambridge, Ma.: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987. Frederic Wakeman Jr. The Great 
Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China. Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1985, ch. 13-15. Thomas A. Metzger. Escape from Predicament: 
Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977. See also Wang Hui. Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004. On 
a more general note, compare Philip Kuhn. Origins of the Modern Chinese State. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002. Donald J. Munro. The Concept of Man in Early China. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1969. Thomas A. Metzger. The Internal Organization of the Ch’ing 
Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communication Aspects. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1973. 
45 Hsiao Kung-chuan’s seminal study on rural China provides a wealth of information on local 
governance, with a focus on the 19th century. In the following section I have made use of this work, 
and esp. ch. 6 “Ideological Control: the Hsiang-Yüeh and Other Institutions.” Hsiao Kung-chuan. 
Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1960. 
46 See Hsiao Kung-chuan. Rural China, ch. 2-4. 
47 For the date 1652 see Hsiao. Rural China, p. 616, n. 5. 
48 On the origins of the Xiangyue see Philip A. Kuhn. “Local Self-Government under the Republic: 
Problems, of Control, Autonomy, and Mobilization” in Frederic Wakeman, Carolin Grant (eds.). 
Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p. 257-
98, here p. 260f. 
49 Translation after Hsiao. Rural China, p. 186. Chinese text from Qing huidian shili, juan 397, 1b. 
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991, 14 vols., here vol. 5, p. 422. 
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(1) “Perform filial duties to your parents;” 孝顺父母 
(2) “honour and respect your elders and superiors;” 恭敬长上 
(3) “maintain harmonious relationships with your neighbours;” 和睦乡里 
(4) “instruct and discipline your sons and grandsons;” 教训子孙 
(5) “let each work peacefully for his own livelihood;” 各安生理 
(6) “do not commit wrongful deeds.” 无作非为 
 
In 1670 the Kangxi emperor came forward with a new set of maxims that 
were henceforth to be used in the biweekly instructions of the population. The 16 
maxims of the Shengyu were the officially designated content of the Xiangyue 
lectures until the end of the dynasty 250 years later. These sixteen maxims read:50  
(1) “Esteem most highly filial piety and brotherly submission, in 
order to give due importance to human moral relations;” 
敦孝弟以重人伦 
(2) “behave with generosity toward your kindred, in order to 
illustrate harmony and benignity;” 
笃宗族以昭雍睦 
(3) “cultivate peace and concord in your neighbourhoods, in order 
to prevent quarrels and litigations;” 
和乡党以息争讼 
(4) “give importance to agriculture and sericulture, in order to 
ensure a sufficiency of clothing and food;” 
重农桑以足衣食 
(5) “show that you prize moderation and economy, in order to 
prevent the lavish waste of your means;” 
尚节俭以惜财用 
(6) “foster colleges and schools, in order to give the training of 
scholars a proper start;” 
隆学校以端士习 
(7) “do away with errant teachings, in order to exalt the correct 
doctrine;” 
黜异端以崇正学 
(8) “expound on the laws, in order to warn the ignorant and 
obstinate;” 
讲法律以儆愚顽 
(9) “explain ritual decorum and deference, in order to enrich 
manners and customs;” 
明礼让以厚风俗 
(10) “attend to proper callings, in order to stabilize the people’s 
sense of dedication [to their work];” 
务本业以定民志 
(11) “instruct sons and younger bothers, in order to prevent them 
from doing what is wrong;” 
训子弟以禁非为 
(12) “put a stop to false accusations, in order to protect the honest 
and good;” 
息诬告以全善良 
(13) “warn against sheltering deserters, in order to avoid being 
involved in their punishment;” 
诫匿逃以免株连 
(14) “promptly remit your taxes, in order to avoid being pressed for 
payment;” 
完钱粮以省催科 
(15) “combine in collective security groups (baojia), in order to put 
an end to theft and robbery;” 
联保甲以弭盗贼 
(16) “eschew enmity and anger, in order to show respect for the 
person and life.” 
解雠忿以重身命 
                                             
50 I have given preference to the translation in Wm. Theodore de Bary, Richard Lufrano (ed.). 
Sources of Chinese Tradition 2: from 1600 Through the Twentieth Century (Second edition). New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000, 73f. Hsiao’s translation is in Rural China, p. 187f.  Chinese 
text from Qing huidian shili, juan 397, 2b-3a, Zhonghua shuju ed., vol. 5, p. 422f. The most detailed 
study of the Shengyu is Victor H. Mair. “Language and Ideology in the Written Popularizations of 
the Sacred Edict” in David Johnson et al (ed.). Popular Culture in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985, p. 325-59. 
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Both the Liu yu of the Shunzhi emperor and the Shengyu were short and to 
the point; their aim was to bring the highly condensed essence of the official Neo-
Confucian ideology to a predominantly rural population. These peasants usually 
had little or no literacy, but the proven potential for unrest and upheaval; they were 
therefore regarded to be in need of moral rectification and control. The Shengyu 
was the Kangxi emperor’s comment and elaboration on the Liu yu; likewise, later 
rulers saw the necessity for further elaborations and explanations. In 1724, the 
Yongzheng 雍正 emperor (r. 1723-35) wrote the Shengyu guangxun 圣谕广训, a 
much longer comment on the Shengyu, that was to be used in the village lectures. 
In the course of time, other popular elaborations on the Shengyu appeared, such 
as the Shengyu xiangjie 圣谕像解 (“Illustrated Explanations of the Shengyu”) 
compiled by Liang Yannian 梁延年 in 1681.51 All these editions served the same 
purpose: to propagate a uniform ideology in an easily comprehensible way to 
reach a maximum amount of the population and thus to establish ideological 
control. It is in this point that I consider the Shengyu and its exegeses of interest 
for the study of modern Chinese propaganda.52 
The first three maxims of the Liu yu are concerned with enhancing proper 
social relations, as are those of the Shengyu:53 filial duties and respect towards 
elders, especially within the clan, had been considered cornerstones of Confucian 
ethics for centuries. In the Shengyu’s paraphrase of the third maxim, however, we 
witness a shift in emphasis. The Liu yu had admonished the peasants to “maintain 
harmonious relationships with your neighbours,” which certainly was a good in 
itself in conjunction with the first and second maxim. The Shengyu now made 
explicit the purpose of this maxim: “to prevent quarrels and litigations.” Judicial 
duties belonged to the most onerous tasks of local official in late imperial China; 
legal battles and disputes consumed both time and administrative energy. To 
settle arguments through mediation and to avoid litigation by the local officials was 
clearly in the interest of the latter; the maxim thus acquires an administrative 
                                             
51 Repr. by Jiangsu fushu, Guangxu ren-yin (1902). On the Shengyu xiangjie see Mair. “Language 
and Ideology,” p. 330-32. 
52 The relevance of the Shengyu has been commented upon earlier, for example by Timothy Cheek. 
Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997, p. 17. Cheek does not, however, substantiate his observation. 
53 See the tabulation in Hsiao. Rural China, p. 187f. 
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flavour. A similar process can be observed with regard to maxim five, where “let 
each work peacefully for his own livelihood” is reformulated in the more concrete 
terms of “agriculture and sericulture” that are to provide “a sufficiency of clothing 
and food” and thus enhance social stability. 
The trend towards explanations serving primarily the concerns of officials 
can also be seen on a more general level. Hsiao Kung-chuan has observed that 
while only one maxim of the Liu yu, the last (“do not commit wrongful deeds”) 
addressed public order, this number had risen to six in the Shengyu (maxims eight 
and twelve through sixteen).54 With the introduction of the Shengyu, the Xiangyue 
lectures thus became more openly an instrument of ideological control of the 
countryside: “One is tempted to surmise that whatever had been the attitude of the 
Shunzhi emperor, imperial Confucianism had become, in the hands of his 
successor, less an influence to make men good than a method to dissuade them 
from becoming elements dangerous to the security of the empire.”55 Admonitions 
such as “do away with errant teachings” (a paraphrase for the doctrines of secret 
societies, the notorious vehicles of peasant uprisings), the prohibition of sheltering 
deserted soldiers or criminals on the run, or even the demand to pay taxes 
promptly are blunt administrative measures with only the thinnest veil of moralist 
packaging. The Yongzheng emperor’s Shengyu guangxun placed even more 
stress on ideological control of the peasant population.56 
The method of justifying administrative policies by packaging them in 
ideological terms, with the intention to increase the control over the people, is 
familiar to us from modern-day CCP policies. In both late imperial and modern 
China, an authoritarian claim lies behind this technique. It is the claim that the 
Party / the emperor has a higher insight into the proper needs of the day and can 
therefore demand submission from the people. The source of this insight is the 
correct ideology. Consequently, it is in terms of this ideology (Confucian moral 
ethics or Marxism) that the policies in question are explained when they are 
handed down. In both cases, the ideology is associated directly with the source of 
the message (the policies in question), that is, the emperor and the CCP. The 
medium derives legitimacy from its very closeness to the source of the message – 
                                             
54 Ibid. This trend is also discussed in Mair. “Language and Ideology.” 
55 Hsiao. Rural China, p. 188. 
56 Ibid. 
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thus the designation of the CCP papers as the Party’s “mouthpiece” (houshe 喉舌). 
The sixteen maxims have been formulated by the emperor himself and are his 
own words addressing the masses, hence their designation as the “sacred” (sheng 
圣) edict. This sacred character of the Shengyu must be taken literally: a 
handbook for officials giving advice on how to perform the Xiangyue lectures calls 
for incense to be burnt during the ritual.57 What I want to stress here is the 
similarity of the attitude adopted by both the CCP and the imperial government 
with regards to the role of ideology in the face of their respective populations, and 
the ways this ideology is made to work. This view, I suggest, is of an authoritarian 
nature. 
In conjunction with this authoritarian character, the paternal general attitude 
of the Shengyu is remarkable. This becomes obvious in the Yongzheng emperor’s 
preface to the Shengyu guangxun.58 Directly addressing his audiences, the 
emperor proclaims: “We wish you, soldiers and people, to respect the sublime 
intentions [our father] Shengzu 圣祖 [the posthumous name of the Kangxi emperor] 
had in rectifying your moral attitudes [de 德] and enriching your well-being.59 Do 
not regard it [the Shengyu] as instructions and commands of empty words, but 
exert yourselves in unanimity to become people decent and frugal, and do all you 
can to eradicate all dishonest and violent practices.” A “decent and frugal people” 
(jin shen jie yong zhi shuren 谨身节用之庶人) is an almost verbatim quote from the 
Shuren 庶人 chapter of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝经).60 Borrowing from 
the locus classicus mandating the deference of the young towards the elders, the 
                                             
57 Huang Liuhong. Fuhui quanshu. Kangxi 38 (1699), juan 25, p. 9a. Repr. in Guanzhen shu 
jicheng, vol. 3, p. 501. 
58 The Chinese text I have used is in Qing huidian shili, juan 397, 4b-5b, Zhonghua shuju ed., vol. 5, 
p. 423f. Alternative translations can be found in William Milne (trsl.). The Sacred Edict, Containing 
Sixteen Maxims of the Emperor Kang-he, Amplified by his Son, the Emperor Yoong-ching. London: 
Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1817; and A. Théophile Piry. Le Saint Edit: Étude de 
Littérature Chinoise. Shanghai: Bureau des Statistiques, Inspectorat Général des Douanes, 1879. 
The latter book also provides the Chinese text. 
59 “To rectify the moral attitudes and enrich the well-being” (zheng de hou sheng 正德厚生) is a 
quotation from the Da Yu mo 大禹谟 chapter of the Shangshu 尚书. James Legge translates: “there 
are the rectification of the people’s virtue, the conveniences of life, and the securing abundant 
means of sustentation [hou sheng 厚生] – these must be harmoniously attended to.” The Chinese 
Classics, vol. 3: The Shoo King. Repr. Taipei, 1972, p. 56. 
60 See Ruan Yuan. Shisan jing zhushu. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980, vol. 2, p. 2549: “...being 
decent and frugal, in order to nourish your fathers and mothers – this is the piety [xiao 孝] of the 
people.” 
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Yongzheng emperor thus sets up a father-son relationship between himself and 
the people. Yet he goes even further: of his own father’s noble intentions when 
proclaiming the Shengyu, the Yongzheng emperor says, “and he viewed you, his 
people, just like newborn infants.” The term chizi 赤子, which I have rendered here 
as “newborn infants,” is a topos in Chinese literature found already in the 
Shangshu 尚书, where in the Kanggao 康诰 chapter the king says: “[Deal with 
them] as if you were guarding your own infants, and the people will be tranquil and 
orderly.”61 This turn in the logic of the Shangshu is particularly interesting, because 
it relates exactly to what the Qing emperors had in mind with the Shengyu: to bring 
about the obedience and submission of the populace by taking care for their moral 
and material needs (“rectifying the moral attitudes and enriching the well-being”). 
The Shengyu served the former purpose.62 
We are presented here with a figure of thought absolutely compatible with 
that observed earlier in the discussion of Lenin’s “What is to be Done?:” Lenin 
justified the need for an avant-garde party with the backwardness of the Russian 
population. He did not believe in their potential for self-liberation; instead, only the 
intervention of the party would bring enlightenment to the people. Without the help 
of professional revolutionaries, the people would remain stuck in ignorance, doing 
harm to their very interests. A comparable attitude speaks from the preface to the 
Shengyu guangxun: it is not the people themselves who take care of their material 
and spiritual concerns; rather, the emperor is responsible for them. It is he who 
must “rectify their moral attitudes and enrich their well-being.” The Yongzheng 
emperor explains that he “wishes” (yuan 愿) the people to show gratitude for his 
father’s (and, by implication, his own) best intentions that are in fact but the 
people’s own interests. Taking the Shengyu for empty words, they are warned, 
would be only to their disadvantage. The elitist approach towards the people in 
Lenin’s writings can thus be understood in the familiar terminology of Chinese 
tradition.63 
                                             
61 Trsl. after Legge. The Chinese Classics, vol. 3: The Shoo King, p. 389. 
62 Quotations from the Shangshu are generally frequent in the text corpus surrounding the Shengyu. 
This is not difficult to understand, given the ideological nature of the Shangshu and the book’s 
predilection for universal ethical claims and statements. 
63 The elitist approach took on paternal and even descending tones, in particular in the various 
interpretations and paraphrases of the Shengyu. See Mair. “Language and Ideology,” esp. p. 339f 
and  the table on p. 356. 
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In one of the administrative texts, the inability of the ordinary people to care 
for their own affairs and to behave properly is lamented in similar terms:64 
[The emperor] pitied the small people (xiao min 小民) who might in their ignorance 
violate the laws, and he therefore printed and proclaimed the legal regulations, so that 
every family and each household might know them and reform themselves. They look 
up with respect and see the emperor caring for them just like he cares for his own 
children. [In this way] they are aroused and stirred up and their benevolence (ren 仁) 
and righteousness (yi 义) unfold ever more completely. Every district and county official 
who wants to be like a parent to his people must first of all teach and instruct them. 
 
It was common that laws and regulations were read and taught in conjunction with 
the Shengyu at the Xiangyue lectures (see below). The author of this text, Tian 
Wenjing 田文镜, uses the expression “caring for [the people] just like he cares for 
his own children” (bao chi zhi huai 保赤之怀), which is very similar to that used in 
the preface of the Shengyu guangxun. Likewise, the officials in charge of the 
lectures become the “parents” of the supposedly immature people. “Father and 
mother officials” (fumu guan 父母官) was a common designation of local officials at 
the district and county levels in late imperial China. The people, in contrast, are 
likened to children: immature and in constant need of guidance and instruction. An 
expression frequently used for the unenlightened people, living in ignorance and 
stupor is yumin 愚民 – literally, the “stupid people,” a term occasionally even used 
by officials directly addressing the illiterate masses, mostly peasants.65 
It is these masses that the Shengyu and other works of the same genre 
address. The instruction to read aloud the same text every two weeks to make the 
masses remember the very words of the emperor shows little confidence in the 
people’s ability to easily absorb the teachings and employ them on their own. The 
constant repetition of the text served this purpose, as did the composition 
technique: the strictly parallel seven-word sentences were easy to remember and 
to recite. The elaborations of the Shengyu equally paid attention to their 
accessibility for semi-literate peasant masses with little education:66 
                                             
64 Tian Wenjing. Zhou xian shiyi (1730), p. 8a. Repr. in Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 666. 
65 The official Liu Heng 刘衡 (1776-1841), for example, states bluntly: “The ordinary people are dull 
and stupid 百姓颛愚.” Yong li yong yan. Juan 2, p. 3a. Repr. Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 6, p. 201. 
The “stupid people” and their newly found potential were intensely discussed in the press in last 
years of the 19th century. See Andrea Janku. Nur leere Reden: Politischer Diskurs und die 
Shanghaier Presse im China des späten 19. Jahrhunderts. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003, ch. 6. 
66 Shengyu guangxun, Preface. 
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Fearing that the common people [lit. small people (xiaomin 小民)] might [for a while] 
hold in esteem [the Shengyu] and practice it[‘s teachings], but after some time become 
negligent, we once again solemnly enjoin [them], so as to claim back their attention. 
We have treated with utmost reference the sixteen maxims of the [Sacred] Edict and 
expounded their meaning and investigated their words. The result is a total of 10,000 
characters, which we have called the Shengyu guangxun. We have quoted copiously 
from many sources, going back and forth, and attending to minute details; we have 
made their meaning abundantly clear in a rich but straightforward and plain language. 
 
Fearing that the people might prove unable to comprehend the message of the 
Shengyu, the Shengyu guangxun sets out to clarify the “Sacred Edict’s” meaning 
in “rich but straightforward and plain (pu 朴) language.” The concern is similar to 
that of the Chinese Communists, who advocated the “mass character” of their 
propaganda to better reach the masses: the CCP demanded its authors to write 
straightforwardly (in contrast to the laborious style of dang bagu), and to use a 
plain idiom, baihua 白话, the standard colloquial language that was officially 
instituted as the national standard. The administration in Qing China went even 
further, when later edicts allowed the Shengyu to be read in dialects, or, if 
necessary, to be translated by interpreters.67 
Another method to overcome the barrier of illiteracy was the compilation of 
illustrated editions of the Shengyu. One especially fine example is Liang Yannian’s 
Shengyu xiangjie, a work appearing only eleven years after the proclamation of 
the Kangxi emperor’s Shengyu. In the preface, Liang first praises the emperor’s 
best intentions:68 
The son of heaven rules the people on behalf of heaven.69 The methods (dao 道) he 
employs to govern them are certainly numerous. Since ascending to the throne, the 
plans that our emperor devised untiringly, labouring from dawn till dusk, have already 
seen their implementation and have brought about visible results. And in the ninth year 
of Kangxi [1670] he has proclaimed the sixteen maxims of the [Sacred] Edict that are to 
be used as the source for changing the people’s habits and customs. [The sixteen 
maxims are] a grand and magnificent design that leaves nothing to be desired. Ah, how 
great, isn’t this method [dao] unsurpassed? 
                                             
67 See Hsiao. Rural China, p. 191. However, not all of the Shengyu paraphrases were written in the 
vernacular, and their forewords in particular were written in wenyan style, indicating that at least 
some of them targeted local officials rather then the masses as their main readership. See Mair. 
“Language and Ideology,” esp. the table on p. 356. 
68 Liang Yannian. Shengyu xiangjie. Jiangsu fushu printing, Guangxu ren-yin [1902]. Preface, p. 3a. 
69 Literally “to shepherd the people on behalf of heaven” (wei tian mu min 为天牧民) The “heavenly 
shepherd” (tianmu 天牧) is a quotation from the Lü xing 吕刑 chapter of the Shangshu. Legge 
translates: “The king said: ‘Ah! you who superintend the government and preside over criminal 
cases throughout the empire, are you not constituted the shepherds of Heaven?’” The Chinese 
Classics, vol. 3: The Shoo King, p. 598. I am grateful to Lothar Wagner for his help with this 
passage. 
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The county magistrate Liang extols the emperor’s untiring efforts to care for his 
people, a motif we have already commented on above. The product of this 
incessant service to the people is the Shengyu, the best of all possible methods an 
emperor can think of to rule his people. Benevolent care is the way to “change the 
people’s [long-standing] habits and customs.” In view of such a splendid work, 
what is the author’s own intention? Liang goes on to explain his undertaking:70 
Generally speaking, it is the responsibility of a magistrate to carry on the efforts in the 
betterment of the people. When I, [Liang] Yannian, was humbly serving in Fanchang 繁
昌 [a county in Anhui province], I could think of no better method than proclaiming the 
[Sacred] Edict to create respectfulness. Not long after assuming office, I therefore 
received the sixteen-point [Sacred] Edict that had been proclaimed by the former 
Commissioner and Provincial Governor with the surname Jin 靳,71 and devoted myself 
to reading it. [It contains all the] lofty motions and thought of the Duke of Zhou and of 
Confucius, it is splendidly written and absolutely complete. It is just that I felt that the 
composition [might be all too] elegant, and the small people might not necessarily 
grasp all of it; in all humbleness I therefore added notes and explanations and then 
hurriedly had it printed for distribution, in order to bring together the entire county; every 
family should pass it on and each household should recite it. Day after day and month 
after month, summing up to years, it should be common with the people, who should 
[thus] have some knowledge about their proper direction. 
 
If the “small people” (xiao min 小民) are to gain “some knowledge about their 
proper direction,” they must be able to understand the Shengyu at first hand (a 
quite realistic point of view not necessarily acknowledged by all officials). Yet even 
the conciseness of the Shengyu and its seven-character maxims might pose a 
problem for many of the illiterate population. Liang thus saw the need for further 
explanations, if the Shengyu was to be popularized successfully among the people 
of the whole empire (Forty years later, the Yongzheng emperor arrived at a similar 
conclusion). Liang Yannian wanted to make sure that “every family” and “each 
household” would grasp the meaning of the Holy Edict; he explains his method to 
make the Shengyu easier to understand for the masses:72 
But there are mountain lads and village kids who do not know a single character, as 
well as women and girls, who might not understand [even an annotated edition of the 
Shengyu]. Therefore I have imitated collections such as the Yangzheng tujie 养正图解
                                             
70 Shengyu xiangjie. Preface, p. 3a-b. 
71 Jin Fu 靳辅 (1633-1692), the governor of Anhui province. See Arthur W. Hummel. Eminent 
Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (hereafter ECCP). Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1943, vol.1, p. 161-63. The Shengyu apparently was passed down through the bureaucratic 
ranks. 
72 Shengyu xiangjie. Preface, p. 4b. 
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73 and the Renjing yangqiu 人镜阳秋,74 and have compiled the Shengyu xiangjie. I have 
drawn [pictures of] the deeds of the people of old and placed [these illustrations] 
beneath each maxim; then I have added the original text [of the stories accompanying 
the illustrations] below. Righteous words and virtuous deeds thus follow one after 
another, with some rough explanations, easy to understand. 
 
In compiling the Shengyu xiangjie, Liang Yannian relied on a tradition of illustrated 
works compiled especially to bring important contents such as moral treatises, to 
audiences that were either illiterate or had little education, but that were especially 
in need of “being transformed.”75 Hua min 化民 was a pattern Liang Yannian used 
and that also resonated with the Chinese Communists 250 years later: the need to 
educate the populace while taking into consideration the limited educational 
opportunities, especially of the peasants. In Yan’an, the CCP made use of the 
woodcut industry producing popular new year posters.76 These posters had a 
function very similar to the Qing dynasty illustrated moral treatises: to popularize 
ideological messages down to the very grassroots. This is exactly what Liang 
Yannian had in mind when he spoke of “mountain lads and village kids,” as well as 
“women and girls,” whom he considered to belong to the same educational 
category. The real, as opposed to the stated purpose of the Shengyu xiangjie 
might be debatable, since the illiterate peasant population would hardly be able to 
purchase an expensive illustrated print in 20 juan. The buyers might rather have 
been more affluent families who used the book to teach their children. 
Nevertheless, the Shengyu xiangjie proved to be a success story, since more than 
two hundred years later, officials in Jiangsu province considered this work to be a 
tool effective enough to justify the expenses of a reprint in 1903. 
“Transforming the people,” educating them and leading them towards a 
path of moral correct behaviour, and, by the same token, requiring them to respect 
the laws and the authority of the officialdom, had another motivation. The seventh 
of the Shengyu’s sixteen maxims had admonished the people to “do away with 
errant teachings, in order to exalt the correct doctrine.” The concern with orthodox 
                                             
73 A Ming dynasty illustrated treatise on political ethics by Jiao Hong 焦竑. 
74 By Huang Yingzu 黄应组 (b. 1563), another popular illustrated book from the Ming dynasty. 
75 Illustrated moral treatises were produced not only for the illiterate peasant education, but also for 
children. One very fine example is the Dijian tushuo 帝鉴图说, compiled in 1573 by the grand 
secretary Zhang Juzheng 张居正 as a textbook for the juvenile Wanli 万历 emperor. 
76 See Hu Qiaomu. “Cong chunjie xuanchuan kan wenyi de xin fangxiang;” JFRB editorial, Apr. 25, 
1943. Repr. in Hu Qiaomu wenji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992, vol. 1, p. 95-100. 
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ideology was a crucial issue for the central bureaucracy at the court in Beijing as 
well as for local officials, as the proliferation of “errant teachings” – in particular the 
teachings of militant sects inspired by Daoist or Buddhist doctrines – constituted a 
permanent potential threat to social order and a headache to officials working at 
the grassroots. The propagation of the Shengyu and the text body associated with 
it must thus be understood as a form of counter-propaganda reacting to the rapidly 
increasing flow of popular religious tracts. Shanshu 善书 were printed locally 
through private initiatives and were distributed freely to the populace.77 As a 
master tract compiled by the emperor, the Shengyu was aimed to stem the tide of 
unregulated publications circulating in the provinces.78 The claim to represent 
orthodoxy against heterodox teachings is another quality that makes the Shengyu 
functionally comparable to the propaganda emanating from the CCP Party center. 
In the discussion above, I have concentrated on the Shengyu and the body 
of texts surrounding it. I will now turn to the administrative handbooks from the 
Qing dynasty, usually called guanzhen shu 官箴书.79 As the treatises in this genre 
advise officials on how to perform the various duties on their job, I consider them 
to be an approximate equivalent of the Party documents that were my main source 
in chapter two. The handbooks are internal sources that explain the relevance of 
the policies in question, here propaganda of Confucian ethics; they advise officials 
on the proper execution of their duties with regard to these policies, and give exact 
prescriptions on how the Xiangyue lectures are to be performed. They also contain 
discussions about eventual problems the official in charge should be prepared to 
encounter. There is one important difference, however, to the CCP materials used 
in the previous chapter: the intrabureaucratic communication of the propaganda 
sector documents the vertical flow of information within the xitong, based on 
                                             
77 On Shanshu see Cynthia Brokaw. The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral 
Order in Late Imperial China. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
78 I am grateful to Rudolf Wagner for pointing this issue out to me. See also the discussion in Pei 
Huang. Autocracy at Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723-1735. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1974, p. 187-204 (a discussion of the seventh maxim can be found on p. 193f), 
and Victor Mair. “Language and Ideology,” p. 343-46. However, as Brokaw points out shanshu 
were not necessarily hereditary tracts undermining the central authority: “By the late seventeenth 
century, then, the ledgers, once texts of rather doubtful origin and suspect use, had become 
comprehensive reflections of an elite vision of social order.” The Ledger of Merit and Demerit, p. 
240. The generally supportive character of shanshu (very much like the Shengyu) is indeed the 
central argument of Brokaw’s chapter four. 
79 On this genre see Will. Official Handbooks and Anthologies. 
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official directives. The administrative handbooks, in contrast, were written by 
officials for officials; they are thus a kind of horizontal communication and mostly 
have a non-official character. The Qing handbooks can therefore be treated only 
as functional equivalents of the Party materials used in chapter two. They are, 
however, an invaluable source because of the amount of detailed information they 
provide. 
The Shengyu and the Shengyu guangxun were read and explained to the 
people at the Xiangyue lectures. How were these lectures to be performed? Tian 
Wenjing’s Zhouxian shiyi 州县事宜, a brief handbook commissioned by the 
Yongzheng emperor,80 instructs local officials: “On the first and fifteenth of each 
month [the official] must go the venue [of the lecture] personally, together with the 
officials in charge of education, the Assistant Magistrates, and the other officials; 
he must assemble the soldiers and the people, and respectfully read and explain 
the Shengyu guangxun point by point. He must use simple comparisons and 
examples, so that everybody knows [their meaning]. Additionally, he must proclaim 
the printed laws and regulations in a way everyone can understand them.”81 The 
latter point is especially interesting, because it makes evident the Shengyu was 
employed by the official as an administrative tool: more important than the moral 
betterment of the people was apparently the aim to control them. Ideological 
control was supported by legal control: the Xiangyue lectures were a convenient 
opportunity to conduct legal education and to make the penal code and other 
regulations and legal provisions known to the populace. 
The Xiangyue lectures required the personal involvement of the county 
magistrate and other local officials; the magistrate would assume the leading role: 
he was to read and paraphrase the Shengyu guangxun. In the villages outside the 
county seat, village elders and local respectables were to assume the role of the 
magistrate: “In the larger towns and villages lecturing sites shall be set up, and 
members of the local gentry who are honest and trustworthy and have formerly 
committed no crimes shall be elected to the post of lecturer (yuezheng 约正) and 
take over the charges of lecturing in turns. Yet the seal-holding official must from 
time to time visit [the lecturing sites] and inspect [the lectures] to stress their 
                                             
80 For background information see Will. Official Handbooks and Anthologies, entry “Zhouxian shiyi.” 
81 Tian Wenjing. Zhouxian shiyi, p. 8a-b. Repr. in Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 666. 
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importance.”82 To increase the penetration of the Xiangyue lectures even beyond 
the counties, the lowest formal administrative division of the empire, trustees had 
to be found in the villages to act as proxies for the imperial officials. The efforts of 
the Qing court to bring its moral vision to the very grassroots are remarkable. 
Another well-known handbook, Huang Liuhong’s 黃六鴻 Fuhui quanshu 福惠全書, 
gives a more detailed explanation for the need to elect village lecturers:83 
The district and county magistrates carry responsibility over financial, grain supply, and 
juridical [affairs], they cannot travel to the villages of the four [directions]. The villagers 
in turn have their obligations in agriculture and sericulture, in trade and commerce, and 
cannot travel to the [local] seats of government. Therefore every town shall set up a 
lecturing site. Alternatively, several towns together may pay for one, or use a spacious 
temple or nunnery. Likewise, every village and every clan shall either especially build [a 
lecturing site] or go to the village temple and ancestral halls. The only condition is that 
[these places] are clean so that the imperial edicts can be honoured there, and that 
they are spacious enough to accommodate the audience. 
 
Population movements were a cause of concern for the officialdom, and to keep 
the rural population in their own villages was an administrative precaution. Having 
too many of the people visiting the county seat to attend the lectures was not only 
impractical, but also dangerous. The village lecturers would thus bring the moral 
exhortations directly to the addressees. Local resources were mobilized for the 
service to the emperor; townships, villages, and even clans were thus integrated 
into a nationwide framework of moral ideological education. Performed 
ubiquitously and synchronically throughout the empire, the Xiangyue lectures were 
indeed a vision of momentous proportions. 
 Choosing the right personnel for the performance was a crucial point for the 
success of the enterprise. So what were the criteria for the selection of the 
lecturers? The Fuhui quanshu comments:84 
The public readings of the [Holy] Edict are called Xiangyue. For the Xiangyue lectures, 
virtuous elders who are respected by the masses must be selected and made lecturers. 
There are lecturers and vice lecturers who are called jiangzheng 讲正 and jiangfu 讲副. 
The lecturer and vice lecturer oversee the performance of the lectures. For the reading 
itself, two young people or students must be chosen with clear and loud voices. These 
young people must be good at reciting, they mustn’t make mistakes when reading 
                                             
82 Ibid., p. 8b. Repr. p. 666. 
83 Huang Liuhong. Fuhui quanshu. Juan 25, p. 8a. Repr. Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 501. The 
Fuhui quanshu has been rendered into English by Djang Chu as A Complete Book Concerning 
Happiness and Benevolence: A Manual for Magistrates in Seventeenth-Century China (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1984). However, since this volume is incomplete (for reasons 
explained in the foreword), and in most places must be considered a paraphrase rather than a 
translation, all the following translations are my own. 
84 Fuhui quanshu, p. 7a-b. Repr. p. 500. 
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characters, they must clearly separate the single sentences; their voices must be clear 
and loud so that even those farther apart can understand what they say. 
 
For the Xiangyue lectures peasant activists were recruited, both young and old – 
the young for their physical qualities, the old for the respect they enjoyed with the 
local population. The government relied on these activists to transmit the message 
of its moral propaganda to the population. This mechanism had the double 
function of being economical by saving the local administration scarce resources, 
and of mobilizing an active portion of the population that could also be relied upon 
in other areas of local self-government such as village self-defence (through the 
baojia system) or tax collection (by way of the lijia system). 
 In chapter two, we have noted similar efforts of the CCP to mobilize activist 
elements from among the populace for the Party’s moral-ideological project: the 
worker-peasant correspondents. Due to the difference between spatially limited 
oral agitation, such as the Xiangyue lectures, and the correspondents’ 
contributions to printed newspapers that were distributed beyond the borders of a 
single locality, comparability is limited to functional aspects. With regard to the 
economic use of scarce financial resources, and the Party’s efforts to mobilize the 
rural population, the Xiangyue lectures are of interest for the study of modern-day 
propaganda. To mention is first and foremost the objective of both the imperial 
government and the CCP: to make its respective message become the people’s 
own message and thus to increase the chances for the internalization of this 
message by the audience, the massive peasant population of rural China.85 
 Functional similarities of the traditional peasant activists cum lecturers, and 
the modern worker-peasant correspondents can be found in one more respect: the 
notorious distrust of the government towards its own grassroots agents. The stress 
on the need to control the correspondents and to carefully censor their 
contributions has been addressed above in chapter two. The administrative 
handbooks do likewise comment on the need to supervise the local lecturers: “The 
lecturers and vice lecturers elected in the townships, as well as the village heads 
and clan chiefs [performing these duties], must have their names reported in 
writing, through the townships, to the district and county [government]. Only after 
                                             
85 This process is also detailed in Donald J. Munro. The Concept of Man in Contemporary China. 
Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 2000, esp. ch. 3. 
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the candidate[’s names] have been examined and ascertained by the district and 
county [government] can they assume their lecturing responsibilities.”86 Control of 
the lectures of the imperial Sacred Edict reached down to the lowest levels of the 
transmission chain. The danger of these procedures – a danger well-known to the 
modern counterparts – was to stifle the grassroots initiative that should be 
nurtured in the first place, and thus to reduce the effectiveness of the lectures. 
 Doubts about the effectiveness of the Xiangyue lectures are indeed 
justified.87 For one, the imperial court did simply underestimate the sophistication 
of the rural population: even the “stupid people” would be annoyed if they were 
made to listen to the same text every two weeks, for years on end. Repetition 
propaganda runs the risk of having paradoxical effects. Concentration might lapse: 
“If the country bumpkins (xiangyu 乡愚) both old and young jostle and shout, how 
can they listen to the words of heaven and respectfully watch [the ceremony]?”88 
The lectures were equally soporific for the officials involved, among whom even 
the good-willed could not but come to see them as a hassle that was executed in a 
mechanistic way. As this became evident, the handbooks for officials cautioned 
their readers:89 
But if you regard [the Xiangyue lectures] as mere conventionalities: if you beat the 
gongs and pluck the gai 盖90 in the early morning hours of the first and fifteenth day, 
and then go to the temple of the city god; if you sit there in your official attire without 
muttering a single word, like a wooden idol; if the master of ceremony and the local 
nobility recite the Shengyu, and the speaker does not explain its meaning and the 
audience does not understand its details; if both officials and people are in disorder and 
noisily run away [as soon as the lecture is over] – then above there will be no praising 
of the Son of Heaven’s [effort to] transform the people through enlightenment (qiyou 启
牖), and below the masses of ordinary people will not be prompted to renew their ways 
upon the impression [of the Shengyu]. Such are the careless routines of mediocre 
officials, and this is what we call neglecting one’s duties of office while taking the pay. 
 
Tian Wenjing wants to warn incoming officials not to perform the biweekly 
Shengyu lectures in a superficial manner; yet his vivid portrayal seems to describe 
a common practice. Many officials throughout the empire fulfilled their duties with 
only little enthusiasm. The Qianlong 乾隆 emperor issued edicts in 1736, 1737, 
                                             
86 Huang Liuhong. Fuhui quanshu. Juan 25, p. 7b. Repr. Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 500. 
87 See also the discussion in Hsiao. Rural China, p. 194-201. 
88 Huang Liuhong. Fuhui quanshu. Juan 25, p. 6a. Repr. Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 500. 
89 Tian Wenjing. Zhouxian shiyi, p. 9a. Repr. in Guanzhen shu jicheng, vol. 3, p. 666. 
90 Ming luo zhang gai 鸣锣张盖. A few instances of this expression can be found in the Siku 
quanshu database. I have been unable, however, to determine what musical instrument (if at all) is 
meant by gai, which may be dialect word. 
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and 1743 to urge officials to give the Xiangyue lectures their due attention.91 The 
ambiguous character of the lectures becomes evident from the fact that the 
emperor had to repeat his calls once and again: while the public readings of the 
Shengyu were seen as a highly effective means of moral propaganda, the very 
effort to lend them as much dignity as possible turned them into a ritual that easily 
became a perfunctory ceremony devoid of meaning.92 The idea to make 
propaganda from the masses, for the masses ran into problems similar to those 
encountered by CCP two centuries later: the tension between the “mass 
character” of the newspaper, ensured by the participation of local activists (the 
peasant correspondents), and the paper’s “party character,” their submission to 
the Party’s monopoly of policy interpretation; the balance was particularly hard to 
strike. 
 Returning to the argument made in the introduction to this chapter, that “the 
Marxist-Leninist concepts and ideas surrounding the media were accepted in 
China as plausible answers to concerns that had long predated their arrival,” I 
want to summarize briefly those points that have been identified in the discussion 
of the Shengyu as being of relevance for the formation of the modern Chinese 
media concept: as a cultural backdrop they enabled the Chinese Communists to 
understand and conceptualize certain components of Marxism, an imported 
ideology, as “useful” to deal with core questions of governance. The first of these 
is the Leninist demand that the media are the unified, single voice of the Party. 
Authoritarian thinking was rooted in the Chinese polity and the utterances of the 
imperial court demanded the unswerving respect of the populace: the Kangxi 
emperor’s moral maxims were the “Sacred” Edict and their reading was even to be 
accompanied by the burning of incense. The emperor insisted in absolute 
uniformity of the biweekly lectures across space and time in the confines of his 
empire. From this perspective, the Party’s claiming absolute authority over 
newspaper content was only plausible. Secondly, Lenin’s conception of the 
general relationship between Party and people could equally be understood in the 
traditional political imaginaire: the emperor confronted an illiterate “stupid people” 
                                             
91 See Hsiao. Rural China, p. 186. See ibid. p. 196f on further edicts by later emperors with the 
same intention, and the futility of these efforts. 
92 Foreign observers, too, had the impression that popular interest in the readings was rather low. 
See the letter to The Chinese Repository quoted in Mair. “Language and Ideology,” p. 353. 
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that were in need of moral exhortation, that awaited their own transformation. The 
impetus towards betterment, the raising of the consciousness could come from no 
other source than the emperor, or, the Communist Party. From the parochial 
character of the state-people relationship results, thirdly, the normative mission of 
propaganda: education. Ironically, the high-pitched moralizing tone of both imperial 
Chinese propaganda and its modern Communist counterpart, carried in itself the 
potential for subversive readings and other forms of distortion: both were and are 
prone to exploitation, overt or covert, for very different purposes, such as the 
promotion of stability and subjugation under the government’s administration and 
its policies (for example, by tying the Xiangyue lectures to public readings of the 
penal code). Finally, we have noted the similarity in functional terms, of both the 
Qing official’s reliance on peasant activists for the performance of the Xiangyue 
lectures in the villages, and the CCP’s promotion of their newspapers’ “mass 
character” that was put into practice through the system of worker-peasant 
correspondents. In each case, traditional Chinese political culture offered a 
rationale for the logic and correctness of the Marxist-Leninist principles of 
propaganda. 
 As I have cautioned above, the similarities observed should not lead us to 
perceive the modern Chinese media system entirely in terms of Chinese tradition: 
all too obvious are the differences. These differences concern, on the one hand, 
the methods and functions of modern politics – modernity had deeply affected 
even a rural backwater such as Yan’an in the 1930s and 1940s. The relationships 
of state, society, and individual could no longer be imagined from the context of 
Chinese tradition. More importantly, it would be inappropriate to suggest that 
concepts and ideas rooted in traditional Chinese culture reached the twentieth-
century Chinese Communists unchanged or in any “pure” form. To the contrary, 
traditional Chinese thinking was subject to ever accelerating processes of 
transformation due to the increasing interaction with Western ideas in the course 
of the 19th century. The heritage that reached the Chinese Communists was 
Chinese in nature but had incorporated many ideas and suggestions from abroad 
that had altered or reinforced trends of traditional thinking. These processes of 
transformation and modification must be acknowledged in the effort to track down 
the traditional roots of modern Chinese media thinking. One such episode, which I 
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will discuss in the following section because of its relevance to the logic and the 
production of propaganda, was the Taiping rebellion. 
 
 
Taiping Propaganda 
The Taiping rebellion (officially 1850-1864) stands out in the history of the 
nineteenth century not only for the widespread devastation the rebellion and its 
suppression caused, and for its staggering human death toll,93 but also for the 
fundamental changes it effected in the Chinese political culture: the authority of the 
central state was undermined, the legitimacy of Manchu rule over the majority Han 
population thrown into doubt, and finally their suppression gave rise to the foreign-
equipped peasant militias under the control of local commanders like Zeng Guofan 
曾国藩, the very forces that eventually brought down the dynasty fifty years later.94 
In the ideological realm, the Taiping movement had no less far-reaching 
consequences: in the areas under Taiping control, the Confucian classics 
remained unavailable for as long as twenty years; the orthodoxy of the Qing rulers 
was replaced by the Taipings' own ideology. Different from many millenarian sects, 
the sources and vehicles of most of China’s peasant uprisings, the Taiping did not 
draw on Buddhist- or Daoist-inspired folk religion, but rather denounced these as 
superstition: “In recent times, the perverse Buddhist monks falsely propagated 
fantastic stories concerning this devil of Hades, and, moreover, the strange book 
called Yuli ji 玉历记 is palmed off upon the world. Those of this world who read 
books mechanically are often deceived by their statements...”95 For their purposes, 
the Taipings did not draw on Chinese tradition and its rich store house of folk 
                                             
93 The number has been put at up to thirty million people. See, for example, Rudolf G. Wagner. 
Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: the Role of Religion in the Taiping Rebellion. Berkeley, Ca.: 
Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1982, p. 1. 
94 On the Taiping Rebellion see Franz Michael. The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966, vol. 1-3. Jen Yu-wen. The Taiping Revolutionary 
Movement. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Wagner. Reenacting the Heavenly Vision. 
Jonathan D. Spence. God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996. Thomas H. Reilly. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and 
the Blasphemy of Empire. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004. 
95 Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957, 8 
vols., here vol. 1, p. 93f. Quoted in Rudolf G. Wagner. “Operating in the Chinese Public Sphere: 
Theology and Technique of Taiping Propaganda” in Chun-Chieh Huang, Erik Zürcher (ed.). Norms 
and the State in China. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993, p. 104-38, here p. 112. The Yuli ji was a popular 
moral treatise of the shanshu 善书 genre. See ibid., p. 111. 
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religion, but rather turned to foreign sources. The adoption of an entirely foreign 
ideology, Christianity, sets the Taiping movement apart from other 
contemporaneous uprisings and constitutes a decisive turn in Chinese history: the 
large-scale import of foreign thinking was a courageous enterprise, as is 
demonstrated by the rejection for several more decades of any such step by the 
Manchu and Han elites. Only after 1900 did Western thought begin to be accepted 
in any comprehensive and systematic fashion as a state ideology in China. 
The Taipings, however, did not entirely reject Chinese traditional values and 
patterns of governance; rather, these were reinterpreted to fit the Taiping 
worldview. This is demonstrated, for example, by the refusal of Taiping leader 
Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 to burn the Confucian classics altogether: he proposed that 
they were rewritten and purged of any references not in accordance with the 
preachings of the Heavenly Kingdom. Purified versions of the Daxue 大学 were 
circulated in the Taiping capital Nanjing, as was an edited version of the military 
treatise Wu jing 武经. Hong himself worked on a new rhyme book to replace older 
versions circulated for centuries.96 
Another point of interest is the Taiping’s treatment of the Shengyu. The 
Shengyu had been proclaimed by the Manchu emperor and was revered as the 
essence of the official state ideology, Imperial Confucianism. The Shengyu would 
thus be expected to be a main target drawing the Taiping’s wrath, who identified 
the Manchus with the biblical devils. However, as Rudolf Wagner has pointed out, 
the Shengyu is not criticized or banned in any known Taiping sources.97 There 
were certainly aspects associated with traditional Confucian culture, such as foot-
binding, that were sternly opposed by Hong Xiuquan and his followers, but the 
strict logic of the moral exhortations and the commandments made in the Shengyu 
seem to have been too compelling to the Taiping leadership, too convincing in the 
light of their own vision of governance, to evoke open criticism of the individual 
maxims. It was, however, considered unfit for the populace; the Xiangyue lectures 
were therefore discontinued. 
This understanding is confirmed by a reading of Taiping texts with functions 
comparable to that of the Shengyu. For this purpose I will turn to the odes of the 
                                             
96 See Wagner. “Operating in the Chinese Public Sphere,” p. 134-37. 
97 Ibid., p. 115. 
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Taiping zhaoshu 太平诏书. This official declaration was released by the Taiping 
court in Nanjing in 1852, but its components are said to have been written by Hong 
Xiuquan in 1844-45, that is at a very early point in the movement. Upon publication 
the Taiping zhaoshu was circulated widely in many different editions; it was 
brought to the attention of foreigners and translated for the North China Herald 
newspaper as early as 1853.98 The first part of the Taiping zhaoshu is entitled “An 
Ode on the Origin of Virtue and the Saving of the World” (Yuan dao jiu shi ge 原道
救世歌). The “Ode” addresses six wrongs among men that are to be corrected in 
order to save the world: licentiousness, disobedience to parents, killing, robbery 
and thievery, witchcraft, and gambling. The tone of this “Ode” as well its general 
attitude are surprisingly close to that of the Shengyu and, even more, to the 
Shunzhi emperor’s Liu yu that was the predecessor of the Shengyu. 
A point in case is the second of the six wrongs identified by Hong: 
disobedience to parents. The “Ode” reads:99 
Our fathers have given us life; our mothers have nursed us;  
The travail and anxiety they endured in rearing us cannot be described. 
Can we not be filial in sustaining them, exhausting loyalty and sincerity? 
The man of true filial virtue loves his parents all his life. 
 
The parallel to the Liu yu’s first maxim, “Perform filial duties to your parents” (xiao 
shun fumu 孝顺父母) is obvious. With regard to the Shengyu, I have noted above 
a utilitarian turn as compares to the earlier Liu yu: the Shengyu’s first maxim 
“Esteem most highly filial piety and brotherly submission, in order to give due 
importance to human moral relations” (dun xiao di yi zhong renlun 敦孝弟以重人
伦), adds the ruler’s desire for stable social relations as a rationale to the original 
maxim. The Taiping zhaoshu, I argue, contains similar considerations (albeit not in 
the maxim on the second wrong). These considerations concerning the 
relationship of subjects and ruler are articulated most clearly in the second part of 
the Taiping zhaoshu, called “Ode on the Hundred Correct Things” (Bai zheng ge 
百正歌). Whereas the first ode seems to address the people in general, this 
                                             
98 The translation by W.H. Medhurst appeared on June 11-18, 1853. Information on the Taiping 
zhaoshu comes from Michael. The Taiping Rebellion, vol. 2, p. 24. The translations below are 
taken from ibid. The original text is found in Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo, vol. 1, p. 
85-99. 
99 Ibid., p. 88. Trsl. p. 27. 
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second piece is directed more explicitly to the ruler. The objective of this “Ode” is 
presented at the very beginning:100 
An ode on the hundred correct things, 
Singing of the hundred correct things. 
The truly correct enjoy heavenly emoluments; 
The truly correct stand in awe of Heaven’s decree. 
The truly correct may become dukes and marquises; 
The truly correct practice virtue and uprightness. 
The truly correct gain the submission of demons and respect of men; 
The truly correct make the people peaceful and the country stable. 
The truly correct make the evil plotters flee to distant places; 
The truly correct invite Heaven’s favourable response. 
 
To “make the people peaceful and the country stable” is the aim of ruler, and he 
does so by setting straight (or making correct, zheng 正) the people’s moral 
attitude. In the Taiping sources, reverence to Heaven and to God, to “stand in awe 
of Heaven’s decree,” is the basic condition for human well-being. Yet in the 
Heavenly Kingdom, the representative of Heaven on earth is none other than the 
Taiping ruler, and the decrees in question are issued through him. Reverence and 
obedience to Heaven also means obedience to the Taiping ruler. 
In turn, the ruler must take care of the people entrusted to him. The Shunzhi 
emperor admonished his people: “do not commit wrongful deeds” (wu zuo feiwei 
无作非为, maxim six). The “Ode on the Origin of Virtue and the Saving of the 
World” contains a number of items that can be classified as “wrongful deeds:” 
licentiousness and gambling are certainly examples of incorrect behaviour, as are 
murder and theft. Yet gambling does harm not only to the soul of the sinner, it also 
upsets social harmony and stability, and thus arouses the concern of the of the 
Taiping leader. Likewise killing and thievery: the source for these demands is 
obviously the biblical Ten Commandments, but there is another layer of meaning 
at work, that transcends the moral agenda of the individual and brings in the same 
administrative concerns that I have established above for the Shengyu. 
Addressing the third wrong, the “Ode” reads: 
For men to destroy one another is extremely lamentable, 
Hence in former days there was no wanton killing. 
 
Franz Michael’s translation of “wanton killing” (shisha 嗜杀) is very thoughtful, as it 
hints at a crucial point in the ode’s argument. The ode doesn’t outright ban killing, 
                                             
100 Ibid., p. 90. Trsl. p. 31-32. 
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but only killing for improper purposes. Whereas the sixth commandment of the 
Christian bible outlaws the killing of men altogether, the Taipings were less than 
reluctant to slaughter their enemies; streams of blood, and even the killing of 
women and children, were usual sights whenever the Taiping troops had 
conquered Chinese cities.101 Capital punishments were declared for a variety of 
crimes. So what the ode declares illegal is not killing of humans in general, but 
unauthorized killing, that is, killing by private persons. It is Heaven’s exclusive 
prerogative to decide on life and death. This argument is exactly in line with the 
laws of the Qing empire that granted the exclusive right of capital punishment to 
the imperial court: “[the decision on] life and death is the power of the court” 
(sheng-sha nai chaoting zhi da quan 生杀乃朝廷之大权). Minor legal matters could 
be dealt with at lower administrative layers, or even transferred to clan jurisdiction. 
The Qing court, however, aggressively defended the right to watch over capital 
punishments and severely censored clans that had transgressed the limits of their 
jurisdiction.102 Under the guise of religiously inspired moral exhortations, we are 
thus presented with instructions on correct behaviour that would directly benefit 
the ruling classes – in both mainstream Qing thinking, and in Taiping propaganda. 
Further parallels can be observed with regard to style and language of the 
Shengyu and the odes of the Taiping zhaoshu. The Shengyu was written in seven-
character sentences of strictly parallel construction, so as to facilitate its recitation 
and memorization. The “Ode on the Origin of Virtue and the Saving of the World,” 
too, uses sentences seven characters in length; those of the “Ode on the Hundred 
Correct Things” have mostly six characters, yet the parallel constructions are even 
more obvious here, as is evident from the ode’s initial lines quoted above. Taiping 
moral propaganda was thus in agreement with many of the basic assumptions of 
the official Qing writings, and also emulated the style of imperial Confucianism 
consciously or unconsciously.103 
                                             
101 See Jen. The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, p. 117-18, for the massacre after the fall of 
Nanjing. 
102 The Yongzheng emperor allowed clan jurisdiction in an edict of 1727. This right was withdrawn 
by the Qianlong emperor after a series of squabbles with powerful clans, especially the Huizhou 徽
州 merchants of Anhui, who had overstepped the limits. See Wang Hui. Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang 
de xingqi, ch. 4. Quotation taken from ibid.  
103 Barbara Mittler has come to similar results in her reading of the Taiping version of the Sanzijing 
三字经. I am grateful to her for pointing sharing this insight with me. 
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I will comment no further on the continuities of propaganda in the nineteenth 
century; rather, I want to address now the stunning openness of the Taiping 
towards thinking that was obviously foreign in origin. The Taiping made use of 
foreign thinking – the Christian religion – as well as of the practical applications of 
this thought. Thus, they bridged with apparent ease the gap of “substance” (ti 体) 
and “use” (yong 用) that the reformers a generation later grappled with. The 
spread of their religion to all Chinese was a matter of special concern to the 
Taipings. In order to proclaim their gospel and to convert their compatriots, the 
Taipings accepted many a recent foreign invention that would increase their 
communicative potential. An especially interesting document is a policy proposal 
with the title “A New Treatise on Aids to Administration” (Zi zheng xin pian 资政新
篇) that was composed in 1859 by Hong Ren’gan 洪仁玕.104 Hong had arrived in 
Nanjing shortly before from Hong Kong and had been appointed Taiping chief of 
staff. He was placed in charge of the administrative apparatus that was in great 
disarray. Hong proposed, among other things, to set up a modern communications 
system. He mandated the construction of railways and inter-provincial highways: 
“First of all, twenty-one highways should be built in the provinces as arteries of the 
country, for when there is communication, the country will be free from illness.”105 
As he had worked with British missionaries for a long time, Hong was in a position 
to make recommendations thus far-reaching, and yet so detailed. Given the state 
of the transportation system in Qing China, his idea to construct wide roads that 
would allow a modern postal system to function properly and with high speed, was 
certainly revolutionary. His insight “when there is communication, the country will 
be free from illness” (tong ze guojia wu bing yan 通则国家无病焉) is a signal of the 
Taiping’s preparedness to modernize the country if the realization of their vision 
required them to do so. 
Among the means of modern communication exploited in the service of 
religion are also newspapers: “newspapers should be published to report 
regularities and changes in current affairs and the rise and fall of prices; faithful 
                                             
104 Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo, vol. 2, p. 523-41. Trsl. in Michael. The Taiping 
Rebellion, vol. 3, p. 748-76. See also the introduction to this document in ibid., p. 748-51. For Hong 
Ren’gan’s biography see ECCP, vol. 1, p. 367-69. 
105 Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo, vol. 2, p. 533. Trsl. p. 764. 
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reporting is the only requirement... The papers should bear the place of publication, 
the name of the publisher, the date of publication, and the price, so that they can 
be bought by people far and near.”106 Hong had seen British newspapers in Hong 
Kong, which were his model.107 It is remarkable that Hong comments here on the 
role of the newspapers in a public sphere: they are an independent institution, with 
“faithful reporting” being “the only requirement.” Hong elaborates on this latter 
point:108 
Newspaper supervisors should be established in all provinces. These offices shall have 
responsibility but no authority, and a person holding such an office must be a man of 
integrity and faithfulness. He shall not be subject to the control of other officials, nor 
shall he assume control over others. Other officials shall not be permitted to comment 
on the reward or punishment of this official, who will be charged exclusively with 
collecting newspapers, bearing names and seals, from the eighteen provinces and all 
other quarters, to be presented to the Sovereign for his sacred perusal. 
 
In this short paragraph, Hong presents a description of the basic philosophy of 
modern newspapers in a public sphere model, and links them to the traditional 
Chinese framework of yanlu 言路. The newspapers are free from supervision, as is 
the official who is placed in charge of them – it is interesting to see the official 
supervisor here, who is in fact nothing else but the personification of the sum of all 
newspapers. Reporting faithfully all “regularities and changes in current affairs,” 
the newspapers (either directly or through the mediating newspaper supervisor) 
are the crucial source of information for the public. The public here is identified 
with the ruler, who is the implied addressee of all information flows which are 
presented to the Sovereign, or literally, to the “sacred glance” of the emperor’s eye 
(shengjian 圣鉴). The revolutionary concept of a modern newspaper is here 
packaged in a familiar institution, the yanlu. The “avenues of speech” traditionally 
signify those channels at the emperor’s disposal that serve to inform him of what 
happens in his empire, in an allegedly objective manner, and outside of the regular 
channels of bureaucratic information flows; they are the means though which the 
ordinary people can turn with their views and complaints directly to the emperor. 
As Andrea Janku has shown, Chinese publicists referred to the yanlu tradition 
                                             
106 Ibid., p. 534. Trsl., p. 767. 
107 On the early press in Hong Kong see Natascha Vittinghoff. Die Anfänge des Journalismus in 
China, 1860-1911. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002, ch. 2.  
108 Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo, vol. 2, p. 534. Trsl. p. 767. 
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again about a decade after the “New Treatise” when they explained the mission of 
the first Chinese newspapers to the public.109 
Hong Ren’gan’s proposals of modernizing the institutions of the Taiping 
empire were bold, but did get nowhere near implementation. On the last proposal, 
the introduction of newspaper supervisors, Hong Xiuquan commented: “This 
proposal should not be carried out now, lest the demonic devils contrive to set us 
against each other. It will not be too late to carry out this proposal after the 
remnant demons are annihilated.”110 The highest Taiping leader found some of the 
innovations way too progressive to fit the immediate needs of the increasingly 
troubled Taiping empire. In fact, the Taiping set up a less than liberal polity, and 
rather tended to suppress other voices.111 Other elements of Taiping propaganda, 
however, had a more lasting impact, an impact directly relevant for the evolution of 
the modern Chinese media concept. 
As has been noted in chapter one, the English term propaganda was 
originally used in religious contexts: the “propaganda of the faith” was the area 
where methods and techniques were developed that served the spread of religious 
ideas. Many of these methods were later transferred into the secular realm of 
politics and publicity. A similar process has taken place in China: the Taiping had 
adopted techniques of religious propaganda such as the use of religious hymns.112 
Ceremonial music was known in Chinese tradition, too, but the musical tunes the 
Taipings introduced for the spread of their belief were of Western origin. The 
purpose of collective singing by lay groups was to form feelings of community, and 
was taught by Western missionaries in China. The Taipings adopted this 
technique and perfected it in their own propaganda. Other forms of oral and written 
propaganda employed by the Taipings include the printing and distribution of 
pamphlets and booklets, some of them even produced with modern machinery 
                                             
109 See Janku. Nur leere Reden, ch. 4.  
110 Zhongguo shixuehui (ed.). Taiping tianguo, vol. 2, p. 534. Trsl. p. 767. 
111 “Once opened and institutionally secured, [the public sphere] not only gave the advocates of 
common sense, rationality, and a free interplay of ideas the necessary leeway to operate, but also 
the opponents of these ideals. Religious fundamentalists and Communists to just name the 
examples that come to mind most readily, made use of the same leeway to spread their own ideas 
with the ultimate aim to establish a social order that would prohibit their deluded opponents to 
spread theirs. ... For all players in the Chinese public sphere it was thus clear that the adversaries 
had no legitimacy for their claims and values.” Wagner. “Operating in the Chinese Public Sphere,” 
p. 116-17. 
112 On this point see Wagner. Reenacting the Heavenly Vision, p. 89f. 
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and movable type that resulted in better and cheaper editions.113 The Taipings 
thus brought to China on a large scale propaganda techniques that later found 
their way into secular uses – modern propaganda in China proceeded from 
religious to political forms, just as it did in the West. 
The most important ideological contribution of the Taiping uprising, however, 
a contribution that played a key role in the formation of the modern Chinese media 
concept, was the institution of a teleological worldview based on a concept of 
linear time. Without either of these, the socialist revolution could not have been 
imagined. The Taiping rebellion, as Rudolf Wagner has shown, was driven by its 
vision, the vision of Hong Xiuquan in 1837 and in the consecutive years. This 
vision became the road map for the construction of a thisworldly Heavenly 
Kingdom; its followers showed no doubts about the accuracy of the vision, but 
rather searched their environment for signs that might be interpreted in such a way 
as to support the vision. Even aspects that initially remained obscure and could 
not be explained by the biblical pattern of interpretation that Hong Xiuquan 
discovered and adopted during his stay with the American Baptist missionary 
Issachar J. Roberts, were treated as parts of the vision that were only momentarily 
beyond human comprehension.114 
The Taiping vision mandated the erection of the Heavenly Kingdom on the 
sacred soil of China as a precondition for salvation. It was this search for salvation 
that drove the Taiping forward in their conquest of more than half of Chinese 
territory; the Taiping movement was deeply messianic in nature. Millenarian cults 
and movements were not new to Chinese thinking: to the contrary, many Buddhist 
or otherwise inspired peasant uprisings in the course of Chinese history had 
operated with millenarian concepts.115 For example, the Eight Trigrams uprising of 
1813 was a millenarian movement that was inspired by folk religion passed on in 
the so-called “White-Lotus Society.” The Taipings, however, went beyond these 
earlier millenarian movements with a crucial concept they had learned from the 
                                             
113 See Wagner. “Operating in the Chinese Public Sphere,” p. 126f., on Taiping printing and 
publication projects. 
114 Wagner. Reenacting the Heavenly Vision, passim. 
115 On millenarian movements in China see Susan Naquin. Millenarian Rebellion in China: The 
Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. Daniel L. Overmeyer. 
Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard 
University Press, 1976. 
 169
Protestant missionaries’ explanation of the Christian religion: a strictly linear 
concept of time. The teleological worldview of the Taipings could hardly have been 
imagined within a framework of cyclical time. 
Traditional Chinese thinking, as has often been commented upon, operated 
within a cyclical imagination of the world.116 In the Qing dynasty, there were in fact 
individual efforts to see time in a more continual perspective, such as in the 
writings of some protagonists of the New Text school.117 Yet the mainstream of 
Chinese thought was constantly fixated backwards into the past and tried to 
reconstruct a political and social vision that would approach the “system” of those 
of ancient, namely the Three Dynasties (Xia 夏, Shang 商, and Zhou 周). The 
social and political arrangements of antiquity had been set up by the sagely rulers 
of the past, but knowledge of these systems had been lost and the systems had 
deteriorated over time. The last remnants of the wisdom of those of old were to be 
found in the classics compiled, edited, and commented upon by Confucius, the 
last sage, who was not a ruler but was “transmitting without acting himself” (shu er 
bu zuo 述而不作).118 Consequently, a great deal of the discussions in Chinese 
intellectual history dealt with the question of how to correctly read the classics and 
interpret the “traces” (ji 迹) of ancient wisdom found therein. The most noble goal 
was to reach an understanding of the correct handling of governance that would 
finally allow the reconstruction of the ancient “unity of dao and governance” (dao 
zhi he yi 道治合一).119 
History was believed to move in circles, with sages appearing at regular 
intervals (usually every five hundred years) to renew the knowledge about the dao 
and the correct implementation of the instructions of those of old. For the political 
system this meant a cyclical movement from moral and political unity through a 
long period of gradual decline and final breakdown, to the appearance of a new 
sage. Later dynasty founders (or their consultants) therefore claimed legitimacy for 
their rule as the institution of a new cycle of history. Cyclical patterns were at work 
                                             
116 On time conceptions in China see the contributions to Huang Chün-chieh and Erik Zürcher. 
Time and Space in Chinese Culture. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
117 On this issue see Wang Hui. Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi, ch. 5. 
118 Lunyu 7.1. 
119 The intricate arguments of these discussions have been traced in much detail by Wang Hui in 
his Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi. 
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also in shorter intervals, such as in the sexagenary cycles of heavenly stems and 
earthly branches (tian gan di zhi 天干地支) used to count years. Cyclical concepts 
of time, albeit on a much larger scale, are found in Buddhism, too, where the souls 
move through birth and rebirth in the Samsára, the circle of life, death, and re-
incarnation that ends only with the soul’s entrance into the Nirvána. 
The Taiping also referred to traditional Chinese conceptions when they 
argued that the Christian religion would fit the needs of China because China itself 
had a distant Christian past; the true religion had only been forgotten. It was 
Confucius who was accused of derailing China from the correct path, a sin for 
which he was flogged in Heaven by the Heavenly Father in the presence of Hong 
Xiuquan.120 Anecdotes like this notwithstanding, the source of the Taiping’s 
inspiration did not lie in the distant past, as did that of the Confucians, but was 
rather transmitted to the Taipings through God’s direct intervention, in the form of 
Hong Xiuquan’s vision. This made superfluous the philological efforts to interpret 
the traces of the ancient sages, because all information about the political and 
social arrangements of the worldly Heavenly Kingdom came from a source located 
outside of history. The fixation of thinking thus changes diametrically; salvation 
was to be found no longer in the past but in the immediate future. History was no 
longer an endless circle of renewal and deterioration of sagely rule (or human 
suffering in the Samsára cycle of reincarnation), but became a continuous, linear 
flow that moved on a path prescribed by orthodoxy towards a clear-cut, precisely 
formulated goal: salvation. In the course of the adoption of a linear understanding 
of time, preached by the Christian religion with its counting of time in years since 
the birth of Christ and the expectation of Judgement Day, a teleological worldview 
could be instituted in China. 
Their vision went so far as to tell the Taipings explicitly how to achieve their 
ultimate goal, the advent of God and the erection of the Heavenly Kingdom in the 
latter-day Israel that was identified with no other place than China.121 All the 
adherents of Hong Xiuquan, the self-proclaimed younger brother of Jesus Christ 
were to do, was to drive Satan back into hell, from where he had conquered the 
souls as well as the territory of humanity. As the Taipings thought of the translation 
                                             
120 See Wagner. “Operating in the Chinese Public Sphere,” p. 107. 
121 The following paragraph relies on Rudolf Wagner’s detailed account of the Taiping’s effort to 
translate their vision into action in Reenacting the Heavenly Vision, chapters four and five. 
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of their vision into reality in rather practical terms, Satan was not hard to find: it 
was the Manchus who had occupied China and erected their rule over the children 
of God, the Han population. The Taipings identified the Manchus as the biblical 
inhabitants of hell and consequently addressed them as “devils” (yaomo 妖魔). 
They had to be driven back into hell, which was no other place than the province 
of Zhili 直隶 that surrounded Beijing (the province was officially renamed into 
“Demon’s Den,” Zuili 罪隶, in 1853).122 
The Taiping’s identification of the Manchus with the biblical devils, in 
conjunction with the teleological worldview and an insistence on the literal 
interpretation of scripture, had disastrous consequences. As Satan was the 
ultimate evil and the only obstacle on the way to salvation, there was not the least 
reason for leniency. In their desire to free the Chinese lands from the demonic rule 
of the Qing, the Taiping developed a religiously motivated radicalism that was in 
part responsible for the enormous death toll mentioned in the introduction to this 
section. When the Manchus were collectively de-humanized, it did no longer 
matter if the Taiping armies were confronted with men, women, or children, 
soldiers or civilians.123 Killing innocent Manchus was not an ethical transgression 
in the sense of the third wrong of Hong Xiuquan’s “Ode on the Origin of Virtue and 
the Saving of the World,” but rather the only way to guarantee the advent of God 
on earth, and thus the salvation of “mankind,” that is, the Han-Chinese population 
exclusive the Manchus. The all-out assault on the enemies of the Taipings could 
be justified in this way. The fatal logic of Taiping radicalism, as well as the 
underlying ideas that drove their desire to eliminate their enemies – the 
teleological worldview in conjunction with a linear understanding of time – 
represents a figure of thought that has become deeply relevant in modern China, 
because the introduction of socialism to China was dependent on the acceptability 
of a teleological worldview. 
 
                                             
122 See ibid., p. 109. For the document in question see “Bian yaoxue wei Zuili lun” in Zhongguo 
shixuehui. Taiping tianguo, vol.1, p. 281-300. Trsl. in Michael. The Taiping Rebellion, vol. 2, p. 276-
94. 
123 Consequently, there were not even efforts to convert the Manchu. See Wagner. Reenacting the 
Heavenly Vision, p. 64-66. 
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Teleological thinking is a crucial tenet of Marxism, and even more so in 
Leninism, where the decisive step from capitalism to socialism – the road towards 
the salvation of mankind, Communism – is to be passed consciously through 
revolution. The logic to carry out revolution in order to proceed to a higher stage 
on a continuous, prescribed road towards an ultimate utopian goal, as opposed to 
rebellion for the sake of a return to sagely forms of governance found in antiquity, 
does resemble that figure of thought that was underlying the Taiping rebellion’s 
drive for power. What I want to suggest here are the parallel moments of both the 
Taiping ideology and the Leninized version of Marxism that was the main source 
of the CCP’s ideology.124 I do not wish to imply that the Taiping uprising was the 
precursor of the Chinese Communist movement of the twentieth-century, or to 
treat Taiping thought as a proto-Leninist ideology. As explained in the introduction 
to this chapter, I want to propose that the existence of a precedent in the form of 
what I have called the Taiping ideology’s figure of thought, made it possible (or 
easier) for the abstract concepts of a Western philosophical-political system such 
as Marxism to be conceived and understood in China, and in the consequence to 
be internalized and sinified by the CCP. 
A similar point, finally, can be made for the very radicalism and violence 
found in the both the Taiping and Communist movements. The Chinese 
Communist movement was certainly too secular to identify the class enemy with 
the devil – although during World War II the Japanese, the incarnation of 
imperialism (according to Lenin the highest form of capitalism) were made to bear 
the epithet “devils” (guizi 鬼子). However, in China’s semi-feudal pre-revolutionary 
setting, the ruling classes were the main obstacle on the road to historical 
progress, just as the Manchu “devils” stood in the way of salvation. The same 
argument qualified for the time after the revolution, when remnants of the old ruling 
elites, who were supposedly fighting even more aggressively against the system to 
stage a comeback, must be eradicated. Consequently, even extreme violence 
against those classes identified as “oppressors” of the people was justified if it only 
served revolution; lenience would only prevent the thorough implementation of 
revolutionary measures. Radicalism was legitimated by the teleological nature of 
                                             
124 It is not surprising, thus, that the Taiping rebellion has earned a largely positive assessment of 
the official CCP historiography (albeit for different reasons), the religious or superstitious 
motivations of the Taipings notwithstanding. 
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the CCP’s ideology that promised a Communist utopia to the Chinese people. The 
Party shared this logic with the Taipings.125 
Yet I would like to go even further in my argument. For the Taipings, the 
conflict with the Manchus was the transfer to the battlefield of a struggle in the 
ideological realm, the field of the religion that had inspired and motivated their 
uprising in the first place: the fight between God and Satan. In the Stalinist view, 
we find the imminent attack of the bourgeoisie exactly here, in the superstructure: 
the remnants of the old ruling classes will regroup again and again and launch 
their attacks on the Party’s rule by undermining the ideological foundations of this 
rule. Stalin argues here differently from the Taiping’s line of thought, but both 
share the notion that the defence of their respective ideologies justifies a ruthless 
struggle against all potential enemies. For Stalin the superstructure was the 
battleground itself, while it did not occur to the Taipings that they might be 
attacked from this direction and that their vision might be undermined from within; 
for them, the ideology itself was but the ultima ratio of their fight. Yet in both cases, 
the very nature of the radicalism, and the absence of restraint in the choice of the 
means for their struggle, is motivated not only by the enemy being identified as the 
obstacle for salvation, but is linked directly to the struggle in the ideological realm 
and to the paramount position of the ideology itself. 
For both the Taipings and the CCP, the correct interpretation of their 
respective orthodoxies was of crucial importance. The Taipings derived their vision 
of the Heavenly Kingdom from their ideology, so any deviating interpretation would 
endanger the entire Taiping project. In a similarly vein, the superstructure was the 
Achilles heel for the CCP, the point where class enemies in disguise of Party 
members might prepare to derail the Communist revolution. Ideological deviations 
therefore, were absolutely intolerable, as they touched on the core beliefs of the 
Party, and were thus systematically persecuted. In both cases, the link between a 
teleological vision and the importance of ideological orthodoxy produced a 
particular fierceness against not only external enemies (Manchus, GMD), but also 
– and especially so – against any deviation within their respective movements. 
                                             
125 For an argument along similar lines see Barend J. ter Haar. “China’s Inner Demons: The 
Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm” in Woei Lien Chong (ed.). China’s Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives. London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 27-68. 
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The Taiping religion did not replace traditional Chinese conceptions of 
governance, of the relationship between ruler and the ruled, and of the general 
nature of man. When the uprising collapsed the Qing emperors tried with new 
verve to impose their ideological vision on the Chinese polity. Even the Shengyu 
experienced a revival.126 Yet after two decades of turmoil, the Taiping movement 
had made known in China (and especially in Southern China, where the majority 
of the Communist leadership came from) a number of modern concepts that were 
to reappear almost a century later in very different fashion. By that time, the ideas 
discussed in this chapter had long since blended into Chinese thought and were 
no longer recognized for their foreign origin. A legacy of the Taiping uprising, they 
had become enclaves of modern thinking in Chinese political culture. The 
evolution of the CCP’s media concept in Yan’an, however, was helped by these 
early interventions of Western ideas and the consequent enriching and 
transformation of the Chinese heritage. 
 
 
The Late Qing Press and the Evolution of the Chinese Public Sphere 
By the time the Chinese Communists developed their media concept in 
Northern Shaanxi, ideas of state tutelage and propaganda were widespread in 
China and abroad; there was little room for a bipartisan press and the liberal idea 
of newspapers that would open their pages to multiple contending and voices and 
open-ended deliberation. Such a press, however, had existed in China, and what 
Fred Siebert calls the “liberal theory” of the press had been a powerful idea just a 
few decades earlier. The functions and the potential of modern mass media had 
been introduced to China almost a hundred years before the CCP reformed its 
media apparatus in Yan’an, and alternative concepts of the press had thrived  for 
several decades. It was only in the early 20th century that these ideas lost their 
influence. In the remainder of this chapter, I will take a brief look at the early 
Chinese liberal press and its eventual decline.127 
 
                                             
126 See Hsiao. Rural China, p. 197, 201, 204-05. 
127 I have profited greatly from the discussions with members of the research group “Early Chinese 
Public Sphere” at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Heidelberg University, as well as from their 
research. The following section draws on this body of recent research.  
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Not the first, but arguably the most influential early modern newspapers in 
China were the Shanghai Shenbao 申报, founded in 1872, and Wang Tao’s 王韬 
Xunhuan ribao 循环日报, set up in Hong Kong two years later.128 In a process that 
has been detailed by Barbara Mittler and others, the Shenbao entered the public 
sphere in Shanghai and introduced to China the principles of a modern, liberal, 
and commercially-driven press, all the while negotiating the new ideas with 
existing media such as the Jingbao 京报, or court gazette,129 to make these ideas 
culturally acceptable in their new environment.130 The Shenbao explained to 
Chinese audiences in and beyond Shanghai the ideas and conceptions of the 
liberal press model that had emerged in Europe after more than a century of 
constant struggle – a struggle against the notoriously intrusive tendencies of 
governments worried about their influence and reputation.131 The Shenbao 
became an instant success and was able to defend its position as the most 
influential Chinese newspaper well into the twentieth century. On the following 
pages, I will therefore concentrate on the Shenbao to trace the emergence of the 
concept of a liberal commercial press in China – the concept that was rejected 
later in favour of a concept that stressed propaganda over deliberation. 
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the Shenbao, see Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, p. 174-207. 
131 This process and the role of the newspapers in the formation of the European public sphere is 
the central subject Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
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The Shenbao was founded in 1872 by a young British merchant, Ernest 
Major.132 Before starting the Shenbao in Shanghai, Major had lived in Hong Kong 
for more than a decade, where he had perfected his command of Chinese. He was 
in search of an investment opportunity and thus started the Shenbaoguan 申报馆 
with one explicit motive: to establish a profitable commercial venture. With this 
idea in mind, Major proved to be at the height of contemporary newspaper theory: 
in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, an ideal had formed of a 
free press, privately owned and run according to market-principles, and thus 
protected from interference by government authorities.133 Major was determined to 
bring this model to China. In Shanghai, he contacted young and energetic 
intellectuals to become the core of his staff: located in Jiangnan 江南, China’s 
cultural centre and the region with the highest density of schools and academies 
preparing candidates for the imperial examinations, Major could draw on a pool of 
learned elites (the wenren 文人) to become both his staff and the readers of his 
paper.134 The first issue of the Shenbao appeared on April 30, 1872. 
The first problem for Major to solve was to introduce his potential readers to 
a new and foreign product, the newspaper, to explain its character and its intention, 
and to convince his readers that they needed such a daily paper. To address his 
readers, Major chose the equally novel medium of the editorial. A number of early 
Shenbao editorials elaborate on the functions and the character of the newspaper. 
On the following pages, I will read these editorials as normative texts trying to 
establish a particular newspaper concept in China. The conception of the role of 
the press that can be reconstructed from these texts is clearly at variance with that 
promoted by the CCP in Yan’an, and other contemporary ideas of the press. 
 
                                             
132 On Ernest Major see Rudolf G. Wagner. “Ernest Major’s Shenbaoguan and the Formation of 
Late Qing Print Culture.” Paper presented at the conference “Creating a Multiethnic Identity: The 
Shanghai Concessions, 1850-1910,” Heidelberg, June 7-9, 1998. I am grateful to the author for 
permission to quote from this paper. The involvement of Major, a foreigner, with the Shenbao must 
be considered the chief reason why many histories of the press produced in the PRC have, for 
ideological reasons, discounted the influence and the importance of the Shenbao on the modern 
Chinese press. 
133 For this particular newspaper concept see Fred Siebert. Four Theories of the Press, p. 39-72. 
See also Denis McQuail. McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. (4th ed.) London: Sage 
Publications, 2000, ch. 2-4, 7. 
134 On the background of the early Chinese journalists see Vittinghoff. Die Anfänge des 
Journalismus in China, ch.3. On the topic of wenren see also Janku. Nur leere Reden, ch. 2. 
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In the Shenbao’s founding issue, Ernest Major turned to his readers with a 
leading article entitled “Announcement of our house” (Ben guan gaobai 本馆告
白).135 In this short piece the “Proprietor of the Shenbao” (Shenbao zhuren 申报主
人, this being the signature of the article) advertises his paper and outlines a few 
basic principles. The article sets out: 
Today there occur under heaven many events which might be recorded. Yet all too 
many of them are buried and remain unknown. Why is this? It is because there is 
nobody who takes enough interest in them to record them, and so remarkable 
occurrences and unpretentious actions remain hidden and untold. This is exceedingly 
regrettable. 
 
The author starts his discussion by addressing the intrinsic value of information 
itself. The newspaper thus centres around the message, the piece of information it 
relates to the readers. This is in fact a remarkable beginning: in their primary 
function, the newspaper is nothing else but a marketplace of information where the 
reader acquires knowledge about events that have occurred “under heaven,” that 
is, everywhere in the world, and that might be of interest for him. This view 
contrasts sharply with the CCP’s understanding discussed in the last chapter: in 
the CCP’s eyes, the value of information depends always on the speaker, whereas 
the Shenbao emphasizes the message itself. Without the newspaper, the events 
reported in the articles would not be recorded, or literally, passed on (chuan shi 传
世). “Passing on” knowledge, especially that concerning the ways of the Sages of 
old, is an important category to which Major refers here. In this respect, China 
indeed is in a deplorable state:  
Tracing this situation into the past, [we find that] from antiquity down to the present 
there have been abundant works by historians and belletrists, minutely detailed 
accounts of mountains and geography [both works of fantasy and real accounts].136 But 
what they record are all tales of former ages and stories of the past. Moreover, this 
literature is vast and varied and its style is high and archaic, so that none but the gentry 
can understand it. Those who are not scholars cannot even read it. 
 
                                             
135 Translated in Roswell. S. Britton. The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912. Shanghai: Kelly & 
Walsh, Ltd., 1933, p. 64-65. The translations below follow Britton; I have modified his translation 
where necessary. For an argumentation along similar lines see an editorial a week later: 
“Shenjiang xinbao yuanqi” in Shenbao, May 7, 1872, also signed “Shenbao zhuren” (i.e., Major). 
Both editorials have been discussed, in much more detail than is possible here, in Vittinghoff. Die 
Anfänge des Journalismus in China, ch. 2; and Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, ch. 1. My own 
reading concentrates on but a few aspects that are of direct relevance for the discussion of the 
CCP’s media concept, the main topic of the present study. 
136 Shanjing dizhi 山经地志. The former alludes to the Shanhaijing 山海经 and refers to fantastic 
geographical accounts, whereas the latter means more sober works of the gazetteer kind. 
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We find two complaints here: the first concerns the obsession with things past; 
affairs of recent origin are hard pressed to prove their value as compared to the 
things handed down from antiquity. The modern newspaper is to redress this bias. 
The focus on information is thus accompanied by a similar focus on recent affairs. 
Secondly, Major comments on the language barrier posed by the style of classical 
writing, a point he further elaborated in later sections of the editorial. In a 
commercial hub like Shanghai, where quick and easy access to information was 
crucial for merchants both big and small, this problem might have been seen 
especially clearly. In the past, there had in fact been a form of literature written in a 
more accessible style, yet these genres had their own peculiar limitations: 
Every age has produced its legends and novels, such as the Bowu zhi 博物志 of Zhang 
Hua 张华137 and the Soushen ji 搜神记 of Gan Bao 干宝.138 The Qixie 齐谐 recorded 
the strange (zhiguai 志怪),139 and Yu Chu 虞初 collected elegant literature.140 All these 
works can be read easily, but the things they present are fabulous and preposterous. 
They are all elegantly composed, so they are useful only to help Confucian scholars 
cultivate their ‘pure conversations’ (qingtan 清谈); they cannot necessarily be 
appreciated by both those of culture and the ordinary folks. 
 
The language barrier remains high even in the case of vernacular fiction. Worse 
yet, this kind of literature has no practical use at all. It satisfies the human interest 
in the strange and fosters those elegant conversations of the upper classes – the 
qingtan – that were led for the sake of arguing itself, being devoid of any aim for 
practical application (at least in the polemical view of the author). It is against this 
background that the modern newspaper is advertised: 
When we cast for something which records and narrates recent events in a style simple 
though not vulgar, and which reports current affairs precisely yet in sufficient detail, so 
that scholars and officials as well as peasants, artisans, traders and merchants all can 
understand, then we find nothing so suitable as the newspaper (xinwenzhi 新闻纸). 
Publication of newspapers originated among Westerners, and has been introduced to 
China. We have seen the Hong Kong newspapers printed in Chinese characters, and 
their form and content are excellent. Now we emulate the idea and establish the 
Shenbao here in Shanghai. 
                                             
137 Zhang Hua, 232-300. The author was known in his time for his broad knowledge of the most 
varied subjects. His Bowu zhi collects miscellaneous tales of marvellous nature. 
138 Gan Bao, 4th cent. The Soushen ji is a collection of marvellous and sometimes fantastic tales. It 
is an early precursor of the modern xiaoshuo 小说 genre. 
139 The Qixie ji 齐谐记 was a collection of zhiguai novels from the 5th century by an unknown author. 
On Zhiguai, or tales of the supernatural, see Judith T. Zeitlin. Historian of the Strange. Pu Songling 
and the Classical Chinese Tale. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Rania Huntington. Alien 
Kind: Foxes and Late Imperial Chinese Narrative. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
140 Yu Chu, fl. Western Han dynasty. His work Zhoushuo 周说, which has not been transmitted, has 
traditionally been treated as the precursor of biji xiaoshuo 笔记小说. 
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Here is a characterization of the modern newspaper: concentrating on the news 
value and the paper’s timeliness; accurate, brief, and detailed reporting; and an 
appeal to all classes of society, through a style “simple though not vulgar.” These 
are the major principles that were to guide the production of the Shenbao.141 
From the perspective of the CCP’s media concept, these principles are of 
interest for what is absent here, for what the Shenbao does not claim to be. First of 
all, we are not told for whom in particular the “Proprietor of the Shenbao” wants to 
speak. The newspaper is a Western medium, a fact that Ernest Major does not 
conceal. Yet he writes in Chinese for Chinese readers, and in the editorial he 
adopts a distinctly Chinese habitus through the frequent references to Chinese 
cultural and literary tradition.142 This is the case here, too. By adopting an explicitly 
Chinese perspective, Major tried to distinguish himself from the Western powers 
that control the city of Shanghai. He does not want to the Shenbao to be seen as 
the voice of the foreigners. 
Neither does the Shenbao represent the position of the Chinese authorities, 
as the Jingbao, the official court gazette, was doing. In an editorial that appeared 
about two months later, the Shenbao explained the difference between the 
Jingbao and the modern newspaper:143 
The new(s)papers (xinbao 新报) of the Western countries transmit the affairs of all 
countries, from the court above to the smallest hamlets below. Every deed and every 
word, each and every thing will be recorded in the papers, be it good or bad, refined or 
coarse. The Chinese dibao 邸报 [another term for jingbao] are very different from these. 
The dibao are made to spread the political affairs of the court only, but do not record 
the petty chatter of the smallest hamlets. And that is why the majority of those who 
read them are literati and officials, while peasants and craftsmen, merchants and 
traders are dissatisfied with them. Therefore, the dibao are not as good as the foreign 
newspapers, which everyone enjoys to read. The dibao are published for those above, 
while the new paper is made for those below. 
 
The court gazette is a medium of top-down communication; it carries important 
information which is, however, not relevant for all layers of society. The new 
papers are broader in scope and thus have multiple functions: firstly, they switch 
                                             
141 See also the discussion in Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, Introduction. 
142 A chief method for the introduction of radical ideas in a way that makes them acceptable in the 
host environment is their packaging into Chinese rhetorical conventions. These methods have 
been discussed by Andrea Janku and Barbara Mittler. On the techniques of quoting and the use of 
classical allusions see Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, ch. 2, esp. p. 123-34. 
143 “Dibao bie yu xinbao lun” in Shenbao, July 13, 1872. 
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from the vertical to a horizontal direction of information by informing 
businesspeople and ordinary citizens on matters of their own environment and of 
their peculiar concerns. Yet they can also function in a vertical way, simply turning 
around the flow of information: through the newspapers, the court may hear of 
bureaucratic malpractices and thus be in a position to act more swiftly – as the 
editorial stresses, the modern newspapers can assume the function of the yanlu, 
the “avenues of speech,” through which the emperor hears about problems and 
remains in touch with the situation in his empire. In another editorial, Ernest Major 
likens the Shenbao to “the rule that the [sages] of antiquity investigate rumours 
and ask about the mores (tan feng wen su 探风问俗).”144 
The Shenbao tried to combine these different functions. An important move 
was the decision to reprint the Jingbao on the pages of the Shenbao.145 By 
reprinting the Jingbao in full (and with technology superior to that of the traditional 
baofang), the editors of the Shenbao hoped to make their paper attractive to 
China’s officialdom. Furthermore, the Shenbao made use of the cultural capital of 
the Jingbao by reprinting it.146 The Shenbao would thus become a newspaper for 
all social strata, containing a broad range of information, and presenting itself as 
an open forum. 
It is here where the major difference to the CCP media concept lies: the 
Shenbao’s audience is defined in an inclusive, not an exclusive way; the paper 
refuses to speak on the behalf of any particular group; it is not a mouthpiece but a 
platform open to all. Consequently, the Shenbao could not be made into a weapon 
of class struggle, or even an arena for such a conflict, as the CCP saw their media. 
Finally, has the Shenbao an educational character? Major’s insistence on an 
easily accessible language and on the expansion of the readership does certainly 
reveal a project of enlightenment (next to commercial considerations). But in the 
Shenbao’s case, it is the people who enlighten themselves through access to a 
broad variety of information; Major’s didactical approach is not of the top down 
                                             
144 “Shenjiang xinbao yuanqi” in Shenbao, May 7, 1872. 
145 In the paper’s “Regulations” that followed the initial editorial, the Shenbao told its readers: 
“Since the Jingbao is the official publication of the court, it is only appropriate that our paper gives it 
due respect and publicity; we will therefore reprint it daily [in the Shenbao] without any omission.” 
146 This is argued in Barbara Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, ch. 3. 
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kind. The educative mission of the CCP press, in contrast, is determined by the 
Party that sets the goals and the direction of the press.  
Ernest Major had a clear vision concerning the policies and intentions of his 
venture. Returning to the initial editorial, we find the following elaborations: 
The political situation of the empire, changing customs, important developments in 
foreign relations, prosperity and depression in business and trade, and all that evokes 
surprise and astonishment and pleasure or that refreshes people’s ears, none of these 
things will be omitted. 
 
A broad scope in reporting and completeness in coverage are fundamental 
demands of a newspaper: political and social developments, as well as all 
business-related news deserve the attention of the journalist. In contrast to the 
traditional writings that Major had mentioned in the earlier paragraphs of the 
editorial, the newspaper is characterized by a strictly utilitarian approach. 
Whatever may be useful for the readers will appear in the paper – as long as it 
satisfies another criterion: truthfulness. 
We shall apply our best efforts to convey only confirmable news, and without 
misrepresentation; also to make the news understandable. We shall not indulge in 
empty and vainglorious talk, neither shall we write about exaggerated and absurd 
things. 
 
The Shenbao rejects unfounded rumours or reports that cannot be confirmed (and 
might arouse the wrath of those concerned): the paper thus tried to avoid being 
drawn into intrigues and factional quarrels. The rejection of “exaggerated and 
absurd things,” however, proved to be a matter of interpretation. The Shenbao’s 
style, like that of other contemporary newspapers, was modelled more often than 
not after existing Chinese forms of prose-writing, and did by no means exclude 
stories about supernatural phenomena, heavenly retribution, and even ghosts – all 
of these found their ways into the paper’s pages. It was not until very late in the 
century that rigid demands to separate fact and fiction were established and 
became (at least in theory) the requirement for any respectable newspaper.147 In 
the inaugural editorial, however, Major stated that 
...we hope that those interested in current affairs may get from our paper the gist of 
daily events, and those engaged in business will not be mislead by any reports in our 
paper. Thus, the publication of this paper is a profound advantage to the world. 
                                             
147 On fact and fiction in the early Shenbao see Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, p. 86-104. See 
also Elizabeth Sinn’s comments on style in the Zhongwai xinwen qiribao in “Emerging Media: Hong 
Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press” in Modern Asian Studies 36.2 (2002), p. 421-
63, esp. p. 456-59. 
 182
 
It is the serious political and economic news that the Shenbao hopes to bring to 
the reader. The latter was especially important in the treaty port of Shanghai: 
reliable business information would make a competitive advantage for the traders 
and entrepreneurs, who, Major hoped, would become a steady source of income 
for his venture. He therefore tried to establish the reputation of the Shenbao from 
the very first issue, guaranteeing the quality of information. Only thus could the 
paper be useful, or of advantage (you yi 有益). Yet the Shenbao’s usefulness did 
not end at Shanghai’s city limits. Major had set his goals much higher: he 
conceived of the Shenbao as a paper of nationwide circulation:148 
Now the world is very large, and its interests and affairs are myriad. The people live 
scattered and cannot see one another. So is there any one person who can know 
thoroughly all of the world’s affairs? However, since the emergence of newspapers, all 
of the world’s affairs which are worthy of record are in fact disseminated throughout the 
world. Since the emergence of newspapers, whoever glances at them can know of the 
world without even leaving his house. Is this not excellent? 
 
The Shenbao assumes a communicative function that furthers interaction between 
the remotest places. Reading the newspaper will make one able to understand 
even complex affairs going on far away (for example at the court in Beijing). The 
author stresses his argument by the allusion to a well-known Laozi 老子 quotation 
(text in italics): “knowing the world without leaving one’s house” (bu chu hu, zhi 
tianxia 不出 户，知天下).149 The Laozi text speaks about the ruler and the ideal 
mode of his rule. The Laozi chapter ends: “The sage knows [everything] without 
going there [himself], he can call things by name without looking at them, his 
[intentions] succeed through non-action” (shengren bu xing er zhi, bu jian er ming, 
bu wei er cheng 圣人不行而知，不见而名，不为而成). The newspaper’s reader 
familiar with the Laozi text is thus likened to the sage ruler; his affairs (business 
affairs, social matters, political intentions) will succeed due to his reading the 
                                             
148 This point is also stressed in the “Regulations” (“Ben bao tiaoli” 本报条例) that followed the 
editorial, where Major explicitly encouraged potential agents in other cities to come forward and 
distribute the paper. He promised them a fixed portion of sales revenues and even offered to take 
back unsold issues at no cost for the agent – evidence of Ernest Major’s efforts to bring Western 
business practices to China. 
149 Laozi 47. 
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newspaper. The functions of the modern newspaper are made plausible to the 
reader in terms of the Chinese tradition in which they are embedded.150 
 Yet the reading of the newspaper alone would not be enough to bring into 
play its communicative function. Rather, Major reminded his readers, their 
participation would be instrumental in unfolding the full potential of the newspaper: 
If however we only carry on this enterprise according to the rules at the time of its 
foundation, we fear that it will be confined in geographical scope and limited in 
knowledge, with many an omission. Therefore we hope that our readers everywhere 
will come forward and instruct us, and rectify our errors – we do sincerely hope that this 
happens. 
 
The readers’ cooperation and participation in the making of the Shenbao is 
explicitly welcome. Ernest Major hoped to tap the pool of talent in the Jiangnan 
region for his paper and told them of the London papers, where “the words and 
characters come all from the pens of gifted men, so that the readers do not feel 
annoyed.”151 The Shenbao offered the Chinese literati a platform to voice their 
opinions and proposals. In this way, the paper would profit from contributions, 
while the wenren living in and around Shanghai could engage in public discussion. 
The press would thus assume the function of the traditional Chinese yanlu: it 
would open up a new avenue of remonstrance and, through the cooperation with 
the traditional elites, promote the public concern for public matters. Major repeated 
his call for manuscripts in the Shenbao regulations that were attached to the initial 
editorial, where he asked people from near and afar to send “items short and 
long, ... such as bamboo twig poems (zhuzhici 竹枝词), long songs, and reports.” 
The Shenbao was explicitly interested in articles on “state affairs, livelihood of the 
people, agriculture, hydrology,” but warned that there would “generally be no 
remuneration” for unsolicited contributions. 
The founder of the Shenbao had in mind the successful European 
newspapers as a model for his own paper. Major was not the only one convinced 
of the suitability of the European model for China. In 1874, Wang Tao spoke out in 
praise of the London Times.152 In turn, the Western-managed papers in China 
came to acknowledge the Shenbao’s efforts to establish an independent, modern 
                                             
150 As Barbara Mittler points out, the Laozi passage was popular with Chinese writers trying to 
promote modern means of communication in China. The same passage is quoted in Zhang 
Zhidong’s 张之洞 Quanxue pian 劝学片 of 1898. See Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, p. 20f. 
151 “Shenjiang xinbao yuanqi” in Shenbao, May 7, 1872. 
152 See Mittler. A Newspaper for China?, p.18f. 
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press in China. The English-language Celestial Empire wrote in 1874: “Now the 
Shun-pao owes its success so far to the fact that it is a pure money speculation, 
and therefore an undertaking intelligible enough to all Chinamen … all who have 
read their Shun-pao with regularity, even for a few months, are comparatively 
enlightened.”153 Within a remarkably short time, the Shenbao had established itself 
as a reliable, indigenous source of information and inspiration. 
Together with the newspaper itself, the Shenbao had brought to China a 
distinctly modern concept of the press, modelled after the British and American 
liberal ideal: managed as a profitable enterprise; centring on the intrinsic value of 
information; guaranteeing the timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and diversity of 
this information; accessible for and appealing to broad and diverse audiences; and 
generally open to the various voices and the different directions of information 
flows within the public sphere. At the same time, as Barbara Mittler has argued, 
the Shenbao had succeeded to package and sell this foreign medium in a way that 
allowed the Chinese readers to appropriate the newspaper as a thing of their own. 
The modern press had become part of everyday life in China. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The liberal press ideal that was introduced to China in the 1870s came 
under pressure in the last decade of the century from two sides: the 1890s saw an 
explosive growth of newspapers issued by partisan groups that were trying to 
promote their positions in the reform debates. The spread of these “advocacy 
papers,” often sponsored by influential officials, blurred the lines between private 
and public newspapers, and for the first time proliferated beyond the foreign 
concessions into the Chinese hinterland. After the 1898 reform movement in 
particular, the Chinese court that for decades had refused to involve itself in the 
modern press, began to see the need to set up its own organs, replacing the 
traditional government gazettes. Under the polemical attacks of both the court and 
the reform factions, especially those of the exiled Liang Qichao, the commercial 
                                             
153 The Celestial Empire, Nov. 12, 1874. Quoted after Janku. Nur leere Reden, p. 70f. 
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press had ever more difficulty to project its image as an institution of impartiality, 
the “Fourth Estate.”154 
However, in his urgent calls for modern press institutions Liang was as a 
matter of fact “integrating the two already existing newspaper models: that of the 
‘liberal’ British-oriented press in the foreign concessions, and that of the 
authoritarian government press of the Peking Gazette and later official 
newspapers (guanbao).”155 He called for competing opinions in the newspapers, 
all the while trying to exclude his journalistic colleagues from participation in the 
ensuing political debates. By doing so, Liang set an important precedent: the effort 
to turn a partisan paper into an official press organ was emulated by both the GMD 
and the CCP.156 
A turning point for Liang’s theoretical conceptions about the role of the 
press and about Western-style democracy in general came after a visit to the 
United States in 1903.157 Exasperated about what he had seen in America, Liang 
formulated a vision of the press that placed much greater emphasis on the state in 
the public sphere. In 1905 he suggested that only an autocratic government would 
be able to rule in the public interest and raise the people’s level of enlightenment; 
and only once this task was accomplished, China would be able to adopt a more 
participatory constitutional form of monarchy.158 The press was a crucial part of 
this process. Yet indications for Liang’s gradual move away from a more liberal 
conception of the press can be found as early as 1901: “There are private 
newspapers, party papers, national papers, and international papers. The former 
Shiwubao 时务报 and Zhixinbao 知新报159 had basically broken away from the 
category of private papers and had entered that of party papers. We may ask: at 
which of these four stages is the Qingyibao 清议报?160 – In between the party 
                                             
154 This argument is made in Natascha Vittinghoff. “Unity vs. Uniformity: Liang Qichao and the 
Invention of a ‘New Journalism’ for China” in Late Imperial China 23.1 (2002), p. 91-143. 
155 Ibid., p. 118. 
156 Compare also Wagner. “The Early Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Public Sphere,” p. 11. 
157 Nathan. Chinese Democracy, p. 58-61. 
158 Ibid., p. 61 
159 Shiwubao (1896-98) and Zhixinbao (1897-1901) were two progressive papers promoting 
political reforms in the course of the 1898 Hundred Days Reform. Liang Qichao was involved in 
both ventures. Comp. Vittinghoff “Unity vs. Uniformity.” 
160 Qingyibao (1898-1901) was the Yokohama-based venture of Liang Qichao in his Japanese exile. 
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paper and the national paper.”161 Liang thus believed the advocacy press to be a 
stage on an evolutionary ladder – a stage higher than the liberal press (that was 
by now perceived as the expression of private, unconsolidated opinions), but still 
ranging below a unified national press that would take the lead in political reform. 
Liang had thus reversed the developmental trajectory of the press in the European 
countries: the path from a press landscape tightly controlled by the government, 
through a contest between government and oppositional groups, to an ideal 
situation of a free public sphere that is beyond the reaches of state intervention, 
populated by commercial papers that oversee and scrutinize the government while 
enjoying the protection of laws and regulations (the ideal outlined in Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere).162 
Andrew Nathan shows that ever since Liang Qichao, the Chinese press was 
perceived not in terms of its being an impartial arbiter of opinions, but variously as 
an instrument for the education of an unenlightened, backward population, as a 
tool to propagate the policies of different advocacy groups in a competitive setting 
(before 1949), or those of a monopolistic Party-state (since 1949). In each case, 
Chinese elites regarded it as necessary to “guide” public opinion and thus to help 
shaping a modern citizenry.163 Very much in the tradition of Liang, thus, the CCP 
emphasized the function of the press in an enlightenment project, a project that 
was conceived in a top-down manner. The CCP further stressed the class nature 
of the press: the standard dictionary definition of “newspaper” proclaimed that 
newspapers had been a weapon in the bourgeoisie’s struggle against the feudal 
system; in turn, “in the nineteenth century, bourgeois newspapers expanded 
enormously, becoming ever more a tool for supporting the capitalist system and 
for deceitful propaganda.”164 The liberal press that had made impartiality a core 
quality ended up being accused of taking sides with the bourgeoisie. The fate of 
the Shenbao in mainstream newspaper historiography is a case in point: it has 
been denounced as an agent of imperialist “cultural infiltration,” established with 
                                             
161 “Qingyibao yibai ce zhuci bing lun baoguan zhi zeren ji ben guan zhi jingli” in Qingyibao 100, p. 
8a. Quoted in Janku. Nur leere Reden, p. 265.  
162 See the conclusion in Vittinghoff. “Unity vs. Uniformity,” p. 131. 
163 Nathan. Chinese Democracy, passim. 
164 Cihai: 1965 nian xinbianben (1979 printing), p. 1264, entry ‘baozhi.’ 
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the intention to “poison the thinking of the Chinese people” and to “increase the 
economic exploitation of China.”165 
The intense cultural debates in the first decades of the 20th century, 
especially during the May Fourth period, temporarily accelerated the trend towards 
the party-ization (dangbaohua 党报化) of the Chinese press. The consolidation of 
the GMD’s power, however, led to a new situation: the GMD papers, outspoken 
advocates of their Party’s course, were lifted into a paramount position, and thus 
became the national papers Liang Qichao had spoken of. The GMD’s Zhongyang 
ribao 中央日报 became a dangbao-turned-guanbao, a modernized version of the 
guanbao 官报.166 Other voices in the Chinese public sphere, such as those of the 
Communists, were consequently suppressed. After the Japanese invasion of 
China, the Wang Jingwei government acted likewise, as did the CCP when it rose 
to power. When the world view narrowed to a dualistic perspective determined by 
the struggle of antagonistic classes, there was no room for the ideal of a liberal 
press. Even worse: in the eyes of the CCP, the bourgeois advocacy papers, such 
as the publications of the GMD, were honest enough to acknowledge their class 
character and their bias openly; they were thus located in the proximity of the 
CCP’s own publications. The liberal press, in contrast, which claimed to be open to 
a variety of different voices, was seen as in reality hiding its bourgeois character; 
consequently, these liberal papers were potentially even more dangerous than the 
official GMD publications, as they tried to conceal their true nature.167 
When the CCP developed its own media concept in the Yan’an years, it 
operated in a complex network of ideas. The immediate model for the construction 
of a Communist press was the Soviet Union. It was through Moscow that Marxist 
ideas concerning the press were transmitted to China. What finally reached 
Yan’an was a modified version of Marxism, or rather Marxism-Leninism, the official 
Soviet ideology: under the course of events in the Soviet Union, Stalinism, a rather 
unique interpretation of Leninism, had become the mainstream thought there in 
the period crucial for China. The package of Marxist thinking that became the 
                                             
165 Comp. Vittinghoff, “Unity vs. Uniformity.” Denouncing the Shenbao was mainstream practice as 
late as the 1980s. The above quotations are taken from Fang Hanqi. Zhongguo jindai baokan shi. 
Xi’an: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1981, p. 38, 44, 47. 
166 On the GMD’s party media and their influence on the CCP’s conceptualization of their own 
media see Fitzgerald. Awakening China. 
167 See the Cihai definition above (n. 164). 
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foundation of the CCP’s own ideology was, as I have shown in chapter two, a 
historical product deeply transformed by events. Yet other factors influenced the 
Party’s choices: as shown in the present chapter, the CCP found itself surrounded, 
both at home and abroad, by ideas that promulgated propaganda and persuasion 
as the major functions of the press, rather than deliberation and bipartisanship. 
The CCP learned from the GMD as well from the practices of the foreign-owned 
press in China and from propaganda practices developed in Europe and the 
United States since World War I. In this environment, the CCP absorbed the 
Leninist-Stalinist package, but it did so in a selective manner: while some 
elements were stressed more in China than they were elsewhere, others were 
downplayed in their importance or even rejected. In this process of absorbing a 
foreign ideology, the cultural predisposition of the CCP leaders played an 
important role. For most of the major elements of the modern Chinese media 
concept, corresponding elements in traditional Chinese political culture can be 
identified that made the foreign imports plausible to the Chinese Communists and 
thus facilitated their being accepted. The traces of tradition in question here, 
however, were less Chinese than might seem in the first place. Rather, the CCP 
found itself confronted with a Chinese tradition with enclaves of modern thinking. 
In some cases, these enclaves played a crucial role in paving the way for later 
ideological constructs to emerge. At the end of these complex processes of 
cultural transfer and indigenization stands the CCP’s media concept. 
When the CCP defeated the GMD in 1949 and established the PRC, it 
found itself ruling over the entire nation. As with many other ideas, patterns, and 
concepts developed in Yan’an, the media concept had to be put into practice on a 
much larger scale than had previously been possible. Translating the theory into 
practice required two things to be done: first, a number of mechanisms had to be 
invented that would allow the normative prescriptions of the media concept to be 
used as a guide to action. Secondly, the media concept itself had to be applied to 
the myriad micro-level decisions of day-to-day administration. While the next 
chapter will briefly discuss the mechanics of control, the second part of this study 
will present a close-up view on the media concept in action. 
Chapter Four 
The Mechanics of Media Control 
 
The news workers have faith in the Socialist news work, they must uphold 
the Party’s basic line, uphold the orientation of serving the people and 
serving socialism; they must liberate their thought and seek truth from facts; 
they must bring into full play the fine traditions and the fine working styles 
of the Party’s and the people’s news work; they must oppose money 
worship, hedonism, and extreme individualism, and must strengthen the 
cultivation of professional ethics. 
(“Chinese News Workers’ Code of Professional Ethics”, 1991) 
 
For books that might arouse problems or where problems have been 
indicated by sides concerned, special inspectors are organized to carry out 
inspection... 
(“Circular on the Strengthening of Book Inspection,” 1994) 
 
The media in the People’s Republic of China operate within a tightly 
controlled space. The conditions under which they work are determined by the 
CCP’s media concept that I have reconstructed and explained in the preceding 
chapters. This concept, however, is but an abstract ideological construct that helps 
us to understand the CCP’s definition of the media and the media’s proper place in 
the matrix of state-society relations, and within the political system of the PRC. 
The concept has never existed in isolation from its institutional environment; it was 
in fact formed in the course of the Party’s practical media work in Yan’an. It can 
thus be treated as a stand-alone unit only for the illustrative purposes the were the 
objective of the chapters above. When the concept is supposed to act as a set of 
guiding principles for the practical day-to-day management and administration of a 
large-scale media apparatus, it has to be moulded into concrete institutional 
shapes. So when the CCP rose to power in 1949, among the first things the Party 
had to do was to translate the media concept into practice, and do so on a national 
dimension – or rather, it had to transform the existing reality in order to fit the 
prescriptions of that normative framework which the media concept represented. 
In the course of this process, the CCP developed a number of mechanisms that 
were established in the early years of the PRC. Adjustments and interpretations 
notwithstanding that were made in later years to uphold the system under 
changing environmental conditions, these mechanisms have generally 
characterized the Chinese media sector ever since. In their totality, they form a 
comprehensive apparatus of checks and controls, designed to guarantee the 
implementation of the Party’s normative project, the re-education of the entire 
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Chinese population. Since this apparatus has developed a dynamics of its own 
and a tendency to function even without constant supervision, I will be speaking of 
the “mechanics of control.” 
The question I want to answer in this chapter is: through what means is the 
media concept translated into practical administration measures that govern the 
media sector? The mechanisms in the apparatus of control operate on a meta-
level; they are supposed to act as a framework for the day-to-day decisions that 
form the administrative basis of media work. It is through them that the media 
concept has become institutionalized in the political landscape of the PRC. They 
are not particular to any mass medium, but rather affect the entire system of public 
communication in the PRC. The Party’s attempt to make the media a part of a 
much greater normative project, as well as the determination to defend this project 
against any attacks from without, proceed from the prerequisite that the Party is in 
ultimate control over all the media – only then are the media able to fulfil the 
mission which the media concept entrusts them with. Pervasive controls thus 
emerge as the bottom line of the media concept in its practical application. The 
general purpose of the mechanisms I will identify in this chapter is to guarantee 
the Party’s paramount position in all affairs related to the Chinese media. 
The mechanisms of control include in particular: the general ideological 
framework, the institutional structures that govern the media sector, the web of 
bureaucratic regulations that have been devised to administer this sector, control 
of the information flow, control of information access, control of public discourses, 
and language control. All these points will be discussed in the sections of this 
chapter. The interplay of these mechanisms, the mechanics of media control, has 
evolved as political circumstances were changing; adjustments were made in 
particular concerning their relative weighting. The mechanisms themselves, 
however, have remained remarkably stable, as becomes clear in the empirical 
chapters in part two of this study. 
As the mechanisms I describe were not tied to any particular period, this 
chapter will not pretend to keep to a chronological narrative. I will consciously try 
to select examples and evidence from different periods and from different media 
forms, so as to underline my proposition that the mechanisms discussed here 
apply to all the media, and that they apply to them across the entire time span 
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since the founding of the PRC (variations in the strictness of their enforcement 
notwithstanding). At the end of this chapter, I will address an issue intimately 
linked to the mechanisms of control: censorship. In the PRC, censorship has taken 
on very peculiar forms that are different from censorship regimes in other socialist 
nations, and also from that introduced by the GMD in the Republican era. I argue 
that these peculiarities must be attributed directly to the CCP’s media concept and 
the peculiar way of its institutionalization.  
 
 
The Ideological Framework 
On the most abstract level, all media institutions, as well as the people 
working in these institutions, have been subject to an ideological framework that 
guides all their work and that provides the basic principles for decision-making 
processes concerning all major questions. This framework of reference was 
established even before 1949 and is still in place today. While at certain times 
paying lip service to the official ideology was sufficient for media workers to get 
along, at other moments anything less than outright enthusiasm would be self-
destructive. 
The ideological framework has been presented to media workers in a 
number of different packagings. First of all, the cornerstones of the official ideology 
have been inscribed into laws and regulations governing media work. Most of the 
mechanisms of control are discussed in these normative texts; in this chapter I will 
therefore rely heavily on such texts. 
Ever since the 1980s, laws have been considered the legal documents with 
the highest status. However, to the present day, the PRC does not have a press 
law, neither has such a law existed at any time since 1949. In the publishing sector 
the document with the highest legal status are the “Administrative Regulations for 
Publishing” (Chuban guanli tiaoli 出版管理条例) that were passed by the State 
Council in 1997.1 A formal publishing law had been in preparation since 1985, 
                                             
1 Issued on Jan. 2, 1997, as State Council order No. 210. See Zhongguo chuban nianjianshe (ed.). 
Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998. Beijing: Zhongguo chuban nianjianshe, 1998, p. 230-33. A slightly 
revised version was enacted on 1 Jan. 2002 that replaced the 1997 regulations. For the text see 
Xinhua wang. “Chuban guanli tiaoli,” at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2001-
12/31/content_220668.htm (downloaded 07 Apr. 2007). 
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being written under the leadership of the CCP PD. The draft reached the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in October 1994,2 but to the 
disappointment of many people in the publishing industry, the law was shelved 
after three years of deliberation, and the “Regulations” were promulgated instead.3 
People with insight into the discussions surrounding the drafting process report 
that the leadership’s uneasiness with the formulation “publishing freedom” (chuban 
ziyou 出版自由) was the main reason for the long delay.4 Such a formulation 
invariably would have to be elaborated in a law, because publishing freedom had 
been written into the Chinese constitution in 1982.5 Yet the debate over the 
publishing law shows not only the CCP’s wariness of the discussions that the 
promulgation of such a law might bring about, but also the relative weakness of 
the government apparatus in a sensitive field such as the media that remained 
under tight control of the Party and its PD. With no law in place for publishing, a 
formal law for the news sector, a much more sensitive field, is even farther away. 
In the “Regulations for Publishing,” the ideological framework is to be found 
in paragraph three:6  
The publishing industry must uphold the general orientation of serving the people and 
serving socialism, uphold the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought and 
the theory of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics; it must disseminate 
and accumulate any science, technology, culture, and knowledge that is beneficial to 
raising the quality of the [Chinese] nation, beneficial to economic development and the 
overall social progress; it must promote the outstanding culture of the [Chinese] nation, 
encourage international cultural exchange, and enrich and raise the spiritual life of the 
people. 
 
While the second section of the paragraph expresses a number of more concrete 
ideas, the first sentence contains the core ideological principles. 
 
                                             
2 On the drafting process see Liu Gao. “Qidai chubanfa de dansheng” in Xinwen chuban bao, Jan. 
23, 1995. Repr. in Liu Gao chuban wenji. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1996, p. 551-52. In 
this article, Liu does still express his hope that the law might be passed soon. 
3 “Regulations” 条例 have a lower legal status than a “law” 法 and are usually a tool for the 
implementation of a law; while the latter must be passed by parliament (the National People’s 
Congress), regulations can be issued by the government. 
4 Interviewee 002, summer 2000. 
5 Article 35: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of 
assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” The Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (1982). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983, p. 32. 
6 “Chuban guanli tiaoli”, p. 230.  
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“Serving the people” (wei renmin fuwu 为人民服务) is the title of a speech 
given by Mao Zedong on Sept. 8, 1944. Mao spoke in commemoration of the 
soldier Zhang Side 张思德 who died in a collapsing coal pit, sacrificing himself for 
the people. In the article, Mao defines “serving the people” as “working entirely in 
the people’s interest.”7 Even death in an accident, such as that of soldier Zhang, is 
worthwhile: “To die for the interests of the people weighs heavier than even mount 
Tai.” Since the 1940s, serving the interests of the people has been elevated to the 
rank of the “basic task” (genben renwu 根本任务) of the Party press, as well as 
writers and artists. This basic task was defined as “the most fundamental 
behavioural norm of Communist ethics, the core of the proletarian world outlook 
and its outlook on life, and the basic aim of the party.”8 Mao’s article was said to be 
“an important textbook material for education in the proletarian revolutionary 
outlook on life;”9 during the Cultural Revolution, it became one of the three 
“constantly read articles” (lao san pian 老三篇). The interests of the people must of 
course be understood in the Leninist sense, that is, as the objective interests of 
the working class as identified by the professional revolutionaries in the Party. To 
“serve the people” thus simultaneously means to follow the leadership of the Party. 
Allegiance to the CCP was also the rationale behind the demand that media 
workers “serve socialism,” a formula that has been added customarily to the 
original “serving the people” since 1980.10 
Besides the “basic task,” the “Regulations for Publishing” define the official 
ideology: Marxism Leninism Mao-Zedong-Thought. The “theory of constructing 
socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been renamed “Deng Xiaoping theory” 
(Deng Xiaoping lilun 邓小平理论) after Deng’s death in 1998 and has more 
recently been complemented by the “important ideas of the Three Represents” 
                                             
7 Orig. pub. with an introduction in JFRB, Sept. 21, 1944. The text in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 3, p. 
1004-06, is slightly modified. The original title was “Wei renmin de liyi er si, shi si you zhong yu 
Taishan.” 
8 Such is the definition in Fan Ping, Ye Duchu (ed.). Dang de jianshe cidian. Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin chubanshe, 1989, p. 76. 
9 See the entry “Wei renmin fuwu” in Wang Jin (ed.). Mao Zedong dacidian. Nanning: Guangxi 
renmin chubanshe, 1992, p. 410. 
10 See Ma Weiliang. “Yingdang kandao zhe shi yige fazhan: dui wenyi wei renmin fuwu, wei 
shehuizhuyi fuwu kouhao de yi dian lijie” in Yalujiang 1982.9, p. 65-68. The new formula was 
promoted originally for the literature and arts field in an editorial in RMRB. “Wenyi wei renmin fuwu, 
wei shehuizhuyi fuwu” in RMRB, July 26, 1980. 
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(San ge daibiao zhongyao sixiang 三个代表重要思想), the shorthand for Jiang 
Zemin’s contribution to the canon of socialist theory. All these theoretical 
complexes are not static, but receive their validity through the authoritative 
interpretation of the Party centre, in accordance with changing circumstances and 
the needs of the day. The CCP’s monopoly on the interpretation of the official 
theory is a powerful means of ideological control in itself. 
Earlier documents for the publishing sector (and also for other fields within 
the propaganda xitong) contain basically the same ideological prescriptions. The 
“Provisional Regulations for the Work of Publishing Houses” (Chubanshe gongzuo 
zanxing tiaoli 出版社工作暂行条例), a CCP PD document dated April 22, 1980, 
defines the orientation (fangzhen 方针) and the task (renwu 任务) of publishing 
houses as follows: “Publishing houses must uphold the socialist road, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism 
Leninism Mao-Zedong-Thought; they must serve the people and serve 
socialism...”11 The first four items are known as the “four cardinal principles” (si 
xiang jiben yuanze 四项基本原则), promulgated by Deng Xiaoping in March 
1979.12 His speech “Uphold the four cardinal principles” was a direct reaction to 
the Democracy Wall movement of late 1978 and early 1979, and signalled the end 
of political relaxation and the reinstatement of control after a period of thaw. That 
the four cardinal principles were written into the 1980 document was a sign of the 
Party’s claim to determine the limits of publishing freedom and to exercise control 
over this area of public communication. 
This ideological framework has to be internalized by all media workers in 
the PRC. Different channels are employed for this purpose, such as regular study 
sessions, examinations, and the formal education of journalists. Journalists are 
supervised though multiple means; their adherence to the official ideology can be 
checked whenever the CCP decides to do so. This happened, for example, after 
the 1989 Democracy Movement, when journalists had joined the students’ 
demonstrations. The PD reacted with efforts to reassert control: in January 1991, 
the Chinese News Workers Association (Zhonghua quanguo xinwen gongzuozhe 
                                             
11 See Zhongguo chuban gongzuozhe xiehui (ed.). Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1980. Beijing: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1980, p. 624-28, here p. 624. 
12 See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (2nd ed.). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994, vol. 2, p. 158-84.  
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xiehui 中华全国新闻工作者协会) passed the “Chinese News Workers’ Code of 
Professional Ethics” that declared in the opening section:13 
The Chinese news sector [xinwen shiye 新闻事业] is an important integral part of the 
socialist cause [shehuizhuyi shiye 社会主义事业] under the leadership of the CCP. The 
news workers must adapt to the requirements of the new situation; they must make 
great efforts to propagate Marxism Leninism, Mao-Zedong-Thought, and comrade 
Deng Xiaoping’s theory of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics; they 
must propagate the orientation and the policies of Party and government, must report 
news and disseminate information, and must reflect and guide social discourse; they 
must strive hard to become the eyes and ears, the mouthpiece of Party and people; 
they must promote the Socialist market economy, the Socialist democratic legal system, 
and the construction of a Socialist spiritual civilization; they must exert themselves in 
the fight to realize the lofty goal of the Socialist modernization of our country. 
The news workers have faith in the Socialist news work, they must uphold the Party’s 
basic line, uphold the orientation of serving the people and serving socialism; they must 
liberate their thought and seek truth from facts; they must bring into full play the fine 
traditions and the fine working styles of the Party’s and the people’s news work; they 
must oppose money worship, hedonism, and extreme individualism, and must 
strengthen the cultivation of professional ethics. 
 
The preface to the “Code of Ethics” amounts to nothing less than a confession of 
faith in the political principles of the CCP. 
Even the most recent textbooks teach the ideological principles that are 
supposed to form the foundation of every journalist’s knowledge. The revised 
edition of Xinwen lilun jiaocheng 新闻理论教程, a textbook published in 2001 by 
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe 中国广播电视出版社, contains the 
following sections in the chapter on “The party character of the news sector”:14 
• “Ideologically, take the Party’s guiding ideology as the compass of the news 
sector, propagate the Party’s theoretical basis and ideological system;” 
• “Politically, maintain close unity with the Party centre, propagate the Party’s 
program and line, its orientation and policies;” 
• “Organizationally, follow the leadership of the Party, respect the Party’s 
organization principles and the discipline of propaganda.” 
The logic behind these demands is clear: “Upholding the principle of party 
character in news work is absolutely identical with our news work upholding [the 
demands of] serving the people, representing the interests of the people, and 
                                             
13 “Zhongguo xinwen gongzuozhe zhiye daode zhunze” 中国新闻工作者职业道德准则, in Hu 
Zhengrong. Xinwen lilun jiaocheng (xiuding ben). Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 
2001, p. 282-86, here p. 282. 
14 Hu Zhengrong. Xinwen lilun jiaocheng, p. 217-23. The author is a researcher at the Journalism 
school of Zhongguo renmin daxue 中国人民大学. 
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reflecting the voice of the people.”15 In the curriculum for young journalists, 
deference to the ideological framework is equated with Party control of the media - 
even in the twenty-first century.16  
 
 
The Institutions of Control 
Understandably, the CCP does not rely on the efficacy of the ideological 
framework alone to translate its claim for ultimate control into political reality. An 
institutional network that covers both the Party organization and that of the 
government, on both central and local levels, serves the purposes of policy 
formulation, administration of day-to-day affairs and planning, as well as control of 
all aspects of the propaganda sector. In chapter one, I have already addressed the 
question of the institutional set-up of this xitong, primarily in the pre-1949 era; I will 
therefore limit the discussion here to an outline of the broad institutional structures 
of control in the PRC. 
The divide between Party and government institutions has for long periods 
been of little more than theoretical nature. In the news sector, the most sensitive 
section of the propaganda xitong, government agencies existed only in the early 
1950s, and again since 1987. More institutional continuity can be observed for the 
field of publishing, but here too the importance of the respective Party bodies has 
always overshadowed that of the government bodies. In November 1949, the 
General Press Administration of the PRC (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xinwen 
zongshu 中华人民共和国新闻总署) and the PRC General Publication 
Administration (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chuban zongshu 中华人民共和国出
版总署) were set up. Both units worked under the Culture and Education 
Commission (Wenhua jiaoyu weiyuanhui 文化教育委员会) of the Government 
Administration Council (Zhengwuyuan 政务院), one of four such commissions 
                                             
15 Ibid., p. 223. 
16 Doubts are, of course, appropriate and even necessary as to the actual relevance of this 
ideological framework for journalism students and journalists in the twentieth century. Yet as has 
been said earlier, the CCP does still demand at least lip service from the journalists; if necessary, 
compliance can also be enforced by other, more coercive means. 
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created in 1949 as core cells of the government.17 The General Press 
Administration had jurisdiction over newspapers as well as over the Xinhua News 
Agency. 
While Hu Qiaomu was placed in charge of the General Press Administration, 
the General Publication Administration was headed by the veteran editor and 
journalist Hu Yuzhi 胡愈之.18 From the personnel decisions in 1949 it is clear that 
the General Press Administration was considered to be much more important than 
the General Publication Administration: in contrast to Hu Yuzhi, Hu Qiaomu was a 
Party heavyweight who was concurrently chief of RMRB (until late 1949) and held 
the post of a vice-head in the CCP PD; most importantly, he was the personal 
secretary of Mao Zedong.19 Moreover, it is not clear how much clout Hu Yuzhi had 
within his own Publication Administration. It seems that the important tasks, such 
as the unification of the Xinhua network, were overseen by a Party bureaucrat with 
long CCP-membership, Huang Luofeng 黄洛峰. Huang headed the 
Administration’s Publication Department and served concurrently as director of the 
CCP PD Publishing Committee. In late 1954, when the General Publication 
Administration was abolished, he became head of the Administrative Department 
for Publication Affairs (Chuban guanli ju 出版管理局) under the Ministry of Culture; 
Hu Yuzhi, in contrast, was given purely representative posts. 
Faster than any other industry, the news sector was transformed: by early 
1952, all existing newspapers had a cooperative ownership structure, with private 
shares being reduced quickly; the need for management by a government organ 
thus did no longer exist. Consequently, the General Press Administration was 
abolished in February 1952. Newspapers were henceforth administered directly by 
the units publishing them (the CC, local Party committees, government ministries, 
                                             
17 For the evolution of these institutions see the chart in Liu Gao, Shi Feng (ed.). Xin Zhongguo 
chuban wushi nian jishi. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1999, p. 395-7. See also Zhonggong 
zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhongyang 
dang’anguan, 2000. 
18 Hu Yuzhi was a member of the China Democratic League, one of the “democratic parties” in the 
coalition government led by the CCP; he was appointed to the General Publication Administration 
as a League member. However, Hu had been a secret CCP member since at least the 1940s, 
although he never held a formal Party position. 
19 Hu’s informal influence was much greater than his formal posts suggest. No decision in the PD 
could pass without his consent. Lu Dingyi, nominally the PD head and thus senior to Hu, admitted 
three decades later that he was isolated in the institution formally under his command, and that Hu 
Qiaomu usually acted as he pleased. See Chen Qingquan, Song Guangwei. Lu Dingyi zhuan. 
Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi chubanshe, 1999, p. 376-78. 
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etc.) and were instructed by the CCP PD. The Xinhua News Agency became a 
unit directly under the Culture and Education Commission of the State Council. 
After the dissolution of the General Press Administration, the Party institutions, 
namely the PD, assumed direct responsibility – and control.20 No organ in the 
government hierarchy responsible for supervision of the press was restored until 
the establishment in 1987 of the PRC Press and Publication Administration 
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xinwen chuban shu 中华人民共和国新闻出版署, 
hereafter PPA). 
Government organs continued to exist for the less sensitive publication 
sector, albeit with significantly reduced staff numbers21 and changing allegiances: 
bodies with different names existed sometimes directly under the State Council, 
sometimes under the Ministry of Culture.22 Here, too, the decision-making power 
was monopolized by the respective bureau of the CCP PD. In general, the division 
of labour between Party and government bodies in the media sector (as in most 
other political sectors) saw to it that the government organs were concerned with 
administrative tasks and with the coordination of planning, while the Party organs 
(especially the PD) were responsible for policy formulation and decision making. 
Only with the establishment of the PPA in 1987, a government body was 
again given responsibility in the news sector, a result of the commercialization of 
the newspaper market which caused the administrative workload to explode. 
Although officials denied this, a more immediate reason for the decision to set up a 
new administrative body under the State Council might have been the campaign 
against “bourgeois liberalization,” during which pressure on the media was greatly 
increased.23 The PPA finally brought institutional continuity to a notoriously volatile 
                                             
20 Compare the argumentation in Sun Xupei in: “Jiefang chuqi dui jiu xinwen shiye de jieshou he 
gaizao” in Xinwen yanjiu ziliao 43 (1988), p. 48-61, here p. 61 
21 Information on staff numbers of Chinese Party and government organs is generally scarce. The 
General Publication Administration started with 278 cadres that remained relatively constant until 
1957, when staff was reduced sharply to 21. Only after the Cultural Revolution, the number of 
cadres in the bodies responsible for the publishing sector reached 100 again. For these numbers 
see “Dangdai Zhongguo” congshu bianjibu (ed.). Dangdai Zhongguo de chuban shiye. Beijing: 
Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993, 3 vols., here vol. 2, p. 500, vol. 3, p. 94-95. The Propaganda 
Department had about 130 cadres in early 1950; numbers varied between 200 and 400 in the 
period before 1966. See Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 9, p. 62f. 
22 For these developments see Liu Gao, Shi Feng. Xin Zhongguo chuban wushi nian jishi. passim. 
23 See the interview with Liu Gao 刘杲, the vice-head of the new institution, in “Publishing: Unified 
Management” in Beijing Review 21, May 25, 1987, p. 14-17. Liu was quoted saying “China now 
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sector. Its real institutional power, however, must be questioned: as a body of only 
vice-ministerial rank, the PPA had to succumb to the much more powerful PD in 
many a conflict, such as in the case of the shelved publishing law.24 Yet in recent 
years the PD has devolved an increasing degree of its workload to the PPA, which 
was thus able to bolster its clout.25 Through its regulatory mechanisms, the PPA 
wields considerable bureaucratic power over its specific sector of the media 
sector.26 
While the PPA is responsible for general coordination, it supervises directly 
only a small number of central-level newspapers, periodicals, and publishing 
houses. The vast number of media fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial 
governments and Party committees. The administrative structure of the central 
level is reduplicated in the provinces: the provincial Party committees (shengwei 
省委) have their own propaganda departments with subordinated bureaus in 
charge of press and publishing, and since the late 1980s most provincial 
governments have established a “press and publication bureau” (xinwen chuban ju 
新闻出版局), to act as the equivalent of the PPA. The local bodies usually answer 
to the provincial committees and governments, respectively, but in important 
questions they may receive direct orders from the Central PD or the PPA.27 
The administration of radio and television lies with the Ministry of Radio, 
Film, and Television (Guangbo dianying dianshi bu 广播电影电视部).28 A 
Broadcasting Bureau (Guangbo shiye ju 广播事业局) had existed since the early 
1950s, first under the General Press Administration, and later directly under the 
State Council. The CCP PD has had a Newspaper and Broadcasting Bureau 
                                                                                                                                      
publishes 1574 newspapers, 5248 periodicals and has 446 publishing houses. The many units and 
the resulting problems call for the establishment of a department of unified management.” (p. 14). 
24 PPA vice-head Liu Gao played a decisive role in the drafting process. 
25 Daniel Lynch speaks of the PPA as a “bureaucratically weak” institution. This judgment must be 
qualified with regard to its growing influence. See After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and 
‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 35. 
26 The PPA actively participates, for example, in China’s censorship regime. For one recent 
intervention see “You don’t say: China forbids seven types of content” at China OnlineNews, Aug. 
13, 2001, at http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/010813/1/c01080805.asp (printout Aug. 20, 
2001). 
27 The closure of many a local newspaper or periodical has come only after intense pressure from 
Beijing. Local governments often hesitate to take such steps on their own initiative (in part also 
because they have financial stakes in the businesses in question). 
28 In March 1998, the Ministry was downgraded into a General Bureau of Radio, Film, and 
Television (Guangbo dianying dianshi zongju 广播电影电视总局) under the State Council. On the 
institutional arrangements see Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 16, p. 870-73. 
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(Baozhi guangbo chu 报纸广播处) since 1951; the division of labour – policy 
formulation and control by the Party body, administrative affairs by the ministry – 
works similar to the procedures in the press and publication sectors. The new 
media, and especially the Internet, are managed by the Ministry of Information 
Industry (Xinxi chanye bu 信息产业部) that was set up in 1998 – after a long 
impasse – through the merger of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
(Youdian bu 邮电部) and the Ministry of Electronics Industry (Dianzi chanye bu 电
子产业部).29 Information on the Party’s organizational answer to the new 
developments in the media sector is insufficient, but given the parallel structure in 
the other areas of the propaganda xitong, it is likely that some kind of body has 
been set up to deal with the area of competence covered by the Ministry of 
Information Industry, presumably under the PD. 
In recent years many administrative tasks, and especially the regulation of 
the personnel in the media sector, have been devolved to a number of 
professional associations, such as the Association of Chinese Publication Workers 
(Zhongguo chuban gongzuozhe xiehui 中国出版工作者协会), the Chinese News 
Workers Association, and the Chinese Editors’ Association (Zhongguo bianji xiehui 
中国编辑协会). These moves are a reflection of the CCP’s shifting approach to 
governance. While in some cases, mostly on the local level, the professional 
associations have succeeded in actually speaking out on behalf of their members, 
which is their nominal task, most associations still function as the transmission belt 
of the Party’s policies and thus regulate rather than represent their members.30 
Finally, the PLA has its own network of media; these are beyond the control 
of the Party or state organs; they are overseen by the Propaganda Department of 
the PLA’s General Political Department (Zong zhengzhi bu 总政治部). 
Newspapers like Jiefangjun bao 解放军报, and the PLA-owned Jiefangjun 
chubanshe 解放军出版社 are thus removed from civilian control.31 
                                             
29 See Eric Harwit, Duncan Clark. “Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political Control over 
Network Infrastructure and Content” in Asian Survey XLI.3 (2001), p. 377-408, here p. 387. I will 
have more to say on this issue in chapter nine. 
30 See Kenneth W. Foster. “Embedded within State Agencies: Business Associations in Yantai” in 
The China Journal 47 (2002), p. 41-65. 
31 Little information is available on the PLA media. For a list of the PLA’s publications and 
broadcast media and their administration see Zhongguo da baike quanshu – Junshi: Zhongguo 
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To sum up, a network of institutions in charge of administration and control 
of China’s media sector covers the entire political landscape of the PRC on both 
central and local levels. Organs in the government hierarchy are duplicated by 
equivalent agencies in the Party structure. In theory, the Party and government 
networks are supposed to practice division of labour, yet in practice the Party 
bureaus and departments in charge of the media sector have been clearly in the 
dominant position. The bureaucratic network is the most visible form of 
institutionalization of the Party’s claim to control the media, yet not the only one: 
other, less obvious mechanisms have proved equally efficient.  
 
 
Bureaucratic Regulation of the Market 
Organizationally, the Chinese media sector is controlled by the propaganda 
authorities; further constraints come from a number of bureaucratic guidelines and 
regulations that have been put in place to control both the access to the sector and 
the behaviour of players in the market. 
Restrictions on market access are an important means of control. While the 
Chinese constitution grants publishing freedom, any new publishing house, journal, 
or newspaper needs approval from the propaganda authorities – even in the 
publishing sector, which is much less sensitive than, for example, the news or 
broadcasting sectors. While these procedures are supposed to be a mere 
bureaucratic routine, the approval of publishing units does in fact provide the PPA 
with enormous sanctioning power. The hurdles for setting up publishing houses, 
for instance, are high. According to the 1997 “Regulations for Publishing,”32 
(a) [the unit shall] have a designation as a publishing unit and a statute; 
(b) it shall have a sponsor unit and a necessary responsible higher-level organ in 
accordance with the requirements of the executive organs for publishing of the State 
Council; 
(c) it shall have a distinctive scope of business; 
(d) it shall have a registered capital of at least 300.000 RMB; 
(e) it shall have a permanent place of work; 
(f) it shall have an organizational structure meeting the needs of the business scope, as 
well as professional editing and publishing staff in conformity with the national 
professional standards. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1987 (for internal 
circulation). 
32 “Chuban guanli tiaoli” (enacted Jan. 2, 1997) in Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998, p. 230. 
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Of the above, especially point (b) is crucial, as it effectively bars individuals or non-
state units without connections to a recognized unit (danwei 单位) that can serve 
as “necessary guarantor” from setting up publishing houses. Only ministries and 
mass organizations and their subdivisions, and wholly state-owned enterprises are 
recognized as “guarantors” and fulfil the requirements of the PPA.33 
Yet the above list contains merely the preconditions for an application for a 
publishing license; once the publisher applies, double approval is necessary from 
local and central organs of publication administration, as well as from the local 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce 工商局.34 Taken together, these procedures 
and requirements provide the authorities with ample opportunity to block 
unwelcome entrants into the publishing business. As a last resort the PPA may 
even refuse approval with reference to article 9 of the “Regulations:” “The 
executive organs for publishing of the State Council formulate the plan for the total 
number, structure and distribution of all publishing units in China, and guide and 
harmonize the development of the publishing business.”35 This requirement indeed 
has a highly manipulative character, as the PPA may argue that the total quota of 
its “plan” has already been filled up, or that the geographical distribution of 
publishing houses is too uneven. 
The bureaucratic registration procedures for publishing houses or journals 
are not at all a one time affair. There are different circumstances under which 
publishing houses must seek renewal of their licenses, the most common reason 
being the amendment of any of the items mentioned in the original application: “If 
publishing units change their name, their host unit or their necessary responsible 
higher-level organ, their scope of business, if they merge or split, or if they publish 
new newspapers or journals, or if the newspapers or journals change names or 
numbers of issues per year, the publishing units shall go once more through the 
application procedure laid out in nos. 11 and 12 of these regulations.”36 Journals 
are thus hit even harder than publishing houses, as almost any changes must be 
                                             
33 See further “Chubanshe nian jian dengji zhidu” (dated July 27, 1994) in Zhongguo chuban 
nianjian 1995, p. 278. 
34 See “Chuban guanli tiaoli,” article 11, in Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998, p. 230. In the Soviet 
Union, bureaucratic procedures were even more complicated and new publishing houses had to 
get their licenses approved from the Central Committee. See Gregory Walker. Soviet Book 
Publishing Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 19-20. 
35 “Chuban guanli tiaoli” in Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998, p. 230. 
36 Ibid. 
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reported, and in many cases new licenses must be applied for.37 Renewal of 
licenses can also become necessary for other reasons – such as stipulated in the 
concluding article 56 of the 1997 “Regulations” which, without citing further 
reasons, requires all existing publishing units to undergo new registration within a 
specified time after the “Regulations” come into effect. 
Besides bureaucratic harassment, the PPA can resort to measures of direct 
market manipulation: subsidies and other forms of logistic support can be justified 
by the state’s “responsibility” towards the publishing sector. In this respect the five-
year plans play a special role: generous funds are handed out for mostly large-
scale publication projects initiated by the government. In the 1980s, some 
publishers even started to mention support they had received for official five year 
plan projects in the imprint of the subsidized books. 
Neither subsidization of publications nor restrictions on market access have 
been reduced after China joined the World Trade Organization: under the terms of 
the accession protocol, foreign enterprises are barred from investing in enterprises 
of the media sector. The single exception concerns book distribution, where 
wholesale and retail markets were opened gradually to foreigners in 2001 and 
2003.38 Distribution, however, must be considered the least sensitive element in 
the publishing chain. The CCP has effectively abolished the Xinhua bookstore’s 
monopoly in the retail sector in the 1980s, and retail – at least in the urban centres 
– has been firmly in the hands of non-state entrepreneurs since the 1990s. Xinhua 
only began to withdraw from its monopoly in wholesale distribution of books when 
China was granted WTO membership. Once a powerful mechanism to steer the 
nationwide availability of books, the Xinhua monopoly is no longer considered to 
be of crucial importance for the efforts to uphold Party control of the sector. 
One more measure to control the market of publications is the 
administration of International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN) and International 
Standard Serial Numbers (ISSN) that have replaced the Chinese national book 
numbers since 1987. Numbers are centrally controlled and are handed out by the 
provincial Press and Publication Bureaus for books listed in publication plans 
                                             
37 See also “Qikan guanli dengji zanxing guiding” (dated Nov. 24, 1988) in Zhongguo chuban 
nianjian 1989, p. 54-56, article 14 
38 On the conditions for the media sector of China’s WTO accession see the “US-China Bilateral 
Market Access Agreement (March 14, 2000),” p. 198, 200 at 
http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/market/183-203.pdf (downloaded July 15, 2003).  
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which the publishing houses must report in advance; this means that only titles 
that have been approved will receive a standard number. Since all Chinese books 
and journals must bear an ISBN or ISSN,39 the control of book numbers is a key 
instrument of publication control.40 The strict control over standard numbers has 
produced a lucrative market for the sale of book numbers that has become a 
chronic problem of the Chinese publishing sector. Even respected publishers are 
reported to engage in this highly profitable business (they sell numbers for up to 
100.000 RMB), all efforts of the publishing authorities notwithstanding.41 
Occasionally, ISBNs are also stolen and simply attached to illegally produced 
books. Theft and sale of book numbers provide avenues for illegal publishing 
activities in China, mostly for pirated editions. Publishers caught selling book 
numbers, however, are subject to heavy penalties; Chinese regulations outlaw not 
only the sale of ISBNs, but also the trade of items produced in such a way, thus 
trying to create counterincentives.42 Yet while the sale of book numbers provides 
access to publishing opportunities for individuals and units not formally registered 
as publishers, this does not mean that anything whatsoever can be published: the 
original owner of the number must avoid trouble and therefore would be willing to 
lend its name only to the more inconspicuous publishing projects. Selling book 
numbers is thus mainly a regulatory problem; publications grossly violating the 
political interests of the central state are unlikely to appear with illegally traded 
numbers. The reason why the problem has never been solved satisfactorily might 
lie herein – and not in a general breakdown of central control.43 Since the sale of 
book numbers poses no immediate danger to the Party’s control of public 
                                             
39 Exempted from this regulation are publications for internal distribution (see below). 
40 Control over ISSNs is much tighter than that of ISBNs. For this reason, some periodicals, such 
as the journal Xueren 学人, founded in 1991, have resorted to the measure of declaring themselves 
a book series and attaching a new ISBN to each issue. Another reason for such steps are, of 
course, the considerably lower fees for ISBNs. 
41 An embarrassing case was exposed in 2004, when Zhongguo qingnian bao revealed that the 
respected Sanlian shudian had sold ISBNs on a massive scale. “Baowei Sanlian shudian,” in 
Zhongguo qingnianbao, 02 June 2004. 
42 Numerous regulations deal with the issue of selling ISBNs, such as “Zhonggong zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu, Xinwen chubanshu guanyu jinzhi ‘maimai shuhao’ de tongzhi” in RMRB, Oct. 29, 
1993. Selling book numbers is also addressed in the 1997 “Regulations” (article 48). Interviewees 
111 and 113 were discussing the issue of selling ISBNs with the author. See also Lynch. After the 
Propaganda State, p. 205-08; and Kong Shuyu. Consuming Literature: Best Sellers and the 
Commercialization of Literary Production in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005, p. 65-77, 90-92. For a different account see Wu Haimin. Shuhao mofang: chubanzhe 
de manxing zisha. Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1995. 
43 Such is the argument in ibid. 
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communication, it is handled as an affair of secondary importance, notwithstanding 
the number of decrees issued time and again but implemented only half-heartedly. 
The CCP relies on other mechanisms to secure control of the media sector, such 
as the control of information flow and information access.  
 
 
Control of Information Flow 
The CCP intervenes to control the flow of information. Information carried in 
the media is fragmented and classified into different categories of sensitivity. 
During the first three decades of the PRC, the distribution of information was very 
tightly regulated. Many of these constraints have been loosened since the early 
1980s, yet factors such as globalization, commercialization, and pluralization have 
not led to a significant erosion of the government’s grip on the media.44 To the 
contrary, the CCP has demonstrated repeatedly that it is fully capable to enforce 
compliance of the media across the nation. 
Since the 1980s, the Party has shifted towards a model of negative 
exclusion to determine the handling of media content: media contents are no 
longer prescribed, rather, the media are forbidden to venture into a small number 
of sensitive core areas without approval from the Party. These areas include 
foreign news and foreign affairs, as well as important national political events, 
such as Party congresses. While both national and regional newspapers in the 
PRC are comparatively free to select their sources for coverage of most domestic 
events, the sole legal source of foreign news is the Xinhua News Agency.45 Xinhua 
has retained its monopoly on international news even in the 21st century: Chinese 
domestic media are forbidden to send correspondents abroad or to purchase 
reports from foreign news agencies.46 Exceptions may be made for events of a 
non-political nature, such as major sports events.47 These are, however, the 
                                             
44 These three factors are assessed in Daniel Lynch. After the Propaganda State.  
45 I have seen no document confirming this point. Information from interviewee 002, summer 2000. 
A reading of various Chinese newspapers from different periods supports the existence of such a 
guideline. 
46 The Hong Kong Mingbao reported that in the run-up to the 16th Party Congress, the PD issued a 
circular explicitly forbidding the media to use international news files from Western news agencies. 
See http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/2/6/21/n197672.htm (downloaded July 12, 2003). 
47 The Internet portal Sina.com obtained a permission in 1998 to send reporters to cover the soccer 
World Cup in France, and again to the Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000. Both events were a 
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exception to the rule and rather serve to underline the strictness of the 
enforcement of Xinhua’s monopoly. 
Chinese media institutions are also not allowed to cover domestic events 
related to foreign affairs, such as visits by foreign heads of state. Xinhua 
exclusively covers all state events – not only those related to foreign affairs (where 
diplomatic issues are at stake), but also high-profile domestic events, such as the 
meetings and congresses of the CCP. For such special events, Xinhua does not 
only provide newspapers and local TV stations with reports, but delivers complete 
packages, including articles, photographs, interviews, and commentary. These 
packages must be run by the local papers in their entirety, with little or no leeway 
for changes or alterations. An especially drastic case were the newspapers of 
November 16, 2002: on the morning after the closing ceremony of the important 
16th Party Congress that saw the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu 
Jintao 胡锦涛, all papers across the nation appeared with identical front pages: 
reports, commentary, and photographs were arranged in identical manner; 
apparently even the page layout had been dictated by Beijing.48 
While the above is an outstanding case, interventions of the authorities into 
seemingly technical questions of newspaper production such as page layout are 
common. In 1997 RMRB published a large illustrated volume entitled Handbook 
on the People’s Daily’s Layout.49 The volume contains reproductions of the 
People’s Daily’s pages, classified according to important recurring subjects such 
as Party congresses, major celebrations etc., each with a short description, 
summing up the points that require attention. The aim of the book, as stated in the 
foreword, is “to provide our sister publications with reference material” on how to 
report on major issues.50 In this way, other newspaper editors may check on how 
to report on Labour Day parades, the anniversary of the victory in the anti-
Japanese war, or the death of a Politburo member; they may find not just 
information on how to arrange articles and photographs, but even 
                                                                                                                                      
major factor in Sina’s rise to become China’s most popular web portal. Information from 
Interviewee 204, September 2002. 
48 See John Gittings. “New China Uses Old Tactics” in The Observer, November 17, 2002. 
49 Renmin ribao bianjibu (ed.). Renmin ribao banmian beiyao. Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 
1997. For an updated version see Wang Wulu (ed.). Shisi da yilai Renmin ribao banmian yanjiu. 
Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei daxue chubanshe, 2006. 
50 Ibid., p. (i). 
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recommendations concerning the appropriate typeface.51 Even layout is thus not 
left to the editors’ discretion, but is subject to instructions that classify and channel 
information according to rules agreed upon centrally. 
So what precisely are the areas defined as sensitive, where is the line that 
journalists must not cross? A circular issued by the PPA in August 2001 lists 
seven areas that are off-limits. Content is forbidden if it:52 
1. negates the guiding role of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong [thought] and Deng 
Xiaoping’s theories; 
2. goes against the guiding principles, official line or policies of the Communist Party; 
3. discloses state secrets, endangers national security or harms the interests of the 
state; 
4. violates state policies towards minorities and religion, endangers national unity or 
affects social stability; 
5. propagates murder, violence, lewdness, superstition and pseudo-science; content 
that guides people in the wrong direction, is vulgar or low; 
6. spreads rumours, false news or otherwise interferes with the work of the Party or 
government; or 
7. violates Party propaganda discipline or the government regulations on publishing 
or advertising. 
 
The formulations for the above items are held intentionally vague, so as to allow 
the CCP to intervene and to ban almost any article published or any programme 
aired. Yet only seldom does the CCP in fact make use of its powers. This is not a 
sign of weakness or loss of control, as has been suggested by some observers,53 
but rather lies in the nature of the Party’s approach to control: the CCP tries to 
secure veto powers, but uses them only if it feels that its interests are at stake.54 
Under normal circumstances, the mere existence of these veto powers suffices to 
generate pre-emptive self-censorship, a point I will return to later in this chapter. 
Drastic action was considered necessary, for example, in August 2000, 
when the Yuanhua 远华 smuggling and corruption case was scheduled to go 
before the courts. On trial were over 200 officials and entrepreneurs, mostly from 
the city of Xiamen 厦门 in Fujian province. The charges in this largest-ever case of 
corruption and economic crime in the PRC concerned the smuggling of thousands 
                                             
51 Ibid., p. 13. 
52 “You don’t say” at China OnlineNews, Aug. 13, 2001. Similar catalogues have been issued 
earlier. See, for example, “Baozhi guanli zanxing guiding” (dated Dec. 25, 1990; issued by the PPA) 
in Xinwen chubanshu zhengce fagui si (ed.). Zhongguo xinwen chuban fagui jianming shiyong 
shouce, 1949-1994. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1996, p. 17. 
53 Daniel Lynch speaks of a “serious reduction in the Chinese central party-state’s ability to control 
thought work or public communications flows.” After the Propaganda State, p. 224. 
54 I will come back to this interpretation in chapters eight and nine. 
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of passenger vehicles and several million barrels of crude oil into China, next to 
numerous other charges. The total value of the case was estimated at about 500 
billion RMB (over 50 billion dollar). Staggering as this sum might be, even more 
embarrassing were the ranks of the officials involved: they included a vice-minister 
of the Ministry of Public Security, the head and vice-head of the Chinese Customs 
Administration (Haiguan zongshu 海关总署), as well as numerous high-level 
cadres in Fujian province and Xiamen city. With ministry-level cadres in Beijing 
involved, the case had the potential to seriously damage the prestige of the CCP 
in the eyes of the Chinese population as well as abroad. When the Yuanhua case 
went before the courts, news releases were tightly controlled by the Xinhua news 
agency. To limit the “negative impact,”55 the PD issued a notice banning all 
publishing houses and film production companies from producing books or films 
relating to the case. It was not until a year later that a semi-fictional account of the 
case appeared. Storm: The Facts Behind Investigating the Huge Xiamen 
Corruption Case belongs to the genre of reportage literature (baogao wenxue 报告
文学) and was written by a collective of eight authors.56 The book was published 
by the renowned Beijing publisher Zuojia chubanshe 作家出版社 that apparently 
had received permission to publish the official Chinese account of the case and 
the trial – such a move had become necessary after a sensational book on the 
same topic had appeared in Hong Kong from where it could easily be smuggled 
into the mainland.57 The text of the PRC book was closely scrutinized by the 
authorities. The staggering initial print run of 200,000 copies demonstrates the 
interest of the public in the case even a year after the trial produced headlines and 
explains why the PD had tried to suppress any unofficial accounts. 
The CCP’s efforts to control the flow of information, however, can backfire. 
This happened when the government tried to cover up the real dimension of the 
SARS epidemic in spring 2003 so as not to derail the annual session of the NPC, 
where the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao was to be 
                                             
55 See “China Bans Books, Films Dealing with Upcoming Xiamen Smuggling Case” by BBC 
Monitoring, via Hong Kong iMail website, Aug. 11, 2000 (printed Aug. 20, 2001). 
56 Zhang Xianhua et al. Fengbao: Chachu Xiamen teda zousi an jishi. Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 
2001. 
57 Sheng Xue. ‘Yuanhua an’ heimu. Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe, 2001. This book hit the 
markets in June, the Zuojia chubanshe volume followed in September. 
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completed. In the run-up to the NPC session, information of any kind was tightly 
controlled, and the numbers of infections in Guangdong and Beijing, the most-
affected areas, were systematically underreported. The government finally broke 
the silence on April 20 and admitted the real amount of the epidemic. This abrupt 
turn had been triggered by two events: firstly, criticism of the Chinese 
government’s handling of the crisis and doubts about the numbers officially 
released were mounting in the foreign press and had begun to filter into China; 
further denial would thus damage the credibility of the Party both internationally 
and at home. Secondly, some of the most courageous newspapers in Guangdong 
province had broken the silence imposed on them, and information was then 
passed on quickly throughout the country by text messaging on mobile phones.58 
As later analyses showed, the government’s tight control of the information flow in 
the media had greatly aggravated the situation and prevented local authorities 
from adopting early quarantine measures to rein in the spread of the disease.59 In 
turn, only an apology to the public, and frankness on the side of the government, 
which promised a more liberal information regime, helped to set in motion a 
national emergency that finally brought the disease under control. More openness 
and growing freedom of information as a result of the crisis, as predicted by some 
observers, however, did not materialize – to the contrary: public apologies were 
one thing, violations of media discipline another. Soon after the crisis, the editor-in-
chief of Nanfang zhoumo was fired and was replaced with none other than the 
head of the Guangdong provincial PD, the very official who was responsible in the 
first place for the suppression of information in Guangdong, from where the 
epidemic had started.60 On another note, Shiji shalong 世纪沙龙, one of the most 
popular Internet chatrooms visited mostly by intellectuals was forced to close for 
more than a week during the height of the crisis.61 The logic behind these moves is 
                                             
58 See John Pomfret. “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening” in Washington Post, May 13, 2003. 
See also Ernest Zhang and Kenneth Fleming. “Examination of Characteristics of News Media 
under Censorship: A Content Analysis of Selected Chinese Newspapers' SARS coverage,” in 
Asian Journal of Communication 15.3 (2005), p. 319-339; and Zhang, Xiaoling. “Reading Between 
the Headlines: SARS, Focus and TV Current Affairs Programmes in China,” in Media, Culture, and 
Society 28.5 (2006), p. 715-37. 
59 See Nailene Chou Wiest. “New Page Opens on the Road to Media Reform” in South China 
Morning Post, May 20, 2003. 
60 See Minxin Pei. “Don’t Hold Your Breath for Openness in China” in Financial Times, May 7. 2003. 
61 This step is discussed by two articles on another website: 
http://www.sinoliberal.com/note/qiufeng%20on%20century%20salon%20shut.htm and 
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not difficult to understand: the government did promise more openness, quicker 
and more reliable information in cases of national emergency. This does not mean, 
however, that the media themselves can decide on the flow of information. The 
ultimate power to decide on the timing and the amount of information to be 
released lies nowhere else than with the CCP. This logic refers directly to the 
media concept that is applied in the twenty-first century just as it was sixty years 
earlier in the Yan’an era. 
 
 
Control of Information Access 
The observations of the previous section must be qualified in one important 
respect. The ban on certain kinds of content does not mean that this information is 
not available at all. It is withheld from most of the population only. Party members 
or high-level cadres may receive briefings on important issues not (or not yet) 
discussed publicly in the press; they might also have access to more or more 
detailed information on certain topics than the rest of the people. In general, the 
amount and the quality of information one can access in the PRC is tied to one’s 
status. It might therefore be more adequate to speak of a multi-layered public 
sphere, or even of several concentric public spheres, than of “the” Chinese public 
sphere.62 
Control of information access in the PRC is as tightly reglemented as 
control of the information flows. The most conspicuous sign of the segregation of 
information is the distinction between “openly available” (gongkai 公开) and 
“restricted access” or “internal” (neibu 内部) publications (newspapers, journals, 
books).63 These two categories of publications serve fundamentally different 
purposes. 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.sinoliberal.com/academic/nanshui%20on%20century%20salon%20shut.htm 
(downloaded July 12, 2003). 
62 Such public spheres have little in common with the Habermasian public sphere. As explained in 
chapter one, I do not consider the model developed by Habermas as very helpful in contexts like 
the PRC. The public sphere here is rather a space of public communication where the state is one 
player. 
63 I have never heard of an equivalent for the Internet, such as a neibu net (as distinct from local 
area networks (LAN) that are password-protected and accessible only by specified groups). 
Chinese interviewees were unable to tell me if there have been any efforts to establish, for example, 
a protected network for medium- and high-level cadres. 
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Internal publications had been distributed since the Yan’an era. Publications 
so classified usually bear an imprint reading “for internal distribution” (neibu faxing 
内部发行).64 As a rule, such publications are not openly sold, but distributed to 
work units; until the 1980s, in the larger cities there were also entire bookstores or 
specialized sections of bookstores where internal material was sold to anyone who 
could identify himself as having the permission to do so.65 Specialized legislation 
has been put in place to regulate the publication of neibu materials.66 
However, it would be a simplification to think of Chinese publications in 
dualistic gongkai / neibu terms. Instead, the logic of the system creates a hierarchy 
of information access with many finely tuned layers. Measured by the amount of 
information that can be legally accessed, foreigners can be found at the bottom of 
these levels: until very recently, many pieces of information available to ordinary 
Chinese were withheld from the eyes of foreigners both abroad and in China. 
Publications that can not be exported are classified “for domestic distribution only” 
(xian guonei faxing 限国内发行). Until recently, books designated in this way were 
openly available (gongkai) in China, but were not sold to foreigners. Among these 
publications is Cankao xiaoxi 参考消息, which is – surprisingly – China’s largest 
circulation daily.67 As a result, until very recently, not a single library outside China 
had any significant holdings68 of a newspaper that reached over four million  
Chinese readers (more than even RMRB).69 Since its establishment the paper had 
been a neibu publication;70 it’s “range of distribution” (faxing fanwei 发行范围) has 
                                             
64 Some useful information can be obtained in Flemming Christiansen. “The Neibu Bibliography: A 
Review Article” in CCP Research Newsletter 4 (1989-90), p. 13-19. 
65 See Harald Richter. Publishing in the People’s Republic of China: Personal Observations of a 
Foreign Student, 1975-1977. Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1978, p. 15-16; 38-39. 
66 See “Neibu baokan guanli yuanze” (issued by the PPA, May 16, 1990) in Xingzhengyuan dalu 
weiyuanhui. Dalu dazhong chuanbo fagui huibian. Taibei: Xingzhengyuan dalu weiyuanhui, 1996, p. 
39-41. 
67 On Cankao xiaoxi see Henry G. Schwarz. “The Ts’an-k’ao Hsiao-hsi: How Well Informed are 
Chinese Officials About the Outside World?” in China Quarterly 27 (1966), p. 54-83.  
68 An electronic edition covering the years from 1957 through 1998 is now available. 
69 Some selected circulation figures (in millions): 
Year 1984 1989 1993 1999 
参考消息 4.79 3,34 3,80 2,80 
人民日报 4,30 2,90 2,79 1,92 
新民晚报（上海） 1,51 1,18 1,67 1,40 
羊城晚报（广州） 1.64 0,99 1,20 1,30 
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been extended twice in 1957 and 1971 and finally included all Party cadres, as the 
large circulation figures in 1984 suggest.71 It was only in January 1985 that 
Cankao xiaoxi was re-classified as “for domestic distribution.” Ordinary neibu 
publications can reach surprisingly high print runs.72 
Cankao xiaoxi is composed entirely of clippings from foreign newspapers 
and news agency dispatches that are translated usually unabridged and 
uncommented. One focus of the paper is the portrayal of the PRC in the foreign 
(including Taiwan and Hong Kong) news media, but it also contains all kinds of 
other information, in particular items concerning the United States and other non-
socialist nations that for many years appeared only rarely in the official Chinese 
press. While RMRB usually relies on the Xinhua News Agency as the source of its 
news, Cankao xiaoxi draws heavily upon foreign news agencies. The paper thus 
has a style very different from other Chinese media and, typical for restricted 
distribution media, provides the readers with “undigested” information, creating a 
much more diversified image of the outside world.73 This supply of foreign public 
opinion would eclipse the Xinhua monopoly if it was not news agency itself that 
compiles and publishes the paper. 
Xinhua is not simply the main source of news articles for other papers; its 
functions are much more comprehensive. It is the main provider of domestic and 
foreign intelligence to the Chinese leadership. Xinhua compiles three other 
important internal publications: Cankao ziliao 参考资料, Neibu cankao 内部参考, 
                                                                                                                                      
Sources: Zhongguo xinwen nianjian she (ed.). Zhongguo xinwen nianjian 1985, 1990, 1993, 1999. 
Beijing: Zhongguo xinwen nianjian she. The numbers of 8-25 million given in Lynch. After the 
Propaganda State, p. 133-34, seem exaggerated and come from a little reliable source. 
70 Chinese sources (such as the entry “Cankao xiaoxi” in Zhongguo da bai ke quanshu: Xinwen 
chuban juan, p. 52) give 1948 as the date for the establishment of Cankao xiaoxi; however, the 
Harvard-Yenching library has a significant collection of Cankao xiaoxi issues from June 1944 to 
Nov. 1945. The issues are compiled jointly by Jiefang ribao and Xinhua she and carry the notice 
“for reference only” (zhi gong cankao). The Harvard-Yenching collection starts with issue 452, 
suggesting that publication had started at least a year earlier, i.e. in early 1943. Repr. Guangxi 
shifan daxue chubanshe (ed). Cankao xiaoxi, 1944.6-1945.11. Guilin: Guangxi shifan dxue 
chubanshe, 2006. 
71 “Cankao xiaoxi” in Zhongguo da bai ke quanshu: Xinwen chuban juan, p. 52. 
72 A neibu volume with lectures on current affairs compiled by the Central Party School was 
published in April 2000 and was in its 13th printing by March 2002. The print run had reached 
157,000, which is astonishing for the rather academic matter the volume deals with and the less 
than appealing design of the book. Zhongyang dangxiao jiaowubu (ed.). Wu ge dangdai jianggao 
xuanbian. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2000. 
73 This observation needs to be qualified, however: while the range of sources is much larger than 
for any other newspaper in the PRC, Cankao xiaoxi clearly applies selection criteria. In addition, 
the articles are edited: the editors will not rewrite articles, but may distort the original meaning 
through deletions and the composition of new headlines that create an altogether different spin. 
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and Da cankao 大参考 (called like this because it is printed in an especially large 
typeface to suit the needs of elderly top-level cadres with poor eyesight).74 Cankao 
ziliao was and is the Chinese leadership’s most important source of information on 
external affairs, including foreign reports on China. Until 1985, it was distributed to 
high-ranking cadres three times daily; the morning, noon, and afternoon editions 
(shangwu ban 上午版, zhongwu ban 中午版, xiawu ban 下午版) had 24 pages 
each. On July 1, 1985, the paper announced a new layout; it would be published 
every evening at nine o’clock and would henceforth increase its volume to 96 
pages.75 In this format it was still published as of late 2001, with the cover note 
“internal publication, do not reprint elsewhere” (neibu kanwu, bu de zhuanzai 内部
刊物，不得转载).76 
Cankao ziliao covers almost exclusively international news; the sources are 
foreign newspapers and news agencies, as relayed by Xinhua personnel overseas. 
Some articles are translated in full, others in summary form. They are usually not 
commented, and there is no follow-up coverage on particular issues. The paper 
thus serves exclusively as a provider of information; any judgement on the issues 
reported is left to the leadership. The breadth of coverage is astonishing, including 
not only breaking news, but also articles on foreign social, cultural, and scientific 
developments. A reading of Cankao ziliao suggests that the Chinese leadership, 
contrary to some earlier estimates, was in fact very well informed about 
developments outside China. While Cankao ziliao is similar in nature to Cankao 
xiaoxi, the coverage of the former is both broader and deeper. The importance of 
Cankao ziliao can be estimated by a report in no. 1411 of June 14, 1957 (noon 
edition), that relays a Reuters report of the day before on the leaking of Mao’s 
“Contradictions Speech” to the New York Times correspondent in Warsaw. The 
New York Times report, carried on June 14 (i.e., because of the time difference 
                                             
74 A directive dated June 5, 1948, instructed Xinhua to provide reference material to the Party 
leadership on a regular basis. This might have been the beginning of these neibu publications. See 
“Zhongyang guanyu ge Xinhua fenshe xu fuqi gonggei ge zhong cankao ziliao renwu de zhishi” in 
XGWX 2.701. 
75 See “Notice” in Cankao ziliao, July 1, 1985. 
76 Observations on Cankao ziliao and the other neibu periodicals discussed in this chapter are 
based on the author’s readings of these materials. 
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between Beijing and New York, several hours after the CKZL “re-”print!), triggered 
the release of the revised version of Mao’s speech later that month.77 
Very little reliable information is available on the legendary Da cankao, or 
on Neibu cankao.78 In format similar to Cankao ziliao, Da cankao seems to provide 
the top leadership with crucial intelligence on domestic affairs. Both publications 
still exist, and have even adopted to modern technologies: in the summer of 2003, 
the website of Xinhua’s Chongqing branch offered a biweekly audiovisual 
supplement (Neibu cankao yinxiang ban 内部参考音像版) to “leading comrades of 
district or division-level and upwards (di-shi ji yishang lingdao tongzhi 地师级以上
领导同志).” Subscribers would receive one VCD of 55 minutes length every two 
weeks, containing “information on domestic and international affairs that is not 
suited or not yet suited for open publication, but has a relatively high reference 
value.”79 The audiovisual supplement promised to be published “strictly respecting 
the directives of the [Party] centre demanding that ‘Xinhua she must do its best to 
publish Neibu cankao.’”80 From this pledge and the table of contents of the 
supplement we can obtain an approximate understanding of objectives of Neibu 
cankao: to provide high-level cadres and especially the top-leadership with first-
hand intelligence, analysis of the latest issues, emerging trends, and of course, 
reports by foreigners on China. 
Neibu papers such as Cankao ziliao, Neibu cankao, and Da cankao are set 
apart from the openly circulating media by both the breadth of the information they 
supply to the top leadership and the higher levels of the Party, and by the fact that 
this information comes in a generally unmediated form: it may be fragmentary, 
contradictory, and in deviance from the Party line. None of this would be 
acceptable for the openly distributed media, for reasons that I have reconstructed 
in chapter two, yet the same does not apply for the Party leadership: apparently, 
higher political consciousness insulates long-time Party members from the danger 
of being corrupted by unfiltered information. They are thus allowed access to more 
                                             
77 The revised version (“Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti” 关于正确处理人民
内部矛盾的问题) was published in RMRB on June 29, 1957. 
78 The print run of Da cankao was limited to about thirty copies, while Neibu cankao had a print run 
of up to 40,000 in the 1960s. Personal communication with Michael Schoenhals, December 2001. 
79 See the advertisement at www.cq.xinhuanet.com\ins\xinhua\xxfw3.htm (downloaded July 10, 
2003). 
80 Ibid. 
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diverse sources of knowledge. In fact, in both their composition and their function, 
the neibu papers do resemble the liberal, deliberative press more than anything 
else published in the PRC. 
Xinhua is the largest provider of intelligence to restricted groups, but it is no 
longer the only institution to do so. The editorial offices of RMRB publish a weekly 
information sheet called Neibu canyue 内部参阅 that is classified as secret (mimi 
秘密) on the cover page. Neibu canyue contains sensitive material on mostly 
domestic issues collected by RMRB; a particularly large type face indicates that it 
is compiled for reference purposes for readers with poor eyesight, i.e. the elderly 
leadership. Articles in the periodical usually introduce a problem that is newly 
emerging, analyze it in a second step, and finally offer policy proposals. The 
journal’s subscription information contains a short self-characterization:81 
Neibu canyue, which is compiled by RMRB, was originally distributed only to leading 
cadres of provincial / ministry / army rank; after instructions from leading comrades of 
the Center and considerations by RMRB’s editorial committee, [the distribution] was 
enlarged to leading comrades of department [si 司] / bureau [ju 局] / district [di 地] / city 
/ division [shi 师]. After the increase in distribution, we have received support and 
encouragement from leading comrades at the Center and in the localities, and [the 
number of] units and leading comrades asking for subscriptions has increased 
steadily. ... Neibu canyue appropriately relaxes its subscription rules for organizations 
concerned with theory, education, and propaganda (e.g. district-level city propaganda 
departments, organ newspapers, and party schools, party secretaries of institutions of 
higher education directly under ministries, commissions, and provinces, etc.). 
 
As many other neibu publications, Neibu canyue goes to lengths to define its 
scope of distribution. The usually strict rules can be relaxed for readers in 
professional units directly concerned by the information in question, such as is the 
case here for high-level cadres in the propaganda sector. 
A reading of Neibu canyue reveals another function – besides supplying 
classified intelligence – of neibu publications: they play an important role in policy 
formulation processes. This function is illustrated especially well in another neibu 
publication, Neibu wengao 内部文稿. This semi-monthly journal is an internal 
bulletin of Hongqi zazhi 红旗杂志 (since 1988 Qiushi 求是), the theoretical organ of 
the CCP CC.82 The articles in Neibu wengao are of an exploratory nature; they 
mostly deal with theoretical issues (in the widest sense, i.e. including economics 
                                             
81 See “Notification for the Subscription of Neibu canyue,” taken from issue 1994/36, p. 31. 
82 Neibu wengao has been published since 1981. The issues from October 1985 to December 
1986 appeared under the title Lilun jiaoliu 理论交流. 
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and social questions). The journal shows policy-making in process: the articles 
deal with new developments and trends in politics, economics, social affairs etc. 
Many articles contain policy proposals or elaborate on material taken from the 
journal’s most interesting section, “Abstracts of important speeches” (Yao lun 
zhaideng 要论摘登). This section comprises very short, mostly colloquial 
statements of unnamed Party leaders that are to be understood as advances for 
emerging new policies, to be formulated by the theory community that is the 
journal’s readership. Articles based on these utterances of the leadership are 
published in the other sections of Neibu wengao (hence the title) for discussion 
and comment. When agreement is reached over an issue and the Party leadership 
has approved of it, articles from Neibu wengao may appear in revised form in the 
mother journal, Hongqi or Qiushi.83 
Neibu books, too, may be used for similar purposes. An example of this 
kind is a massive 760-page volume entitled “Collection of Arguments by Chinese 
Party and State Organs and Officials in View of the Reforms [brought about by] the 
WTO.”84 This volume collects hundreds of articles from both open and neibu 
journals on the subject in question. It bears no publisher’s name and no book 
number, and carries the remark “internal material” (Neibu ziliao 内部资料). The 
material assembled obviously served both to inform cadres on the challenges 
posed by China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and to provide them 
with policy options. The preface to a similar volume stated that the material 
collected there was originally mandatory reading for the participants in a workshop 
on “The Chinese Reforms and Development” (Zhongguo gaige yu fazhan 中国改
革与发展) that were now made available to a broader circle of mid- and high-level 
cadres and policy researchers.85 The practice of compiling collections of 
“reference material” is indeed an established CCP policy and has been used in the 
PRC on countless occasions, such as during political campaigns, when “black 
                                             
83 This description of policy formulation processes in neibu publications is based on the author’s 
reading of Neibu wengao and Neibu weidinggao 内部未定稿, a publication with the same format 
and function, published bimonthly from early 1964 to mid-1966, also by Hongqi zazhishe.  
84 Zhongguo dang-zheng jigou he gongwuyuan dui WTO yantao lundian huiji. Beijing, 2002, 2 vols. 
85 Shi nian lai yingxiang Zhongyang gaoceng jingji juece de lundian huiji. Beijing, June 2002, 2 vols. 
The book carries neither publisher nor book number; its contents are classified as “internal 
reference material” (Neibu cankao ziliao 内部参考资料) 
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material” (hei cailiao 黑材料) was collected to be used in the denunciation of 
individuals isolated as campaign targets.86 
From the discussion on the last pages, the model of a highly fragmented 
public sphere emerges:87 the Chinese population is classified into several layers 
characterized by the width and depth of the information they receive. At the very 
bottom of this hierarchy, even below the ordinary people, foreigners are to be 
found. Cadres range above the people as they have access to neibu materials. 
Within this bloc, we find numerous sub-divisions: according to the respective ranks, 
cadres might be included or excluded from distribution keys for neibu material.88 
The top leadership has unlimited access to large amounts of information of a 
stunning variety. Chart one is an effort to visualize the structures of controlled 
information access in the PRC. Alternatively, a model of concentric public spheres 
could be imagined, with foreigners situated in the middle, with the smallest horizon 
of information (like the proverbial frog in the well), and the other groups of the 
population in concentric rings of ever larger size around them, the size reflecting 
the broader horizon of information they have access to. 
                                             
86 Among the most famous are “Guanyu Hu Feng fangeming jituan de cailiao,” published in three 
parts in RMRB, May 13, May 24, June 10, 1955; and Pipan ziliao: Zhongguo Heluxiaofu Liu Shaoqi 
fangeming xiuzhengzhiyu yanlun ji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe ziliaoshi, [1967], 3 vols. In the 
course of political campaigns, such compilations made from neibu materials, initially neibu 
themselves, could be made available to the public. 
87 As this section is based heavily on normative sources, it describes a prescriptive model rather 
than the empirical reality. Foreigners in China do of course have access to other sources of 
information; they are hardly the least informed community in China. Neither are the boundaries 
between the different levels drawn as sharp as the CCP would like them to be. Rather, informal 
channels (such as the famous “small way news” – xiao dao xiaoxi 小道消息) are responsible for a 
significant degree of the information circulating in Chinese society. What I describe here, thus, is 
but a model that reflects the views (or hopes) of the Chinese leadership that has devised this 
information structure. With this model, I hope to explain the logic of the system of layered or 
segmented information in the PRC.  
88 Similar hierarchies can be observed for information outside of the media system, namely in the 
flow of official documents. These usually carry detailed information on their respective distribution 
key and are classified variously as neibu, secret (mimi), crucially secret (juemi 绝密) etc. See 
Kenneth Lieberthal. Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China. Ann Arbor: Center for 
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978, p. 15-16. 
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Chart 1: The Information Pyramid  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The amount of information available increases for people in higher positions. A small number 
of people at the very apex of the pyramid receives the most diverse and unfiltered information, 
whereas information given to foreigners in the PRC is most closely controlled. The permeability 
between the different layers in this model is uneven, information flows easier across some 
boundaries than across others. It must be stressed that this model reflects the theoretical rather 
than the actual information distribution in the PRC: due to their access to foreign news sources, 
foreigners in fact may have a better insight into political processes of the PRC than even people 
within the system, such as cadres. Conversely, the leadership might miss out on important pieces 
of information that are commonly known among the population, but are deliberately withheld from 
the leadership by cadres interested in protecting their career prospects. Thus, the above model 
explains the philosophy behind the media concept rather than the empirical reality, which is the 
subject of the second part of this study. 
 
In this model practiced in the PRC, an ever smaller number of people 
receive an ever broader amount of information, information that is less edited and 
selected: the ordinary people are allowed to read only news reports that have 
been approved, have been checked on their being in line with current policies, and 
are finally printed in the newspapers. These people, the yumin, so the Party 
leadership believes, might be confused and misled by information from sources 
other than that filtered by the CCP. Too much openness in the Party’s own media 
might even provide domestic and foreign class enemies with the means to 
undermine the Party and its rule. Withholding crucial pieces of information can 
thus be justified by security concerns (foreigners in China meet with the same kind 
of suspicion). According to this logic, cadres, and especially the higher leadership, 
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must devise counterstrategies to defeat any attempts in ideological subversion, 
and therefore need a maximum amount of intelligence. Thus, high-level cadres 
have at their disposal the most heterogeneous of sources from both China and 
abroad. As trained professional revolutionaries they are unlikely to be affected 
negatively by this non-homogenized intelligence, by information not yet interpreted, 
ambiguous in character, contradictory, or even misleading and false – information 
that is neither suitable nor necessary for the rest of the populace. The control of 
information access thus relates directly to the CCP’s normative media concept.  
 
 
Discourse Control 
In the PRC, state controls affect not only what is said, and to whom it is said, 
but also the way in which it is said. Both public discourses and the medium of 
these discourses, language itself, are subject to control by the CCP. Since the 
founding of the PRC, the Party has sought to impose an officially sanctioned 
linguistic code on the Chinese public sphere: rules are issued for formulations 
concerning practically all topics under discussion. These rules must be internalized 
by all participants in public discourse – the Party leadership, the personnel in the 
media sector, and the audiences. Consequently, deviations from official 
formulations or changes are detected immediately by those involved; deviating 
formulations are interpreted as signalling either a shift in policy or a conscious 
manipulation, that is, an expression of opposition. Entire fields of discourse are 
structured in this way – they are governed by nothing less than “master texts” that 
underlie the public discussion and determine how these issues can be 
formulated.89 
While the existence of informal power structures in discursive settings and 
the exercise of this power through communication and the media, as well as the 
potential violence contained in these structures, has been discussed by Foucault 
                                             
89 This argument and parts of this section follow the findings of Simone He in “Entering the World: 
Symbol und Wirklichkeit von Chinas Beitritt zur Welthandelsorganisation WTO (1995-2000): eine 
Diskursanalyse.” M.A. Thesis, Heidelberg University, 2001. I am grateful to Ms. He for permission 
to quote from her thesis. 
 220
and others,90 the control of discursive formations through “master texts” in the 
PRC differs from these settings: rather than informal and hidden, the discursive 
setting in the PRC is characterized by entirely formalized power structures. These 
structures and the control of linguistic expression are openly acknowledged and 
their existence is justified as absolutely necessary and as beneficial to the 
population, who are the addressees of public discourse. It is the media concept 
that lends legitimacy to these structures of power. 
Control of discourses operates on two levels, the level of themes and the 
level of formulations. Within a specified discourse, the Party authorities define 
those themes that will appear in the public discussion. For example, Simone He 
has investigated the discourse surrounding the negotiations for China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO): during the crucial years 1999-2001, a 
small number of themes were selected by the Party for constant repetition in all 
discussions of the issue (such as “excluding China from the organs of world trade 
is not in the national interest of the different countries,” or “under no circumstances 
will China sacrifice its own basic interests to enter the WTO.” With only minimal 
variation, these themes figure prominently in all public discussions on the WTO 
issue in China – Xinhua news agency releases, newspaper articles and comments, 
addresses of government spokespeople, and speeches by the national 
leadership.91 This form of agenda-setting works in a highly selective way, stressing 
the core points of the CCP’s line on this issue, to the obvious neglect or 
suppression of other possible points. 
A particular method to enforce the Party’s agenda-setting power are model 
formulations or tifa 提法 for the various arguments of an issue under discussion. 
Word clusters can be traced in newspaper and magazine articles over several 
years, with only minimal variation. Sticking to established formulations is crucial in 
the discursive system of the PRC where “the manipulation of any one formal 
                                             
90 Asking “how is it that one particular appeared rather than another?” (The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, p.27), Michel Foucault has pioneered the study of 
implied power structures in a wide variety of fields. 
91 He. Entering the World, p. 25-48, here p. 30, 40. For another example, the preparation of the 
master text for the Hong Kong handover in 1997, see Zhongdan Pan, Chin-Chuan Lee, Joseph 
Man Chan, Clement Y.K. So. “One Event, Three Stories: Media Narratives from Cultural China of 
the Handover of Hong Kong,” in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.). Power, Money, and Media: Communication 
Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
2000, p. 271-87, here p. 274. 
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element of formulation A is sufficient to transform it into formulation B” that will 
create a new meaning at variance with the old meaning – and, possibly, at 
variance with the intentions of the Party.92 Formulations very often emanate from 
the highest echelons of the Party’s formal hierarchy and are in fact quotations from 
speeches of the Party leadership. These quotations are unmarked,93 but are 
recognizable for their authoritative nature due to their constant repetition. Their 
source – usually the national leadership – confirms the authoritative nature of 
formulations and reduces the leverage, for example of a journalist, to change them 
at will.94  
In this way, the production of, say, a newspaper editorial, is an exercise in 
bricolage: to discuss an issue such as the WTO accession requires knowledge of 
the themes identified as necessary core elements that cannot be omitted, as well 
as familiarity with the “correct” (zhengque 正确) formulations for these issues. In 
the same vein, the long-winded speeches published after Party congresses for 
study in all government danwei are in effect endless series of tifa that cover all 
major policy issues and must be studied so closely because all cadres need to 
internalize the new discursive prescriptions. In sum, these factors lead to a high 
degree of formalization of the discourses concerned, a linguistic and thematic 
formalization that tends to increase the longer an issue is discussed. The result is 
a high argumentative density of the texts; even small details are invested with 
meaning. 
Differences in the degree of formalization can be identified when texts are 
studied that operate in environments of a less normative nature. On the one hand, 
regional newspapers address a less sophisticated and informed audience, so the 
issues under discussion must be explained through examples and formulations 
beyond those sanctioned by the Party leadership. On the other end of the 
spectrum are specialized professional journals that discuss theoretical problems; 
                                             
92 Quotation from Michael Schoenhals. Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. 
Berkeley, Ca.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992, p. 7. The issue of tifa 
is discussed in detail in ibid., ch. 2. I will come back to this issue when discussing the implications 
of formalized language for the system of media control in the next section. 
93 An exception were utterances from Mao Zedong which were printed in bold type in books, 
journals, and newspaper from 1966 until shortly after the Cultural Revolution. In many cases, these 
were in fact not quotations, but rather tifa. 
94 Compare the discussion of neibu journals such as Neibu wengao for the production of new tifa in 
the preceding section of this chapter. 
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as the readership of these publications is generally smaller, they have more 
leeway in venturing beyond the uniform discursive limits. The degrees of 
formalization thus correspond roughly to the hierarchy of different media that was 
introduced in chapter one of this study. 
Since the late 1990s, the distance between high-conformity and low-
conformity discursive settings has grown significantly due to the proliferation of 
decentralized Internet-based media, such as chatrooms and discussion boards. In 
this setting, discourse control has become increasingly difficult. 95 Yet even here, 
the Party has by no means given up on control, as electronic censorship and 
various experiments with online activist-propagandists show. With regard to the 
Internet the same pattern is valid that has been identified earlier in this chapter: 
while leeway has grown for a large number of issue areas, a number of sensitive 
key issues remain off limits to public discussion;96 it is in these areas that the 
government prerogatives of agenda-setting through tifa remain strongest. 
Master texts that can be found in specific discourses do not stand alone; 
rather, they are engaged in constant interaction and dialogue with different 
countertexts available in the national and international public sphere. Traces of 
these countertexts can be found in interlocutionary elements that frequently 
appear in official discourses. 97 Formulations such as “somebody says...” (you ren 
shuo 有人说) or “somebody has spread rumours” (you ren chuanyan shuo 有人传
言说) introduce arguments that are aimed at other opinions which are declared 
illegitimate or incorrect. These “other” opinions usually originate either in rumours 
circulating among the population, or in the foreign press. The latter has proved to 
be a constant headache for the Chinese government, as the flow of foreign media 
into China cannot be stemmed. The only way for the government to deal 
effectively with information that lies beyond the confines of the discourse controls 
                                             
95 See He. Entering the World, p. 56-75. 
96 Compare chapter nine of this study. 
97 See Rudolf G. Wagner. “The Early Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Public Sphere” in 
EJEAS 1.1 (2001), p. 1-33, here p. 15-16. Wagner discusses the dilemma of the Chinese 
government’s information policies during the 1989 Democracy Movement, when the population 
turned to the foreign media in droves to receive information not available in the Chinese media. 
The official press was therefore constantly preoccupied with refuting the latest rumours reported in 
the foreign press concerning the rift among the central leadership. 
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instituted in the national Chinese public sphere,98 is to delegitimize it by sowing 
doubts concerning its credibility and to convince the public of the correctness of 
the arguments and formulations advocated by the CCP. This is the function of the 
interlocutionary elements in public discourses.99 
Discourse controls have significantly narrowed the spectrum of expression 
in the Chinese public sphere, and especially in the highly normative mass media of 
the central level. They allow the government to keep a considerable measure of 
control over the form in which the media transmit the information in the public 
sphere. The control of language serves the same purposes.  
 
 
Language Control 
The final of the mechanisms employed by the CCP to control the media is 
the control of language itself.100 Since 1949, the administration of language in the 
PRC has been a matter of concern for the highest leadership that led to 
interventions – sometimes even coming from Mao himself – into the day-to-day 
processes of the media. The linguistic tier is the lowest plane of control possible: 
the Party’s ultimate goal is to achieve control over the media through the 
establishment of a fixed register of meaning that makes dissent all but impossible. 
Ideally, heterodox ideas can not be expressed because the proper linguistic 
means to do so do not exist. In its most extreme form, the formalized and sterile 
bureaucratic language of the PRC has become known as “Mao style” (Mao wenti 
毛文体).101 
                                             
98 “... the Chinese government has rigorously maintained that the Chinese public sphere is 
coterminous with its national space.” Ibid., p. 2. 
99 Such dialogues with other voices are in fact as old as the Chinese newspaper itself. See the 
discussion of this rhetoric convention in Janku. Nur leere Reden, ch. 5. 
100 Michael Schoenhals provides fascinating insights into the operation of language controls in the 
PRC in his Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics. For the origin of these controls see Rudolf 
G. Wagner. “Zhonggong 1940-1953 nian jianli zhengyu, zhengwen de zhengce dalüe” in Peng 
Xiaoyan (ed.). Wenyi lilun yu tongsu wenhua. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe 
yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1999, p. 11-38. 
101 On Mao wenti and the struggle of Chinese writers to rid themselves of this linguistic corset after 
the Cultural Revolution see Li Tuo. “Xiandai Hanyu yu dangdai wenxue” in Xindi wenxue 1.6 (1991), 
p. 30-43. See also Li Tuo “Ding Ling bu jiandan: Mao tizhi xia zhishifenzi zai huayu chansheng 
zhong de fuza juese” in Jintian 3 (1993), p. 222-42, where the author expands his argument from 
the linguistic corset to the closely related issue of fixed frameworks of reference for thinking. 
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The concern with linguistic issues predates the CCP’s effort to control the 
written Chinese language. The Lunyu sets the “setting straight of names” (zheng 
ming 正名) into direct relation with governance.102 This is but one aspect of a much 
broader discussion in premodern China based on the assumption that the wisdom 
of the sages of antiquity was hidden in the words of the classics and needed to be 
extracted by sophisticated means.103 Since the legitimacy of any given regime in 
traditional China hinged on the correct understanding of the sages’ words, 
language politics had a very high status quo and received much attention from 
Chinese commentators. During the early decades of the Qing dynasty, these 
considerations led to the establishment of the philological approach to the Chinese 
classics (kaozhengxue 考证学).104  
While the objectives of the CCP are more mundane than those of their Qing 
predecessors, the rigor with which language is controlled has even increased 
thanks to the modern means of communications. Through internal channels, such 
as PD circulars, the CCP PD intervenes to advise the media on correct 
terminology. Interventions in linguistic matters and the prescription of terminology 
is also one of the functions of Xuanchuan dongtai, a crucially important internal 
bulletin in the propaganda sector.105 For example, an item published in this journal 
in 1983 reads:106 
 
                                             
102 Lunyu 13.3 argues: “If the names are not correct, then words will not come straightforward; if 
words come not straightforward, then affairs will not succeed; if affairs do not succeed, the rites 
and music will not flourish; if rites and music do not flourish, then punishments will not be awarded 
properly; if punishments are not awarded properly, then the people are without provision on how to 
set hands and feet [i.e., to behave properly]” 名不正，则言不顺，言不顺，则事不成，事不成，则礼
乐不兴，礼乐不兴，则刑罚不中，刑罚不中，则民无所措手足. 
103 On language philosophy and its relation to political philosophy in early China see Rudolf G. 
Wagner. Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in China: Wang Bi’s Scholarly Exploration 
of the Dark. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003, 5-82. 
104 On this topic see Benjamin Elman. From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social 
Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China. Cambridge, Ma.: Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, 1984. 
105 On the former see Schoenhals. Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics, ch. 2. On issues of 
language control in Xuanchuan dongtai see Michael Schoenhals (ed. and trsl.). “Selections from 
Propaganda Trends, Organ of the CCP Central Propaganda Department” in Chinese Law and 
Government 24.4 (1991-92), esp. “Editor’s introduction” and the first section, dealing with 
terminology issues, p. 5-34. 
106 “Guanyu shiyong ‘qinlao zhi fu’ tifa de tongzhi” in Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu (ed.). 
Xuanchuan dongtai 1983 nian xuanbianben. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 
1984, p. 254. Translation by Michael Schoenhals, taken from Chinese Law and Government 24.4 
(1991-92), p. 29. 
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Propaganda Department Circular Approves of “Achieving Wealth Through Diligence” 
 
To the Propaganda Departments of the Party Committees of the Provinces, 
Municipalities, and Autonomous Regions; the Propaganda Department of the PLA 
General Political Department; and the Party Committees and Party Groups of the units 
within the Central Propaganda Department system: 
During a discussion in the Central Secretariat on July 11, 1983, agreement was 
expressed with Comrade Peng Xiao and Comrade Chen Qisheng’s suggestion that the 
formulation “achieving wealth through labour” be replaced by “achieving wealth through 
diligence,” and it was decided that this formulation first of all be employed in documents 
of the centre, the State Council, and the departments and committees under the centre 
and the State Council, and in central-level broadcasts, newspapers, and journals, and 
that it then be gradually popularized. At the grass-roots level, among the masses, and 
in the works of individual writers, however, the continued use of the formulation 
“achieving wealth through labour” need not be prohibited. 
 
The Central Propaganda Department 
July 28, 1983 
 
The new formulation had been proposed earlier that year with the argument that 
“diligence” is a term more inclusive than “labour” and has more appeal to people 
engaging in work other than physical labour – especially to the intellectuals that 
had been rehabilitated as a part of the working class the year before.107 In this 
case, a PD circular was deemed important enough to be reprinted in Xuanchuan 
dongtai. It is interesting to see here the different layers of the public sphere 
receiving different treatment: the central media must immediately adopt the new 
formula, while media on lower levels are given more leeway. The formalization of 
language, and the need to comply with these prescriptions, is graded; the relative 
significance attached to the media in question determines how closely they must 
follow the new guidelines. 
In some cases on record, the Party centre or individual top leaders of the 
CCP have intervened directly to affect changes of just a single character. In early 
1951, the CC issued a directive that, among others, forbade the use of common 
geographical abbreviations such as Yu 渝 for Chongqing or Min 闽 for Fujian.108 
No reason was given for this bureaucratic measure; it probably served simply 
                                             
107 “Jianyi shiyong ‘qinlao zhi fu’ de tifa” in Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu (ed.). Xuanchuan 
dongtai 1983 nian xuanbianben, p. 215. Translated by Michael Schoenhals in Chinese Law and 
Government 24.4 (1991-92), p. 28. 
108 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiuzheng dianbao, baogao, zhishi, jueding deng wenzi quedian 
de zhishi” in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan xinwen yanjiusuo (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang 
xinwen gongzuo wenjian huibian (XGWH). Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1980, 3 vols., here vol. 2, p. 
176-81. 
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reasons of clarity and was intended to reduce ambiguity. Similar considerations 
motivated Hu Qiaomu, then PD vice-head, to hold a series of “breakfast chats” 
with junior editors of RMRB in spring 1955.109 In these meetings (the transcripts 
appeared in book form in 1978 to serve as textbook material), Hu discussed 
articles from recent RMRB issues and addressed problems, mistakes, and 
weaknesses in these texts. Many of the very detailed comments of Hu concern 
expressions and formulations used incorrectly. On a short RMRB article from May 
11, 1955, for example, Hu had the following to say: “This short article contains 
some mistaken formulations: firstly, it says that ‘children, with the first cry at their 
birth, become future citizens.’ Adding the word ‘future’ is unnecessary here, 
because children are citizens from the very moment of their birth, this is what the 
constitution mandates. Secondly, the argument ‘the children belong to the state’ is 
not correct; people cannot belong to the state, because as citizens they live their 
lives autonomously.”110 Both formulations are mistaken only by nuances, but these 
nuances could lead to misinterpretations and can therefore not be tolerated. The 
attention a senior politician like Hu devoted to such minute issues of language is 
remarkable.111 
Hu Qiaomu was not the only politician to pay close attention to the linguistic 
level of media work,112 but he was in a special position to do so, because he was 
involved in the first place in the formulation of the mainstream of bureaucratized 
language that was elevated to the position of the universal standard language.113 
Besides various other occupations and activities of Hu in the early 1950s, he 
                                             
109 See Xinwen yanjiusuo (ed.). Tantan baozhi gongzuo. N.p., 1978. The “breakfast chats” are 
collected in the second part of this volume. The book is discussed in Schoenhals. Doing Things 
with Words in Chinese Politics, ch. 4. On the background of the talks see ibid., p. 81. 
110 Tantan baozhi gongzuo, p. 185. 
111 Hu’s interventions into language politics were no isolated incident; rather, he set precedents for 
similar efforts to prescribe language in later times. For some recent examples see the following 
volumes: An Rupan, Zhao Yuling. Baokan yong ci bu dang 1000 li. Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo 
dianshi chubanshe, 2001, 2 vols. An Rupan, Zhao Yuling. Baokan chengyu wu yong 1000 li. 
Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 2001. 
112 Mao Zedong himself carefully read important editorials and changed passages he felt 
inappropriate. Mao also corrected formulations and single words. An entire section (p. 303-436) of 
Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan contains “corrected drafts” (gaigao 改稿). An especially 
interesting case is a June 6, 1951, RMRB editorial entitled “Correctly use the language of the 
motherland, struggle for the cleanness and health of the language” (Zhengque de shiyong zuguo 
de yuyan, wei yuyan de chunjie he jiankang er douzheng), ibid., p. 405-11. On p. 413 is a facsimile 
of Mao’s handwritten corrections. This important programmatic editorial, a landmark of PRC 
language policy, is discussed in Wagner. “Zhonggong 1940-1953 nian jianli zhengyu, zhengwen de 
zhengce dalüe,” p. 29ff. 
113 Compare ibid., p. 18 and passim. 
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participated in the compilation of Mao’s Selected Works (Mao Zedong xuanji 毛泽
东选集).114 The first volume appeared in 1951, volume four in 1960. While this was 
not the first edition of Mao’s works, an unusual amount of scrutiny went into the 
process of selecting and editing Mao’s writings. All articles and speeches included 
in the four volumes were edited carefully: while some items experienced more 
significant changes, for the most part the work of the compilation committee was 
limited to polishing and standardizing the style. Yet it is exactly these stylistic 
“improvements” that are of interest for us. The changes in “Fandui dang bagu,” for 
example, are relatively minor in nature. On one occasion, for example, “war” was 
changed into “war against aggression,” making the meaning more precise. In 
many instances, the colloquial he 和 replaced the copula yu 与, used frequently in 
written Chinese. On the other hand, Mao’s colloquial abbreviation Ma-Liezhuyi 马
列主义 was replaced with the full form Makesi-Lieningzhuyi 马克思列宁主义 in 
hundreds of passages.115 In the course of this process, Mao’s texts were 
transformed into a highly homogenous and linguistically entirely rational body of 
texts that henceforth served as the single most important model of modern 
Chinese that was taught, studied, and emulated at every occasion for the next 
thirty years. “Mao style” was born – the ultimate paragon of a bureaucratized, 
controlled idiom against which all other utterances were measured. Mao wenti 
created a new standard in the PRC that was the precondition for the 
institutionalization of the linguistic control of the media. 
Finally, the CCP extended its ambitions in the management of 
communication to the sub-linguistic level of the Chinese characters. Only ten days 
after the founding of the PRC the Chinese Association on Character Reform 
(Zhongguo wenzi gaige xiehui 中国文字改革协会) was established to explore 
options to simplify the Chinese characters, and possibly even their abolishment in 
                                             
114 On Hu’s involvement see Ye Yonglie. Mao Zedong de mishumen. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe, 1994, p. 60-62. In this key project (Mao himself revised the texts, Liu Shaoqi was in 
charge of the first three volumes) Hu was responsible especially for grammar and language. He 
was later entrusted with the overall responsibility for volume four. 
115 A very convenient tool to track these changes is the Japanese edition by Takeuchi Minoru (ed.). 
Mo Taku-to shu. Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1970, 10 vols. This edition meticulously marks all differences 
between the early texts, as published in JFRB and elsewhere, and the Selected Works versions. 
For “Fandui dang bagu” see vol. 8, p. 89-108; the examples can be found on p. 93. 
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the long term in favour of all-out Romanization.116 In 1956 and 1964, the Chinese 
Character Reform Committee (Zhongguo wenzi gaige weiyuanhui 中国文字改革委
员会), since 1954 the Association’s successor body, produced two tables with 
simplified characters that were henceforth used in all newspapers, books, and 
other print products.117 On the surface level, the rationale behind the simplified 
characters was to facilitate the efforts to erase illiteracy, but they had the additional 
effect to define the claims of the CCP to exert its authority over the consumption of 
information even on the level of characters.118 Later generations that have grown 
up with the simplified characters increasingly feel the consequences of these 
efforts in political symbolism and sub-linguistic control, as the barrier to read 
traditional characters alienates large groups of the population from reading matter 
not under control of the authority of the CCP. 
Through the introduction of simplified characters and the other measures of 
language control discussed in this section, the CCP has worked hard to create a 
unique form of language that is highly standardized and bureaucratized. Grammar, 
vocabulary, writing conventions, and even characters were to conform closely to 
the ideals of the Party – not only to the language of newspapers and the state 
television broadcasts, but also to the most various kinds of writings, including non-
official communication and belles lettres.119 The Party’s success in implementing 
these prescriptions is striking: the degree of linguistic conformity in much of the 
literature produced in the PRC even today is most remarkable. This compliance 
                                             
116 On this early stage see Constantin Milsky. Préparation de le réforme de l’écriture en République 
populaire de Chine, 1949-1954. Paris: Mouton & Co., 1974. 
117 See Wenzi gaige zazhi bianjibu (ed.). Jianguo yilai wenzi gaige gongzuo biannian jishi. Beijing: 
Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1985. A third stage of character reform was announced in late 1977. See 
GMRB, Dec. 20, 1977. The proposals of this third stage, however, proved so unpopular that they 
never went beyond the experimental stage and were withdrawn after a short time. On this latter 
stage see Hans-Jörg Geduhn. Sprachplanung in der Volksrepublik China, 1976-1980. Bochum: 
Brockmeyer, 1985, ch. 5. 
118 The fact that the Party leadership, including Mao Zedong, concerned themselves with this issue 
added weight to the character reform project. On Mao’s involvement see “Letter to Wu Yuzhang” 
(dated Aug. 29, 1949) in Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984, p. 336-37. 
The context of the letter is given in Jianguo yilai wenzi gaige gongzuo biannian jishi, p. 6. Hu 
Qiaomu, too, was deeply involved in the character reform issue. See Hu Qiaomu tan yuyan wenzi. 
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999. 
119 The fascination of the novels and screenplays of Wang Shuo 王朔, the enfant terrible of the 
mainland literary scene after 1990, comes to a considerable degree from his mockery of this official 
style, which is decontextualized in his works and thus exposed in its absurdity. See, for example, 
the dialogues in the soap opera Bianjibu de gushi that is discussed in chapter eight of this study. 
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must explained by the sheer dearth of alternative writing styles available in the 
public sphere.120 
 
 
The Issue of Censorship 
Before concluding this chapter, I will briefly discuss the important issue of 
censorship. Censorship has existed and does exist in the PRC. The forms, 
however, that Chinese censorship has taken differ markedly from censorship in 
other authoritarian regimes, and in the first place from censorship practices in the 
Soviet Union.121 
In the early years of the Soviet Union, the CPSU developed an extensive 
censorship bureaucracy.122 Glavlit (shorthand for Glavnoe upravlenie po delam 
literatury i izdatv, the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs), was 
a centralized institution created in 1922 with the purpose “to unite all forms of 
censorship of printed works.”123 Glavlit and its successor organizations (different 
name, same function) were responsible for censoring all books, journals, and 
newspapers in the entire Soviet Union. They did so by either receiving manuscript 
copies before these went to press, or by sending so-called “political editors” as 
plenipotentiaries to newspapers and publishing houses. Since 1931, all 
publications were required to carry the date of publication approval in the imprint at 
the end of each book, as well as a number code identifying the responsible censor. 
The censorship process usually included a check of the manuscript before it was 
sent to the print shop, the distribution of “signal copies” to higher organs, and the 
deposition of further obligatory copies in the main libraries. Only then would the 
                                             
120 See Li Tuo’s complaints in “Xiandai Hanyu yu dangdai wenxue.” 
121 On censorship in the PRC see especially Schoenhals. Doing Things with Words in Chinese 
Politics, ch. 5 and passim; Schoenhals. “Media Censorship in the People’s Republic of China” in 
Susan Whitfield (ed.). After the Event: Human Rights and their Future in China. London: Wellsweep 
Press, 1993, p. 61-72; Lynch. After the Propaganda State. See also Perry Link. The Uses of 
Literature: Life in the Socialist Chinese Literary System. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2000. 
122 On the institutions and methods of censorship in the Soviet Union see Peter Kenez. The Birth of 
the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. Herman Ermolaev. Censorship in Soviet Literature, 1917-1991. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Walker. Soviet Book Publishing Policy, esp. p. 28-41. See also 
Walker’s contribution “Soviet Publishing Since the October Revolution” in Miranda Beaven Remnek 
(ed.). Books in Russia and the Soviet Union: Past and Present. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 
1991, p. 59-91. 
123 Ermoleav. Censorship in Soviet Literature, p. 3. 
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formal printing permission be given. This kind of full-fledged pre-publication 
censorship required massive manpower, and by 1939 Glavlit had grown into a 
gargantuan operation employing over 6,000 personnel in Moscow and its 
provincial outlets, supervising all newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, the 
TASS news agency, and the public library system. Glavlit issued its own internal 
bulletin and published handbooks on banned issues. Furthermore, it cooperated 
closely with the GPU (the secret police); the coercive side of censorship thus 
loomed always in the background.124 
While many countries in the socialist world emulated the Soviet system,125 
the CCP opted for a different path. In the PRC, no institutional bureaucratic regime 
of pre-publication censorship was ever instituted. Different reasons can be 
established for the Chinese decision not to copy this aspect of the Soviet system 
of governance. First, there is the question of manpower: when the CCP rose to 
power in 1949, its reserve of literate, trained and reliable cadres was stretched 
extremely thin in the effort to organize the multitude of administrative tasks. Even a 
field as crucial as the propaganda sector had to do with scarce resources, as the 
next chapter will illustrate. Born out of these circumstances of strain, however, was 
also a very different approach to governance: the CCP always favoured methods 
of indirect control of the population, as opposed to heavy-handed policing. This is 
obvious from the fact that the secret police and the secret service never played a 
role in the internal affairs of the PRC comparable to that of the GPU in the Soviet 
Union or the “Stasi” in East Germany, where at times roughly ten percent of the 
population were spying on each other and were registered with the Ministry of 
Public Security as “unofficial employees.”126 With its political campaigns, the CCP 
developed in the early years of the PRC an approach to mobilizing and policing 
the population that proved much more effective than the bureaucratic approach of 
the Soviet Union: the psychological impact of the campaigns produced pressures 
to conform and participate that led to a high degree of compliance on the side of 
                                             
124 Ibid., Introduction and ch. 1. The 1939 figure is from ch. 2. 
125 A fascinating insight into the Polish censorship regime is given in Jane Leftwich Curry. The 
Blackbook of Polish Censorship. New York: Vintage Books, 1984. 
126 David Childs, Richard Popplewell. The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security 
Service. New York: New York University Press, 1996. On the Chinese intelligence services see 
Roger Faligot, Rémi Kauffer. The Chinese Secret Service. New York: Morrow, 1989. See also 
Zhong Kan. Kang Sheng pingzhuan. Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1982. 
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the individual. Even without permanent controls, the very eventuality of being 
subjected to the psychological agony and the enormous peer pressure that 
campaign victims faced, did suffice to force large parts of the Chinese population 
into compliance for decades.127 How little leeway dissenting voices could find, and 
how fragile and isolated the individual forays of these voices in fact were, becomes 
only visible in comparison to the strong traditions of dissent in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, be it the Russian samizdat press in the 1970s or the highly 
organized political opposition in Poland in the 1980s. Nothing comparable could 
ever develop in China after 1949.128 
The mass campaign approach to governance and the techniques of 
psychological persuasion have shaped the propaganda sector. The numbers of 
staff of the CCP PD – never exceeding 500 – are dwarfed by those of the Soviet 
Glavlit, an institution with in fact a much narrower field of activity. Under these 
circumstances, comprehensive pre-publication censorship was feasible at no point 
in the history of the PRC,129 it would outright impossible today: there are about 
2,000 newspapers and 8,200 magazines in the PRC, and about 83,000 new books 
are produced annually130 – far too many to be controlled comprehensively by any 
bureaucracy. 
                                             
127 On the mechanics of mass campaigns see Gordon Bennett. Yundong: Mass Campaigns in 
Chinese Communist Leadership. Berkeley: Center of Chinese Studies, 1976. 
128 Tomasz Goban-Klas (in an otherwise disappointing book) shows to what degree media workers 
of the solidarity movement could free themselves of the grip of Polish state. The Orchestration of 
the Media: The Politics of Mass Communication in Communist Poland and the Aftermath. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994, ch. 10-12. 
129 The only exception here is film: even in the reform era, the number of films produced annually in 
the PRC never rose to a point where films could not be subjected to comprehensive and detailed 
scrutiny by the PD’s Film Bureau. Film scripts are inspected before filming starts, and the finished 
films are again subject to inspection before they are allowed to be screened. In the scale of 
sensitivity of the different media forms introduced in chapter one, film ranks at the top, which 
explains the unusual amount of attention film receives. The financial and technical input required 
for the production of film has facilitated the CCP’s efforts of control, as the non-official production of 
films was all but impossible until the advent of VHS systems and hand-held video cameras. 
Chinese film producers have turned to foreign sources of financing to avoid harassment of the 
propaganda authorities, and to have the possibility to show their films abroad in case they are not 
cleared by the PD for domestic screening. Film censorship is regulated by “Dianying shencha 
zanxing guiding” (issued by the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, June 4, 1993). See 
Xingzhengyuan dalu weiyuanhui. Dalu dazhong chuanbo fangui huibian, p. 399-406. On 
censorship in the field of television see the section on the TV series Heshang in chapter eight. 
130 Figures (for 1999) from Guojia tongjibu (ed.). Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000. Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 2000, p. 752. 
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Yet the absence of full-scale pre-publication censorship does not mean that 
there are no institutionalized censorship mechanisms in the PRC.131 First of all, the 
big central-level newspapers are compiled in close cooperation with the Party 
leadership.132 Next, there is indeed pre-publication censorship for books on a 
small range of topics, such as religion, minority issues, Party history, Party and 
state leaders, or the Cultural Revolution.133 Works on these subjects are 
considered sensitive enough to require an inspection of the manuscript, in some 
cases by specialists like those of the Central Party School.134 Maps have to be 
checked by the National Bureau of Cartography (Guojia cehuiju 国家测绘局).135 It 
is in these sensitive areas that the Party feels its basic interests are at stake; 
books on such topics thus receive special scrutiny. The bulk of publications in the 
PRC, however, is controlled by other mechanisms. 
A PPA document issued in 1994 details the forms of censorship for 
books:136 
The characteristics of the administration of book publishing require not only to make 
ex-post investigations of books already published, but also to examine the Book 
Publishing Title Selection Plans (BPTSP), in order to understand and to analyze from a 
macro-perspective the total number, structure, characteristics, and trends of books to 
be published. Therefore, book inspection does here include two aspects: 
a. Inspection of BPTSP 
Inspection of BPTSP means normally the inspection of the annual BPTSP and 
specially submitted BPTSPs. For specially submitted BPTSPs, in accordance with the 
relevant guidelines, in addition to the title selection plan, the manuscript [itself] will be 
inspected.  
b. Inspection of books already published 
Special inspection is targeted; for books that might arouse problems or where problems 
have been indicated by sides concerned, special inspectors are organized to carry out 
inspection. 
Normal inspection is routine inspection of books published, with the intention of 
discovering problems, understanding trends, and grasping the trends of publishing. 
 
                                             
131 There is no word in Chinese specifically referring to “suppression or prohibition of speech or 
writing” (this being the English definition). In official documents, a number of terms are used to 
characterize the activities usually associated with censorship, including jiancha 检查, shencha 审查, 
shendu 审读, and sometimes yanjiu 研究 and jiandu 监督. None of these, however, carries the 
same negative connotations generally implied by “censorship.” 
132 See esp. Wu Guoguang. “Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the 
People’s Daily” in CQ 137 (March 1994), p. 194-211. 
133 Interviewees 101, 105, 106. 
134 Interviewee 002, summer 2000. 
135 See “Ditu shenhe guanli banfa” in Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1997, p. 278-80. 
136 “Guanyu jiaqiang tushu shendu gongzuo de tongzhi” (dated June 16, 1994) in Zhongguo 
chuban nianjian 1995, p. 230-31. 
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The PPA conducts pre-publication and post-publication censorship. Pre-
publication censorship is based primarily on publication plans (BPTSP) that all 
publishing houses must submit annually to the PPA; the PPA (or the local organs) 
then decides which of the books on the plan can be published without further 
notice, and which manuscripts must be submitted before publication. The annual 
publication plans must be handed over to the provincial Press and Publication 
Bureaus in December, and are consequently passed on upwards to the PPA. The 
publication plans must contain the title of every book to be published in the next 
year, the name of the author, and a short outline of the content, usually two to 
three lines.137 The manuscripts of books listed in the “specially submitted BPTSPs” 
must be submitted to the PPA together with a report on their specific “problems,” 
as well as a proposal of how to deal with them (article 3 of the document). 
Post-publication censorship can be targeted, which means the inspection of 
publications that have already drawn criticism; but post-publication censorship is 
conducted also on the basis of routine screening. The document quoted above 
stipulates that this screening be conducted in the form of biweekly and quarterly 
reports of the local Press and Publication Bureaus to the PPA (article 4). These 
reports shall provide up-to-date information on the latest developments in the 
publishing sector so as to facilitate quick responses. The reports will be reprinted 
in a publication called Quanguo fapai xinshu banyuebao 全国发排新书半月报, 
issued by the Information Center (Xinxi zhongxin 信息中心) of the PPA. 
Organizationally, a vice-head of each provincial Press and Publication Bureau is 
supposed to oversee post-publication censorship, which is carried out by 
especially appointed “book inspection teams” (shendu banzi 审读班子, see article 
6); the names of the members of these teams, i.e. the “responsible persons,” must 
be reported to the PPA. 
Conducting pre-publication censorship for periodicals is more difficult due to 
tight publishing schedules and time constraints. Newspapers and journals are 
therefore usually subjected to post-publication censorship. There can be 
exceptions, however: for half a year after the suppression of the 1989 Democracy 
                                             
137 Interviews summer 2000. Very extensive publication plans have been a major tool of the 
coordination and supervision of book publishing in the Soviet Union. See Walker. Soviet Book 
Publishing Policy, p. 39-44. 
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Movement, the liberal journal Dushu was required to have each issue approved 
before publication.138 Drastic measures like these, however, are the exception to 
the rule. The publication administration authorities normally use other means to 
direct the publishing policy of Chinese periodicals; circulars inhibiting reports on a 
specific subject are often carried in the CCP Propaganda Department’s journal 
Xuanchuan dongtai. In early 1996, the propaganda authorities anticipated the 
interest of many magazines and publishers in the 30th anniversary of the start of 
the Cultural Revolution. To avoid widespread public discussions, the CCP issued a 
circular in April that year, strictly forbidding any commemorative articles in journals 
and other activities. When the journal Dongfang zazhi 东方杂志 defied the order, it 
was shut down. Yet the Party’s behaviour is stereotyped and thus can be guessed 
in advance; in the particular case, Dushu magazine had anticipated the Centre’s 
move and published its articles on that subject in February, thus avoiding any 
serious consequences.139 
In the majority of cases, however, the CCP relies on post-publication 
censorship to check the compliance of the media. For this system to function 
properly, the CCP has developed a unique mechanism which is called the 
“responsibility system” (zeren zhi 责任制). While in a centralized censorship 
regime the ultimate responsibility for the content of a publication rests with the 
censors, the CCP has shifted this responsibility one level downwards, to the 
editors. Editing is consequently said to be “the key link of the publishing houses’ 
work; to ensure good editing is the key to realize publication plans and to raise the 
quality of books.”140 In practice, the “responsible editor system” means that the 
editor of a particular magazine or book is responsible for its content. A 1980 
document requires that “the responsible editor must carefully edit, refine, and 
organize those manuscripts that have been accepted. If there are any problems, 
like [passages that] contravene the current state laws and policies or leak party 
and state secrets, as well as omissions and defects of content or argumentation, 
the responsible editor should turn with his criticism to the author or should discuss 
                                             
138 Interviewee 109. 
139 Interviewee 109. 
140 “Chuban gongzuo zanxing tiaoli,” issued by the CCP PD (dated April 22, 1980), in Zhongguo 
chuban nianjian 1980, p. 624-28, here p. 625. 
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revisions with him.”141 Chinese editors thus shoulder tasks that go far beyond the 
mere editing of texts: they have to judge the content’s compliance with state laws 
and Party principles and policies. 
Under the “editor responsibility system,” editors are made responsible for 
anything they have allowed to pass for good. § 24 of the 1997 “Administrative 
Regulations for Publishing” has the editors assume legal liability: “The publishing 
units practice the system of editor responsibility and guarantee that the content of 
the publications is in accordance with the provisions of these regulations.”142 As a 
rule, no book can appear without the name of the “responsible editor” (zeren bianji 
责任编辑) appearing in the imprint information. By making the editors guarantee 
for the publications they handle, they are taking over censorial functions – the 
“responsible editor system” is in fact the key element of censorship in the PRC. If 
any problems are found with a given book upon publication, the authorities can 
track down the culprit without even contacting the publishing house. For periodical 
publications, the situation is slightly different: while some journals list the names of 
editors of single articles, most do not do so;143 the editor-in-chief of a periodical is 
generally responsible for the content of the entire issue. The editors-in-chief of 
newspapers shoulder even heavier responsibilities.144 
Incidents of editors being made liable for works found to have problems 
abound. When Zhang Xianliang’s 张贤亮 novel Zao’an! Pengyou 早安！朋友 drew 
criticism in spring 1987 for describing the sexual psychology of middle school 
students, the Ningxia magazine Shuofang 朔方 was ordered to stop serializing the 
book. The authorities turned with their complaints to the journal office and the 
editors, who were accused of having violated guidelines concerning pornography; 
                                             
141 Ibid. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in practice editors “discuss revisions” only with the most 
influential authors; very often, changes are carried out without further notice to the author. 
142 In Zhongguo chuban nianjian 1998, here p. 231. Emphasis added. 
143 Among literary journals, for example, the renowned Shouhuo 收获 does not publish the names 
of editors of individual pieces, nor do Dushu 读书 or Wenxue yichan 文学遗产; Dangdai 当代 does 
since 1996, Zhongshan 钟山 since about 1994, and Shiyue 十月 since spring 1989. The situation 
looks similar for non-literary journals. Overall, the number of journals providing the names of 
responsible editors is on the rise, implying an increasing stress on control. 
144 Legislation in the U.S. follows exactly the opposite logic. In a landmark ruling in 1997, the 
Supreme Court declared the 1996 Communications Decency Act unconstitutional, on the grounds 
that it would impose too high thresholds on Internet service providers that could result in legal 
liability. See http://www.ciec.org/SC_appeal/decision.shtml (downloaded Dec. 1, 2005). 
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the author, however, was by and large left alone.145 In spring 2000 the novel 
Shanghai baobei 上海宝贝 by the upstart author Zhou Weihui 周卫慧 came under 
attack and was consequently withdrawn from circulation; the book’s publisher, the 
Shenyang based Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe 春风文艺出版社, an innovative 
publishing house with a solid reputation, was made to bear the blame. The editors 
of the book were fired and the entire editorial board was “rectified” (zhengdun 整
顿).146 The remarkable point, however, is that the author herself was left alone; 
bad press notwithstanding, she continued to write and give interviews. As so often, 
the condemnation of the book had the adverse effect of creating curiosity that 
greatly increased Zhou Weihui’s publicity, producing a run on pirated copies that 
suddenly were available everywhere and brought the book to the attention of 
Taiwan and international publishers.147 While denouncing Shanghai baobei has 
backfired on the surface, the penalties handed out created a strong disincentive 
for serious publishers (not so for illegal publishers attracted by the amounts of 
income generated by the hype) to engage in similar projects. At the same time, the 
Chinese government avoided international condemnation that would inevitably 
have followed the persecution of a writer. Punishing the editors is far more 
economical. 
The “responsibility system” targets not only the “responsible editor” of a 
given book or magazine article, but is extended to the entire hierarchy of the 
media unit in question through the “three tier system” (san ceng zhidu 三层制度), 
commonly known as “triple inspection system” (san shen zhi 三审制): books and 
articles that are prepared for publication must be examined and approved on three 
layers within the publishing unit before going to print. These procedures are 
mandated by official documents guiding publishing: “To make general judgments 
concerning the political content and the academic (artistic) quality of a manuscript, 
and to decide whether or not to use it, [publishing houses] should normally adopt 
the three layer system of examining manuscripts, i.e., preliminary examination by 
                                             
145 See “Publishing: Unified management,” p. 17. On Zhang Xianliang see the articles by Perry Link, 
Jeffrey C. Kinkley, Yenna Wu, and Philip E. Williams in Asia Major 4.2, 1991. 
146 Interviewees 106 and 002. See also Craig S. Smith. “A ‘Decadent Best-Seller’ Provokes 
Beijing’s Wrath” in International Herald Tribune, May 12, 2000. 
147 See Suh-kyong Yoon. “The Crying Game” in Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr. 12, 2001, p. 
64-66, here p. 66. 
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the editor (or assistant editor), re-, and final examination by the chief of the 
editorial board and the editor-in-chief.”148 Responsibility is thus shared on the three 
technical levels within publishing units, with the “responsible editors” shouldering 
the heaviest load. Yet if a publisher is found to have overstepped the rules, the 
upper two layers can also be blamed. 
Similar processes are at work in the newspaper system: the vice editor-in-
chiefs responsible for particular sections (for example national news, literature and 
art, or economic news) must pass upwards their print sheets; only after approval 
from the editor-in-chief (who is usually also responsible for the yaowen 要闻, i.e. 
“important news” section on page one) can the paper be printed. In exceptional 
cases, the editor-in-chief might refer single pieces to higher levels, mostly the PD, 
for approval. In most cases, however, newspapers work through the responsibility 
system.149 In recent years, the responsibility system has been further expanded to 
cover the new media; for the Internet it has been in place since 2002.150 
On a psychological plane, the system of editor responsibility is based on the 
assumption that individuals in the publishing process will react to pressure exerted 
on them by avoiding conflict and complying with the rules. The three-tier system 
provides additional checks: it is considered rather unlikely that three individual 
editors on different hierarchical levels will take the risk to offend the authorities, 
even given other incentives (for example, of a financial nature). Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of violations that have occurred in spite of the responsibility 
system seem to concern the ban on pornography, a particularly lucrative business 
where the expected monetary rewards make the risk worthwhile. Instances of 
political dissent in the Chinese media, in contrast, have been and still are few and 
far between. The success of the CCP’s efforts to mute dissenting political voices in 
the media must be attributed to a large degree to the psychological pressures of 
the editor responsibility system. 
                                             
148 “Chuban gongzuo zanxing tiaoli” (1980), p. 625. On the “triple responsibility system” see also 
Chen Fong-ching and Jin Guantao. From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese 
Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation, 1979-1989. Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1997, p. 99. 
149 Interviewee 002 summer 2000. See also Wu Guoguang. “Command Communication.” 
150 Li Liang, Yu Li. “Shisi bu-wei lianhe ‘jinghua’ hulianwang” Nanfang zhoumo, 18 Aug. 2005, at 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4428 (downloaded 07 Apr. 2007). 
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Finally, self-censorship plays a significant role in the control of the media.151 
Avoidance of politically sensitive topics on the side of the authors has become 
especially relevant in the depoliticized setting of the reform era, when topics no 
longer classified as sensitive were available in abundance. Many authors’ interest 
in political issues declined with the normalization of social relations after the 
Cultural Revolution and especially with the rise of consumerism in the 1990s. For 
a variety of reasons, only a small minority of writers is willing to address topics that 
at best might prove difficult to publish, and at worst will bring them into serious 
conflict with the bureaucracy. Authors have always tended to write only things that 
they could reasonably expect to be published in the foreseeable future. Writing for 
the drawer is an option appealing to only few writers. Even during the Cultural 
Revolution, when publishing was almost impossible, those writers that continued 
writing did so with the hope of a relaxation of the political climate. What they had in 
mind, however, was not a full-fledged opening up of the system, but rather a return 
to a situation comparable to that of the 1950s; consequently, the “implied censor” 
was at work even in these “manuscripts for the drawer.”152 This became obvious 
when these works could be published in the years immediately following the 
Cultural Revolution: most of them were felt to be written in an ideological and 
theoretical straightjacket all too rigid for the liberal 1980s; they had lost their 
appeal within a few years. 
To sum up, censorship does exist in the PRC and it has taken many 
different forms. These forms, however, differ significantly from the heavy-handed 
bureaucratic censorship regimes once practiced in the Soviet Union and most 
Eastern European countries. These differences are related to the nature of the 
Chinese media concept: the media concept gives absolute power in the media 
sector to the CCP and also provides the rationale for this construction. The 
concept itself, however, is formulated in a relatively vague and open manner; it 
refrains from giving too rigid prescriptions. Consequently, the Party can chose 
whatever means available at a given time to translate the vision provided by the 
media concept into concrete political terms. This flexibility guaranteed the success 
                                             
151 On the topic of self-censorship see Bonnie S. McDougall. “Censorship and Self-Censorship in 
Contemporary Chinese Literature” in Whitfield (ed.). After the Event, p. 73-90. 
152 The concept of the “implied censor,” always present in a writer’s back of the mind, has been 
advanced by Rudolf Wagner in an unpublished paper “The Implied Censor in Chinese Literature.” I 
am grateful to the author for making this paper available to me. 
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of the concept in the Yan’an era, when the CCP found itself under serious material 
constraints; it proved to be the winning formula once again in 1949. Faced with a 
serious shortage of qualified personnel the Party was forced to find alternative 
mechanisms to control the media. As a result, the CCP built a censorship regime 
that was based less on comprehensive pre-publication censorship than on 
psychological pressures to enforce the compliance of the media. These pressures 
are directed at authors, who succumb to self-censorship in order to have a realistic 
chance of getting their manuscripts published. More importantly, editors in China’s 
publishing houses and newspaper offices bear the brunt of publishing control: 
through the editor responsibility system – a genuine Chinese invention – they are 
made responsible for whatever they allow to pass. If, in retrospect, any book or 
article is found to have overstepped the limits set by the Party, the editors are held 
liable and may be punished. In the long run, the psychological approach to 
censorship proved to be not only economical, but much more effective than the 
Soviet model: printed public expression of dissent in the PRC never reached the 
scale it did in other regimes of the Socialist world. 
 
* * * 
 
The above conclusions with regard to the nature of censorship in the PRC 
can in fact be extended to the whole apparatus of media controls: the CCP exerts 
control primarily through indirect mechanisms. The impact of these mechanisms 
may not be as obvious as the official stamp of censorship approval in Soviet books, 
but in the long run they have proved much more effective than the Orwellian 
bureaucracy of control practiced in the Soviet Union (or, for that, the control efforts 
of the GMD). 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of the mechanics of control in 
the Chinese media sector. These mechanisms – the ideological framework, the 
administration of control, the bureaucratic regulation of the sector, the control of 
information flow and information access, discourse control and control of language 
– work in concert to provide the CCP with a tight grip on the entire Chinese media 
landscape: the media operate in a framework characterized by constrains of 
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several different layers. These restraints are geared to direct the media’s day-to-
day operations, and to define their general direction – to serve the Party’s cause. 
A key feature of the framework outlined in this chapter is its flexibility. The 
Party’s media concept is not monolithic, and neither are the mechanics of control. 
It is very much up to the Party to decide which elements of the media concept to 
stress at a given time, and to determine the degree to which each element of the 
mechanics of control is to be enforced. The functional separation of control 
mechanisms and enforcement mechanisms is at the very root of the CCP’s media 
management. While the demands for compliance with all features of the control 
network are in effect constantly, the Party can decide ad hoc on how much leeway 
it allows the media the put into practice the daily instructions from the Party 
leadership. The system works not so much through constant enforcement of all 
demands on all layers, but rather through the mere existence of these demands 
and the very potential of the Party to demand a literal interpretation when this is 
deemed desirable. By decentralizing responsibility but keeping up the pressure at 
the theoretical level, the CCP has greatly reduced the costs of control, all the while 
balancing the needs of a high degree of control and a maximum amount of 
flexibility to adapt to the demands of the actual policy process. 
Under these circumstances, the media operate in a highly instable 
environment that, on the once hand, periodically provides them with opportunities 
to explore niches and pursue their own ideas, once the Party centre signals 
controls to the relaxed. On the other hand, they must beware of backlashes and 
keep their experiments within a narrowly circumscribed frame. This makes media 
emancipation of the Solidarnosc type all by impossible in the PRC. The separation 
of claims to control and actual enforcement has become especially visible in the 
reform era. Since the early 1980s, the CCP has withdrawn from day-to-day 
management of many areas of social life, resulting in a considerable relaxation of 
the political atmosphere, a relaxation that is apparent in the media sector as well. 
However, the Party has given up neither its claim to absolute authority over the 
public sphere and its vigilance regarding undesirable trends. The majority of the 
examples I have referred to in the sections of this chapter were in fact taken from 
the reform era, rather than the pre-1976 era. The CCP has rebuilt the control 
architecture only in so far as to retain control of the media sector against claims 
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coming from a variety of directions: market forces, globalization, a more 
sophisticated population, and technological change all have made inroads into the 
Chinese media sector. Yet neither of these has been able to seriously erode the 
Party’s ability to ensure control. How strong controls of the media remain even in 
the 21st century becomes obvious in particular in those issue areas considered 
crucial enough to touch the basic interests of the Party. The CCP has shown once 
and again, with sometimes harsh interventions, that the mechanics of control are 
firmly in place and that they work. 
The discussion in this chapter has been ahistoric by design; my aim was to 
provide an outline of those measures of control that media personnel in the PRC 
have faced and face in their daily work. The individual mechanisms of control 
identified in this chapter have been remarkably stable throughout the period from 
1949 to the present. At the same time, however, it is clear that the above 
discussion has necessarily focused on the normative aspects of the system. The 
mechanics of control have been presented primarily as the Party sees them, 
emphasis has been placed on their intended, as opposed to their actual functions. 
I have hinted to the messy everyday business of media making, to the some 
complex realities, at various points in the sections of this chapter, but its main 
purpose has been to provide a more or less systematic sketch of the mechanics of 
control that, in their entirety, affect the day-to-day decisions in the media sector. 
The second part of this study now turns to these concrete issues of day-to-
day media work, and examines in five case studies how the CCP’s media concept 
has affected the choices and the actions of the players in the media sector, and in 
how far the outcomes of these processes must be related to the media concept. 
The case studies, taken from very different periods covering half a century, can 
have only the character of illustrations. These illustrations, however, shall help us 
understand how media control works in the PRC. 

Chapter Five 
Books for New China:  
Xinhua Shudian and the Transformation of Chinese Book Publishing 
 
“My heart beats for my motherland and my mind is with my compatriots; full 
of remorse and anxiety I want to call one last time on the whole nation to 
persist and unite in the war of resistance, so as to introduce at the earliest 
possible day a truly democratic system and to establish an independent, 
free, and prosperous new China.” 
(Zou Taofen, Last Will, 1944) 
 
“...when the enemy attacked southern Shandong in 1947, many bookstores 
upheld their work; the comrades of the bookstore in Linshu county took up 
weapons while continuing sales; they hid their books in the mountain 
gullies, grasped their guns and stood sentry together with the militia in 
order to protect their assets.” 
(Xinhua shudian baogao, 1950) 
 
The chapters in part one of this study have considered the origins of the 
CCP’s media concept as well as its normative stipulations. I will now leave the 
Yan’an laboratory in order to see how this normative plane relates to the empirical 
reality of the media sector: the CCP media concept has been introduced as an 
auxiliary construction that I have extrapolated from the Party’s writings on media 
issues in order to help us understand how the media in the PRC are working, and 
how they are related to the Chinese state and to society. This chapter addresses 
the earliest years of the PRC. Upon assuming power, the CCP had to translate its 
vision of propaganda into political and administrative practice on a national scale 
within the shortest possible period of time. I will illustrate this process, and the 
problems and debates surrounding it, through a discussion of the transformation of 
the Chinese publishing sector from a highly competitive, market-driven industry 
into a government-managed propaganda bureaucracy between 1949 and 1951. 
The accelerating collapse of the GMD regime since late 1948 and the CCP 
takeover of key cities and entire provinces confronted the CPP with problems 
hitherto unknown; the construction of a functioning governing apparatus was a 
momentous task and, at the same time, the first major test for the Party’s 
administrative ideas.1 In this chapter, I will illustrate the challenges the CCP was 
                                             
1 Several studies have investigated the CCP takeover and the associated problems on the ground: 
Ezra Vogel. Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969; Kenneth G. Lieberthal. Revolution and Tradition in 
Tientsin, 1949-1952. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980; and more recently, James Z. Gao. 
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facing in one particular sector of the propaganda xitong, the publishing industry. 
How did the CCP’s media concept inform decision-making in the takeover process? 
How literally could the theoretical prescriptions be applied? Was the Party forced 
to amend the concept in order to meet practical needs? And how was the Chinese 
concept mediated with Soviet advice? 
To answer these questions, I will contrast the fate of the two most important 
CCP-led publishing houses, Sanlian shudian 三联书店 and Xinhua shudian 新华书
店, in the takeover period. Both Sanlian and Xinhua were controlled by the Party, 
products of the CCP’s pre-1949 activities in the publishing sector, yet they 
represent two very different approaches to Party leadership in the media sector. 
Sanlian and its three predecessors had started as independent ventures, but since 
1937 had been co-opted by the CCP. While they received instructions from the 
Party centre through CCP-affiliated or –appointed personnel in the the company’s 
leadership, they remained nominally independent in a classic United Front 
approach designed win the cooperation of sympathetic non-Party groups. As the 
Party’s most sophisticated publishing venture, Sanlian had worked successfully in 
the urban areas under GMD control and had gained significant experience in 
Shanghai’s commercialized urban publishing landscape. Xinhua, in contrast, had 
been under direct bureaucratic control of the CCP since its inception in Yan’an and 
had fought side by side with the CCP in its guerrilla bases and in the liberated rural 
base areas. 
For the Party’s purposes of rapidly unifying the Chinese publishing industry 
and building a national administrative infrastructure, Sanlian would undoubtedly 
have provided the better point of departure: it was knowledgeable of the urban 
industrial and market-driven environment, it had a proven ability of reaching out to 
intellectuals (an important group whose technical expertise was crucial for the task 
of socialist construction), and it was financially successful (another important asset 
at a time of severe fiscal strain). Nonetheless, Sanlian was never seriously 
considered as a role model;2 the Party leadership regarded Xinhua as the only 
                                                                                                                                      
The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou: The Transformation of City and Cadre, 1949-1954. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
2 In the early 1980s, the Sanlian model was unearthed by a group of intellectuals associated with 
the Sanlian tradition and presented as a “missed alternative option.” This perspective, however, 
figuring prominently in a massive amount of retrospective literature, must be seen as a rhetorical 
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viable choice for the modelling of a socialist publication sector. The CCP 
demanded comprehensive and direct bureaucratic control, even if this would mean 
operational problems in the short run. Since early 1949, the operations of Xinhua 
were expanded rapidly to make it a national state-owned monolith and the 
foremost regulator of the industry. At the same time, Sanlian was dismantled; its 
most experienced staff was transferred – paradoxically – to either the emerging 
bureaucratic institutions for the publishing sector, or to Xinhua and the work units 
under the control of the Xinhua network. 
This choice, I will show, was directly related to the media concept. The 
Party was ready to accept setbacks and disruptions of the industry in favour of a 
literal interpretation of the media concept: the media concept demanded nothing 
less than direct and exclusive CCP control of all media, to make them into the 
Party’s mouthpiece, and to prevent them from being hijacked by class enemies. 
For these reasons, the pace of the publishing industry’s nationalization moved far 
ahead of practically all other sectors of industry and commerce, practically 
skipping the transitional phase of joint management and ownerships that most 
other industrial and commercial sectors went through before 1956. This rush, I will 
argue, must be attributed to the Party’s desire to transform the Chinese publishing 
sector from a market-driven industry into a government-managed bureaucracy as 
fast as possible. 
On the following pages, I will first sketch the basic structure of the Chinese 
publishing industry in the 1930s and 1940s, so as to provide the backdrop for the 
processes taking place between 1949 and 1951. I will then outline the experiences 
of Sanlian shudian and Xinhua shudian as CCP-led publishers. The main sections 
of this chapter reconstruct the difficult and by no means linear process that led to 
the emergence of the new administrative infrastructure for the publishing sector, 
and the role of Soviet advisors in this process. The transformation of the Chinese 
publishing industry illustrates the challenges the Party faced, and the price it was 
ready to pay, in the effort to bring day-to-day media work in line with the normative 
prescriptions of the media concept. 
                                                                                                                                      
move employed in an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort in the 1980s to promote reforms and work 
towards greater independence for the publishing sector. I have discussed these issues in “People’s 
Publishing: The Transformation of the Chinese Publishing Sector, 1942-1952,” paper presented at 
the XIVth Biennial Conference of the European Association of Chinese Studies, Moscow, 26-28 
August 2002. In 1949, the “Sanlian approach” was not an option. 
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The Backdrop: Publishing in Republican China 
The Yan’an-based Xinhua bookstore must be regarded as both a product of, 
and a critical reaction to, the publishing industry of Republican China. Xinhua was 
the CCP’s answer to the state of contemporary publishing, yet it also interacted 
with its environment through its publications, as well as on the level of ideas. This 
section provides a short sketch of the publishing sector in the Republican era. 
Modern book publishing arrived in China in the latter half of the 19th century. 
Ernest Major set up not only the Shenbao, but – driven by the pursuit of profit that 
had also motivated his newspaper project – also ventured into the book publishing 
business. Both commercial and non-commercial publishing had experienced rapid 
growth during the Qing dynasty. Intellectuals in the Jiangnan region, notably 
around Suzhou, increased their publishing activities, while private printing-shops 
especially in Fujian mass-produced cheap editions that were sold through agents 
even into far-away regions; as a result, both the availability of books and general 
literacy rose considerably.3 
Yet the Shenbaoguan brought to China new methods of management and 
new technology: it produced affordable high-quality editions of the classics and 
other materials that were in strong demand by literati for use in the preparation for 
the civil service examinations. The Shenbaoguan hired intellectuals to select the 
texts and prepare them for printing; the editions were produced with movable 
letter-type and were meticulously proof-read, and consequently advertised in the 
Shenbao newspaper and sold nationwide through the Shenbao’s distribution 
network. The success of the Shenbaoguan editions showed that there was 
                                             
3 On Qing publishing see Benjamin A. Elman. From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social 
Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China. Cambridge, Ma.: Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, 1984, ch. 4; Cynthia J. Brokaw, Kai-wing Chow (eds.). Printing and Book 
Culture in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; Kai-wing Chow. 
Publishing, Culture, and Power in Early Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University press, 2004. 
For the Fujian publishers see Brokaw. Commerce in Culture: The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing 
and Republican Periods. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007; and “Commercial 
Publishing in Late Imperial China: The Zou and Ma Family Businesses of Sibao, Fujian” in Late 
Imperial China 17.1 (1996), p. 49-92. On the connection of mass print culture and literacy in Qing 
China see Evelyn S. Rawski. Education and Popular Literacy in Ch’ing China. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1979. 
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considerable demand for books produced commercially with modern technology 
and management.4 
The dominant players of the publishing industry of Republican China, too, 
relied on cutting-edge technology and high editing standards. Shangwu 
yinshuguan 商务印书馆 (founded 1897) and Zhonghua shuju 中华书局 (set up 
1912), owed their success to their school textbooks series that conquered the 
market in the first two decades of the 20th century.5 Both publishers were set up by 
intellectuals who imported foreign know-how and equipment to build publishing 
empires with state-of-the-art technology. Like the Shenbaoguan, they set up shop 
in Shanghai, the city that had emerged as the new publishing hub under the late 
Qing. The fusion of commerce and culture that characterized the Shanghai’s 
economic infrastructure profoundly influenced the direction of the publishing 
industry. As Leo Lee has argued, the new print culture gave rise to the emergence 
of modernity in Shanghai, from where it spread to other parts of China.6 
In the aftermath of the May Fourth enlightenment movement, numerous 
publishing businesses sprang up in Beijing and especially in Shanghai. Best-
known today are those ventures set up by prominent intellectuals (or people who 
would rise to prominence later), such as Beixin shuju 北新书局 and Kaiming 
shudian 开明书店.7 While operating on a commercial basis (frequent bankruptcies 
attest to this point), these publishers had the same function as the “advocacy 
press:” to provide an outlet for the various political voices that contended for 
                                             
4 Rudolf G. Wagner. “Ernest Major’s Shenbaoguan and the Formation of Late Qing Print Culture.” 
Paper presented at the conference “Creating a Multiethnic Identity: the Shanghai Concessions, 
1850-1910,” Heidelberg, June 7-9, 1998. 
5 On textbook publishing see Robert Culp. “‘China – the Land and its People:’ Fashioning Identity in 
Secondary School History Textbooks, 1911-37.” in Twentieth-Century China 26.2 (2001), p. 17-62. 
6 Leo Ou-fan Lee. Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945. 
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1999, ch. 2. The importance of printing and publishing 
was first established in Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin’s classic The Coming of the Book: 
The Impact of Printing, 1450-1800. London: Verso, 1997 (orig. 1958). On publishing in Shanghai 
see further Christopher A. Reed. Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004. 
7 Beixin (founded in 1925) was supported by Lu Xun and other writers. Kaiming was set up by 
Zhang Xichen, a professional publisher, but attracted the support of many leading writers, such as 
Mao Dun, Ba Jin, and Xia Yan. On Beixin see Li Xiaofeng. “Lu Xun xiansheng yu Beixin shuju” in 
Chuban shiliao 8 (1987.2), p. 31-32. On Kaiming see Song Yunbin. “Kaiming jiu shi: Wo suo zhidao 
de Kaiming shudian” in Wenshi ziliao xuanji 31 (1962.10), p. 1-30, and the contributions to 
Zhongguo chuban gongzuozhe xiehui (ed.). Wo yu Kaiming. Shanghai: Zhongguo qingnian 
chubanshe, 1985. Compare also Jan Kiely. “Third Force Periodicals in China, 1928-1949: 
Introduction and Annotated Bibliography” in Republican China 21.1 (1995), p. 129-168. 
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influence on the marketplace of ideas. These “advocacy publishers” were 
nonetheless outnumbered by the purely commercial publishing enterprises that 
flooded the market of Shanghai and beyond with cheap entertainment literature.8 
Often small and smallest scale operations, most of these businesses could survive 
in an environment of cut-throat competition only through specialization into narrow-
defined but lucrative niche markets, such as comics publishing or martial arts 
fiction. 
At the other end of the scale, a publishing cartel composed of the “six big” 
names (Shangwu, Zhonghua, Shijie shuju 世界书局, Dadong shuju 大东书局, the 
GMD-owned Zhengzhong shuju 正中书局, and Kaiming) rose to an oligarchic 
position in the 1930s. They divided up the most lucrative market segment, 
textbook publishing, among themselves and, by 1949, were making a staggering 
70 per cent of their profits from schools textbooks.9 The GMD intervened into the 
business of the publishing enterprises through censorship, through regulations for 
the publishers who were made to support the Party’s project of “tutelage” of the 
Chinese people,10 and finally by founding its own venture, Zhengzhong shuju.11 
The GMD did not, however, undertake any efforts to abolish the capitalist 
organization of the publishing market itself. Such steps were left to the CCP. When 
the Communists ascended to power in 1949, they found a publishing industry that 
had suffered from the Japanese occupation and from civil war, but was 
                                             
8 While the literature produced by these publishers, often called “mandarin ducks and butterfly 
fiction” (yuanyang hudie pai xiaoshuo 鸳鸯蝴蝶派小说), has received increasing scholarly attention, 
research into the journals where this fiction was published has begun only in recent years. See 
Perry E. Link. Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies: Popular Fiction in Early Twentieth Century Chinese 
Cities. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. Denise Gimpel. Lost Voices of Modernity: A 
Chinese Popular Fiction Magazine in Context. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001. To my 
knowledge, there are as yet no studies of the publishing houses responsible for the majority of this 
literature; even their names are mostly forgotten, as shows a glance at the table – reflecting the 
1949 situation – in Zhongguo chuban kexue yanjiusuo, Zhongyang dang’anguan (ed.). Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo chuban shiliao 1 (1949) (hereafter ZRGCBSL). Beijing: Zhongguo shuji 
chubanshe, 1995, p. 224-45. 
9 For the number see Hu Yuzhi’s opening report to the 1949 national Xinhua shudian conference in 
ZRGCBSL 1.254-66, here p. 256. 
10 John Fitzgerald. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. See also Jiang Pei, Ji Yaguang. Huimie de zhongzi: 
Guomin zhengfu shiqi yishi guanzhi fenxi. Xi’an: Shaanxi renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000. 
11 On publishing in Republican China see Lee-hsia Hsu Ting. Government Control of the Press in 
Modern China, 1900-1949. Cambridge, Ma.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 
1974. For Zhengzhong see Dangying wenhua shiye zhuanji bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.). 
Zhengzhong shuju. Taibei: Zhongguo gongmindang zhongyang weiyuanhui wenhua gongzuohui, 
1972. 
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nevertheless a market-driven, profit-oriented, and highly competitive industry 
populated by sophisticated, consumer-centred publishers. Nothing could be further 
from the Party’s intentions, as reflected in the media concept. I will turn now to the 
CCP’s own experience in the Chinese publishing sector. 
 
 
Life, Reading, and New Knowledge: Sanlian shudian 
Sanlian shudian was formed in late 1948 through the merger of Shenghuo 
shudian 生活书店, Dushu chubanshe 读书出版社, and Xinzhi shudian 新智书店.12 
All three bookstores had been led by intellectuals standing in close contact with 
the CCP and supporting the Party’s ideological program; many of them were Party 
members themselves. Yet while the three publishers had closely cooperated with 
the Party and with each other, the CCP had never tried to assume full bureaucratic 
control; it was content with directing them through Party members in key positions 
at the three publishers. Shenghuo and its partners did not act in the name of the 
CCP’s propaganda authorities. Direct control would have endangered the very 
existence of the enterprises, since they were operating primarily in GMD-controlled 
areas, and would have risked to alienate many of the intellectuals that supported 
the bookstores. Nevertheless, the three publishers had successfully propagated 
Communist ideas and exerted great influence on urban readers, and especially on 
middle school and college students.13 
 
 
                                             
12 Thanks to a debate in the 1980s, led mostly on the pages of the journal Chuban shiliao 出版史料, 
much information on the three bookstores has become available. Given the biased nature of this 
material, I have tried to check all pieces of evidence against other sources. On the background of 
the 1980s debate and the political motivations behind it see my paper “People’s Publishing: The 
Transformation of the Chinese Publishing Sector, 1942-1952.” On the three bookstores see 
Chuban shiliao 1 (1982), p. 8-63; 2 (1983), p. 131-45; 3 (1984), p. 1-19; 6 (1986.12), p. 28-34, 83-
84; 7 (1987.1), p. 36-37; 12 (1988.2), p. 15-16. 
13 Wen-hsin Yeh’s excellent study describes the transition of Shenghuo from a mildly conservative 
bourgeois venture into a Party enterprise. See her “Progressive Journalism and Shanghai’s Petty 
Urbanites: Zou Taofen and the Shenghuo Weekly, 1926-1945” in Frederic Wakeman, Wen-hsin 
Yeh (eds). Shanghai Sojourners. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 
1992, p. 186-238, esp. p. 222-38. I am hesitant, however, to follow her description of the post-1937 
Shenghuo shudian as a “Party mouthpiece,” a characterization that seems to reflect primarily the 
estimate of post-1949 sources on which a large part of Yeh’s account is based. 
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Shenghuo shudian was set up in 1932 around the editorial offices of 
Shenghuo zhoukan 生活周刊, an enormously popular weekly established in 1925 
and run by Zou Taofen 邹韬奋 since 1926.14 The founders of Shenghuo shudian 
thus followed a well-established pattern: many successful Chinese book 
publishers had developed from journal offices (e.g. Kaiming had been formed 
around the journal Xin nüxing 新女性; Beixin built on the power of the journal Yusi 
语丝, associated with Lu Xun).15 In following this pattern, Shenghuo could 
capitalize on the journal in several respects: first, the publishing house could bank 
on the reputation and the popularity of Shenghuo zhoukan: with its advice columns 
and the increasingly vocal anti-Japanese position, the journal had reached a print 
run of 150.000 in 1931, with subscribers coming from Shanghai and beyond.16 
This provided the fledgling publisher with another advantage, since it could make 
use of the journal’s nationwide distribution channels. Finally, the journal provided 
the publisher with access to well-known authors that would guarantee the venture 
to become a success.17  
Shenghuo shudian was started as a cooperative enterprise, with Zou 
Taofen, Hu Yuzhi and others as shareholders.18 While being a commercial 
enterprise (as the great number of advertisements on the journal’s pages reveal), 
profit-seeking was obviously not the bookstore’s main purpose. Shenghuo’s 
management was willing to take considerable risk for their political convictions: in 
1933, for example, Shenghuo published a volume of Gorky’s works (Gaoerji 
chuangzuo xuanji 高尔基创作选集) that was banned immediately because Qu 
Qiubai figured as the translator – a well-known Communist, Qu was anathema for 
the GMD authorities. A mere three years later, Shenghuo republished the book 
                                             
14 On Shenghuo zhoukan and the evolution of Shenghuo shudian see Yeh. “Progressive 
Journalism and Shanghai’s Petty Urbanites,” esp. p. 190-222. For the myth created around Zou 
Taofen see ibid. p. 186-89. On Zou see also Rana Mitter. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with 
the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, ch. 3 and passim. 
15 The founder of Kaiming shudian, Zhang Xichen 章锡琛, had left his former employer, Shangwu, 
to start Xin nüxing. 
16 The number is taken from Shao Gongwen. “Jinian Shenghuo shudian wushi nian” in Chuban 
shiliao 1 (1982), p. 12-23.  
17 Success in terms of popularity and economic success are closely intertwined. Hence, it is not 
easy to tell whether it was the authors who brought the journal to prominence, or vice versa. 
18 On Shenghuo see Shenghuo shudian shigao bianji weiyuanhui. Shenghuo shudian shigao. 
Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1995. Hu Yuzhi joined the CCP in 1933; however, his membership was 
never publicly revealed and he remained a secret Party member to his death. See Zhang Yihe. Zui 
hou de guizu. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 21. 
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with a slightly altered title and a different pseudonym; this time it escaped the 
attention of the censorship.19 Shenghuo also published several Marxist classics, 
such as Engels’ Anti-Dühring (Fan Dulin lun 反杜林论, 1937) and Marx’ Kapital 
(Ziben lun 资本论, 1938, 3 vols.), and other leftist publications like Ai Siqi’s 艾思奇
Sixiang fangfa lun 思想方法论.20 
Shenghuo was able to establish close ties with many influential intellectuals 
and writers: Lao She 老舍, Zhang Tianyi 张天翼, Ba Jin 巴金, Shen Congwen 沈从
文, Zang Kejia 臧克家, and Ai Wu 艾芜 all were backbone authors of Shenghuo.21 
While some of the writers published by Shenghuo shudian, such as Qu Qiubai or 
Chen Boda 陈伯达, were prominent CCP members, others were intellectuals 
sharing the ideas of the Communists and supporting them. The majority of the 
leftist-leaning writers were thus ideological allies of the CCP without being formal 
Party members. In the same way the main figure behind Shenghuo shudian, Zou 
Taofen, can be characterized: Zou was an independent-minded, fiercely anti-
Japanese intellectual fostering a leftist agenda for which he went into exile and 
later to jail.22 However, Zou refused to enter Party politics all his life until his 
untimely death in 1944 (Zou was 49 years old); he chose to support CCP policies 
and accept the Party’s leadership without entering into formal organizational ties. 
Zou’s ambiguous position – loyalty to the CCP and its goals on the one hand, 
disdain for Party membership and discipline on the other – was tolerated by the 
CCP for the moment, at the time of the anti-Japanese war and the United Front: 
Zou’s position did not call into question the Party’s leadership of Shenghuo 
shudian, and it proved an effective cover for propaganda operations in GMD 
controlled areas. Only on his deathbed did Zou go public with his political 
convictions and asked to be admitted to the Party. 
                                             
19 This anecdote appears in Shao Gongwen. “Jinian Shenghuo shudian wushi nian,” p. 16. 
20 Cf. Cao Helong, Li Xueying (ed.). Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhi Sanlian shudian tushu zongmu, 
1932-1994. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1995, p. 18-19. Sixiang fangfa lun was published in 1936. 
21 See “Shenghuo zhoukanshe ji Shenghuo shudian chuban de tushu mulu” in Qian Xiaobo, Lei 
Qunming (ed.). Taofen yu chuban. Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1983, p. 220-44.  
22 To escape GMD persecution, Zou travelled to Europe and the United States from July 1933 to 
August 1935. He was arrested in Shanghai in November 1936 and released in July 1937. See 
Fudan daxue xinwenxi yanjiushi (ed.). Zou Taofen nianpu. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 
1982. Patriotism and opposition to Japanese aggression were themes that united the CCP and 
many Chinese intellectuals: on the platform of anti-Japanese resistance the Party could portray 
itself as the only truly patriotic force in Chinese politics and could thus claim to speak for the critical 
intellectual mainstream – even if these intellectuals were not Party members themselves.  
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The two smaller partners in the Sanlian venture have histories similar to 
those of Shenghuo shudian.23 Dushu chubanshe was founded in Shanghai in 1936 
by Li Gongpu 李公朴, Ai Siqi, and others.24 While Li was not a Party member, Ai 
Siqi had joined the CCP in 1935; when he left for Yan’an in 1937, Huang Luofeng, 
another CCP member, took over the management. Next to Ai’s own works, notably 
his Dazhong zhexue 大众哲学, Dushu published many translations of Soviet 
literature and social science books. It took an even more aggressive path than 
Shenghuo and sold many Soviet books, such as Lenin’s Selected Works and the 
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course.25 
As a consequence, Dushu frequently ran into problems with the GMD authorities. 
Xinzhi shudian was formed in 1935 by members of the Zhongguo jingji yanjiuhui 
中国经济研究会, including Sun Yefang 孙冶方 and Hua Yingshen 华应申.26 Xinzhi 
focused on social sciences and works on political economy and published books 
by Chen Boda (Zhenli de zhuiqiu 真理的追求, 1937) and the Soviet philosopher 
Mark. B. Mitin (Xin zhexue dagang 新哲学大纲, 1937), among others. 
It is important to point out that while the leadership of all three publishers 
was composed of CCP members or close allies of the Party, none of them held 
any offices in the CCP propaganda apparatus prior to 1945. They set up their 
respective book stores in their capacity as individual Party members; contact with 
the Party’s formal structure was thus only indirect. This stands in marked contrast 
to Xinhua shudian, a creature of the Party’s propaganda apparatus, or the Party’s 
main journals that were edited by top-ranking Party members. Shenghuo, Dushu 
                                             
23 CCP presence at Dushu and Xinzhi was more direct than at Shenghuo. See Xu Boxin’s report to 
the 1949 national Xinhua conference: “Guotongqu geming chuban gongzuo baogao” (Oct. 6, 1949) 
in ZRGCBSL 1.297-316, here p. 300. 
24 On Dushu see Fan Yong (ed.). Zhandou zai baiqu: Dushu chubanshe, 1934-1948. Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian, 2001. See also Fan Yong. “Yi ge zhandou zai baiqu de chubanshe: ji Dushu 
shenghuo chubanshe” in Chuban shiliao 1 (1982.12), p. 24-40.  
25 Ibid., p. 32. Dushu received these books from the Soviet embassy in Chongqing. 
26 On Xinzhi shudian see Xu Xuehan. “Xinzhi shudian de zhandou licheng” in Chuban shiliao 1 
(1982.12), p. 41-51; “Xinzhi shudian de zhandou licheng” bianji weiyuanhui (ed.). Xinzhi shudian de 
zhandou licheng. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1994. Sun Yefang had entered the CCP in 1924 and 
had held several minor Party positions in the early 1930s. Hua Yingshen became a Party member 
in 1937. 
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and Xinzhi were not Party publishers, but private enterprises under Party 
leadership.27  
Patterns of more direct interaction between the three publishers and the 
CCP leadership emerged only when GMD pressure in Shanghai mounted. Zou 
Taofen started to cooperate with the Communists since 1936, after his arrest by 
the GMD police.28 His bookstore moved to Wuhan in 1937 and later to Chongqing. 
After Zou’s refusal to accept a merger proposal of the GMD’s Zhengzhong shuju, 
pressure on Shenghuo worsened in 1941. The other two companies did not fare 
better: to evade GMD harassment, the three book stores began cooperating in 
Chongqing in a number of different ventures, such as the establishing of Wenlin 
chubanshe 文林出版社 and Emei chubanshe 峨嵋出版社, two cover operations 
that published books for Shenghuo, Dushu, and Xinzhi.29 Another form of 
cooperation was Lianying shudian 联营书店, a 1944 venture that united a dozen 
smaller book stores, led by Huang Luofeng and Zhang Jinglu 张静庐. The 
arrangement for this and other projects resulting from the three book stores’ 
cooperation in the years of the anti-Japanese war and the civil war after 1945, was 
to share resources, especially in the area of distribution; the publishers’ editorial 
boards remained distinct and they maintained their particular identity.30 
On the eve of their merger into Sanlian shudian, Shenghuo, Dushu, and 
Xinzhi thus had preserved their individual traditions and their distinct character. 
The CCP had assisted the leftist publishers and had supervised their work; in 1942, 
for example, Huang Luofeng was sent to coordinate the activities of Shenghuo.31 
However, the Party had never tried to assume direct bureaucratic control of the 
publishers or to integrate them into its own institutional framework; neither had 
there been efforts of a buy-out, so as to make the publishers become Party-owned 
or state-owned enterprises. Rather, the CCP was satisfied with the existing 
cooperative enterprise structures, where trusted CCP members exercised majority 
                                             
27 This does not mean that cooperation between the Party and the three publishers was not close. 
In 1938, Xinzhi shudian set up Zhongguo chubanshe 中国出版社 in Hankou on behalf of the CCP 
CC Changjiangju 长江局. Zhongguo chubanshe specialized in publishing Marxist books, mainly 
works from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. 
28 See Shao Gongwen. “Jinian Shenghuo shudian wushi nian,” p. 142. 
29 Ibid., p. 135. 
30 See ibid., p. 138. 
31 Ibid., p. 135. 
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control of shares. It was the loyalty of individual Party members and the trust and 
support of non-Party intellectuals that was the basis for the three publishers’ 
allegiance to the CCP. 
In 1948, however, the national situation changed in favour of the CCP and 
the Party began to make preparations for an eventual national takeover. Under 
these circumstances, a narrower interpretation of the media concept won the day. 
Reflecting the CCP priorities, the Party decided to formally merge Shenghuo 
shudian, Dushu chubanshe, and Xinzhi shudian into Sanlian shudian, an issue 
that will be discussed below. With the chances of victory growing, the need for 
undercover propaganda operations such as those of Shenghuo lost urgency, while 
the task of constructing a socialist nation became the focus of the Party’s planning. 
It was Xinhua shudian, the CCP’s publishing operation in Yan’an, that indicated 
the only viable path for the future of the Chinese publishing industry. 
 
 
People’s Publishing: Xinhua shudian 
The origins of Xinhua shudian lie in the dark. Shortly after the Party Center 
had settled in Yan’an in January 1937, a Central Party Paper Committee was set 
up to oversee the Party’s most important propaganda organ, the weekly Jiefang. 
Under this Committee sections for publishing and distribution were formed; both 
were housed in the caves at Yan’an’s Qingliangshan 清凉山. The main duty of the 
Committee’s distribution section was to send the Party paper to all cells, but the 
employees soon started retailing the Party’s publications to local buyers from their 
office, a side-cave of Wanfodong 万佛洞. Thus were the humble origins of Xinhua 
shudian.32 
 As a cave bookstore Xinhua certainly is a curiosity, yet the pattern of its 
foundation reads familiar: formed around Jiefang magazine, Xinhua was an outlet 
for the direct distribution of publications of a particular ideological grouping that felt 
excluded from the mainstream publishing market. Consequently, Xinhua’s main 
                                             
32 Zheng Shide. “Wushi chunqiu hua Xinhua: Xinhua shudian zongdian jianshi” in Song Yingli et al. 
(ed.). Zhongguo dangdai chuban shiliao. Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 1999, vol. 4, p. 109-47. 
See also the debate in Chuban shiliao 8, p. 96-106. The earliest traces of Xinhua’s existence are 
the imprint information in the Jiefang magazine, which reads “distributed by Xinhua shuju (sic), 
Yan’an county, Shaanxi.” 
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task was to sell books, pamphlets, and other propaganda publications, among 
them many translations from Soviet works. One of the first advertised publications 
was a series on Leninism (Liening congshu 列宁丛书) published under the name 
of Jiefang magazine’s editorial office.33 Xinhua does not seem to have published 
any books on its own account in this early time. 
Xinhua’s founding differs from the establishment of other publishing houses 
in two important aspects. Firstly, Xinhua was located in the remote hinterland, cut 
off from the pressures of competition that other bookstores with ideological 
messages faced. Yan’an was the CCP’s showcase of a reformed community; 
market rules did not apply to enterprises here in the same way as they did for any 
a Shanghai-based publisher, giving the Party leeway to experiment with new 
organizational forms. Xinhua was in the exceptional situation to have an economic 
as well as an ideological monopoly. Secondly, both in the early years and later, 
Xinhua remains name- and faceless. In striking contrast to the Shanghai-based 
publishing houses that all evolved around the strong personalities of their founders 
or their main contributors, there is for all practical purposes no information on 
Xinhua’s personnel. Neither in contemporary sources nor in later literature is the 
management of Xinhua discussed. Xinhua was a bureaucratic enterprise not 
based on the ambitions of any individual, but rather on the needs of the Party as a 
collective. The same observation can be made for the later period leading up to 
1949: while Xinhua apparently received its instructions directly from the PD, we 
see very few cadres with experience and leadership qualities emerging from the 
Xinhua network. The downside of the collective nature of the bureaucratic Party 
enterprise that was Xinhua shudian should become apparent in 1949.34 
In April 1942, the CC ordered a reshuffle of publishing work in Yan’an to 
establish closer control over this crucial area of the propaganda sector. Two 
weeks after the April 15 Circular,35 Xinhua announced a reorganization and, in a 
                                             
33 A reproduction of this advertisement from April 1937 can be found in Zhao Shengming. Xinhua 
shudian dansheng zai Yan’an. Xi’an: Huayue wenyi chubanshe, 1989, plates. On the early years of 
Xinhua see ibid., ch. 1. 
34 None of the (few) cadres mentioned by name in the accounts of Xinhua’s early history did play 
any role in the publishing sector in the PRC. The only familiar names are those of the CCP 
leadership, including those of Mao Zedong and Zhu De – their direct contact to Xinhua supports the 
observation of the publisher’s closeness or even the oneness with the Party. 
35 “Zhongyang shujichu guanyu tongyi Yan’an chuban gongzuo de tongzhi” in XGWX 2.367. 
Translated and discussed above in chapter two. 
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symbolic act, moved to a new address in Yan’an’s bustling market street outside 
Nanmen 南门 where it was given a spacious retail outlet with a proper signboard 
carrying its name, calligraphed by Mao Zedong, who reportedly paid a visit to the 
bookstore.36 The Rectification Campaign had not only provided the impetus for 
Xinhua’s restructuring, but also proved to be an important factor for the growth of 
the bookstore and its rising significance: the campaign required cadres in the Party 
and the army to undergo intensive study and training in political and ideological 
issues that led to sharply increased demand for study materials such as books and 
journals. As a consequence, the number of publications distributed by Xinhua in 
1943 nearly tripled against the year before.37 The campaign also gave a boost to 
Xinhua’s own publication activities, which had been marginal before 1942. 
In the course of the Rectification Campaign, Xinhua grew not only in Yan’an 
itself, but also expanded into other CCP base areas.38 In what became known as 
“follow-the-army-bookstores” (sui jun shudian 随军书店), Xinhua sent propaganda 
cadres that carried books with them to accompany the units of the Eight Route 
Army whenever possible. In other regions where underground guerrilla troops had 
established base areas, Xinhua shipped books to these areas to support both the 
army and the local Party organizations in their political and propaganda work. 
Wherever CCP rule was more stable and the local Party committees had more 
resources at their disposal, Xinhua established local branches. In the North China 
area, a Xinhua shudian had already existed since 1941; branches in other 
“liberated areas” followed.39 Due to war time conditions, Xinhua’s contact with 
these local bookstores was rather sporadic, and as a matter of fact they were led 
by the local governments and army commanders.40 So while the CCP was able to 
centralize control over the publishing activities in Yan’an and the surrounding area 
                                             
36 As I have mentioned in chapter two, this latter information can not be verified. Taken from Zhao 
Shengming. Xinhua shudian dansheng zai Yan’an, p. 75. 
37 See the useful bibliography of titles distributed by Xinhua in ibid., p. 266-75. 
38 Information in this and the following paragraphs relies in the account in Zheng Shide. “Wushi 
chunqiu hua Xinhua,” and on the articles in Chuban shiliao 2 and 8. 
39 Frequently, the formation of local bookstores followed the pattern of the Yan’an bookstore: the 
publication of local newspapers and propaganda material led to the establishment of distribution 
agencies that developed into bookstores. 
40 For one example see Shi Yucai. “Taihang diqu de baokan chuban gongzuo” in Chuban shiliao 2 
(1983.12), p. 8-12. The author started his career at Xinhua’s branch in the Taihang 太行 range and 
was the only Xinhua man to occupy important administrative posts in the publishing sector in the 
1950s. 
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quite effectively, administrative unification proved impossible for the other areas; 
rather, operations were conducted in a highly decentralized way. 
The CCP’s hopes for an improvement of the political environment after the 
end of the anti-Japanese war did not materialize, and Xinhua’s range of operations 
remained confined to the “liberated areas.” Worse was to come when the GMD 
general Hu Zongnan 胡宗南 took Yan’an in March 1947, and many CCP 
institutions, including Xinhua, took a heavy blow. By that time, however, the 
Party’s publishing activities had expanded into all other base areas so that the 
destruction of Xinhua’s original facilities did not mean the end for its activities. By 
1947, Xinhua had branches in the Northwestern, Northern, Eastern, and 
Northeastern regions. The Northeastern Xinhua branch was called Dongbei 
shudian 东北书店 and changed its name to Dongbei Xinhua shudian 东北新华书店 
only in 1949.41 
During both the anti-Japanese war and the ensuing civil war, the Xinhua 
cadres had to deal with very difficult working conditions. Running a publishing 
venture in the rural backwaters, far from the sophisticated audiences and the 
technical infrastructure of the cities was a challenge itself, but the war aggravated 
the circumstances under which the Xinhua personnel worked, especially in the 
partisan areas. Accounts and memoirs published in the PRC abound of tales like 
the following: “... when the enemy attacked southern Shandong in 1947, many 
bookstores upheld their work; the comrades of the bookstore in Linshu 临沭 
county took up weapons while continuing sales; they hid their books in the 
mountain gullies, grasped their guns and stood sentry together with the militia in 
order to protect their assets.”42 While stories like these read like romanticized war 
accounts, the extremely harsh conditions which the Xinhua people endured during 
these years were Xinhua’s legacy; it was on this basis that Xinhua people from the 
rural base areas hoped to claim the leading positions in the publishing sector for 
themselves when the CCP moved into the cities, the centres of the publishing 
industry, in 1949, and when the sector was reorganized: by way of reference to 
their revolutionary credentials, the Xinhua hardcore tried to fight off claims from the 
                                             
41 Short outlines of the histories of the local Xinhua branches can be found in “Xinhua shudian 
baogao,” in ZRGCBSL 2.859-76. 
42 From ibid., p. 864. For a similar account, yet expanded to more than 250 pages, see Wang Yi et 
al. Zhanzheng niandai de Shandong Xinhua shudian. Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1990. 
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more sophisticated and experienced urban publishing personnel. Yet while their 
model of publishing came to prevail in the PRC, the Xinhua people lost out in the 
allocation of jobs in the publishing sector after 1949. 
 
 
Books for New China: The Process 
Through Sanlian and Xinhua, the CCP had collected experience with two 
different modes of publishing in the revolutionary period. Xinhua stood for a fully 
Party- or state-owned operation under the direct leadership of the CCP, whereas 
the Sanlian model relied on indirect Party leadership through individuals who might 
or might not be Party members; their enterprises were privately or cooperatively 
owned. Many people in the urban-based publishing industry looked at the nearing 
CCP victory with unease, hoping for mode of coexistence with the CCP that would 
resemble the Sanlian model.43 That was in fact what the CCP had promised under 
the slogans of “new democracy” and the coalition government, and what came to 
implemented in most industrial and commercial sectors in the first years after the 
takeover.44 Not few of the Sanlian cadres, too, hoped for an arrangement that 
would allow them to retain a degree of independence and their corporate identity – 
in return, they would put their expertise, their close connections with the urban 
intelligentsia, and the prestige of the three bookstores at the CCP’s service, as 
they had in the two decades before. 
The Party leadership, however, moved much more quickly to define the 
future outlook of the publishing sector; the decision-making process was clearly 
informed by the media concept that did not allow for the sector to keep on working 
                                             
43 Even in the carefully selected source collections that have recently been published in the PRC, 
some sense of the private publisher’s hopes and ideas (and, if necessary, resistance against the 
CCP’s plans) can be gained. The larger publishing houses such as Shangwu in particular, were 
brave enough to stand up to CCP policies as late as 1950. I will refer to some of these instances 
below. 
44 Compare the “Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” 
(Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling) that was passed on Sept. 29, 1949, 
two days before the founding of the PRC, and served as the normative foundation of the CCP-led 
coalition government. Of interest for the publishing industry was in particular article five that 
granted press freedom, and article 49, which defined the role of the media in broad terms. See 
Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992, vol. 1, p. 1-13. Translated in Harold C. Hinton. The People’s 
Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1980, vol. 
1, p. 51-55. Background information on the “Common Program” is found in Bo Yibo. Ruogan 
zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (xuiding ben). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997, vol. 1, p. 29-36. 
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as an industry. A first indication of this direction was the merger of Shenghuo, 
Dushu and Xinzhi into Sanlian shudian. Under mounting pressure from the GMD 
authorities, Shenghuo shudian, Dushu chubanshe, and Xinzhi shudian had all 
transferred the core of their operations to Hong Kong in fall 1947: Shanghai was 
no longer safe after several arrests in June that year, and after the Shanghai 
municipal committee of the GMD had accused Dushu and Xinzhi of pro-
Communist activities.45 In the British territory of Hong Kong, under colonial 
administration, the bookstores felt safe from GMD persecution – a form of safety 
the Chinese publishing industry had enjoyed in pre-war Shanghai, but that did no 
longer exist there. While underground activities continued in Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Wuhan, and Beijing, many important personnel transferred to Hong Kong: with Xu 
Boxin 徐伯昕, Huang Luofeng, and Shen Jingzhi 沈静芷 the managers of the three 
bookstores had set up shop in Hong Kong by late 1947. 
In the British colony, the three Party-affiliated publishers cooperated closely 
to rebuild their operations that were in tatters after a decade of war and 
persecution. To speed up this process, and to strengthen its grip over the three 
publishers, the Party Center decided in June 1948 to unite its scattered forces. In 
a telegram, Zhou Enlai ordered the Sanlian cadres to shift the focus of their work 
to publications aimed at workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to move their 
personnel and activities to the “liberated areas.”46 The three bookstores that had 
emerged as the backbone of the Party’s publishing activities in the areas not under 
CCP control, were now to be prepared for the tasks ahead: the future Sanlian 
shudian would be needed when the Party moved into the cities, notably Shanghai 
and Beijing, the centres of the Chinese publishing industry. First of all, the three 
bookstores were to be merged into one publishing house, so as to concentrate 
their resources. The Party’s most senior man in the publishing sector, Huang 
Luofeng, was given the order to conduct the merger talks. 
Little information is available on the talks themselves, which lasted for more 
than three months. A working committee was set up for the merger talks that was 
led by Hu Sheng 胡绳, the man in charge of the Cultural Affairs Committee of the 
                                             
45 See Fan Yong. “Yi ge zhandou zai baiqu de chubanshe,” p. 39. 
46 See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949. Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989, p. 775-76. 
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CCP CC Hong Kong Bureau (Zhonggong zhongyang Xianggang fenju wenwei 中
共中央香港分局文委). The other members were Shao Quanlin 邵荃麟, also of the 
Cultural Affairs Committee, and the general managers of the three bookstores.47 
Huang Luofeng is named as the driving force behind the process in all sources; 
given that he was the most senior CCP member among the five men except Shao 
(who lacked experience in publishing affairs and was invited because the three 
bookstores were led by the Party cell headed by Shao), such an arrangement 
could be expected. No information is available on what happened during the three 
months of talks. This dearth of information itself signals that the talks were more 
difficult than the Party was ready to admit: although the three publishers had 
cooperated for a long time, they had distinct histories and identities, and 
apparently Huang encountered more resistance than anticipated. Only one 
document is available that sheds light on the situation at Sanlian in fall 1948: 
“Before the merger, some cadres could not quite straighten out their thinking, and 
generally there were some rather mistaken opinions. For instance, some 
comrades at Shenghuo shudian felt offended and were not very willing to abolish 
the old brand name of Shenghuo and to change it for Sanlian shudian; some 
comrades at Dushu chubanshe and Xinzhi shudian were very unhappy because 
they thought they were swallowed up by another bookstore.”48 Behind the polite 
formulations it is obvious that resistance against the merger was widespread 
among the rank and file employees; objections must have been considerable 
among the management, too, given the length of the talks. The merger was further 
complicated by the difficult ownership structures of the three bookstores, and the 
fact that it was not simply three publishing houses that had to be united; rather, 
Shenghuo, Dushu, and Xinzhi had set up dozens of smaller ventures, either alone 
or together, in Guiyang, Chongqing, Shanghai, and elsewhere. The shareholder 
and investment structures must have been exceedingly complicated.49 
                                             
47 See Shenghuo shudian shigao bianji weiyuanhui. Shenghuo shudian shigao, p. 400. Compare 
also Wang Fangzi. “1937-1949 nian de Xianggang chubanye” in Chuban kexue 2000.4 at 
http://www.cbkx.com/2000-4/52.shtml (downloaded July 22, 2003). 
48 See “Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhi Sanlian shudian gongzuo baogao” (report at the first national 
Xinhua conference, dated Oct. 8, 1949), delivered by Shao Gongwen, in ZRGCBSL 1.370-82. 
Shao’s comments on the difficulties of the merger are on p. 372. 
49 Altogether 80 different ventures with Sanlian capital are listed in Ma Zhongyang, Su Kechen. 
Chubanjia Huang Luofeng. Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1991, p. 190-93. All of these had 
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In the end, however, the Party’s demand won the day, with the three 
publishers accepting the rather awkward name Shenghuo – Dushu – Xinzhi 
Sanlian shudian 生活·读书·新知三联书店 as the compromise formula for the 
new enterprise. On October 26, the Sanlian General Administration (Sanlian zong 
guanlichu 三联总管理处) was established in Hong Kong; Xu Boxin and Shen 
Jingzhi became general manager and vice manager, and Huang Luofeng headed 
the committee in charge of the General Administration.50 
In the meantime, during fall and winter 1948, the national political and 
military situation had changed decisively in favour of the CCP. Much faster than 
expected would Sanlian now be confronted with new tasks. In early April 1949, the 
Sanlian General Administration moved from Hong Kong to Beijing, just six weeks 
after the CCP had taken the city. Once in Beijing, it quickly came under the 
influence of the Publishing Committee and the rapidly growing clout of Xinhua. 
While Sanlian in Hong Kong still tried to implement the terms of the merger 
agreement and to overcome the difficulties of cooperation, events in the North 
proceeded at a speedy pace: on February 3, the PLA marched into Beijing and 
thus took the city that had been selected to become the administrative centre of 
New China. Only three weeks later the first cell of a national institution in control of 
publishing was established: the Publishing Committee (Chuban weiyuanhui 出版委
员会) was an interim body set up under the Propaganda Department of the CCP 
North China Bureau to plan the institutional structure that was to govern the 
publishing sector in the new state.51 The Party’s policy toward publishing was 
formulated in March by the Central Committee: “Publishing work must be unified 
and centralized, but on the basis of decentralized management; conditions 
allowing and being favourable, [publishing] can proceed in a planned and gradual 
                                                                                                                                      
to be brought under the roof organisation of Sanlian. Shenghuo shudian shigao, p. 400-02 provides 
a few details on the process of restructuring capital, dept, and stock. 
50 Wang Fangzi. “1937-1949 nian de Xianggang chubanye.” 
51 An interim body, the Linshi chuban weiyuanhui choubeihui 临时出版委员会筹备会, had started 
work a week earlier, on February 16, to take charge of day-to-day affairs in the publishing sector. 
The Publishing Committee held its first meeting on February 22 in the presence of Zhou Yang. See 
“Linshi chuban weiyuanhui choubeihui di yi ci tanhua hui jilu” (Feb. 16) in ZRGCBSL 1.14-15; 
“Linshi chuban weiyuanhui choubeihui di san ci tanhua hui jilu” (Feb. 19) in ZRGCBSL 1.19; 
“Chuban weiyuanhui di yi ci huiyi jilu” (Feb. 22) in ZRGCBSL 1.22-28. 
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manner towards unification and centralization.”52 This formulation is relatively 
vague: centralization is quoted as a goal, but both the degree of centralization and 
the speed of the process were still open to debate. The Party’s desire to establish 
centralized control of the publishing sector was clear, so as to make the media 
unified and single voice of the Party. Much less clear, however, were the terms on 
which this first stipulation of the media concept would be implemented: as I will 
show presently, rather then being a linear process, the institution of Party control 
was characterized by experimenting, trial and error, and repeated zigzags. 
The Publishing Committee was placed in charge of the activities of the 
Party-controlled publishers (i.e., mainly Xinhua) in the North China region and 
consequently played a crucial role in the unification process. The unification of 
Xinhua’s scattered operations was a protracted process that started from the 
bottom with the formation of larger administrative entities from the outlets in single 
areas. According to Huang Luofeng, the Central Committee decided in August 
1948 to set in motion the process of centralizing the Party’s publishing activities.53 
Since Xinhua’s operations were most developed in the North China region, 
unification started here with Zhou Yang, the head of the Propaganda Department 
of the CCP CC North China Committee, laying out a blueprint in February 1949: a 
handful of local entities in Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Zhangjiakou, Taiyuan, and 
elsewhere were to be upgraded into main branches (zongfendian). Only after the 
formation of these branches would the Northern China main branch be established 
that would later become but one branch under the national organization. Zhou 
further explained: “The leadership relationship of the branch stores in the different 
localities and their relationship with the local Party and government will be 
arranged as follows: the main branch will make the overall arrangements with 
regard to economic, professional, and personnel matters, but in organizational 
matters they [the branch stores] will answer to the district committee (quwei 区委) 
or municipal committee (shiwei 市委) [of the Party].”54 Zhou does already hint here 
to a system of dual responsibility of all professional units to both government and 
Party organs, as was discussed in chapter four. 
                                             
52 Cited in Huang Luofeng’s keynote speech at the 1949 Xinhua conference: “Chuban weiyuanhui 
gongzuo baogao” in ZRGCBSL 1.267-96, here p. 268.  
53 I have seen no document verifying this point. See ibid. p. 268. 
54 See Zhou’s report as contained in “Chuban weiyuanhui di yi ci huiyi jilu,” p. 24f. 
 263
The Party body that was put in charge of publishing in the North China 
branch was the Publishing Committee. The composition of this new body, however, 
gave headaches to the Party because of a lack of personnel: not all of the nine 
cadres on the body came from the propaganda sector and most of those that did 
had done news work only; those with a past in publishing were not senior enough 
and came from Xinhua. None of them had sufficient experience with publishing in 
an urban setting and could lead the takeover (jieguan 接管) of the large publishing 
industries in Beijing and Tianjin, the centres of publishing in the Northern region.55  
 
Chart 1: The Publishing Committee 
 
Name Born Joins CCP Past experience Exp. with 
urban 
publishing? 
Probable 
function in 
出版委员会 
祝志澄 1906 1932 Printing worker at Shangwu, leads 
printing plants in Jiangxi Soviet and 
Yan’an, takes part in Long March 
 Worker activist
华应申 1911 1937 Xinzhi shudian, Zhongguo CBS, 
Huazhong Xinhua shudian 
(manager) 
X Xinhua 
representative 
平杰三 1906 1927 Admin. career in Huabei; before 
1949 vice-secretary of CC Huabeiju; 
no publishing experience 
 CC Huabeiju 
representative 
王子野 1916 1938 Editor at Jin-Cha-Ji ribao; in 
Huabeiju PD resp. for publishing 
 Administrator 
史育才 1914 1938 Huabei Xinhua ribao; Huabei 
Xinhua shudian (manager) 
 Xinhua 
representative 
欧建新      
卢鸣谷 1917 1938 Journalist with Dongbei 
newspapers; Dongbei shudian vice-
manager 
 Dongbei 
shudian repr. 
王钊 1923 1939 Minor propaganda posts in Dongbei  ? 
郭敬 1908 1936 Propaganda posts in Dongbei; CCP 
Beijing PD secretary 
 Beijing CCP 
representative 
黄洛峰 1909 1927 Dushu chubanshe (manager), 
Sanlian shudian (manager) 
X Head 
 
Note: no biographical information on Ou Jianxin could be found, neither could his range of activities 
be identified from the meeting transcripts; while Ou was present in most early meetings, he only 
rarely addressed the plenum on a number of technical issues. His influence on the Committee 
seems to have been marginal.  
 
Sources: Zhongguo renming dacidian: dangdai renwu juan. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 
1992; Zhongguo chuban kexue yanjiusuo, Hebei sheng xinwen chubanju (ed.). Zhongguo chuban 
renming cidian. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1989; Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). 
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chuabanshe, 2000. 
 
                                             
55 See the analysis in Chart 1: The Publishing Committee.  
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The CCP therefore resorted once again to Huang Luofeng: a veteran Party 
member, Huang had worked with Dushu chubanshe back in Shanghai and Hong 
Kong and thus knew the industry from first-hand experience; furthermore, he had 
proved his talent as an able administrator in overcoming the difficulties in Sanlian’s 
merger. In mid February 1949, Huang was therefore recalled from his position in 
Shenyang, where he had organized Sanlian’s Northeastern branch and went to 
Beijing to lead the Publishing Committee. 
The initial measures of the unification process concerned Xinhua’s activities 
in Beijing and Tianjin. It was here that Huang and his colleagues encountered their 
first problems, a legacy of the cities’ conquest: while the Huabei Xinhua branch 
had entered the urban areas from the Central Committee’s base in Shijiazhuang, 
outlets of Dongbei shudian (the Xinhua branch in the Northeast), following Lin 
Biao’s armies’ move southwards into Northern China, had spread simultaneously 
into Beijing and Tianjin. Rivalry caused resentment in both organizations; the 
merger of these outlets took several months to complete – apparently, squabbles 
over petty interests were not exclusive to Sanlian.56 Further problems lay down the 
road. From a March 15 report that Huang had written for Zhou Enlai, we can get a 
fairly comprehensive picture of the situation of the publishing industry six weeks 
after the conquest of Beijing, of the intentions of the Publishing Committee, and of 
the state of its work.57 
Although first steps to unify the Party’s publishing activities in the various 
areas under CCP control had already been taken, “the situation between the 
different areas is that as of today each still goes its own way; there is no unity or 
concentration, and no rational division of labour and cooperation.”58 In a reversal 
of earlier proposals, the concentration of publishing affairs in the hands of the 
Party now became the choice of the day. Huang provided the rationale for 
centralized control: “If compared to the objective demands of cultural construction, 
our current material and financial means fall very far behind. ... Unification and 
concentration is therefore inevitable to avoid waste and to fully realize our 
                                             
56 See Huang Luofeng’s report, p. 283-84. 
57 Huang Luofeng’s report, “Chuban gongzuo jihua shu,” is an attachment to “Lu Dingyi guanyu 
Chubanju gongzuo fangzhen deng wenti zhi Zhou Enlai de qingshi xin ji Zhou Enlai de pishi” in 
ZRGCBSL 1.37-42. Zhou passed the report on to Dong Biwu and Hu Qiaomu and asked for their 
opinions. 
58 Ibid., p. 39. 
 265
capacities.”59 Neither Xinhua nor Sanlian had the resources and first of all the 
personnel to expand their network, if these resources were not used with a 
maximum of “rationality:” “Only if we are united and concentrated, we can bring 
into full play our forces and compete with the large private publishers – so as to 
surpass them in business and to gradually control them politically and 
economically.”60 The rationale for the centralization of control is interesting indeed: 
Xinhua had come to the Beijing area as an outsider, where it faced the large and 
experienced publishing companies that controlled the market. Only with massive 
administrative support would Xinhua be able to compete with them. It comes as a 
surprise that the CCP thought of the relationship to other publishers in terms of 
competition: the Party’s foothold in the city obviously was precarious at best, and 
the Publishing Committee did not consider taking on the private publishers in the 
near future. For the time being, the Committee prepared only to take over control 
of those shares in companies like Zhengzhong shuju or Dadong shuju that had 
been owned by the GMD or by high-ranking GMD officials. 
In Huang’s argumentation, we can detect the logic of the CCP media 
concept: the Party’s goal is to re-educate the population and to remould their 
thinking, formulated in this paragraph of Huang’s report as “cultural construction.” 
The agent of this enterprise is clearly the CCP, and it can achieve this task only 
through direct control of the media; it thus seeks control of the publishing industry. 
The way to realize this goal is the Xinhua path. Huang does also mention Sanlian 
as a model to be followed, on a par with Xinhua, but his stress is not the three 
bookstores’ tradition of independence combined with their loyalty, but rather the 
voluntary submission under closer Party control that is worth to be emulated: “In 
the GMD areas, Shenghuo shudian, Xinzhi shudian, and Dushu chubanshe have 
fully merged in October last year; this is a hallmark on the road of the publishing 
businesses led by the Party towards unification and concentration.”61 Sanlian has 
set out on the road of Xinhua-ization that leads towards Party publishing. The 
Publishing Committee therefore concentrated its energies on the unification of 
Xinhua; its plan for the year 1949 read: “In the course of this year, the Northern 
China Xinhua branch must be merged first, and then Sanlian shudian and Dongbei 
                                             
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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shudian must be merged [into the Publishing Committee]; the personnel, 
infrastructure, and financial means of the three bookstores are to be used 
rationally and adjusted; and the strong points of each of them must be [further] 
strengthened.”62 
The report also proposes, for the first time, an outline for the future 
separation of responsibilities between Party and government: “The publishing 
businesses under the leadership of the Party unify and centralize step by step, and 
their composition must be reorganized. In [the area of] publishing the two sectors 
[xitong 系统] of Party and state must be separated, while for distribution, a 
centralized [yiyuanhua 一元化] distribution network must be set up, the 
responsibility for which lies entirely with the [future] publishing bureau of the 
government side.”63 Printing and distribution were technical aspects of the 
publishing process and therefore less sensitive; only publishing proper would be 
placed under direct Party control. For a number of crucial items – translations of 
Marxist-Leninist classics, Party documents, the works of Party leaders, textbooks 
for the CCP’s internal education programs, and Party journals – Huang proposed 
direct management by Jiefangshe 解放社 under the PD.64 Thus, the might of the 
industry oligarchs was gradually to be eroded: the printing of Party documents was 
a field of increasing significance with presumably profitable publishing jobs from 
which non-Party publishers were excluded. In sum, Huang’s March 15 report to 
Zhou Enlai reacted to the CC directive earlier that month that had called for 
unification and centralization of the publishing sector (see above). It seems that 
the Publishing Committee went ahead with the process of unification with even 
more determination than the CC had stipulated; the lower level cadres had 
adopted a vision of publishing more radical than the CC – in typical bureaucratic 
behaviour, lower level cadres interpreted the media concept in a way more literal 
than the CC. 
                                             
62 Ibid., p. 41. 
63 Ibid., p. 40. 
64 Jiefangshe was the editorial department of the CC organ Jiefang founded in 1937. Its book 
publishing activities had been handed over to Xinhua shudian in the early 1940, but Xinhua 
customarily published a number of Marxist-Leninist classics as well as study materials for cadres 
under the imprint of Jiefangshe until 1950. Huang Luofeng proposed to formally “revive the 
organisation of Jiefangshe” in order to become the publisher for these materials. This did not 
happen, and the publications in question were issued under the name of Renmin chubanshe since 
1950. 
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When the Publishing Committee set out to work, its scope and functions 
were still very tentative; the transcripts of the early meetings attest to the confusion 
and to the cadres’ sometimes rather naive ideas, especially concerning the 
immediate capacities available to the CCP during the take-over. The early 
proposals of the Publishing Committee sketch a controlling agency of Orwellian 
dimensions: the future Publishing Office was supposed to centralize supervision 
over all publishers and bookstores by holding majority shares, and it would have 
performed inspections of all books to be published. As an initial capital, the 
Publishing Committee proposed one billion Yuan,65 and it pledged to train one 
thousand cadres within three years. By early spring, institution building efforts had 
gained so much momentum that the desire to control directly and immediately 
anything and everything replaced earlier pledges of governing through indirect 
influence. The Publishing Committee’s plans, however, were angrily rejected by 
Dong Biwu 董必武, head of the Finance and Economics Commission of the North 
China People’s Government and a CCP Politburo member, as utopian.66 
By slowly increasing its manpower, the Publishing Committee worked to 
gradually assume direct control over the publishing sector. Two decisive steps 
guaranteed the Party’s grip on the crucial junctures of publishing in China. A key 
issue was the assignment of textbook publication for primary and secondary 
schools. In the areas controlled by the CCP, the Party made every effort to abolish 
textbooks issued under the auspices of the GMD as soon as possible, in order to 
promote new education guidelines.67 This policy produced the need for an 
enormous number of textbooks to be published and printed in time for the fall term. 
While the sheer numbers to be produced were a major challenge (due to lack of 
capacities, printing jobs were delegated to local level printing shops), the 
economic consequences were equally important: the big Shanghai publishers had 
                                             
65 Even under the inflationary conditions of 1949 this was an enormous sum that totalled the entire 
capital of the North China Trading Company, as Dong Biwu remarked. 
66 For the plan see “Zhongyang chubanju zuzhi dagang (caoan)” in ZRGCBSL 1: 1949, p. 43-45. 
Dong Biwu’s reaction is in ibid., p. 46-47.  
67 For this purpose, a Textbooks Inspection Committee (Jiaokeshu bianshen weiyuanhui 教科书编
审委员会), led by the writer and educator Ye Shengtao 叶圣陶, assumed responsibility on all 
textbook contents. Ye was later to become vice-head of the General Publication Administration. On 
CCP educational policies in the takeover period see Shi Ming Hu, Eli Seifman (ed.). Toward a New 
World Outlook: A Documentary History of Education in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1976. 
New York: AMS Press, 1976, Part I. 
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earned up to 70 per cent of their revenues from text book production; their 
exclusion from this highly profitable market segment was a blow that on the other 
hand increased Xinhua’s market share and promoted the influence of the 
Publishing Committee.68 
A second measure to enhance Xinhua’s standing in the publishing sector 
was an order of mid-September that formally guaranteed Jiefangshe (i.e. Xinhua 
shudian, see above) and Xinhua the exclusive right to publish and reprint Party 
documents, speeches and texts by Party leaders, and other official 
pronouncements, even if these had been published in newspapers before. Even 
“progressive” publishers such as Beixin were refused the right to publish 
collections of important policy documents and were punished for violations. The 
Propaganda Department explained that giving exclusive rights of these documents 
to Xinhua was necessary to ensure the correctness and timeliness of all editions 
circulating, to enable possible corrections of the texts, and “to prevent arbitrary 
explanatory and interpretive notes being added that distort the original meaning.”69 
While increasing control, the effective monopoly for Xinhua was also a competitive 
advantage, since demand for policy documents and the works of Party leaders 
was rising sharply with the CCP’s emerging victory and the proliferation of study 
and re-education classes. With Party documents and school textbooks, two 
profitable core segments of the publishing market had effectively been granted to 
the Party publishers; shortly thereafter, government documents, too, were 
declared to be the exclusive terrain of Xinhua and Jiefangshe.70 
These measures notwithstanding, problems in the early months abounded. 
From the meeting notes of the Publishing Committee, we get the impression of a 
lack of general direction, doubts concerning the scope of control, and sometimes 
complete chaos. Clashes intensified between cadres coming from the base areas 
and those that had worked in the cities for a longer time. The Publishing 
                                             
68 For the number see Hu Yuzhi’s opening report to the 1949 Xinhua conference in ZRGCBSL 
1.254-66, here p. 256. The text book issue is a recurring theme in the notes of the Publishing 
Committee meetings in ibid.  
69 See “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu siying shudian bianxuan wo dang wenjian 
deng wenti gei Huadongju xuanchuanbu de zhishi” in ZRGCBSL 1.219-20. This document also 
contains the decision to punish Beixin. 
70 See ZRGCBSL 2.1-2. In a letter from Hu Yuzhi, dated April 27, 1950, however, a partial 
withdrawal from this measure was declared and private publishers were allowed to print 
government documents, since Xinhua reacted too slow and lacked sufficient capacities. See 
ZRGCBSL 2.159-61. 
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Committee had to admit: “A number of comrades who have lived in the cities for a 
longer time look down on the ‘country bumpkins’ (tu baozi 土包子) and say that 
they are ‘earthy’ (tu 土) and ‘lack any sense of time.’ The comrades coming from 
the countryside despise their ‘airs’ and say that they are formalistic.”71 Dissatisfied 
customers in the stores reminded the Committee of shortcomings in its work, as it 
was forced to acknowledge repeatedly.72 The Committee’s general approach to 
solving problems that emerges from the meeting notes – discussions in its 
meetings and the request of orders from higher organs – seems to have clashed 
with the requirements of effective economic management. 
Once more cadres from the erstwhile Sanlian organization joined the new 
bodies in charge of publishing, the few Xinhua people active in the administration 
lost out in the distribution of posts and positions. The number of cadres with a 
background in the CCP’s urban publishing ventures, and especially in Sanlian 
shudian, was on the rise. This became first apparent in fall 1949, when the 
“National Xinhua Bookstore Conference on Publishing” was convened in Beijing 
on October 3. The 165 participants of this first major publishing conference 
included delegates from the regional Xinhua branches, from Sanlian, as well as 
members of the Publishing Committee and a number of cadres from different Party 
committees in the propaganda sector.73 The conference gave ample room for 
regional work reports and provided an opportunity for cadres to link up and 
exchange experiences. Furthermore, the Party centre chose this opportunity to 
communicate policies and directions to all delegates. During the conference, the 
personnel setting for the post-1949 period began to emerge. Of ten keynote 
speakers, only five were later appointed to responsible positions in the publishing 
sector: Hu Yuzhi, Huang Luofeng, Xu Boxin, Shi Yucai 史育才, and Wang Yi 王
益.74 Hu was a member of the China Democratic League (his CCP membership 
                                             
71 “Chuban weiyuanhui zonghe baogao” (dated June 30, 1949) in ZRGCBSL 160-69, here p. 164. 
72 See, among others, ibid. 
73 See the table in ZRGCBSL 1.449-54. This list, however, leaves out those cadres from work units 
other than the publishers and the Publishing Committee. Thus the names of influential cadres in 
the propaganda sector, such as Hu Qiaomu, Lu Dingyi, and Chen Boda, were omitted, although 
they attended at least part of the conference’s proceedings and also spoke to the participants. 
74 Hu delivered the general report, Huang spoke on behalf of the Publishing Committee, Xu 
reported on the Party’s pre-1949 publishing activities in the GMD areas; Shi Yucai and Wang Yi, 
the general managers of the Huabei and Huadong Xinhua bookstores, reported on their respective 
publishers. 
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was secret) and served mostly in United Front functions; his actual influence in 
publishing affairs seems to have been small. Three of the other four had a Sanlian 
past.75 Of the remaining, two occupied medium-level propaganda and publishing 
posts after 1949, the other three faded into oblivion after the conference.76 Thus, 
the Xinhua people were the ones who lost out in process of institution building and 
were relegated to second- and third-tier jobs (see chart two). These developments 
present us with a paradox: while the Party leadership had decided to make Xinhua 
the model the entire publishing industry was to follow eventually, Xinhua itself had 
failed to train a cadre of experienced personnel. It was overwhelmingly cadres with 
a Sanlian background who were called in to run Xinhua and to take charge of re-
engineering the publishing sector. They were better educated and had more 
experience in the urban publishing market, but in turn they had to accommodate 
the Party’s prerogatives, and eventually even bring about Sanlian’s demise. 
Around the time of the publishing conference, the formal administrative 
structure for the publishing sector began to emerge. The Publishing Committee 
was dissolved in November 1949; both its personnel and its tasks were divided 
between the new Publishing Bureau, a Party body under the CC PD (the 
Publishing Committee had answered to the CCP North China PD), and the 
General Publication Administration (GPA) that was formally inaugurated on 
November 1. The leadership of the government body was handed over to a 
number of elder-generation intellectuals without formal CCP affiliation, such as Hu 
Yuzhi, Zhou Jianren 周建人, and Ye Shengtao. Hu and Zhou were associated with 
Shenghuo shudian, while Ye had a close relationship with Kaiming. Among the 
Administration’s vice-heads, only Chen Kehan 陈克寒, the editor-in-chief of Xinhua 
she, was officially a CCP member. While non-Party people were awarded 
prominent representative posts, the crucial work in the Administration was done by  
 
                                             
75 Wang Yi (b. 1917) had worked at Shenghuo and Xinzhi between 1935 and 1940; he later headed 
Shandong Xinhua and Huadong Xinhua. Shi Yucai had made his early career at Huabei Xinhua 
shudian and was thus the exception among the five men. 
76 Wang Shuntong 王顺桐, who represented Xibei Xinhua as a propaganda official of the CC 
Northwest Bureau, later served on local posts in the propaganda, publishing, and science fields. 
Shao Gongwen 邵公文, who delivered the Sanlian report, became general manager of Sanlian and 
later led other enterprises in the publishing sector. No information at all is available for the (non-) 
careers of Li Wen 李文, Hua Qinghe 华青禾, and Chen Yu 陈雨, the general managers of Dongbei 
Xinhua, Huazhong Xinhua, and the Xinhua branch accompanying the third field army, respectively. 
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Chart 2: Keynote Speakers of the 1949 Xinhua Conference 
 
Name Talk at 1949 conference Past Experience Later functions 
胡愈之 全国出版事业概况 Shenghuo; diff. newspapers GPA head; vice minister for 
Culture 
黄洛峰 出版委员会工作报告 Dushu chubanshe 
(manager), Sanlian shudian 
(manager) 
GPA Publishing Bureau head; 
Wenhuabu chuban shiye 
guanliju head 
徐伯昕 国统区革命出版工作报告 Shenghuo (manager), 
Sanlian (manager) 
GPA General Office head; 
GPA Distribution Bureau 
head; Xinhua zongdian 
(manager) 
李文 东北新华书店工作报告 ? ? 
史育才 华北区新华书店工作报告 Huabei Xinhua ribao; Huabei 
Xinhua shudian (manager) 
Xinhua shudian (manager); 
Wenhuabu chuban shiye 
guanliju vice head 
王顺桐 西北区新华书店工作报告 Prop. positions in CCP CC 
Northwest Bureau 
medium-level prop. and 
science admin. positions in 
Northwest, Beijing 
邵公文 生活读书新知三联书店工
作报告 
Shenghuo shudian Sanlian gen. manager; 
Zhongguo tushu faxing gongsi 
gen. manager 
王益 华东区新华书店工作报告 Shenghuo, Xinzhi; Shandong 
Xinhua; Huadong Xinhua 
Xinhua zongdian gen. 
manager; since 1958 Wenhua 
bu chuban shiye guanliju 
head 
陈雨 华东军区、第三野战军随
军书店图书馆工作报告 
? ? 
华青禾 华中区新华书店工作报告 ? ? 
 
Note: grey fields in column three (past experience)  = Sanlian past 
 grey fields in column four (later functions)  = posts in national publishing leadership 
 No information on Li Wen, Chen Yu, and Hua Qinghe is available. 
 
Sources: Zhongguo renming dacidian: dangdai renwu juan. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 
1992; Zhongguo chuban kexue yanjiusuo, Hebei sheng xinwen chubanju (ed.). Zhongguo chuban 
renming cidian. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1989; Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). 
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chuabanshe, 2000. 
 
the Publishing Bureau (Chuban zongshu chubanju 出版总署出版局). With Huang 
Luofeng, Zhu Zhicheng 祝志澄, Hua Yingshen, and Hu Sheng, we find four ranking 
CCP members in charge of the Publishing Bureau. Of these, Huang, Hua, and Hu 
had a Sanlian past (Hua Yingshen had recently worked for Xinhua). Zhu Zhicheng 
had been a printing worker employed by Shangwu, and had later overseen the 
Yan’an printing plant; he was apparently the worker element in the administration 
who had been carried over from the Publishing Committee. On the most important 
posts in the new national administrative structure we thus find a remarkably high 
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number of Sanlian people, as against only very few Xinhua cadres (see also chart 
3).77 The allocation of administrative jobs to former or current Sanlian people did 
not strengthen Sanlian’s position in the PRC. To the contrary: Sanlian was not only 
sidelined as a Party publisher; the CCP’s reliance on experienced Sanlian 
personnel in the new administrative organs bled it of its backbone employees. 
Sanlian’s ability to compete in the market was shrinking. 
Chart 3: Leadership of the General Publication Administration 
 
Name Born Joins CCP Past Experience GPA Post 
胡愈之 1896 (1933) Shenghuo; diff. newspapers Head 
叶圣陶 1894 - Shangwu, Kaiming Vice head 
周建人 1888 1948 Shangwu, Shenghuo, Xinzhi Vice head 
陈克寒 1917 1934 Huabei Xinhua ribao; Xinhua she 
head 
Vice head; (conc. posts in 
PD) 
萨空了 1907 - Journalist Vice head; (conc. vice-head 
of Gen. News Admin.) 
黄洛峰 1909 1927 Dushu chubanshe (manager), 
Sanlian shudian (manager) 
GPA Chubanju head 
祝志澄 1906 1932 Printing worker at Shangwu, leads 
printing plants in Jiangxi Soviet 
and Yan’an, takes part in Long 
March 
GPA Chubanju vice head 
华应申 1911 1937 Xinzhi shudian, Zhongguo CBS, 
Huazhong Xinhua shudian 
(manager) 
GPA Chubanju vice head 
胡绳 1918 1938 Shenghuo GPA medium-level pos.; 
head of GPA Party cell; 
(conc. vice-head of PD 
Secretariat) 
 
Sources: Zhongguo renming dacidian: dangdai renwu juan. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 
1992; Zhongguo chuban kexue yanjiusuo, Hebei sheng xinwen chubanju (ed.). Zhongguo chuban 
renming cidian. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1989; Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). 
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chuabanshe, 2000. 
 
At the Xinhua conference in Beijing, a clearer understanding of the future 
direction of the publishing sector began to emerge. The first major issue was the 
national unification of publishing and the organization of an institutional framework. 
During the conference, the enormous difficulties of this undertaking, arising from 
regional disparities, were highlighted by cadres: especially personnel from regions 
such as the Northwest and Central China that had only recently been occupied by 
                                             
77 Biographic information taken from Zhongguo renming dacidian: dangdai renwu juan. Shanghai: 
Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1992; Zhongguo chuban kexue yanjiusuo, Hebei sheng xinwen 
chubanju (ed.). Zhongguo chuban renming cidian. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1989; 
Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao. Beijing: Zhonggong 
dangshi chuabanshe, 2000. 
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the PLA had to deal with difficult topography and a lack of infrastructure. The key 
argument in favour of unification and centralization was “rationalization” – a point 
consistent with the arguments made in favour of the Sanlian merger. The idea of 
“rationalizing” a chaotic, market-driven industry had its origins in the Yan’an era.78 
According to this understanding, the energies consumed by free market 
competition can be channelled to more productive purposes, that is, “serving the 
people.” Unification, so the conference participants hoped, would for example help 
to bring down book prices through a fixed national system of price calculation. 
Lower book prices would lessen the burden especially of poor readers and would 
contribute to the state’s effort to reduce illiteracy.79 
An issue that obviously gave a headache to many participants was summed 
up under the slogan “enterpris-ation” (qiyehua 企业化). Referring to the tense 
fiscal situation of the central government, the Party leadership called upon the 
publishers and book stores to pay attention to their bottom line, to introduce 
modern accounting, and to work towards equity break even (shiwu baoben 实物保
本). In open defiance of this policy, delegates from poorer regions, especially from 
the Northwest, asked for more capital injections, but apparently did not succeed, 
since qiyehua was included in the final report.80 Qiyehua, however, must not be 
mistaken for “business-ization” (shangyehua 商业化). The CCP had no intention of 
introducing market principles at Xinhua, but demanded only that its publishing 
outlets should avoid losses for which the state – i.e. the people – would have to 
pay for. This important difference also led to a redefinition of the term “profit.” 
As a medium-term goal aside from qiyehua, specialization emerged during 
the conference. Specialization concerned primarily the separation of publishing, 
printing, and distribution of books. The integrated production chain that handled 
books from the editing of manuscripts to retail sales to the customer was a 
particular feature of the Chinese publishing industry: all major and many minor 
                                             
78 Compare the April 15, 1942, Directive that mandated the restructuring of the Yan’an publishing 
sector, discussed in chapter two. 
79 Huang Luofeng explains the new pricing system in his closing report to the conference 
(ZRGCBSL 1.425-40, here p. 433). See also Lu Dingyi’s thoughts on the book price issue in his 
closing address to the conference (ZRGCBSL 1.441-46, here p. 445). On the CCP’s efforts to 
erase illiteracy see Glen Peterson. The Power of Words: Literacy and Revolution in South China, 
1949-1995. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997. 
80 Huang Luofeng speaks about qiyehua in his closing report (p. 433-34). For a rebuttal see the 
report of Wang Shuntong, the Northwest Xinhua representative (ZRGCBSL 1.349-70). 
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Chinese publishers were publishing house cum printing shop and book store – 
thus the names of the Chinese publishers, that mostly ended in shudian 书店, 
shuju 书局, or yinshuguan 印书馆.81 Chinese bookstores derived much of their 
identity from the integration of publishing proper, printing, and wholesale and retail 
sales. At the Xinhua conference, the integrated production chain was called 
“unscientific;” in his opening remarks, Hu Yuzhi accused the assembling of 
publication, printing, and distribution under the same brand as a remnant of feudal 
thinking.82 Huang Luofeng proposed the separation of these three activities in the 
long run, arguing for “professionalization.”83 
A theme that was only beginning to emerge was Xinhua’s future status. 
Until 1949, Xinhua had been a Party bookstore, answering to the local Party 
committees. After the founding of the PRC, the unified control of Xinhua was to be 
handed over not to the Party centre, but to the General Publication Administration, 
a government body subordinate to the State Council.84 Xinhua was to undergo the 
transition from a Party publisher to a state bookstore, a decision made public by 
the Propaganda Department shortly after the conference.85 With Xinhua becoming 
a state bookstore rather than a Party publisher, however, its relationship with other 
publishing houses had to be clarified. Lu Dingyi drew attention to the necessity “to 
cooperate honestly and frankly with the public-private joint ventures and the 
private publishing industry. The ‘Common Program of the Political Consultative 
Conference’ guarantees that the people have the freedom of publishing... The 
private publishing businesses must respect the state laws and orders, but within 
the limits permitted by these laws and orders, they have publishing freedom.”86 On 
the sidelines of the Xinhua conference, a tea party was convened where the CCP 
reassured the private publishers of their position in the PRC. The key-note speech 
was given by Hu Yuzhi, a non-Xinhua man.87 Nevertheless, the state-owned 
publishers occupied a key-position and played a leadership role within the industry: 
                                             
81 Similar arrangements were common in Europe until the 19th century. 
82 Hu Yuzhi’s report can be found in ZRGCBSL 1.254-66, here see p. 254-57. 
83 See Huang’s report, p. 431-33. 
84 On the issue of the transition and a discussion of some related problems see Huang’s report on 
behalf of the Publishing Committee, p. 295-96. 
85 “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu quanguo Xinhua shudian chuban gongzuo huiyi 
de tonggao” (dated Oct. 26, 1949) in ZRGCBSL 1.474-75. 
86 Lu’s speech, p. 444. 
87 A summary report of this tea party is available in ZRGCBSL 1.462-67. 
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“Our own forces are smaller than those of the private [publishers], but we mustn’t 
allow the private sector and ourselves to develop in opposition to each other, and 
we mustn’t force them out [of business] and let them disappear; we must unite with 
them, lead them, and, under the principle of taking both public and private 
enterprises into account [gongsi jian gu 公私兼顾], introduce division of labour in 
the production in a planned and gradual way.”88 A double-track policy is emerging 
here: while the private industry is being reassured of their status, behind the 
closed doors of the publishing conference the ground was prepared for a dominant 
role for the state-owned Xinhua bookstore. The demand of direct Party control 
from the media concept was understood in an increasingly literal fashion. 
At the very end of the Xinhua conference, the core principles for publishing 
in the PRC were summed up by none other than Lu Dingyi, the head of the CCP 
PD. In a crucial passage of his closing remarks, Lu made clear the difference 
between the Party’s publishers and the private publishing houses:89 
The publishing industry that serves the people does indeed have [bright] prospects. 
This is a truth that already lies clearly before us. Such publishing organs like Xinhua 
shudian and Sanlian shudian that are serving the people, have struggled bitterly for so 
many years, and now indeed they face a bright future. The difference between our 
publishing industry and the old publishing industry is to serve the people 
unconditionally. The profit to the cause of the people’s liberation is the only profit that 
counts for us; no matter whether the publishers earn money or make losses, no matter 
whether individual satisfaction is high or low, all must serve the people. Under the rule 
of the GMD, the people’s publishing workers went so far as to be ready to sacrifice 
their lives for the profits of the people. From the old point of view, such a kind of 
publishing and such publishing workers, were simply “stupid.” But just this kind of 
publishing and these publishing workers are those that will have a future. Stalin has 
said that Communists are made from a special material. Our Communists are just this 
sort of special people, they unconditionally serve the people. Xinhua shudian and 
Sanlian shudian are models of this kind of publishing businesses; the outstanding 
publishing workers from all over the country will advance on this road. We must 
maintain and develop this glorious tradition. 
 
As the most senior Party representative to address the conference, Lu chose blunt 
words to describe the prospects for the publishing sector. The most interesting 
point is Lu’s use of liyi 利益. Liyi should be rendered variously as “profit” and 
“benefits.” Lu deals here with two competing understandings of liyi, business 
profits on the one hand, and the benefits of the people – that transcend a purely 
monetary understanding. Lu Dingyi regards the latter as the “correct” interpretation. 
                                             
88 Hu Yuzhi’s speech, p. 266. 
89 Lu Dingyi’s address in ZRGCBSL 1.441-46, here p. 442. 
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For the private publishing houses, Lu’s speech would have sounded alarming, if 
they were given an opportunity to hear his address, because his proposals come 
up to abolishing market principles for the publishing sector. Lu also goes further 
than Huang Luofeng when he justifies even loss-making enterprises: under certain 
circumstances, the demands for equity break even can be suspended. Finally, Lu 
Dingyi singles out Xinhua (and the Xinhua-ized Sanlian) as a model not just for 
state-owned publishing enterprises, but for all publishers: the introductory remark 
that the future (qiantu 前途) belongs to those publishing enterprises that “serve the 
people” is a clear indication of the further direction. In his speech, Lu had 
proposed nothing less than the blue print for the transformation of the publishing 
sector. 
 
 
Learning and Emulating: Soviet Publishing and the Transformation of the Chinese 
Book Industry 
How did the CCP put into practice its ambitions to assume comprehensive 
control of the publishing sector? Through what steps was the Xinhua model 
extended to the entire Chinese publishing industry? And, most importantly, what 
models did the CCP use for the implementation of the media concept in the 
publishing sector? As the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(Bolsheviks): Short Course became the blueprint for the construction of socialism 
in China, the Soviet experience played an important role in the restructuring of the 
Chinese publishing sector and provided a model for the transformation the 
industry.90 It was, however, a model based on the Soviet experience of the 1930s, 
long after the revolution – in contrast to the more recent prescriptions of Soviet 
advisers who urged the CCP to respect the relatively long period of transition that 
                                             
90 Unfortunately, since the 1960s Chinese sources do no longer comment on the Soviet role in the 
publishing sector. Information is very fragmentary and must be reconstructed from what little 
material is available. A recent volume affirms the important influence of the Soviet model for the 
Chinese publishing industry in the 1950s. See Yu Min (ed.). Qian Sulian Eluosi chuban guanli 
yanjiu. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2002. 
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had been agreed at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 
September 1949.91 
According to the biographers of Hu Yuzhi, a Soviet representative was 
present at the Xinhua conference.92 The director of the Soviet Union’s International 
Bookstore addressed the audience and instructed the Chinese, who were eager to 
learn from the Soviet Union, on the Soviet experiences in publishing and its 
administration, among other things.93 He told the Chinese especially about the 
need to separate publishing, printing, and distribution. His address was also 
included in a volume collecting the key speeches of the conference that was 
distributed in 1950.94 However, the number of Soviet advisors in the publishing 
sector staying permanently in China was probably very small in contrast to those 
in other industries in the 1950s.95  
As an alternative to sending experts to China, the Soviet authorities invited 
Chinese administrators to visit the Soviet Union and collect experience first hand. 
Since none of the new leaders of the publishing sector had studied in the Soviet 
Union during the heyday of the Third International in the 1930s, the inspection 
tours of the early 1950s were an important experience for them. Most notably, 
Huang Luofeng went to Moscow in July 1950 for a four-month period of study.96 
The most convenient way to transfer Soviet knowledge to the PRC was the 
translation into Chinese of Soviet books and other material that was then used as 
study material all over the country. During the first decade of the PRC, large 
numbers of Soviet literature of theoretical and applied nature was translated into 
                                             
91 A parallel argument has been made, with regard to the transformation of the Chinese economy, 
by Li Hua-yu. See Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006. Li’s observations seem to be valid for the publishing sector as well. 
92 The name of this man is given as Deaomiduofu 德奥米多夫. I have been unable to track down 
this person. 
93 See Yu You. Hu Yuzhi zhuan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1993, p. 328-29. 
94 Xinhua shudian zong guanlichu (ed.). Quanguo Xinhua shudian chuban gongzuo huiyi zhuanji. 
Beijing, 1950, p. 367. Unfortunately, I have never seen this collection. Deaomiduofu’s speech is not 
available in other collections of publishing documents published later. 
95 Having no concrete figures to answer this question, I conclude from the fact that Soviet advisers 
are never mentioned in contemporary sources of the publishing sector that there were few (if any) 
advisers in the PRC’s publishing sector. For a study of the impact of the Soviet model on industrial 
management in the PRC see Deborah A. Kaple. Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High 
Stalinism in China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
96 Huang went as a member of a Propaganda Work Team organized by the Propaganda 
Department. See the Appendix in Ma Zhongyang. Chubanjia Huang Luofeng, p. 262. For some 
reason, Huang’s visit abroad is not even mentioned in the main text of this volume. The mission 
may have been secret, as there is no information on it available. 
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Chinese.97 This pattern was very common and is found in the publishing sector as 
well.98 In March 1950, Shidai chubanshe 时代出版社 (a Shanghai-based venture 
owned by the Soviet news agency TASS) translated a small volume entitled 
“Soviet Publishing” that contained five lectures by Soviet publishers.99 Of special 
significance for the organization of the PRC publishing sector are the passages of 
the book introducing the structure of the Soviet publishing industry:100 
 
In the Soviet Union, the publishing sector practices division of labour according to the 
different characters [of publications]. This means that every Soviet publishing organ 
generally publishes one sort of books: politics, art, agriculture, medicine etc. Thus, in 
the Soviet Union there exist: the National Publishing House for Political Books 
(Gospolitidat), the National Publishing House for Arts Books (Goslitiedat), the National 
Publishing House for Agricultural Books (Sel’khoegie), the National Publishing House 
for Medicine Books (Medgie) etc. Many publishing houses have joined the National 
Association of Publishing Houses (Ogie) under the Soviet Council of Ministers. The 
National Association of Publishing Houses plays an important role in the Soviet 
publishing sector. Among its members are (as of 1947): the National Publishing House 
for Political Books, the National Publishing House for Literary Books, the National 
Publishing House for Medicine Books, the National Publishing House for Technical 
Books, the Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House of the National Academy of 
Sciences, the Soviet Dictionary (Foreign Languages and Languages of Minorities in the 
Soviet Union) Publishing House, the Geography Books Publishing House, the Jewish 
‘Der Emes’ Publishing House, and the publishing organs of the eighteen districts; these 
eighteen publishing organs primarily print works of local character, literary works of 
local authors, and books for production and agriculture. Besides the publishing houses 
belonging to the National Association of Publishing Houses, there is the Publishing 
House of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the publishing houses of the other [local] 
academies of sciences, the publishing houses of many ministries (like the Textbook 
Publishing House of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Republic, the Medicine 
Books Publishing House of the Soviet Ministry of Physical Education, the Military 
Affairs Books Publishing House of the Soviet Ministry of Armed Forces etc.), 
educational institutions, mass organizations, party organizations, and the publishing 
organs of the institutions of higher learning and other organizations. In Moscow, there 
is furthermore the Foreign Languages Publishing House that is specialized in printing 
and translating books into foreign languages. Besides the national publishing houses, 
there are publishing organs in the member republics, autonomous regions, districts, 
and localities. 
 
                                             
97 Compare the following bibliography: Zhongyang wenhuabu chuban shiye guanliju (ed.). Wo guo 
fanyi chuban Sulian shuji mulu. Beijing: Zhongyang wenhuabu chuban shiye guanliju, 1955. 
Compare also the list given in Kaple. Dream of a Red Factory, p. 14-18. 
98 Translations relevant for the publishing sector include: Sulian de chuban (see below); 
Nazhaluofu. Sulian chuban shiye jianshi. Beijing: Shidai chubanshe, 1955; Sulian chuban yinshua 
gongzuo renyuan huiyi wenjian. Beijing: Shidai chubanshe, 1955; K.I. Yinlinsiji. Shukan bianjixue 
jiaoxue dagang. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1956. 
99 Maerkusi. Sulian de chuban. Shanghai: Shidai chubanshe, 1950. Orig. Sovetskaia pechat’. 
100 Ibid., p. 36f. 
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The above passage is just a brief description of the organization of the Soviet 
publishing industry, but in the Chinese context it must be read as a blueprint for 
the future transformation of the publishing sector. It stands in marked contrast to 
the organization of the Chinese publishing industry before 1949. The Soviet model 
first of all prescribes “division of labour” in the form of specialization: all publishing 
houses have narrowly defined fields of business. The distinction of responsibilities 
for particular kinds of publications is advocated as a measure of rationalization, yet 
it also serves purposes of control. If the Soviet model was to be implemented in 
China, the identity of the existing Chinese publishers would receive a major blow: 
for decades, Chinese publishing houses had produced books across functional 
lines. Sanlian and its predecessors, for example, published Chinese and foreign 
literature as well as works of philosophy, the social sciences, and occasionally 
even the sciences. Such a broad scope became impossible in the light of the 
Soviet model. 
The passage quoted above contains important information concerning the 
administrative organization of the sector: the National Association of Publishing 
Houses is entrusted with the united leadership of the entire Soviet publishing 
industry, with the exception of publishers directly administered by the Party or by 
the government ministries. To set up a comprehensive structure of control and 
command that would correspond with the Soviet counterpart thus became a 
priority for the CCP. Most importantly, however, is the complete absence of private 
publishing houses in the long list given by the Soviets. In the long term, the entire 
private sector in China would thus have to be nationalized. As I will show below, 
the Chinese Communists set out to learn from the Soviet experience and made 
every effort to emulate the Soviet model. As a consequence, the Chinese 
publishing sector became in many ways a direct copy of the Soviet model; even 
details, such as the Academy of Sciences’ own publishing house, were taken over 
from the Soviet Union. 
In its first months, the GPA was preoccupied mainly with creating a 
confusing bureaucratic structure with overlapping layers that struggled for 
competencies. Deciding the division of responsibilities apparently consumed so 
much energy that very little time remained for the ambitious goal of direct 
leadership of the state-owned Xinhua bookstore. The GPA explained malfunctions 
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and failures to perform usually with a lack of experienced cadres and other 
personnel that prevented it from setting up an even more complicated structure.101 
Hu Yuzhi had to admit shortcomings in the organization of book supply, the 
relationship with the private publishers, and in the communication between the 
GPA and the Party agencies. In a June 1950 report to Hu Qiaomu, Hu Yuzhi drew 
a pessimistic picture of the situation in the publishing sector. Hu Yuzhi’s frankness 
is striking:102 
The publishing sector of the entire country is still quite chaotic. Output is low and so is 
quality. The vast majority of new books are of mediocre content and are stereotyped. 
The biggest sales are only cadre study books and journals, with literary works coming 
in second; books in support of production and construction and reading materials for 
the great masses of workers and peasants are few and far between. We will have to 
spend a great amount of work to turn around the trend of publishing being detached 
from the real needs. 
The steps taken towards unification of Xinhua bookstore are extremely slow. While 
objective conditions are excellent, the subjective conditions cannot keep pace. Our 
biggest shortcoming is that relations with the masses haven’t been handled well; the 
distribution organs are slacking and the readers say that Xinhua is a yamen103 that is 
difficult to enter. 
Book prices have reached a very severe [i.e. high] level. Many schools and students 
cannot afford textbooks; in Beijing middle schools, three to four students share one 
book. High paper prices are of course the main reason for high book prices, but 
another reason is the mishandling of distribution and our inability to avoid waste. 
In most places, textbooks cannot be supplied in time. The Xinhua bookstore in 
Guangzhou united the private booksellers and organized a textbook supply committee; 
in mid-April, [the textbooks] for the spring term had not yet been supplied completely, 
so that the schools had to extend their deadlines for two months; [the Guangzhou store] 
violated regular guidelines and sold books for increased prices calculated by parity 
units; [this behaviour] lacks organization and discipline and does harm to the prestige 
of the Party and the government (they have later apologized publicly in the 
newspapers). 
 
The GPA’s first experiences in directly managing production and supply of books 
had been nothing short of a disaster. The exclusion of the commercial publishing 
houses such as Shangwu, from textbook publishing had led to a breakdown of 
                                             
101 The GPA’s three-month report from February 16, 1950, gives fair insight into the problems 
plaguing the body in the early days (“Chuban zongshu san ge yue gongzuo jiancha hou de ji xiang 
jueding” in ZRGCBSL 2.90-94). In one instance, a cadre admits that books imported from the 
Soviet Union and distributed by the new International Bookstore (Guoji shudian 国际书店), a GPA 
unit, were so expensive due to that book store’s ineffectiveness, that even Xinhua branches 
refused to place their orders through Guoji, and preferred cheaper books imported by private book 
sellers in Northeast China. 
102 See Hu Yuzhi’s letter to Hu Qiaomu which in its extraordinary frankness in fact amounts to a 
self-criticism: “Chuban zongshu gongzuo zonghe baogao: 1950 nian 2-5 yue” in ZRGCBSL 2.300-
01. 
103 The organs of central and local government and administration in imperial China were notorious 
for the arbitrariness of the officials; “entering” a yamen, that is, reaching the successful handling of 
official matters usually required either a lot of money or good personal relations, or both. 
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supply. Worse, Shangwu’s workshops were standing idle and the publisher 
produced huge deficits month after month; only massive subsidies by the new 
government (that was in dire straits fiscally anyway) kept Shangwu from drastically 
reducing its workforce, a step that would have further damaged the reputation of 
the new government.104 
Yet while Hu Yuzhi was ready to shoulder his part of the blame, he was not 
afraid to point out the responsibility of the Party for the present situation in the 
Chinese publishing industry:105 
The Party’s leadership relationship is weak. The Party branch’s help in raising the 
cadres’ ideological [awareness], in implementing business strategies, and in reflecting 
the masses’ opinions, is not big, so that leadership and masses lose touch and the 
views of leadership and cadres are not united. Human resource management tends to 
a closed-door attitude. Some non-Party cadres [i.e. personnel] say that the activities of 
Party and [Communist Youth] League are shrouded in mystery and therefore they have 
apprehensions and misgivings, and that the leaders of the administration, too, 
sometimes make not clear the intentions of the Party. (The following is omitted).106 I 
have to personally shoulder the responsibility for these affairs, because I have not 
patiently linked up with the Party and, with the exception of key questions, have not 
often requested advice and reported to the Party. From now on I must correct this 
[shortcoming]. I hope that you will give me much support and I ask the Party cell to give 
me much more leadership assistance and the necessary criticism. 
 
Obviously, Hu Yuzhi counts himself to those “non-Party cadres” who feel that the 
CCP shrouds itself “in mystery.” Formulated in a polite manner, Hu makes it 
abundantly clear that he feels let down by the Party; communication between the 
political leadership (from where the policies emanate that Hu has to implement) 
and the administrative organs is not functioning properly; the difficulties in the 
sector and the frustration for the employees are thus aggravated. 
While the private sector had suffered considerably from the new restrictions 
and the uncertainty caused by the administrative chaos,107 the worst performer in 
                                             
104 “Chuban zongshu gongzuo zonghe baogao: 1950 nian 2-5 yue,” p. 301. For more details see 
“Wei Shangwu yinshuguan wenti Chuban zongshu zhi Huadong Xinwen chubanju han” in 
ZRGCBSL 2.249-52. 
105 “Chuban zongshu gongzuo zonghe baogao: 1950 nian 2-5 yue,” p. 301. 
106 Omission in the original (ZRGCBSL reprint). 
107 In addition to restrictions on their business scope and the loss of important sources of income, 
such as school textbooks, the large private publishers were dealt a further blow: in spring 1950 the 
GPA began to urge the large publishing houses to move their headquarters from Shanghai to 
Beijing. This open step to advance central government control went at the heart of the publishing 
sector: for decades Shanghai had been the undisputed capital of publishing in China. When 
publishing houses were urged to shift to Beijing – in return for massive capital injections 
desperately needed by the ailing publishers – they had to reorient from the commercial setting of 
Shanghai to the politicized environment of Beijing; the move wreaked havoc to their identities. For 
Kaiming see “Chuban zongshu gei Kaiming shudian fuwen” in ZRGCBSL 2.246-47. 
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the industry was undoubtedly the Party-led Xinhua shudian. Not even a year after 
the founding of the PRC it turned out that the rigorous and often blind 
implementation of the media concept on a national scale had put much strain on 
the publishing industry. In mid-1950, the private sector did still exist and tried to 
carve out its niche under the new conditions. Yet these difficulties notwithstanding, 
the Party’s propaganda leadership decided to push ahead with the media concept 
that the CCP had developed in Yan’an: Xinhua was the one and only choice 
acceptable to the Party leadership. 
A consequence of the chaos in the regulatory bodies was the decision to 
transfer responsibility for the day-to-day affairs of Xinhua from GPA to another 
body, the Xinhua Main Administration (Xinhua zong guanlichu 新华总管理处); the 
GPA was henceforth to concentrate on strictly administrative affairs. The Xinhua 
Main Administration was established in Beijing on April 1, 1950 and was put in 
charge of all management affairs of the Xinhua branches in the large regions.108 
While retaining close ties to the GPA (Huang Luofeng, head of the GPA’s 
Publishing Bureau was named general manager of the Xinhua Main 
Administration), the Main Administration took over the responsibility for all core 
publishing areas such as textbooks, the Marxist classics, and Party and 
government documents; the regional branches would receive master copies of the 
works compiled in Beijing and were to reprint them for local distribution. In addition, 
they would be allowed to publish works of local character, literary works, and, on 
demand of the centre, a few school textbooks. Editorial control was thus being 
concentrated not only in the hands of Xinhua, but in the Main Administration under 
direct political control of the central government. Furthermore, with the 
establishment of the Xinhua Main Administration, the relationship among the 
branches was reformed: horizontal contacts between regional bookstores were 
gradually reduced, with all important information flowing through the Main 
Administration. The vertically integrated system of administration and 
communication through which the CCP has controlled the flow of information and 
the decision-making processes in all areas of life since the 1950s was thus 
introduced into the publishing sector, too. 
                                             
108 See “Chuban zongshu guanyu tongyi quan guo Xinhua shudian de jueding” (March 25, 1950) in 
ZRGCBSL 2.107-17. 
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In August and September, 1950, two important conferences were convened 
that introduced the next step in the process of unification and consolidation of the 
Chinese publishing sector. The Second National Work Conference of Xinhua 
Bookstores met in Beijing from August 29 to September 10, followed by the First 
National Publishing Conference, held from September 15 to 25, where 
representatives of the private publishing houses joined the Xinhua cadres. The 
Xinhua conference summed up the progress of work since the first such meeting a 
year earlier; the attending Xinhua cadres were briefed on the further direction of 
the structural reforms of the sector. The theme now moving onto centre stage was 
the breakup of the integrated production chain of publishing, printing, and 
distribution (faxing 发行),109 an issue that had already been discussed the year 
before. The introduction of “division of labour” (fen gong 分工) was motivated by 
the Soviet model that loomed in the background of many a speech at the 
conference. Knowledge about Soviet publishing practices and the organization of 
the Soviet publishing sector seemed to be much better now; it is very likely that 
Huang Luofeng, who was still in the Soviet Union at the time of the conferences, 
provided the attendants with detailed information on what he was seeing in 
Moscow. 
The new organizational pattern was discussed at the two conferences, and 
the decisions reached there were approved by the Central Committee and then 
communicated within the Party.110 On October 28, 1950, the government issued a 
“Directive of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s 
Government Concerning Improving and Developing the Publishing Business in the 
Whole Country,”111 thus formally pronouncing the division of labour:112 
Publishing, distribution, and printing of books and journals are three kinds of work 
with different characteristics; principally they shall gradually practice scientific division 
of labour. To raise the quality of the publications, the professional publishing houses, 
in the first place the public sector publishing houses, shall gradually practice a rough 
                                             
109 Before 1949, no clear distinction between retail and wholesale existed in the Chinese publishing 
industry; most bookstores engaged in both kinds of activities. Since wholesale purchases by lower 
level Xinhua stores were initially treated as normal sales, many local stores complained about 
inflated prices, because the prices had to accommodate both the costs of the end seller and the 
intermediary, whereas books in larger cities were cheaper due to a shorter distribution chain. 
110 See “Zhongyang zhuanfa quan guo chuban huiyi guanyu ge xiang gongzuo fangzhen de 
jueding” (dated October 13, 1950) in XGWX 3.128-130. 
111 “Zhongyang renmin zhengfu Zhengwuyuan guanyu gaijin he fazhan quan guo chuban shiye de 
zhishi” in ZRGCBSL 2.642-45. 
112 Ibid., p. 642-43. 
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division of labour according to the nature of the publications. The General Publication 
Administration shall also, as far as possible, help the larger ones of the private 
publishing houses to outline a professional publishing direction; it shall assist the 
smaller private publishing houses, under the principle of respecting their free will, to 
[join in] cooperative business operations, so as to overcome the phenomena of 
unbridled competition, duplications and waste in publishing work.113 
 
In practice, this decision proposed both a division of labour along organizational 
lines and a specialization according to subject matter, as practiced in the Soviet 
Union. It thus required the separation of Xinhua’s publishing, printing, and 
distribution activities. The internally distributed final document of the publishing 
conference then proposed the establishment of a number of state publishing 
houses, formed around Xinhua’s editorial committees, each with a specified task: 
the People’s Publishing House (Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社) was to specialize 
on publications of political nature and policy-related reading materials, the task of 
the Education Press (Jiaoyu chubanshe 教育出版社), to be formed in junction with 
the education ministry, was to publish school textbooks, etc. Likewise, the 
conference decided that the larger private publishing houses should concentrate 
their publishing activities on one special field; their retail and wholesale activities 
were to be transferred gradually to Xinhua.114 
The GPA reacted quickly and the reorganization of the Chinese publishing 
sector took effect on December 1, 1950, when Renmin chubanshe was 
established. Hu Sheng, a Sanlian man, was made head of the first new publishing 
house, to be assisted by Hua Yingshen and Wang Ziye 王子野, two Xinhua 
cadres.115 Shortly thereafter, the printing plants in Beijing and elsewhere were 
reorganized: in 1949, the administration of the printing facilities that Xinhua had 
taken over from Zhengzhong and other GMD publishers had been handed over to 
the Publishing Committee and was then transferred to the Xinhua Main 
Administration. Under the new system of division of labour, these plants, as well 
as those that had been built in the months since the CCP’s assumption of power, 
                                             
113 Note that the directive does not differentiate properly between “division of labour,” i.e. the 
separation of publishing, printing, and distribution, and “specialization,” which means that 
publishing houses must concentrate on a single kind of publications. Both are referred to as fen 
gong 分工 here. 
114 See “Zhongyang zhuanfa... de jueding”, p. 129-30. 
115 See Bi Dezhen. “Renmin chubanshe 40 nian” in Song Yingli. Zhongguo dangdai chuban shiliao 
4.371-77, and Renmin chubanshe zongbianshi, Renmin chubanshe shewu bangongshi (comp.). 
“Renmin chubanshe dashiji” in Chuban Shiliao 9-10. Both accounts are highly stratified mainstream 
histories. 
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retained their name, but were placed under direct supervision of the GPA as 
independent work units.116 On January 1, 1951, the Xinhua Main Administration 
was renamed Xinhua Main Branch (Xinhua zongdian) and set up shop as the 
state-owned agency to concentrate exclusively on book distribution. The main 
branch in Beijing was to “manage in a unified way the national Xinhua book stores’ 
distribution of monopolized books and journals.”117 
In the provinces, the same organizational pattern was followed when the 
vertical administrative organization of the PRC gradually evolved: the editorial 
boards of the local Xinhua branches (zong fendian) formed the core of the 
provincial people’s publishing houses (such as Hebei renmin chubanshe 河北人民
出版社, Shandong renmin chubanshe 山东人民出版社, Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe 上海人民出版社 etc.),118 while responsibility for printing was transferred 
to the local publishing authorities (usually a chubanju or xinwen chubanju). On 
both central and provincial levels, the tripartite “division of labour” was 
implemented administratively through three independent work units under joint 
supervision of the publishing authorities and the propaganda committees. 
With the second restructuring in late 1950 and early 1951, the 
transformation of Xinhua came to a preliminary conclusion. The national 
administrative structure was completed in the early 1950s with the establishment 
of the last provincial governments. While administrative responsibilities shifted 
over the next decades, with stress alternating between Party and government 
authorities, the overall arrangement of “division of labour” and double, i.e. Party 
and state, responsibility has remained remarkably stable until today: as the 
country’s most important retail and wholesale chain119 Xinhua has refrained from 
entering the publishing sector again. Renmin chubanshe and its local pendants 
                                             
116 See “Chuban zongshu guanyu Xinhua shudian zong guanlichu gaizu ji chengli Renmin 
chubanshe deng san qiye danwei de tongbao” (dated January 17, 1951) in ZRGCBSL 3.17-18. The 
exact date when Xinhua Printing Plant Main Administration became independent is unclear. 
117 Ibid., p. 17. The term “monopolized” (zhuanying) refers to those market segments other book 
stores were excluded from, such as political publications and school textbooks. 
118 The three provincial publishers were founded in Nov. 1950, Jan. 1951, and Mar. 1951, 
respectively. 
119 In 1996, Xinhua had a market share of 90% of national book sales value; in the countryside, 
Xinhua accounted for 98% of sales. Numbers from Shu Chen. “Xinhua shudian jianku chuangye 60 
nian” in Song Yingli. Zhongguo dangdai chuban shiliao 4.102-07, here p. 104. For the urban areas, 
the figures may be taken with a grain of salt, but Xinhua’s dominance in the countryside is beyond 
doubt. 
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have lost much of their significance due to the depoliticization of Chinese society 
in the 1980s and 1990s but still have a monopoly on government documents and 
the collected works of the most important Party leaders (albeit by far not as 
lucrative a business as it was in the early 1950s). 
Over the short time of just 15 years, Xinhua shudian had thus evolved from 
a cave bookstore in Yan’an to a powerful national player with monopolies in the 
three core areas. Xinhua had paved the way for the restructuring of the publishing 
sector along lines that the Party regarded as “rational” and “scientific,” and had 
thus moved, with political and material support of the Party-state, from a peripheral 
position to the centre-stage of the Chinese publishing sector. By late 1950, Xinhua 
had even become the pace-setter for the private publishing sector, indicating to 
them a direction of development that soon became mandatory for the remaining 
private publishing enterprises. 
The restructuring the Chinese publishing sector had taken little more than 
two years, from early 1949 to early 1951. The process had been far from linear; it 
had been riddled by protracted debates, misunderstandings, and breakdowns of 
communication. Overall, trial and error accompanied the experiments that in the 
end led to the emergence of a permanent structure for the Chinese publishing 
sector – not without, however, leading to significant disruptions of the industry’s 
functioning. The Party’s determination to accept these disruptions – even where 
they threatened other priority projects, such as reforming the school sector – as a 
transitory phenomenon attests to the conviction of the CCP leadership to follow 
the ideas outlined in the Party’s media concept: direct control over the media, their 
enlightening mission, their orientation towards the masses as defined by the Party, 
and their ambiguous nature in class struggle. To establish full and unequivocal 
control over all segments of the media sector was an issue of key concern for the 
CCP in the takeover years. 
The extent to which the Party’s movements were driven by the prescriptions 
of the media concept becomes clear in view of the fate of Sanlian shudian, the 
other pre-1949 model of CCP-led publishing. As indicated above, Sanlian could 
look back on two decades of experience in which it had been a highly effective 
operation that had produced with a well-trained, sophisticated cadre – none of this 
could be said of Xinhua. Nonetheless, the dismantling of Sanlian began only 
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months after the merger in late 1948. Since early 1949, a continuous stream of 
Sanlian’s best and brightest – Huang Luofeng, Xu Boxin, and Shen Jingzhi, to 
name but a few – were transferred to positions in the new administrative organs 
and to Xinhua, or to publishers in the private sector that were gradually turned into 
public ownership. Only the Sanlian cadres had a pool of experience with the urban 
private sector publishing that that was crucial for the CCP’s takeover of the 
industry. Shen Jingzhi, for example, was sent to the business council, the new 
leading organ of Kaiming shudian, where he served as the CCP’s contact man.120 
The hopes of Kaiming, the most “progressive” among the six large publishing 
conglomerates of Republican China, to earn the favour of the new rulers and to 
play an increased role in the new setting, did not materialize. In 1953, Kaiming 
was merged with Qingnian chubanshe 青年出版社121 into what became Zhongguo 
qingnian chubanshe 中国青年出版社, a fully state-owned venture. 
As early as July 1949, a CCP CC directive indicated the future path for 
Sanlian when it clarified the relationship of Xinhua and Sanlian:122 
Both Sanlian shudian and Xinhua shudian are publishers under the leadership of the 
Party, but Xinhua is entirely public owned, and after the establishment of a future 
central government, it will become a state publisher. Sanlian [in contrast] is a 
progressive publishing house of joint public-private ownership and will retain this form 
[of ownership] in the future. In the national new-democratic publishing sector... Xinhua 
must therefore shoulder the main responsibility, and Sanlian should become Xinhua’s 
close aide and colleague. 
 
Sanlian was to play a privileged role in the PRC, albeit in a position second to 
Xinhua. This position of subordination became more pronounced in 1950, as 
Sanlian was perceived more and more as a private sector company (rather than a 
Party publisher, the way Xinhua was treated). The private publishing houses were 
placed under considerable pressure to proceed towards diverse forms of joint 
private-public ownership, and finally nationalization, a course that Sanlian, too, 
was now to go.123 The former Sanlian cadres that had moved to the government’s 
                                             
120 See Tang Xiguang. “Kaiming de licheng” in Zhongguo chuban gongzuozhe xiehui. Wo yu 
Kaiming, p. 289-314, here p. 312-13.  
121 Qingnian chubanshe was attached to the Central Committee of the Chinese New Democratic 
Youth League (Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan 中国新民主主义青年团), that became the 
Communist Youth League (Gongqingtuan 共青团) in May 1957. 
122 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Sanlian shudian jinhou gongzuo fangzhen de zhishi” (dated 
July 18, 1949) in ZRGCBSL 1.190-91, here p. 190. 
123 This process that came significantly earlier in the publishing sector than in most other industries, 
cannot be discussed in detail here. Resentment and resistance against the GPA’s bullying was 
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publishing authorities could not prevent Sanlian from being marginalized. Upon 
pressure from the CCP, Sanlian had to pass its retailing activities to Zhongguo 
tushu faxing gongsi 中国图书发行公司 in late 1950, just as all other private 
publishing houses had to.124 Bled of its most able staff – second-tier personnel 
such as Shao Gongwen 邵公文 were now in charge – Sanlian’s situation 
deteriorated further. The end of the road was reached in August 1951, when 
Sanlian ceased to exist as an independent publishing enterprise and was merged 
with Renmin chubanshe.125 Books were still published under Sanlian’s name, but 
its organization was incorporated into that of Renmin chubanshe and Sanlian’s 
editorial department – its strongest asset – moved into the building housing 
Renmin chubanshe in an arrangement called “one unit with two brand names” (yi 
ge danwei, liang kuai mingpai 一个单位，两块名牌). 
The demise of Sanlian was accelerated by external factors. Rising tensions 
on the Korean peninsula and the PRC’s entry into the war (the Chinese army 
crossed the Yalu 鸭绿 river on Oct. 16, 1950) placed the Chinese economy under 
severe stress. In close conjunction with the war, the CCP started the “campaign to 
suppress counterrevolutionaries” (sufan yundong 肃反运动); the radicalization of 
the domestic situation speeded up the trend towards uniformity.126 Probably even 
more important was Mao Zedong’s impatience with the speed of economic 
construction in the PRC. As early as 1950, Mao began to think about accelerating 
the PRC’s march towards a socialist economy and thus to cut short the period of 
New Democracy that in 1949 had been defined as lasting ten to fifteen years. 
Under these circumstances, the need for a model enterprise of the United Front 
                                                                                                                                      
strong among the large publishing companies. Shangwu resorted to all legal means to fight off the 
GPA’s efforts to make inroads into its organization. This struggle is documented in “Shangwu 
yinshuguan wenti li ci huitan zhiyao” in ZRGCBSL 2.250-52, a very interesting document that 
provides rare insights into organized resistance against the new state in the early years after the 
takeover.  
124 Zhongguo tushu faxing gongsi was a pure bookseller founded by Shangwu, Zhonghua, Kaiming, 
and Sanlian on Jan. 1, 1951. Three years later, Zhongguo tushu faxing gongsi was merged with 
Xinhua. 
125 Sources on the merger are not available, it is mentioned in passing in a few publications, such 
as the entry “Shenghuo-Dushu-Xinzhi Sanlian shudian” in ZDBQ, Xinwen chuban juan, p. 261f. 
Additional information was provided by interviewee 109. 
126 On the sufan campaign and its consequences see Julia C. Strauss. “Paternalist Terror: The 
Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic 
of China” in Comparative Studies in Society and History 44.1 (2002), p. 80-105. The campaign was 
announced in the “double ten” directive, issued on Oct. 10, 1950. 
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approach, such as Sanlian shudian, quickly evaporated. The crucial propaganda 
sector underwent transformation towards full state control and even state 
ownership several years before the other industries. 
With the passing of Sanlian from the scene, only Xinhua remained as the 
embodiment of Party-led and state-owned publishing in the PRC, a model that did 
not change significantly for the next thirty years. Only the Xinhua path allowed the 
direct translation of the CCP’s media concept into this field of the propaganda 
sector – publishing was no longer an industry in an economic setting, but a tool of 
persuasion and education in the hands of the CCP. It was the demand for direct 
and exclusive control over the media that prevented the Party from ever seriously 
considering Sanlian as a model for the organization of the publishing sector. Its 
apparent strengths notwithstanding, and in face of obvious difficulties in the 
transition process, the Party decided to stick to the Xinhua path: direct and all-
encompassing bureaucratic control of the publishing sector under a network of 
new administrative agencies, with Xinhua at the core, even when such control 
came at a price in terms of efficiency and market performance. 
 
* * * 
 
In this chapter I have argued that within the short span of three years, the 
CCP transformed the Chinese publishing sector from a highly competitive cultural 
industry into a segment of the propaganda and education xitong. The transition to 
forms of public ownership and direct state control occurred much faster than in 
most other industries – a clear sign that the CCP did not think of publishing in 
economic terms. 
In 1949, the CCP could draw on two sets of first-hand experience in the 
publishing sector. For more than a decade, the Party had relied on indirect means 
of control – mainly through Party membership of key personnel and the loyalty of 
cadres – to use enterprises such as Shenghuo shudian as outlets to spread the 
CCP’s message. This approach had proven its effectiveness in the areas under 
GMD control and under the Japanese occupation, where Shenghuo, Dushu, and 
Xinzhi helped the Party to reach out to intellectuals under the umbrella of the 
CCP’s United Front policy, and at the same time to coordinate communication with 
 290
Party members. The Sanlian cadres had learned their craft in the cosmopolitan 
setting of Shanghai, the centre of China’s publishing industry. Due to their 
expertise, many of them moved into the new positions of authority in the sector. 
Sanlian had become the CCP’s leadership academy for the publishing sector. 
Yet under the impression of the Soviet model, the CCP decided to 
implement the Party’s media concept much more literally than the Sanlian model 
would have permitted. Only Xinhua shudian, the CCP’s publishing arm of the 
Yan’an period, provided the Party with direct and exclusive control over the entire 
publishing sector, as the media concept formulated in the early 1940s had 
mandated. Nothing short of a fully-owned propaganda institution, integrated into 
the Party’s framework of bureaucratic control, could be tolerated in the 
propaganda xitong – a crucial pillar of the CCP’s rule, and also a field where the 
Party expected counterattacks of its enemies. The Party thus arrived early on at a 
very literal interpretation of the media concept. 
In the course of the institution building process, the CCP was ready to face 
repeated setbacks and even resistance, but proceeded with the implementation of 
the Xinhua mode of publishing on a national scale: a network of administrative 
agencies was put in charge of the sector to put into effect the Party’s claim of 
control. In the cities recently captured, notably Beijing and Shanghai, Xinhua took 
over first the GMD-owned publishing facilities and then expanded its market share 
at the expense of the private sector. The identity of the large private publishing 
houses was broken by the forced move of their headquarters from the capitalist 
setting of Shanghai to the political environment of Beijing, by the decision to break 
up the integrated production chain of publishing, printing, and distribution, and by 
the enforcement of “specialization” that made publishers chose a single market 
segment. Not even Sanlian was spared its fate and, bled of its leading core, it was 
merged into the state-owned publishing sector. By late 1951, three monopolists 
were born with the retail and wholesale chain Xinhua shudian, the Xinhua printing 
plants, and Renmin chubanshe. The remaining publishers of the formerly private 
sectors did only nominally continue to exist, and the last pockets of resistance 
were disappearing over the next two years.127 The Xinhua model had been 
                                             
127 A notoriously difficult segment of the publishing industry was the highly fragmented and 
specialized cottage industry producing comics, concentrated mainly in Shanghai. Reports such as 
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implemented across the board on a national scale, and the Chinese media 
concept had become the guiding logic of the publishing industry in an almost 
unmediated way. 
The CCP’s decision to enforce the media concept in a literal manner 
despite a series of setbacks and obvious failures shows the power of the CCP’s 
belief in the correctness of the principles it had developed for the media sector. 
The transformation of the publishing sector had proven the strengths of the media 
concept, but had also exposed its weaknesses and its inherent tensions. These 
weaknesses did not disappear after the initial takeover years, but rather tended to 
pile up as the new regime consolidated. It was eight years after the creation of the 
PRC, in 1957, that these tensions broke through the surface and the problems in 
the media sector became visible in a short but violent explosion of arguments. 
                                                                                                                                      
“Shanghai lianhuan tuhua de gaizao qianhou” (dated Oct. 1950) in Shanghai dang’an 1999.4, p. 
19-22, “Shanghai jiefang yilai liang nian ban lianhuan tuhua gaizao yundong chubu zongjie” (dated 
Jan. 1952), in ibid., p. 22-27, document the Party’s difficulties to turn around these last pockets of 
the capitalist, market-driven publishing industry of the Republican era. 

Chapter Six 
The Paper, the Party, and the People:  
Wenhuibao, Spring 1957 
 
 “The stage of hurricane-like class struggle has already passed in our 
country... this is no longer storm and downpour, not even medium rain, but 
rather a little rain, a drizzle, a continuous light drizzle.” 
(Mao Zedong, Feb. 27, 1957, as remembered by Xu Zhucheng) 
 
“As long as class differences exist in the world, the newspapers are always 
a tool of class struggle” 
(Mao Zedong, June 14, 1957) 
 
The implementation of the media concept across the entire media sector of 
the PRC had provided the CCP with an unprecedented degree of control: neither 
the Qing rulers nor the GMD had succeeded in establishing a grip on the media, 
based on ideological convictions, even remotely as thorough as that of the CCP. 
By the early 1950s, the Party found itself in a position of almost total control of the 
publishing industry, the press, and the other elements that were now united in the 
newly constituted propaganda sector. The CCP was ready to embark on the 
project of remoulding the thinking of the Chinese people. 
A number of successes across the political board seemed to prove right the 
new government’s approach to governance: after years of war the economy was 
restored in record time, the country gained international recognition in the Socialist 
camp, and the population was united ideologically through the Korean War. In all 
these processes, the media played a decisive role. These general achievements 
notwithstanding, however, day-to-day reality in the media sector looked not all that 
rosy, and more than five years after the founding of the PRC, the entire sector was 
struggling with a number of difficulties. While some problems of the takeover 
period had been solved relatively soon, others turned out to be of more than a 
transitory nature and were there to stay. 
When problems in the superstructure were found to stand in the way of 
further rapid progress in the project of economic construction, the leadership 
started to consider corrections in the ideological arena. The second major 
challenge to the Party’s media concept (after the extension of the Yan’an vision to 
the entire country after 1949, see chapter five) was thus initiated originally from 
within the Party itself. It was only after the Party leadership had stepped into action 
and after repeated calls on Party members in 1956 and spring 1957 that the rank-
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and-file of the media personnel reacted to the call of “letting hundred flowers 
blossom:” the CCP’s number one newspaper, RMRB, announced a change in 
policy as early as July 1956, but it was not until nine months later that journalists 
from all over the country started publicly debating solutions to the structural 
problems that were by then well-known to both the Party leadership and the 
journalists below. 
Yet during the open debates that were spreading across the nation in May 
1957, some of the fundamental assumptions underlying the media concept were 
identified as the root of the structural problems in the media sector. When the CCP 
leadership came to the conclusion that courageous journalists were calling into 
question the pillars of the Party’s media concept, it intervened violently and 
brought the debate to an end. The ensuing anti-Rightist campaign targeted those 
newspapers and journalists that were found to be at the forefront of the critics. The 
campaign led to the reinstitution of controls and cemented a literal interpretation of 
the media concept. 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the Shanghai daily Wenhuibao 文汇报 
(hereafter WHB) to illustrate the debates surrounding the function of newspapers, 
their responsibility towards the state and the people, and the role of journalists. 
The Beijing-based Guangming ribao 光明日报 (GMRB) and WHB were the two 
papers most severely criticized during the anti-Rightist campaign. Observers have 
tended to pay more attention to the Beijing paper, because its leadership was 
made up of well-known intellectuals, notably Chu Anping 储安平.1 Yet it was WHB 
that ran the more outspoken articles and, once the anti-Rightist movement began, 
Mao’s public wrath was directed primarily against WHB and its leadership of 
professional journalists, rather than against GMRB. 
I will start my discussion with an attempt to outline the problems that 
beleaguered the Chinese newspaper landscape, first from the perspective of the 
Party leadership, and then from that of the journalists. While much information on 
the problems as perceived by the men and women in the newspapers surfaced 
during the high-tide of criticism, the most comprehensive account comes from a 
                                             
1 On the essayist and journalist Chu Anping see Dai Qing. Liang Shuming, Wang Shiwei, Chu 
Anping. Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1989. Xie Yong (ed.). Chu Anping: yi tiao heliu bande 
youyu. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1999. Zhang Yihe. Zui hou de guizu. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 2004, ch. 2. 
 295
fictional source, Liu Binyan’s 刘滨雁 Ben bao neibu xiaoxi 本报内部消息, on which 
I will draw here.2 I will then address the reform measures in the newspaper sector 
that were initiated by the Party. The main part of this chapter focuses on the 
discussions of May 1957. I have selected a seemingly minor debate, the Zuo Ye 
affair (Zuo Ye shijian 佐叶事件), which however contains practically all arguments 
and proposals brought forward in the newspaper sector. When Mao ordered the 
Party to fight back in June, it reacted quickly: an especially malicious piece of 
criticism came from Yao Wenyuan 姚文元, at that time a figure still on the fringes 
of the news sector. Finally, the public criticism and self-criticism of WHB reveals 
not only many of the arguments made for reforms of the press, but also the Party’s 
retrospective interpretation of these proposals; in this light we can also reassess 
the role of the CCP’s media concept. 
I will argue that the Party had intended to relax controls and allow for a 
more liberal interpretation of the media concept – but not for its abolition. The 
debate in the newspapers also remained within the limits of the concept. It was 
only after the journalists were encouraged repeatedly to address the structural 
problems of their sector that some elements of the media concept were 
questioned. The concept itself, however, was never called into question, not even 
in May 1957. Nonetheless, when the crackdown came, the Party argued that it had 
met with an attack of the class enemy in the ideological realm: the tensions 
between the different elements within the media concept finally broke through the 
surface, and the concept’s concluding Stalinist clause became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Consequently, all energy was channelled into resurrecting the status 
quo ante; yet what prevailed in the end was an even more radical and literal 
interpretation of the media concept. 
 
                                             
2 As Rudolf Wagner has proposed, in political settings as tightly controlled as the PRC, important 
political debates are often shifted to the realm of literature, where they can be discussed more 
openly and comprehensively. The analysis of fictional sources therefore reveals many important 
arguments that otherwise do not appear openly. See “Introduction” in Rudolf G. Wagner. Inside a 
Service Trade: Studies in Contemporary Chinese Prose. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 
1992. See also Merle Goldman. “Mao’s Obsession with the Political Role of Literature and the 
Intellectuals” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, Eugene Wu (eds.). The Secret Speeches 
of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward. Cambridge, Ma.: Council 
on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989, p. 39-58. The importance of the story discussed 
here is underlined by Mao Zedong, who referred to it in his famous “Things are about to change” 
from mid May, 1957, that signalled the impending change in the political climate.  
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The Setting: One Hundred Flowers 
When Mao Zedong called for a “high tide in socialism” in December 1955,3 
he signalled his dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the country towards 
socialism: the rapid economic reconstruction after the Anti-Japanese and Civil 
wars, and the completion of institution building in 1954, led the Chairman to view 
more optimistically the Chinese people’s ability to achieve socialism in a relatively 
short time. In the production drive beginning in late December 1955, whole 
industries of the urban economy were converted to socialist forms of ownership 
within a matter of days, while in the countryside collectivization was speeded up. 
The production drive was accompanied by a liberalization in the ideological realm, 
designed to set free more forces for the construction of socialism. A relaxed 
attitude towards intellectuals could be justified on the grounds that the coalition 
government was basically consolidated.4 The relaxation in the ideological realm 
was soon affected by events beyond China’s borders: the ‘Thaw’ in the Soviet 
Union and in Eastern Europe after the XXth CPSU Congress and Khrushchev’s 
secret speech made their impression on the liberalizing experiments in spring 
1956 in China.5 
Two major policy interventions by Mao Zedong created a distinctly different 
atmosphere in the ideological realm. The first was Mao’s (then secret) “Ten Great 
Relationships” speech, delivered on April 25, where Mao felt the need to redefine 
the relationship between the Party and the people.6 In his point seven, “The 
relationship between Party and non-Party,” he came to the conclusion that “it’s 
probably better to have several parties. Not only has it been that way in the past, 
but it may well be so in the future.” Non-CCP intellectuals could indeed play a 
positive role in the country and were free to voice their opinions: “Let them rail us; 
                                             
3 See his foreword (xu) to the three volume-edition Zhongguo nongcun de shehuizhuyi gaochao. 
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1956, 3 vols. 
4 The first major sign of a changing intellectual climate was Zhou Enlai’s speech “Guanyu 
zhishifenzi wenti de baogao,” held on Jan. 14, 1956, on the occasion of a CCP CC conference on 
intellectuals. The speech was published in RMRB, Jan. 30, 1956.  
5 This argumentation follows Roderick MacFarquhar who summarizes “that China’s thaw originated 
in the victories for socialism of late 1955 and early 1956, albeit liberalization was certainly later 
spurred on by events in Eastern Europe.” See The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1: 
Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p.81. 
6 “Lun shi da guanxi.” The relationships speech was published only after the Cultural Revolution in 
RMRB, Dec. 26, 1976. For his analysis (Origins, p. 48-51), MacFarquhar had to use versions of 
this speech published in unofficial Red Guard tabloids in the Cultural Revolution. The following 
quotes are taken from RMRB. 
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if they are unreasonable, we rebuke them, if they are reasonable, we accept it. 
This is quite beneficial to the Party, to the people, and to socialism.” Mao even 
went so far as to proclaim that bourgeois intellectuals of the likes of Long Yun 龙云, 
Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, and Peng Yihu 彭一湖,7 who had been critical of the Party, 
should also be given an opportunity to voice their opinions (“We also have to nurse 
them”), and advised the CCP: “I hope that you will grasp United Front work so as 
to improve our relations with them and make every possible effort to mobilize their 
activism to serve socialism.” Non-party intellectuals were thus encouraged to 
contribute actively to the CCP’s policies and were assured that their criticisms 
would be dealt with on a factual basis; they would not have to fear reprisals. This 
seemed to be a remarkable reversal of policies from the Hu Feng 胡风 and 
Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries (Sufan 肃反) campaigns a just year earlier.8 
 Mao’s “Hundred Flowers” speech, which he delivered just a week after the 
Relationships speech, was the second signal that the atmosphere in the 
superstructure was about to change.9 In literature and art, Mao proposed more 
                                             
7 Long Yun had been a GMD army commander who had declared his support for the CCP in 1948 
and consequently occupied military and civil positions in the PRC. The philosopher Liang Shuming 
had been involved in both politics and newspaper work and was a prominent member of the 
Democratic League, one of the democratic coalition parties. The outspoken intellectual frequently 
ran into trouble with the CCP. Chow Ching-wen reports one particularly severe clash with Mao 
Zedong in Ten Years of Storm. The True Story of the Communist Regime in China. Westport, Con.: 
Greenwood Press, 1960, p. 252-57. See also Theodore H.E. Chen. Thought Reform of the 
Chinese Intellectuals. Westport, Con.: Hyperion Press, 1960, p. 46-49, 91-93. Peng Yihu was 
member of the Standing Committee of the China Democratic National Construction Association, 
another coalition party. 
8 On the Hu Feng campaign see Merle Goldman. Literary Dissent in Communist China. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967, ch. 7. On the Sufan campaign see Julia C. Strauss. “Paternalist 
Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the 
People’s Republic of China” in Comparative Studies in Society and History 44.1 (2002), p. 80-105. 
Technically speaking, the Sufan campaign was continuing all through the Hundred Flowers 
movement. 
9 Excerpts from Mao’s speech at the Supreme State Conference (May 2) are reproduced under the 
title “Zai yishu fangmian de bai hua qi fang de fangzhen, xueshu fangmian de bai jia zheng ming de 
fangzhen, shi you biyao de” in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhongyang dang’anguan 
‘Dang de wenxian’ bianjibu (ed.). Gongheguo zouguo de lu. Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian 
zhuanti xuanji 2: 1953-56. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991, p. 249-50. The entire 
speech was never published, but sources say that Mao lectured on the ‘Ten Great Relationships,’ 
“the content being roughly the same as the speech on Apr. 25 [i.e., the original Ten Great 
Relationships]” (see Zhongyang dang’anguan ‘dang de wenxian’ bianjibu (ed.). Gongheguo zouguo 
de lu. Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian zhuanti xuanji 2: 1953-56. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1991, vol. 6, p. 105, n. 1). Since it is unlikely that Mao held two talks to the same 
audience on one day, I suggest that the famous “Hundred Flowers” speech was in fact another 
version of the ‘Ten Great Relationships,’ containing the remarks quoted above. This would also 
explain why the speech was never published. For a similar argumentation see MacFarquhar et al 
(eds.). The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, p. 140, note 8. The remarks on the “Hundred 
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diversity, while with respect to the science community he explained: “Within the 
limits set by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, all academic ideas, 
correct or incorrect, should be voiced, without us interfering. Lysenko or not-
Lysenko, how can we understand that fully; there are so many theories, so many 
schools in science. And in the social sciences, there’s also this school and that 
school, so let them talk. In the journals and in the newspapers, all sorts of opinions 
can be voiced.” The Party would withdraw to a certain extent from interference into 
intellectual discourse. It was the task of Lu Dingyi, head of the CCP Propaganda 
Department, to elaborate on Mao’s ideas in a prominent June 13 article in 
RMRB.10 Lu explained: “Our policy of ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred 
schools of thought contend’ means free [speech] among the people (renmin neibu 
人民内部). We advocate increasing this kind of freedom as the people’s political 
power consolidates.” Referring to the decisive victory in the transition to socialism, 
Lu Dingyi proposes that the scope for discussion in arts and sciences can be 
widened, in order to speed up development: “If we want to make our country rich 
and strong, in addition to consolidating the people’s political power, to developing 
the economy, developing the realm of education, and strengthening national 
defence, we must also bring literature and arts, and the sciences to a flourishing 
development; not a single of these conditions is dispensable.” Free debate, so Lu 
hoped, would set free productive forces that were able to propel the country 
forward on a path faster than that possible under the previous conditions. Open 
discussion and a competition of ideas were necessary factors for this goal. Yet 
while the new policy opened up a new scope of debate, Lu also outlined the limits 
                                                                                                                                      
Flowers” were not included when the final version of the Relationships speech was prepared for 
publication in 1975. At that time, Mao personally approved of the final text that was produced by 
merging the two drafts of April 25 and May 2 (i.e., the “Hundred Flowers” speech), while in late 
1965 he had objected against internal circulation of the speech (in its earlier form). Jianguo yilai 
Mao Zedong wen’gao 6.105-06, n.1; see also ibid. 13.444-45, n.1. As Mao mentioned in another 
speech on Apr. 28, the concept had been around for several months. It was sometimes attributed 
to Zhou Yang (see an injection by “somebody in the audience” in an excerpt from this speech, 
reproduced under the title “’Bai hua qi fang, bai jia zheng ming’ yinggai cheng wei women de 
fangzhen” in Gongheguo zouguo de lu, p. 248-49. The origins of the concept are also discussed in 
MacFarquhar, Origins, p. 51-56. 
10 The article is based on a speech by Lu held on May 26 to an audience of academics, writers, 
and professionals in the CCP leadership compound at Zhongnanhai 中南海. The manuscript went 
through several drafts, and the Propaganda Department and later Zhou Enlai made revisions. After 
the speech, it was revised again and sent to Mao for comments on June 8. The revised text was 
finally published in RMRB on June 13. On the revision process and Mao’s endorsement (“very 
good, can be published”) of the text see Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wen’gao 6.120, n. 1. 
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that discussion was not to cross: “In brief, while we advocate to draw a clear line 
between the enemy and us in politics, we also advocate that among the people, 
there definitely must be freedom. ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred 
schools of thought contend’ is an expression of the freedom among the people in 
the realm of literature and art and scientific work.” Within the limits indicated by the 
Party, however, discussion was allowed, and this included the medium of criticism 
and self-criticism. Lu indicated that even the Party might become an object of 
criticism: “Openly admitting errors, exposing the reasons of these errors, analyzing 
the environment that has produced these errors, and discussing in detail methods 
to correct these errors, is, for a Party, the hallmark of a respectful Party, and for an 
individual, the attribute of a matter-of-fact style.” Lu Dingyi’s declaration that 
neither individuals (the Party members) nor the Party itself were immune to 
committing mistakes and consequently were legitimate targets of (well-intentioned, 
i.e. ‘among the people’) criticism was ultimately responsible for the outpouring of 
criticism in the following months and in spring 1957. 
In the background of the efforts to liberalize the political atmosphere and to 
encourage the intellectuals to voice their criticisms was the debate on 
bureaucratism. Mao Zedong became increasingly convinced that bureaucratism 
had become the main obstacle for the development of Socialism. This view was 
argued, on Mao’s behalf, by Deng Xiaoping in his speech at the Eighth Party 
Congress in September 1956. Liu Shaoqi, however, contended that subjectivism 
was the main obstacle, and the debate remained inconclusive for the time being. 
Only in spring 1957 Mao was able to persuade his still reluctant colleagues of the 
need of a rectification campaign that would address the issue of bureaucratism – 
what became the high tide of the Hundred Flowers campaign in May 1957.11 
The adoption of a new line in the treatment of intellectuals and in the realm 
of the superstructure had profound implications for the newspaper sector. As Mao 
had indicated in his Hundred Flowers speech, the press was the main channel of 
articulation for the intellectuals and thus a major avenue of debate. A shake-up of 
the Chinese press was thus a crucial part of the liberalization drive. 
 
 
                                             
11 See MacFarquhar. Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, p. 112-16. 
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The Problem (I): The View from the Top 
It was Liu Shaoqi who came forward to carry the Hundred Flowers policy 
into the media sector and to jump-start the opening-up of the CCP’s press 
infrastructure. On May 28 and June 13, he called two meetings with senior 
representatives of Xinhua she and discussed with them some problems of the 
current Chinese press.12 The points addressed by Liu were of far-reaching 
importance and concerned not only the basic outlook of Xinhua, the core-piece of 
the Party’s press apparatus; they were of relevance for the entire press sector. 
Liu first of all discussed the basic character (xingzhi 性质) of Xinhua she: he 
proposed that Xinhua should claim more freedom to speak for itself, while toning 
down its role of being the official government spokesman:13 
You should thoroughly discuss: is it better if Xinhua she is the state news agency or 
should it belong to the people (laobaixing 老百姓)? I think it is better if it is not a state 
news agency but belongs to the people... Xinhua’s editorials and the editorials by 
Xinhua journalists should not speak in the name of the state... If Xinhua belongs to the 
people and doesn’t play the role of a state news agency, the State Council could 
establish a news office that would assume the task of publicly distributing news and 
statements, and refuting rumours. 
 
Such a proposal did not mean that Xinhua was to be privatized or freed from Party 
control; what Liu had in mind was that Xinhua claim more independence as a 
source of news, rather than just act as the mouthpiece of the government. 
Nowhere in his speech did he mention any real changes to Xinhua’s ownership 
structure nor to its place within the administrative structure. However, it was a 
critique of Xinhua’s general outlook: all too proudly Xinhua had presented itself as 
the government spokesperson, only to find that its reliance on this position had 
also produced negative results. Liu Shaoqi’s proposal that Xinhua view itself as 
“the people’s” news agency was a slap in the face of the Xinhua leadership 
because it attested to them that they had lost touch with the people they were 
supposed to serve. Xinhua personnel thus should look to the Party leadership for 
direct advice less often and instead rely on their own instincts when reporting the 
                                             
12 See “Dui Xinhua she de di yi ci zhishi” in XGWH 3.358-69; “Dui Xinhua she gongzuo de di er ci 
zhishi” in ibid., p. 377-82. For a summary of Liu’s main points and criticism thereof see Renmin 
ribao wuchanjieji geming pai, Shoudu xinwen pipan lianluozhan (ed.). Xinwen zhanxian liang tiao 
luxian douzheng dashiji, 1948-1966. N.p., n.d., p. 9-10. 
13 “Dui Xinhua she de di yi ci zhishi,” p. 367f. 
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news; at the same time, however, the journalists were supposed to stay loyal to 
the Party, as Liu had made unmistakably clear. 
Liu’s second proposal carried the argument of his outline of Xinhua’s basic 
character further, addressing the work of Xinhua’s reporters: he called on the news 
workers to pay attention to being “objective, truthful, impartial, and not one-
sided” – the basic credo of the liberal press.14 The Chinese newspapers should not 
be afraid to report negative aspects in their news stories: “we must talk about the 
good things, and about the bad things, too,”15 and the journalists should even 
report shortcomings in the CCP’s work if this can help the Party to overcome these 
shortcomings: “When an error just raises its head over the horizon, it would be 
harmful to the people if we do not uncover and stop it; we must raise [this problem] 
without delay in our news reports and make the people pay attention to it.”16 Yet 
Liu carefully balanced his statement and defined the class framework of 
reporting:17 
Our news reports cannot transcend classes and cannot be objectivistic; we must adopt 
a firm standpoint of the people and a class standpoint; [the reports] must use a Marxist-
Leninist point of view and method. While news reporting should be objective, truthful, 
and impartial, it must also give consideration to the benefit and harm it does, it must 
see whether it is beneficial to the cause of the people and the proletariat. Stalin, for 
example, has committed many errors, in the struggle to eliminate 
counterrevolutionaries (sufan douzheng 肃反斗争) he had some people killed by 
mistake, this is true. But if we report this, it would be very harmful to the struggle 
currently going on, this is a question of standpoint. He has committed mistakes, but we 
must think about when it will be beneficial for us to talk about it. 
 
When Liu thus proposed that newspapers pay more attention to truthfulness and 
the troublesome aspects of Chinese society and the Party’s work, he obviously did 
not advocate an all-out adoption of the principles of the liberal press. He spoke of 
a “false impression,” implying that creating an impression, a preconfigured picture 
of the situation, would be permissible and even be the task of the newspapers; Liu 
just wanted this impression to be nearer to what he defined as the “truth,” thus 
strengthening rather than weakening the position of the Chinese press by making 
it become more objective. 
                                             
14 Ibid., p. 363. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 362. 
17 Ibid., p. 360-61. 
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When he urged reporters to pursue a more truthful style in news reporting, 
Liu did in fact give a remarkably frank assessment of Chinese newspaper practice 
in the years leading up to 1956. In general, newspapers had become too dull and 
boring. This was, first of all, a result of overcompliance with what the reporters 
suspected were the leadership’s intentions, and the fear to commit political 
mistakes. Liu was especially concerned with what had become a common practice: 
to report only the positive aspects in the newspapers. There was no need to do so, 
Liu explained:18 
When carrying international news, some papers only print positive stories about us; 
whenever somebody condemns us or says something positive about America it is 
being deleted; this method is not good. If, for example, the head of the American 
government condemns us, can we print this in our newspapers? In my opinion, we can 
do so. If he condemns us, then this is a real fact and is the objective reality, how can he 
condemn us! If we print such things in our newspapers from time to time, we let the 
people know that somebody is condemning us, that imperialism is spreading rumours, 
and so we raise the indignation of the people. 
 
In this respect, so Liu, Xinhua could even learn from the capitalists news agencies’ 
credo of objectivity. Chinese newspapers, by reporting almost exclusively the 
positive in order to create a favourable public opinion for the Party, had lost 
credibility with the masses who could see many problems on a daily basis; at the 
same time, this practice carried the risk that the leadership might not be informed 
immediately of emerging problems. 
Liu furthermore requested the newspapers to pay more attention to their 
readers’ needs. He proposed that the content carried by the papers be diversified 
and that they should struggle to attract more readers through more lively reporting, 
implying that news reporting was too monotonous, with lengthy and dull articles 
dominating the newspapers’ pages. He agreed with a proposal raised by his 
audience that news should generally be short, “three to five hundred words for 
normal news.”19 Liu thus admitted that many stories in the newspapers were too 
long-winded and boring. Rather, newspaper articles should be short and to the 
point, so that they “are of general interest, and at the same time are of interest to a 
small number of specialists.”20 In this context, Liu also circulated the idea that 
Xinhua she may start its own newspaper and begin to compete with RMRB with a 
                                             
18 Ibid., p. 360. 
19 Ibid., p. 364. 
20 Ibid.  
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focus on publishing news. Rather than complementing each other, the 
newspapers’ relationship should be characterized by competition. This idea was 
probably motivated by Mao’s call for the Hundred Flowers: different opinions were 
supposed to compete, and newspapers consequently would have to find ways to 
attract a following among the readers, who would thus have an opportunity to vote 
in a competitive market. 
Finally, competition should be carried into the newspaper boardroom itself, 
and journalists encouraged to speak out and write more openly and in a fresher, 
livelier style. Liu told the Xinhua leadership that more newspaper articles should 
be signed by their authors: Xinhua reports were required to be truthful, lively, 
interesting, and should be written in good style. A journalist doing so should be 
allowed to make a name for himself. Reporters shoulder the laborious task of 
researching news stories, and they have to take the risk of being criticized in case 
they are found wrong; thus, they should be given the opportunity to show off their 
talents. This, Liu felt, was but an adequate compensation.21  
In his two talks at Xinhua she, Liu Shaoqi proposed a change in existing 
media policy and suggested remedies for a number of shortcomings that had 
accumulated over the years since 1949. A careful reading of the text of Liu’s 
speeches reveals a number of problems that weighed on the effectiveness of the 
newspapers, the “Party’s mouthpiece.” Liu’s intention was to overcome these 
problems and to make the press a more efficient tool of propaganda. In the 
Cultural Revolution, excerpts from these very speeches were listed as Liu 
Shaoqi’s “crimes” that were said to be proofs for the ulterior intentions of Liu to 
lead the press down a bourgeois path.22 Quite the opposite seems to be true: 
while Liu addressed the shortcomings of the papers in a remarkably frank tone, he 
did so only behind closed doors; his audience, a reported eleven cadres, were all 
experienced and trusted leading personalities in the media sector. The remedies 
he proposed were clearly designed to raise the efficiency of the newspapers – 
without altering their basic character. Liu did not call into question the Party’s 
media concept. That said, however, it seems that his analysis of the problems 
affecting the Chinese newspaper sector in the mid-1950s remains rather shallow; 
                                             
21 Ibid., p. 363f. 
22 For example, in Xinwen zhanxian liang tiao luxian. 
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the points addresses by Liu almost exclusively concern surface phenomena, and 
his remedies, too, deal only with the most visible of the newspaper’s structural 
problems. A much more thoroughgoing reflection on the deeper reasons for the 
problems of the Chinese press came almost simultaneously from a very different 
direction. 
 
 
The Problem (II): The View from the Bottom 
How did the journalists perceive of their situation? The Hundred Flowers 
campaign provided them with a unique opportunity to voice their grievances. Even 
under the new political atmosphere of “thaw,” however, many news personnel 
were reluctant to address the roots of the problem openly: too much was at stake. 
The news sector was and is a field much more sensitive than the publishing sector; 
consequently, there is much less detailed first-hand information available on the 
press for the period under consideration here, the Hundred Flowers campaign. 
Inside accounts are still treated confidentially and even memoirs are occasionally 
censored.23 Just as in other sensitive fields, fictional or semi-fictional accounts 
often provide more original and unfiltered insight into the problems under debate, 
information that cannot be discussed in other strictly factual accounts.24 In the 
following section, I will rely on such an account to reconstruct the journalists’ 
analysis of the structural problems of the Chinese newspaper sector. 
 
                                             
23 Very precious information on WHB, for example, could certainly be found in Wenhui kuaibao, an 
internal bulletin of the paper, that is – unfortunately – not available to the researcher. The most 
important source on WHB for the period under consideration here are therefore the memoirs of 
WHB’s editor-in-chief, Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, which were published in 1998 by Sanlian shudian. The 
book’s prefaces, however, are dated from 1985 and 1987, and in the epilogue Xu’s son explains 
that the book could be only published after lengthy negotiations, and several years after Xu’s death. 
Even then, many passages from the manuscripts were obviously deleted. Some of the passages in 
question can be reconstructed as they appear in Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). Wenhuibao 
shilüe, 1949.6-1966.5. Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1997; this volume quotes from the 
manuscript of Xu Zhucheng huiyilu. Fortunately, two crucial fragments of the manuscript are 
available in two articles: “‘Yangmou’ – 1957” in Xinhua wenzhai 1989.2, p. 143-49, and “Yangmou 
qinliji” in Zhongguo zhi chun 55 (1987), p. 19-30. Both articles are almost identical, yet the latter, 
published outside the PRC, contains several paragraphs that were deleted in the Xinhua wenzhai 
article. As a rule, I have given preference to quoting from this source, which I regard to be the most 
authentic. 
24 See the argument in Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, “Preface” and “Introduction,” esp. p. 1. 
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The June 1956 issue of Renmin wenxue 人民文学, the country’s flagship 
literary journal, carried a story by a young and until then almost unknown writer, 
Liu Binyan, entitled Ben bao neibu xiaoxi (Inside News from our Paper, hereafter 
Ben bao).25 Although a fictional account, Ben bao is solidly rooted in reality: it is 
generally seen as belonging to the genre of “reportage literature” (baogao wenxue 
报告文学), or rather, “texie” 特写, as which it was classified by the original 
publisher. A “Texie” is a piece of fiction, closely tied to and reflecting real events 
and situations, invested with deep social commitment; for this sake, problems 
looming below the surface of society are explored. “Texie” is a counter-genre to 
the longer, more normative novel.26 The genre “texie” was a Soviet invention; it 
was a product of the “Thaw literature” that proliferated in the Soviet Union after the 
death of Stalin. Influential works of this genre, notably those of Valentin Ovechkin, 
were introduced to China since 1955, and Liu Binyan, as translator of several of 
Ovechkin’s articles, contributed to its introduction in China.27 When Lu Dingyi 
publicly endorsed the Hundred Flowers policy, Chinese writers such as Wang 
Meng 王蒙 and Liu Binyan took this as a signal to emulate the Soviet literary thaw 
with in their own writings. One of these products is Ben bao. 
A classic example of the texie genre, Liu’s story is a piece of fiction, yet the 
problems addressed by the author are very real. Liu Binyan was a journalist with 
Zhongguo qingnianbao 中国青年报, the organ of the Communist Youth League’s 
Central Committee; in this position, he had gained first-hand insights into the 
                                             
25 Liu Binyan. “Ben bao neibu xiaoxi” in Renmin wenxue 1956.6, p. 6-21; a sequel (xubian, see 
below) was published in Renmin wenxue 1956.10, p. 48-59.  A translation by Bennett Lee can be 
found in William J. F. Jenner. Fragrant Weeds. Chinese Short Stories Once Labelled as ‘Poisonous 
Weeds’. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1983. This translation, however, is unsatisfactory in several 
respects: first, the original story and the sequel were lumped together into a single piece, the 
strikingly different character of both parts notwithstanding. Secondly, the translator has not marked 
the changes made by Renmin wenxue’s editor-in-chief, Qin Zhaoyang 秦兆阳. While these 
changes were not visible in Renmin wenxue (and all later publications), they reflect the different 
conceptions of the problem itself and of the political landscape by the writer Liu on the one hand, 
and Qin, an administrator in the cultural sector, on the other. Some fragments of the original text 
have been recovered by Rudolf Wagner and are investigated in Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 
179-192 and 213-26. 
26 For a thorough investigation of this genre that was very influential everywhere in the socialist 
world, see Wagner, Inside a Service Trade, p. 243-376. 
27 Ovechkin’s “Days in the rayon” (Raionnye budni) appeared in Chinese as “Quli de richang 
shenghuo” in Yiwen 1954.5, p. 1-38; others, such as Galina Nikolaeva’s The Newcomer: The 
Manager of an MTS and the Chief Agronomist (Povest’ o direktore MTS i glavnom agronome), 
followed in 1955 (Tuolaji zhan zhanzhang he zong nongye shi, published by Zhongguo qingnian 
chubanshe). For an analysis see Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 311-24. 
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problems of newspaper-making in Beijing and in the debates going on among 
newspaper personnel. Liu (b. 1925) had joined the CCP at the age of nineteen and 
had worked for Zhongguo qingnianbao since 1951. Being responsible for the 
paper’s department of industry and trade, Liu had extensive contacts with workers 
and knew about the troubles caused by the CCP’s policies. Like the protagonist in 
his story, Liu unsuccessfully tried to bring these problems to the attention of the 
public, but his articles were rejected.28 He thus experienced the frustrations that 
activist reporters had accumulated since 1949, and which form the focus of Ben 
bao. In March 1956, Liu accompanied Deng Tuo 邓拓, the editor-in-chief of RMRB, 
to Warsaw to attend a meeting of the International Organization of Journalists.29 In 
Poland, he not only had an opportunity to read the Soviet press (Liu was fluent in 
Russian) and see the results of the emerging “thaw” with his own eyes; he also 
heard of Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin at the CPSU’s XXth  Congress. 
He thus felt even more encouraged to deliver in his story an authentic reflection of 
the concerns of Chinese newspaper makers in 1956. 
While Liu Shaoqi’s critique of the press was little more than a 
phenomenological description of the shortcomings in the newspapers, Liu Binyan 
went much further when he tried to reconstruct the underlying social and political 
conditions that were responsible for the problems identified by Liu Shaoqi. He was 
encouraged to do so by Qin Zhaoyang, Renmin wenxue’s editor-in-chief, who 
made every effort to draw the readers’ attention to the story: it was printed in bold 
face in the journal’s table of contents, and in an editor’s note Qin commented that 
the story’s aim was to carry the “opposition to rightist conservative thinking” to a 
new level of reflection.30 
The story’s plot is set in the offices of a Party newspaper of an unidentified 
provincial capital (in criticism of the story later revealed to be Harbin ribao 哈尔滨
日报, the Heilongjiang provincial committee’s mouthpiece, which had a reputation 
to be particularly conservative).31 The story’s protagonist, a young female reporter, 
is a type rather than an individual character: Huang Jiaying 黄佳英 embodies one 
of several groups of “organization (wo)men” that supposedly make up the board of 
                                             
28 See Liu Binyan. Liu Binyan zizhuan. Hong Kong: Xinguang chubanshe, 1990, p. 46. 
29 Ibid., p. 65f. 
30 “Bianzhe de hua” in Renmin wenxue 1956.6, p. 125. 
31 See Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 182f. 
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a typical newspaper. She is an activist, filled with enthusiasm towards her work 
and towards the Party’s cause. Her enthusiasm, however, gets her nowhere, 
because “the activism and the creativity of the newspaper employees are being 
frustrated for the reason that the editor-in-chief doesn’t trust the editors and 
reporters; he underestimates their political consciousness and abilities, interferes 
too much and does not care enough about the editors’ opinions.”32 The heroine’s 
youthful activism is bogged down by a dilemma: she learns about many urgent 
problems but is neither allowed to report them in the paper, nor to get actively 
involved in solving these problems. To the contrary, her outbursts of activity get 
her into difficulties with her superiors and her behaviour is criticized as 
individualistic; she is reproached for having “her own opinion on each and every 
matter.”33 For the same reasons, her application to join the Party has been 
delayed time and again. 
She finds herself surrounded by another type of “organization men” on the 
same level of the paper’s hierarchy – people, however, who get along much better 
in the system than she does: they have resigned their activism and instead carry 
out orders passively while trying to anticipate what they are expected to do and 
say. Some simply hope to swim with the tide without causing trouble for 
themselves; others, including the protagonist’s fiancée, have become opportunists 
and careerists who use the system for their own advantage to get ahead within the 
bureaucratic structure. When asked to come up with a proposal for the coverage 
of the “National Congress of Advanced Producers,” the young man triumphantly 
declares: “I have called two newspapers in Beijing, they use the same way of 
reporting it.”34 Emulating the Beijing newspapers is a convenient way to be on the 
safe side – even if the coverage is found to be almost identical with that of the 
preceding year. The rigid control of the newspapers, caused by a literal 
understanding of the media concept, is stifling the activism and the creativity of the 
journalists. 
Above the level of the newspaper reporters, we find two layers of leadership: 
the vice editor-in-chief finds himself squeezed between his subordinates and the 
editor-in-chief. He has resorted to passivity and, instead of making decisions, 
                                             
32 Renmin wenxue 1956.6, p. 19. 
33 Renmin wenxue 1956.10, p. 55. 
34 Renmin wenxue 1956.6, p. 12. 
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passes up any problems he is confronted with, and delegates downwards 
whatever he is asked to do, thus “relaying the directives of the department head as 
his own and making the editorial board members’ reports into his own reports.”35 
He refuses to shoulder any responsibility; instead, he has studied closely the 
‘rules’ along which the bureaucracy functions and that must be respected if he is to 
reduce resistance to a minimum: “He had already mastered a couple of concepts 
and formulas he had come to call ‘rules’ and to which he reduced all complicated 
matters or which he would put atop everything, so that he could be satisfied with 
them fitting everywhere.”36 Originally an activist himself who had come to the 
newspaper several years ago full of anticipation of his job and of the contributions 
he would make to the Party’s goals, he has become bogged down by the same 
system that strangulates the journalists’ activism. In a grotesque fit of excitement 
he sighs: “What a wonderful thing to have one's own opinions!”37 
The editor-in-chief is characterized primarily by his absence: he does not 
appear even a single time in the entire story. Locked up in his office, he rejects 
whatever initiative reaches him from below and frustrates his subordinates by his 
bursts of anger over the telephone. He wants to decide everything by himself; his 
work style is characterized by looking to his superiors in the municipal Party 
committee and its PD for advice – and not to the editors and their reports. The 
heroine characterizes the day-to-day policy of the newspaper: “we always have to 
wait until the provincial Party Committee has defined an issue as a key task, and 
only then is an amount of space dedicated to this problem and we report about 
it.”38 When a new problem arises, an editor who has become used to this form of 
management reacts with disbelief on a proposal to report it in the paper: “How 
could we do that! The Party Centre has not yet considered this issue and has not 
reached a decision, how could a newspaper possibly start a discussion?”39 In the 
desire for control, the political centre in Beijing has claimed the exclusive authority 
to define the issue areas that the newspapers will deal with. Liu Shaoqi had 
addressed the same point in his talks with the Xinhua journalists. The results of 
                                             
35 Ibid., p. 15. 
36 Ibid., p. 16. 
37 Ibid., p. 18. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. 
39 Ibid., p. 20. 
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blind obedience and overcompliance are likely to be counterproductive: if the 
journalist’s initiative is curbed, crucial problems may go unreported. 
The editor-in-chief looks to his superiors not just for advice on what to write 
about, but also for judging the success of his paper: “reactions” (fanying 反应) are 
of prime importance to him in his search for guidance; the readers, in contrast, do 
not figure in his calculations. Thus, his newspaper has turned into nothing short of 
a newspaper’s caricature: even the employees poke fun at the paper’s section of 
economic and industrial news, saying it has become “virtually a propaganda office 
of the provincial committee’s industry department.”40 This, so the story’s underlying 
message, is the most appropriate characterization of the Party newspapers in the 
1950s. 
Through the four “types” of characters that populate the typical Chinese 
newspaper boardroom of 1956, Liu Binyan draws the picture of an ossified 
bureaucratic apparatus: layers of authority and rigid lines of communication have 
hamstrung the entire newspaper. The problems Liu Shaoqi had discussed with the 
Xinhua staff were rooted in the very structure of the media apparatus that the CCP 
had created after 1949, they were structural problems. Even worse: in his story Liu 
Binyan shows that they were not problems peculiar to the newspaper sector; 
rather, they were a mirror image of other sectors of Chinese society. The female 
protagonist has uncovered in the industrial work units she is supposed to write 
about exactly the same structures that hamper her own actions. The system stifles 
activism and instead supports all sorts of careerists and opportunists who are 
interested not in contributing to the Party’s cause, but only in their personal 
advancement. 
Upon publication Ben bao was greeted by the readers,41 and the reaction 
the story had caused, as well as the evolving political situation, encouraged the 
editor-in-chief of Renmin wenxue, Qin Zhaoyang, to urge Liu to write a sequel 
(xubian 续编). This sequel was published in the October issue of the same journal, 
                                             
40 Ibid., p. 19. 
41 A particularly noteworthy piece among the numerous reactions on the story appearing in 
newspapers all over the country is a short Xiangsheng 相声 dialogue by Jian Yu 鉴余, published 
under the title “Richang tanhualu” 日常谈话录 in the October issue of Renmin wenxue that also 
carried the sequel. In this ironic piece, an old cadre confesses that if he were in the position of the 
editor-in-chief, he would not “just criticize [the heroine]? I would punish her!!” (p. 23-24) because 
she dares to criticize the Party’s policies. Liu Binyan’s picture of the situation was thus thought to 
be rather too moderate in the face of the real situation. See Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 224.  
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carrying the conflict of the story’s protagonists to a new level. Most importantly, the 
sequel centres around the character of Chen Lidong 陈立栋, the editor-in-chief 
who finally appears before the readers. While in the first part, he had been but an 
angry voice over the telephone, Liu treats him now with much more openness than 
would have been possible four months earlier; he explained the reasons behind 
Chen’s behaviour: the editor-in-chief is portrayed as the loyal Party soldier who 
lives true to the principle “obediently and loyally following Party leadership” (laolao 
shishi fucong dang de lingdao 老老实实服从党的领导).42 He is a veteran Party 
member who has always worked hard, but has lost touch with reality and with the 
people. Yet he is not an opportunist and events do finally shake him out of his 
complacency. 
When the Party orders a change in subscription policies (such a change 
had indeed occurred, taking effect on July 1, 1956, see below), the number of 
copies sold plunges dramatically, revealing to Chen that his cherished newspaper 
is in fact so dull and boring that even the workers – the paper’s target group – 
refuse to read it. Other newspapers have reacted immediately and have adopted a 
more accommodating style, but not so Chen’s paper. Liu drives home this point 
through a comparison of the visual appearance of a progressive and a backward 
paper:43 
Today’s paper – how alluring a thing! In all the different corners of our mother country, 
many thousands of readers every morning greet this harbinger of time full of 
excitement, eager anticipation, and a fresh mind! Packed with the voices, colours and 
the smell of the whole world, it bursts into the door opened towards the sun, rouses 
people with a shout, whispers to them, stirs them, and draws them into reflection... 
But there is also another kind of paper: the first impression it gives the reader is that of 
rows and rows of unfriendly lead letters. You cannot really find out what day’s paper 
you hold in hands and need to spend great effort to dig patiently through all four pages, 
yet what you receive from it will be little nonetheless.  
 
There is no doubt that Chen’s paper belongs to the latter category. Confronted 
with the bare fact that nobody actually needs the paper he has dedicated all his 
energy to, Chen goes on a soul-searching journey and comes to the conclusion 
that he himself is to blame, his good intentions notwithstanding. Chen’s sudden 
transformation into a human being increases the power of the argument: the fault 
lies within the system. A young editor pronounces the momentous truth: “What I 
                                             
42 See ibid., p. 216.  
43 Renmin wenxue 1956.10, p. 50. 
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think, what we need is a thorough change in the system, in the way of doing 
things.”44 The media concept, and in particular the CCP’s strict interpretation of the 
first three clauses that stress the functional character of the media, have imposed 
upon the Chinese newspaper sector a comprehensive system of control that is on 
the brink of strangulating the press. Thus, it turns out to run counter to its initial 
purpose, and doubts arise about the newspapers’ very function: in the two-
direction flow of information, the bottom-to-top channel has become clogged. The 
concerns of the masses can no longer reach the leadership but end up in internally 
circulated reference material (such is the story’s title, Benbao neibu xiaoxi): “It was 
indeed odd how things turned out. The reports written by the journalists that 
contained new and interesting problems, were not printed, but turned into ‘inside 
news,’ while the long-winded and boring internal document, originally written for a 
small circle of people, had to be printed in a newspaper with tens of thousands of 
subscribers.”45 In a world stood on its head, the internal has become public and 
the urgent matter of public concern is sealed up in the Party’s internal 
communication. When the leadership has lost touch with the masses, the masses 
refuse to accept what is being transmitted downwards to them. Instead of guarding 
the Party’s rule, the media concept and its strict interpretation endanger it. 
In Liu Binyan’s eyes, one of the most important functions of the newspapers 
no longer works properly: the newspapers are supposed to be the ears and eyes 
of the Party, informing the leadership of what is going on in the society.46 Yet when 
the bottom-to-top stream of information no longer functions, the newspapers also 
cannot carry out their second main function: being the throat and the tongue of the 
Party (dangde houshe 党的喉舌). With opportunists, careerists, and formalistic 
conservatives in command, who follow the Party line only in form but not in 
substance, the newspaper can no longer speak for the Party but has become the 
tool of a self-serving bureaucracy. 
What had happened that encouraged Liu Binyan to adopt an even sharper 
tone in the sequel to his Ben bao? Two events had convinced Liu that he was right 
with his criticism, which he perceived as an enthusiastic echo of Mao’s call for 
                                             
44 Renmin wenxue 1956.6, p. 10. 
45 Ibid., p. 13. 
46 “However, now we all know, each Party member should be the ears and eyes of the Party, the 
brain of the Party” (Xubian, p. 58). See also Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 222f. 
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hundred flowers to bloom: on July 1, 1956, RMRB had announced a major 
reshuffle of its editorial policy, an issue I turn to shortly. Secondly, in September 
1956 the CCP had held its Eighth Party Congress, where Mao had argued again in 
favour of rectification (although as yet with little success). Both the Party Congress 
and the makeover of RMRB seemed to confirm Liu’s positions.47 
Liu Binyan’s analysis of the situation in China’s newspaper sector, 
especially in the sequel, is alarming indeed. Yet not enough: while the author had 
focused on the ossified bureaucratic structure as the obstacle to effective news 
work, Qin Zhaoyang, the story’s editor, decided to add another element and thus 
make the conflict even more acute. Without Liu’s knowledge, he carried out a 
series of major amendments in the sequel, so that Chen, the newspaper’s editor-
in-chief, makes his self-criticism not out of insight, but rather to save his position 
and carry on as before. The bureaucratic structure, Qin implies, gives even people 
with sinister motives an opportunity to pursue their plots.48 Ben bao thus was 
made dangerously close of implying what the CCP feared most: the class enemy’s 
subversion of the mass media. 
With or without Qin’s amendments to the original story, Ben bao contains a 
thorough analysis of the major problems that characterized Chinese newspaper 
work around the time Mao had called for one hundred flowers to flourish and for 
criticism to be voiced. While it was Liu’s merit to bring these deficiencies to the 
public’s attention, he was not  the only one to see the structural problems of the 
news sector. Behind closed doors, discussions had taken place and the Party 
leadership had decided to take action in the newspaper sector. Changes became 
visible for everyone on July 1, the CCP’s 35th anniversary. 
 
 
The Thaw (I): Reform of RMRB 
By convention, the most prominent location of RMRB’s pages is the upper 
left hand corner of the first page. It is here where usually important editorials, 
major policy announcements, or the key articles of the day’s edition are to be 
                                             
47 The Party Congress is analyzed in MacFarquhar. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, ch. 8-
11. 
48 See Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, p. 213-26, for the changes to the original text wrought by 
Qin. 
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found.49 On July 1, 1956, RMRB’s readers found in this corner an editorial entitled 
“To the Readers” (Zhi duzhe 致读者) that told them: “Beginning from today, RMRB 
will publish eight pages daily. Moreover, there will be some changes in editorial 
work. We want to use this opportunity to talk about these changes. RMRB is the 
Party’s paper, and it is also the paper of the people; from its initial issue until today, 
it has always served the interests of the Party and the people.” The very fact that 
the organ of the CCP Central Committee addressed its readers directly and in 
such explicit terms is remarkable. The paper indicated a change in direction right 
from the title of its editorial. The unusual volume of the paper – eight pages 
instead of six hitherto – was another sign telling the readers that they were to 
expect something new.50 
The editorial explained that even after eight years of publication (RMRB 
was founded on June 15, 1948), many shortcomings remained that were to be 
addressed by the current change in format. RMRB listed three major areas for 
improvements: the scope of reporting was to be enlarged, free debates should be 
promoted, and the paper’s style would be given a lift. In a world full of change, the 
paper explained (obviously referring to the production drive and the transition to 
socialism), “different categories of readers demand to understand this changing 
world from different points of view. Doing our best to satisfy the various demands 
of our readers is our bounden duty.” The rather narrow scope that had 
characterized RMRB (and, as readers knew, most papers in the country) to that 
date, was no longer appropriate in the current situation. The paper therefore 
pledged to diversify and to increase reporting to a broader range of issues. To 
serve its readers’ needs, even topics that until then had not found their way into 
the paper’s pages were to be covered, such as news about the capitalist countries, 
poor villages in the countryside, and negative aspects (“things not pleasant”). 
While the amount of news was to be increased, much more coverage should be 
given to features. This announcement contained, of course, an implicit critical 
assessment of Chinese newspaper work: a reporting policy all too narrowly 
                                             
49 See Renmin ribao bianjibu. Renmin ribao banmian beiyao. Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 
1997. Comp. for example the explanations on p. 1-4 and the following examples. 
50 Another indication of the significance was the editorial’s title: it is certainly no coincidence that 
“To the readers” had also been the title of the seminal editorial that announced the reform of JFRB 
in April 1942. 
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focused on political events and appeals for economic construction had hurt the 
paper’s attractiveness for the readers; a dull and boring paper was not an effective 
medium for propaganda and had failed to bring about a lively and enthusiastic 
atmosphere. “Life” – shenghuo 生活 – is a key word in the editorial.51 
The changes introduced in July 1956 were clearly inspired by Liu Shaoqi’s 
directions to the press a month earlier.52 The July 1 editorial was preceded by 
several weeks of discussions and an evaluation of RMRB’s work. The team in 
charge of the reform was led by Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s personal secretary, together 
with Deng Tuo, the paper’s editor-in-chief, and vice-editor Hu Jiwei 胡绩伟.53 On 
June 20, the group sent a report to the CC that outlined their assessment and 
plans, and shortly thereafter they received approval from the Centre.54 July 1, the 
35th anniversary of the CCP was chosen as the launching date of the “new” RMRB. 
The July 1 editorial was written by none other than Hu Qiaomu.55 
The editorial promised the readers that to produce a lively and attractive 
paper, two sections of RMRB in particular were to be expanded: the economic 
section would devote one page each to industry and agriculture daily; and the 
international news section was doubled to two pages. Both measures reflect the 
desire to give scope to formerly underreported subjects. RMRB further introduced 
regular features, such as a daily page with “academic and cultural issues;” the 
upper half of the last page was to be reserved for a literary supplement, while the 
lower half would carry advertisements. Both page seven, with the cultural features, 
and the last page were instrumental in producing a newspaper boasting more 
variety and colours – as Liu Binyan had shown, it was these kinds of features that 
had been most likely to fall victim to the printing of lengthy Party documents. 
                                             
51 Shenghuo and shengqi 生气 appear at several times in the editorial, in an effort to transmit an 
impression of vigor and energy. “Life” was one of the key themes of the “thaw” literature, both in 
China and in the Soviet Union; frequent references to the youth, and to a vigorous, rebellious type 
of personality in particular, symbolize the departure from dogmatist old modes of thinking. Comp. 
Wagner. Inside a Service Trade, ch 6, on the redefinition of the “socialist personality.” 
52 On the RMRB reforms see also Timothy Cheek. Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng 
Tuo and the Intelligentsia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 145-48. 
53 See Li Zhuang. Renmin ribao fengyu sishi nian. Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1993, p. 191-
97. Li himself belonged to the seven-member team in charge of reform. 
54 “Renmin ribao bianji weiyuanhui xiang Zhongyang de baogao.” See Li Zhuang. “Sishi nian jian 
san da shi” in Renmin ribao baoshi bianjizu (ed.). Renmin ribao huiyilu. Beijing: Renmin ribao 
chubanshe, 1988, p. 50-61, here p. 56. The document was never published. 
55 It was included in Hu Qiaomu wenji. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992, vol. 1, p. 480-83. 
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With the square statement that “newspapers are a society’s institution for 
the expression of opinion” (baozhi shi shehui de yanlun jiguan 报纸是社会的言论
机关), the editorial set out to explain the second of its reform proposals, the 
promotion of free debates (kaizhan ziyou taolun 开展自由讨论). “In the past, our 
newspaper has handled the promotion of debates not well at all, and this has 
reduced the vitality of the paper.” This public self-criticism was followed by a 
pledge to open up space for freer and livelier discussions: the paper would 
withdraw from selecting the topics that could be discussed. The course of debates 
would not be predetermined, and if a discussion did not come to a conclusive 
solution of a problem immediately, or if dissenting opinions remained, this was not 
bad, but rather a sign of normality. Yet RMRB did not only redefine the rules of 
public discussion, but also reminded its readers: “although the articles published in 
our newspaper have been selected by the editorial department, they may not 
necessarily represent the view of the department.” Retreating from the power to 
speak in a uniform voice on behalf of the Party on all issues was a major step for 
RMRB: to acknowledge the legitimacy of different opinions within the population, 
within the Party, and on its own pages did affect the very role of the PRC’s number 
one newspaper as the authoritative voice of the Party. No longer could the editor 
in Liu Binyan’s story call the Beijing papers in search of the “correct” line of 
reporting. Each newspaper would still have to shoulder the responsibility to “lead 
society’s understanding towards a correct path,” but it was now acknowledged that 
“in no society, all members can possibly have one and the same understanding 
towards each and every concrete problem.” RMRB was to make allowances for 
the diversity of opinions within society and give them ample room to “bloom and 
contend.” 
The third area where RMRB pledged to reform was its style: improving the 
paper’s style was a key requirement to make it more attractive and readable. 
Again, RMRB had to make a self-criticism: “Although our newspaper has carried 
many good articles in the past and the language in the paper has gradually 
improved somewhat, all in all there are still many works that are stiff, dry, and 
long-winded; empty and dogmatic ‘eight-legged essays’ and grammatically 
inconsistent writings are far from being stamped out.” RMRB now urged all writers 
to pay attention to producing carefully structured and beautifully written articles 
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and “to refrain at all costs from making the reader feel lulled to sleep while 
reading.” The new rules the editorial proposed were that “newspapers must be 
substantial, reasonable, and well-structured” (yan zhi you wu, yan zhi cheng li, yan 
zhi cheng zhang 言之有物，言之成理，言之成章) – issues discussed by Mao in 
his 1942 speech condemning dang bagu.56 
With an improvement in format, content, and style, RMRB pledged to carry 
out an ambitious overhaul of the entire newspaper that was intended to bring the 
paper closer to the reader. Reducing the distance between the readers and the 
newspaper staff (and the Party leadership who occupied the other end of the 
communication channel) was crucial if the paper was to be made more effective. A 
surprising step was the editorial’s announcement to scrap the page that had been 
reserved for reader’s correspondence. Instead, letters would from now on appear 
on all pages. Thus, readers were allowed a say in all sections and on all topics; 
they were no longer confined to a cage-like special section that was easily 
overlooked by readers interested only in instructions from above, but not in the 
people’s voices – people such as Chen, the editor-in-chief in Liu Binyan’s story. 
This bold move thus was clearly an effort of RMRB to redefine its relationship with 
its readers. The paper argued “the name of our paper is People’s Daily, which 
means that it is the people’s common weapon, and also their common property. 
The people’s masses are its master. Only by relying on the people’s masses can 
we make a good job in running our paper.” The last sentence is a reference to 
Mao’s famous dictum “Revolutionary war is the masses’ war; only by mobilizing 
the masses can we fight the war, only by relying on the masses can we fight the 
war.”57 In his text, Mao made reliance on the people’s masses a prerequisite for 
success in the revolutionary war. The argumentation in the editorial parallels that 
of Mao: only relying on the readers and serving their interests unselfishly can lead 
to success in the socialist revolution currently under way. 
The changes that RMRB announced in the July 1 editorial were of immense 
importance not just for the paper itself, but also for the theoretical premises of 
newspaper making in the PRC. The considerations of RMRB were clearly initiated 
from above; they reflected the broader issues raised by Mao in the Relationships 
                                             
56 “Fandui dang bagu,” discussed in chapter two. 
57 From “Guanxin qunzhong shenghuo, zhuyi gongzuo fangfa” (dated Jan. 27, 1934), included in 
Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 1, p. 136. 
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and Hundred Flowers speeches. Under these circumstances, can the RMRB 
reform be seen as an attempt to leave behind the straightjacket of the Chinese 
media concept? Apparently not: neither did the CCP renounce its claim of direct 
control of the paper – after all the reforms were of the top-down kind – nor did the 
Party walk away from claiming the right to use the media as a tool in the normative 
project of educating the people and remoulding their thinking. To the contrary: the 
intention of the RMRB reforms was to improve the paper’s performance and to 
make it an even more effective tool of Party propaganda. While the paper 
promised to give more room to discussions and to tolerate dissenting opinions, 
such steps were explained with the hope to increase the speed of economic 
construction and transition to socialism in a more competitive social climate that 
would encourage wider strata of society to become engaged in the Party’s projects. 
Thus, the CCP was ready to make amendments to the interpretation of the media 
concept and to the way of its implementation. Alterations of the concept itself, 
however, were not on the agenda. It was not until spring 1957 that the journalists 
themselves started to challenge essential aspects of the media concept. 
Due to RMRB’s vanguard function in the Chinese newspaper sector, a 
decisive policy change such as that announced on July 1 could not go without 
response from other newspapers in the nation. The various central and regional 
newspapers had to take seriously the problems raised by RMRB: its self-criticism 
was not so much a self-criticism per se but a reproach of the entire newspaper 
sector. To drive home this point, the CC sent RMRB’s June 20 report to the local 
PD’s and newspapers with a note that encouraged them explicitly to follow 
RMRB’s lead.58 Within the framework of the Hundred Flowers policy, newspapers 
were now called upon to open up their pages and to produce more lively and 
readable articles, to carry the debates that one hundred flowers and one hundred 
schools were to produce. Other strong signals of changes in policy emerged from 
Beijing, such as the decision to increase significantly the circulation of Cankao 
xiaoxi 参考消息, the premier neibu newspaper.59 Following the lead of RMRB, 
                                             
58 The note is reprinted in Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting (ed.). Dang de xuanchuan 
gongzuo wenjian xuanbian. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, vol. 1, p. 
311-12. 
59 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kuoda Cankao xiaoxi dingyue fanwei de tongzhi” (dated Dec. 18, 
1956) in XGWX 3.1197-1200. See also Mao’s remark “Kan Cankao xiaoxi jiu shi ‘zhong niudou’” 
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newspapers across China soon began to emulate its new line.60 A special case 
was that of the Shanghai daily WHB. 
 
 
The Thaw (II): WHB Reborn 
WHB could not react immediately to the changing atmosphere for a simple 
reason: it no longer existed. Only two months prior to the RMRB reform, on April 
28, WHB had published its last issue and thus completed a protracted transition 
process from a general newspaper to a specialized paper aimed at middle school 
teachers, now called Jiaoshibao 教师报 and published twice weekly in Beijing. Yet 
WHB had shown resilience before, and the rapidly changing political environment 
helped it to make a comeback that had seemed all but impossible a few months 
earlier: on October 1, 1956, WHB was reborn in what was the third relaunch in its 
turbulent history. 
WHB looked back on a tradition as a newspaper with a primarily intellectual 
target group. Founded in 1938 by a group of intellectuals around Xu Zhucheng 徐
铸成, it had addressed an urban, educated readership with high-quality features 
and lively discussions.61 Closed down twice by the Japanese and GMD authorities 
for its leftist agenda in 1939 and 1947, WHB resumed publication in 1948 for the 
second time. Xu Zhucheng, then a seasoned and respected journalist known for 
his sharp editorials, was called back to lead the paper. Xu was chief-writer (zhubi 
主笔), an arrangement under which he would write and sign most of the paper’s 
key articles and editorials.62 
                                                                                                                                      
(dated Jan. 27, 1957) in Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983, 
p. 185. On Cankao xiaoxi see chapter four. 
60 On the effects on other newspapers see Fang Hanqi, Zhang Zhihua (ed.). Zhongguo xinwen 
shiye jianshi (di er ban). Beijing: Zhongyang renmin daxue chubanshe, 1995, p. 424. 
61 The best source on WHB is the Xu Zhucheng’s autobiography, Xu Zhucheng huiyilu. The rest of 
this chapter draws heavily on this – even after heavy editing, see above – uniquely frank and rich 
source. Other literature includes Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). Wenhuibao dashiji (1938.1-
1939.5, 1945.8-1947.5). Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1986; Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). 
Wenhuibao shilüe (1938.1-1939.5, 1945.8-1947.5). Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1988; and 
Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). Wenhuibao shilüe (1949.6-1966.5). Shanghai: Wenhui 
chubanshe, 1997. Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). Cong fengyu zhong zou lai. Shanghai: 
Wenhui chubanshe, 1993. Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi (ed.). Zai quzhe zhong qianjin. Shanghai: 
Wenhui chubanshe, 1995. 
62 Such a position existed in most Chinese newspapers before 1949; it was much more attractive 
than that of an editor-in-chief who cannot normally publish articles or editorials under his own name. 
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Thanks to its leftist credentials, WHB was allowed to continue publication 
after 1949, but since 1951 it came under the pressure of the CCP’s “rationalization 
and division of labour” policy that worked analogous to that in the publishing sector. 
Since in the eyes of the planners in Beijing there was no room for two papers with 
the same target audience, intellectuals, WHB lost out against GMRB. Its role was 
redefined: “WHB must make further efforts to explicitly take middle and primary 
school teachers, high school students and some university students as its main 
target group.”63 This audience, while officially still defined as “educated” or 
“intellectuals” (zhishifenzi 知识分子) was a setback for the ambitions of Xu and his 
newspaper, that had counted influential intellectuals such as the historian Jian 
Bozan 翦伯赞, the writer Mao Dun, and Peking opera star Mei Lanfang 梅兰芳 
among its regular contributors and had spearheaded many an important 
intellectual discussion. With the paper being forced to succumb to pressure from 
both Beijing and Shanghai, its content became more focused and WHB was 
turned into a professional paper; as a consequence, its print run surged to 
200.000,64 but WHB had lost much of its intellectual audiences.65 
In April 1955, the Ministry of Education convened a conference in Beijing to 
discuss the creation of a new paper, Jiaoshibao. The idea for a paper specialized 
in education, organized after a Soviet model, had been launched in spring 1954 by 
the head of the CCP PD, Lu Dingyi, and in March 1955 the PD formally approved 
of the plans prepared by the Ministry. At the conference, Xu Zhucheng had to 
agree to participate in the preparations for Jiaoshibao that was to be formed “on 
the basis” of WHB and several minor, education-related publications.66 On October 
1, 1955, an “Important message of our paper” announced that WHB from that date 
on was to be published only twice weekly: “To gather experience for running 
                                                                                                                                      
The CCP did away with the position of chief writer after 1949, and people like Xu became editor-in-
chief. 
63 “[Zhonggong Shanghai] shiwei guanyu Shanghai xinwenjie sixiang gaizao hou jiaqiang lingdao 
wenti de tongzhi,” dated Jan. 1953. Cited after Wenhuibao shilüe, 1949-1966, p. 39. 
64 Ibid., p. 50. The surge in circulation was probably the result of institutional subscriptions by 
schools.  
65 Besides “specialization” other forces were at work that increased the pressure on WHB and 
eventually brought about its closure: Ke Qingshi 柯庆施, the Party secretary of Shanghai, hated the 
paper and sent a vice editor-in-chief to WHB with the explicit task to force its closure. See Xu 
Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 143. 
66 Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 49-53. As the authors note, it took unusually 
long for the State Council to agree. Zhou Enlai hesitated to scrap a newspaper of the reputation of 
WHB and asked the Shanghai authorities about their assessment before he approved of the plans. 
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Jiaoshibao, our paper has decided to publish, beginning from October 1, four 
pages twice a week (Wednesday and Saturday) in the format of [the future] 
Jiaoshibao as a trial so as to facilitate the transition to Jiaoshibao... According to 
the directives of the PRC Ministry of Education, we will continue to use the name 
Wenhuibao in the transition period.”67 In the following months, the WHB staff had 
no choice but to wind up their paper’s operations: WHB had to close its Shanghai 
offices; most of the staff were transferred to other work units while a small number 
of key staff moved to Beijing, where Jiaoshibao was published under the name of 
the Ministry of Education.68 On April 28, 1956, WHB published its last edition and 
informed its readers: “It has been decided that Jiaoshibao will start publication on 
May 1; WHB will therefore be discontinued. Dear readers! From now on, we will 
meet at Jiaoshibao!”69 For all practical purposes, the fate of WHB thus seemed to 
be sealed: under the logic of the “specialization” policy, a Soviet import, there was 
no room for WHB. 
Yet events were overtaking the developments in the newspaper sector: only 
weeks after WHB had closed its doors Mao proclaimed the Hundred Flowers. 
When intellectuals were called upon to engage in debates and Liu Shaoqi 
proposed that even RMRB should prove its worth in competition, the need for 
more than one newspaper carrying intellectual discourse suddenly became acute. 
In the new political situation, the old WHB seemed to represent just the model of 
what a newspaper for the intelligentsia was supposed to look like. Advancing on a 
fast track, decision makers in Beijing apparently came to reconsider the WHB 
issue; the PD and UFWD joined hands working to restore WHB. On the one hand, 
Li Weihan, the UFWD head called Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and Wang Yunsheng, 
three prominent non-CCP figures, to come up with proposals for newspaper work, 
including WHB. Luo Longji thereupon contacted Xu Zhucheng and Pu Xixiu 浦熙修, 
WHB’s former Beijing bureau chief, encouraging them to take a proactive stance, 
                                             
67 “Ben bao zhongyao qishi.” 
68 Contrary to the jubilant words that accompanied the last edition, WHB staff were probably all but 
happy about the closure of their paper. All preparations for Jiaoshibao are conspicuously absent in 
Xu Zhucheng’s memoirs, a sure sign for Xu’s disapproval (he uses the same technique in other 
places of his autobiography). Xu was named editor-in-chief of Jiaoshibao but was in fact side-lined 
by a CCP cadre and vice editor-in-chief, Liu Songtao 刘松涛. He had not much to do in Beijing and 
described these months as the “most leisurely time in my life.” Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, p. 253-54. 
69 “Zhong kan ci,” WHB 1956.4.28. 
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since the Ministry of Education might drag its feet on the WHB issue.70 On the 
other hand, Deng Tuo, the editor-in-chief of RMRB, played a crucial role. In late 
June, Deng hinted to Xu Zhucheng that the question was being discussed.71 Xu 
consequently rejected an offer to go to GMRB as editor-in-chief on the grounds 
that his closest associates were all with Jiaoshibao (in his stead, Chu Anping took 
over GMRB).72 In late June and early July Beijing began to brim with rumours and 
from Lu Dingyi, the head of the PD, Zhu and Pu Xixiu heard that WHB’s relaunch 
was a sealed fact. A few days later, Xu and Pu were summoned to Zhongnanhai 
where Zhang Jichun 张际春, a vice-head of the PD, told them officially of the CC’s 
decision to revive WHB. Shortly thereafter, Deng Tuo explained the Party’s 
intentions to them. Xu remembers this meeting:73 
[Pu] Xixiu and I went ahead to the appointment. First I talked about my personal views. 
Deng Tuo immediately started to talk just like an old friend and said: “Here are some 
immature ideas for you two as a reference: first, the Centre hopes that WHB will 
resume publication as soon as possible; naturally they hope that it will vigorously 
propagate the ‘Double Hundred’ policy and encourage the intellectual circles to 
contend and bloom courageously, because WHB has always been particularly 
influential among the intellectuals. Secondly, [WHB] should vigorously present new 
achievements and trends in culture, science, and technology from both abroad and at 
home to the readers, so as to broaden the perspective of the intellectuals. Thirdly, 
[WHB] should also be concerned with the intellectuals’ material and spiritual life; there 
is no harm in setting up a column that broadly discusses [things like] how to decorate 
one’s house, how to plant flowers, breed fish, or furnish one’s study etc. Fourth, after 
the socialist transformation is completed, a culture high tide will certainly appear in the 
vast countryside, and you should start early to pay attention to culture and education in 
the countryside. The experience of the old Dagongbao 大公报 with traveller’s letters is 
worth emulating, so you can send journalists to travel the villages all over the country. 
They do not necessarily need to take letters of introduction from all [bureaucratic] 
layers with them, the material they get in this way is always “reporting the good but not 
the bad.” [Journalists] can directly go to the cooperatives and understand the real 
situation at the grass-roots and then write their reports. Finally [the Centre] hopes that 
you will put emphasis on reflecting [our] situation in Western Europe, America, Japan, 
and Southeast Asia, and exert influence [there]. Currently, the influence of RMRB and 
Xinhua she is still mainly limited to Eastern Europe, their influence in the other areas 
falls even short of that of Dagongbao and WHB. You must pay attention to stress this 
aspect.”74 
                                             
70 Zhang Yihe. Zui hou de guizu, p. 36-38. 
71 Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, p. 255f. Xu does not give a date but remembers that this happened during 
the third meeting of the first National People’s Congress, which convened from June 15-30, 1956. 
72 Ibid., p. 255. 
73 Ibid., p. 258. For a slightly more elaborate account see Xu Zhucheng. Baohai jiuwen. Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1981, p. 312-16. 
74 The last passage (“Finally, ...”) is grammatically ambivalent and could be misunderstood as a call 
on WHB to increase reporting on the capitalist areas and to introduce ideas from there to China, as 
Liu Shaoqi had demanded from the Xinhua personnel. The meaning is clearer in the uncensored 
version of this chapter. See “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 144. It is interesting to see that the Party 
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Deng Tuo, on behalf of the Party Centre, presented to Xu a complete program for 
the revived WHB: after the relaunch WHB was to target intellectuals and 
concentrate on the spheres of culture, the sciences, and literature and art – due to 
its reputation with China’s intellectuals, WHB was suited for this task like no other 
paper in China. 
Feverish preparations for the relaunch began immediately after the 
Zhongnanhai meeting. Xu could ensure the return of many of WHB’s former staff; 
additionally, Qin Benli 钦本立, who headed the America group at RMRB’s 
international news section, would join the paper and head WHB’s Party group.75 
The writer Ke Ling 柯灵, a man of the first hour of WHB, would also return; 
together with Xu, Qin, and Pu Xixiu, who was to carry on as Beijing bureau chief, 
he would form the paper’s core staff. A skilled negotiator, Xu initially opposed to 
return to Shanghai to run his paper; he agreed only after securing a guarantee that 
the Shanghai authorities would not interfere with WHB’s operations. Ke Qingshi 柯
庆施, the Shanghai Party secretary, was notorious for his intolerant approach to 
any form of intellectual debate, which had earned him the nickname “one-voice-
hall” (yiyan tang 一言堂).76 At a dinner with Yao Zhen 姚溱, a PD vice-head, Xu 
was reassured by Shi Ximin 石西民, head of the Shanghai Party Committee’s PD, 
that WHB would be classified as a central-level newspaper (zhongyangji 中央级) 
                                                                                                                                      
Centre regarded WHB as a tool for external propaganda, an often neglected aspect of the Chinese 
media. 
75 This position made Qin Benli (1918-1991) de facto the most powerful man at WHB. Qin only 
reluctantly gave up his job as head of the America section at RMRB’s international news 
department; he was initially only “borrowed” by WHB. Qin Benli. “Liu zai jiyi li de pianduan” in 
Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Cong fengyu zhong zou lai, p. 135-40, here p. 136. See also Xu 
Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 144. At WHB, Qin was given an opportunity to establish himself 
as an independent thinker and liberal minded journalist. More than thirty years later, in May 1989, 
his courage and his stubbornness brought him into conflict with the Shanghai authorities once 
again, when he was purged as editor-in-chief of the famous Shijie jingji daobao 世界经济导报 that 
consequently was closed down. 
76 Xu had a strained relationship with Ke, and also with Zhang Chunqiao, head of the CCP 
Shanghai PD’s Office for Literature and Art. Ke had reportedly said that “there are too many 
newspapers in Shanghai, which makes it inconvenient to control them; Wenhuibao should be 
closed down.” Wenhuibao shilüe, 1949-1966, p. 62f. Ke is identified as the notorious “one-voice-
hall” in Xu Zhucheng. “Yangmou qinli ji,” p. 21 (Ke’s name does not appear in the two versions of 
this account published in the PRC). The nickname of Ke, “one-voice-hall,” where only one speaks 
and all other listen, is also reported in Chen Huangmei. “Zhou Enlai dui dianying yishu de qinqie 
guanhuai,” in Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (ed.). Bu jin de sinian. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1987. 
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and would not be cut off from crucial Beijing news sources, such as the internal 
circulation Da Cankao, as had happened earlier.77 
With the help of Deng Tuo, Xu Zhucheng drew up the official plan for 
WHB’s relaunch and handed it to Zhang Jichun, who told Xu to go ahead with his 
preparations immediately. When the plan’s official confirmation by the CC arrived, 
it carried, next to the usual notice “approved” (zhaozhun 照准), a sentence reading 
“comrade Xu Zhucheng must be given full powers of office” (yao rang Xu 
Zhucheng tongzhi you zhi you quan 要让徐铸成同志有职有权). Xu could thus start 
his enterprise with a maximum of support. 
A person who had been instrumental in securing this amount of support was 
Deng Tuo, the editor-in-chief of RMRB. The degree of Deng’s commitment to 
WHB is indeed amazing: his name appears time and again in the memoirs of WHB 
people, and he helped WHB at several critical junctures throughout 1956 and 1957. 
Only speculation is possible regarding the reasons for Deng’s engagement, going 
far beyond the loyalty requested by friendship. Apparently Deng was dissatisfied 
with his position at RMRB: he was under high pressure, with little leeway to pursue 
his own ideas. Time and again, Deng was not even his own master at RMRB, but 
had to succumb to the power of the grey eminence, Hu Qiaomu. Yet it seems that 
Deng also was dissatisfied with the very direction that RMRB had taken: His 
ongoing support for WHB suggests that he himself was in favour of a livelier, more 
open newspaper, an ideal he saw realized by Xu Zhucheng’s paper.78 
Xu and his staff formulated the editorial policies of WHB: it was to become a 
lively, fact-based, and intellectually stimulating paper. Xu went so far as to lay 
down as a rule: “what others don’t touch, we print; whatever others print we don’t 
touch” (ren qi wo qu, ren qu wo qi 人弃我取，人取我弃).79 Taking the RMRB 
reforms as a point of departure, WHB planned its comeback as a paper boasting 
of diversity and pledged to “break with established rules” (dapo kuangkuang 打破
框框) – a far cry from its last days as an independent paper, when WHB had to 
                                             
77 Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, p. 259. It was probably WHB’s access to Neibu cankao that was at stake; 
no newspaper would be likely to have access to Da cankao, whose small print run served 
exclusively the top leadership. 
78 The memoirs of Xu Zhucheng as well as his remarks in Baohai jiuwen, p. 314f, seem to support 
this reading. Timothy Cheek, too, details Deng Tuo’s dissatisfaction with his work. See Propaganda 
and Culture in Mao’s China, p. 132; 172-77. 
79 Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, p. 260. 
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concentrate on topics of relevance for middle school teachers. Xu Zhucheng 
activated his old relationships and could thus secure strong support from leading 
Chinese intellectuals. 
After just two months of preparations, the reborn WHB was launched on 
October 1, 1956 – the third relaunch in its eventful history. From the first day on, 
the editorial department tried to produce a lively and inspiring newspaper. The first 
issue boasted with contributions by prominent writers and intellectuals: poetry from 
Ai Qing 艾青 and Guo Moruo, (then head of the Federation of Literary and Art 
Circles as well as president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences), appeared on 
pages one and two; Guo had written another piece on literature and society; the 
veteran journalist Song Yunbin 宋云彬 contributed an article on the Tang dynasty 
writer Han Yu 韩愈. Other articles included the first part of cartoonist Feng Zikai’s 
丰子恺 “Lushan youji” 庐山游记, and an essay by the writer Shu Wu 舒芜. 
The core piece in WHB’s relaunch issue was its editorial. Framed and 
placed in the upper left hand corner, it drew the attention of the readers just as 
RMRB’s July 1 editorial had done. It is insightful to read WHB’s relaunch editorial 
against the background in RMRB’s reform announcement. Most conspicuous is 
the strikingly different tone of the two editorials that starts right from the title: WHB 
contrasted RMRB’s short and matter-of fact “To our readers” (Zhi duzhe 致读者) 
with the its own “Respectful announcement to our readers” (Jinggao duzhe 敬告读
者). By using the expression jinggao, the authors of WHB chose a more polite 
formulation that at the same time implies some sort of personal relationship 
between the speaker and the addressee that is absent in the rather factual zhi, 
which may even indicate a top-down direction of communication. In this way, WHB 
tried to reduce the distance between the newspaper and its audience. The editorial 
continues in the same tone: while RMRB flatly announced that it had changed its 
editorial policy and then explained the paper’s future direction, WHB linked its 
editorial line with the demands of the readers: it had received over 70,000 letters 
of support since the earliest rumours of a relaunch, containing numerous 
proposals that WHB had consulted while drawing up its relaunch plans. The most 
important point was an explicit rejection of the policy of specialization that had 
been forced on them before; WHB assured its readers that it would be a general 
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interest paper: “We have already made some concrete arrangements so that WHB 
can fully and accurately report on major domestic and international news, with a 
focus on reporting news in the areas of culture, science and education.” WHB 
would not specialize on one particular target audience, as Jiaoshibao had done. 
The July 1 editorial had declared: “RMRB is the Party’s paper, and it is also 
the paper of the people.” WHB contrasted this with its own statement of intent: 
“WHB has always been a newspaper of the people, a newspaper of the 
intellectuals.” While the formulation is a quotation from RMRB, the emphasis 
chosen could not be more different. Most conspicuous is the absence of the 
paper’s Party character. Only in the editorial’s last paragraph is the CCP 
mentioned for the first time: “The wise leadership of the Party and the Party’s 
concern and care for the intellectuals have already opened up unheard of future 
prospects for us. Let us advance even more courageously, advance towards 
science, advance towards socialism!” The formulation remains ambiguous: the 
Party’s leadership is mentioned, but it remains unclear what that means for the 
newspaper; in fact, the editorial says nowhere that WHB is led by the Party. The 
paper thus moved to the fringes of the CCP’s media concept. It would serve 
socialism but left it open if that meant toeing the Party line or allowing for 
interpretations by the paper’s editors. 
Such rhetoric could, of course, be justified by the Party’s current policy, the 
Hundred Flowers. The editorial defined the paper’s own understanding of its 
mission: “WHB will provide a fair amount of space to become a forum for ‘hundred 
schools of thought to contend.’ We will solicit articles, reflect the questions [raised] 
in debates of all different kinds and promote ‘the contending of hundred schools of 
thought.’” This was a repudiation of the earlier policy to “learn from the Soviet 
Union:” “In the last few years, we have studied the experience of the news work of 
the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries and have reaped certain gains. In 
the future WHB will continue to study the strong points of all sides, preserve its 
own style, and strive for rich and colourful contents and a lively and liberal 
appearance.” In this short passage, the Soviet experience is negated three times: 
the qualification “certain gains” amounts to a rejection of the Soviet model; the 
pledge to study the “strong points of all sides” means studying also the methods of 
newspaper-making in the capitalist countries, a proposal of Liu Shaoqi in his talks 
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with news workers that had been used by RMRB’s “reform group;”80 and the 
paper’s announcement to “preserve its own style” meant that no outside models 
would be allowed to dictate WHB’s style and editorial policy. WHB promised to 
“strive for rich and colourful contents, and a lively and liberal appearance.” 
Encouraged by support from the CC committee (as Deng Tuo had stressed), 
by Liu Shaoqi’s demand for improvements in the Chinese newspaper sector, and 
by Mao’s calls for one hundred flowers to bloom and one hundred schools of 
thought to contend, WHB thus outlined an editorial policy that would challenge the 
ways of newspaper making established in the PRC after 1949. In doing so, WHB 
went beyond RMRB’s reform pledges when it declared: “A people’s newspaper 
(renmin de baozhi 人民的报纸) should first of all speak through facts, reflect reality 
through the news happening every day, and proclaim the truth.” Renmin de baozhi 
sounds like Renmin ribao – the reader arrives at the impression that WHB tried to 
be the better RMRB, fulfilling the promise of RMRB’s name. Going so far, however, 
WHB was careful not to leave the framework of the media concept. The editorial 
refutes any dogmatic interpretation of the concept, but this line had been proposed 
by Liu Shaoqi and thus came from the highest Party leadership. Yet the editorial 
comes nowhere near the point of questioning or even rejecting Party leadership 
per se, not even in its refusal to spell out the CCP’s direct leadership of the paper. 
Even more conspicuously, the deeper motivation of the Party’s media concept is 
fully present in the Oct. 1 editorial: WHB hopes to “advance towards socialism” by 
way of education and enlightenment of the people; the ultimate goal of the paper’s 
new outlook is to increase its effectiveness in the pursuit of the CCP’s normative 
projects. All that WHB did was to apply a liberal interpretation of the media 
concept and to stress the clauses (1) to (5) in relation to clause (6), which defined 
the media’s role in class struggle. We see at work here the latent tension between 
the different elements of the concept. Yet at the beginning of the Hundred Flowers 
campaign, this tension was still manageable and did not automatically lead to 
conflict. 
 
 
                                             
80 “Dui Xinhua she gongzuo de di er ci zhishi,” p. 359. 
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The readers all over the country greeted WHB’s relaunch enthusiastically. 
The paper’s first issue sold over 100,000 copies and the print run reached 300,000 
in May 1957.81 WHB picked up many controversial issues and topics that did not 
make it into other newspapers. For instance, WHB joined a major debate that 
critically assessed Chinese film production since 1949. Two articles in particular, 
written by Zhong Dianfei 钟惦棐, a cadre of the CCP PD, caused a stir, and later 
drew Mao’s wrath; they were among the accusations levelled against WHB after 
June 1957.82 WHB also translated excerpts from Anna Louise Strong’s new book 
The Stalin Era.83 On a more local notice, WHB came to the defence of students 
who cheated because they were so bored by their dull examinations – this matter, 
too, became a hotly debated issue. While WHB quickly earned itself a reputation 
for unusual and contentious issues, it also boasted high quality literary and 
academic contributions. It was proud to publish on its pages poetry by the two 
marshals Zhu De 朱德 and Ye Jianying 叶剑英, as well as pieces by historians 
Jian Bozan and Hou Wailu 侯外庐. Within a short time, WHB had moved back 
onto the centre stage of the Chinese newspaper scene. When blooming and 
contending reached new heights in spring 1957, WHB was again on the forefront. 
The degree to which the paper had succeeded in establishing itself as an 
independent-minded and intellectually stimulating newspaper became visible only 
after the launch of the anti-Rightist campaign: it was WHB that received the 
disputable honour of being torn to pieces and criticized by name for its editorial 
policy in two articles written by Mao Zedong personally. 
 
 
 
 
                                             
81 First figure taken from Xie Weiming. “Fanyou fengbao zhong de ‘Beiban,’” in Wenhuibao baoshi 
yanjiushi. Zai quzhe zhong qianjin, p. 289-300, here p. 294. In mid May 1957, Deng Tuo informed 
Xu, who had just returned from the Soviet Union, that WHB’s print run had reached 300,000. See 
Xu Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 147. 
82 “Dianying de luogu” (signed ‘Wenyibao pinglunyuan’) in WHB, Dec. 21, 1956, and Wenyibao 文
艺报, Dec. 15, 1956. “Weile qianjin,” in WHB, Jan. 4, 1957. See also Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 171-74. 
83 The veteran newspaper man Fan Changjiang 范长江 had recommended the volume to Qin Benli. 
See Qin Benli. “Liu zai jiyi li de pianduan,” p. 137. WHB started serializing several chapters of the 
volume on Feb. 24, 1957. Because of the book’s critical judgement of Stalin, it was published in 
China only as a neibu edition. WHB was later criticized for publishing the excerpts. 
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May 1957: The Debate on Journalism 
General response to the Hundred Flowers policy was lukewarm through 
most of 1956: with the exception of a number of young writers like Liu Binyan, 
many intellectuals who had seen the effects of previous campaigns hesitated to 
come forward with criticism. Mao was particularly dissatisfied with the response of 
the press. In order to jump-start blooming and contending in the crucial 
propaganda xitong, the CCP convened on short notice a national propaganda 
conference, to be followed by provincial propaganda conferences, from March 6 
through 13, 1957. Over 800 participants (including 160 non-CCP personnel) from 
all over the country came to Beijing.84 The Shanghai delegation included 
representatives of the press, the literary and art circles, and the education sector, 
as well as a young secretary (ganshi 干事) from the Shanghai PD with the name of 
Yao Wenyuan 姚文元. It was very unusual for a junior cadre in his twenties to 
attend an important meeting like the propaganda conference. Only in Beijing the 
other delegates learned that Mao had read Yao’s articles and wanted to meet 
him.85 For the Shanghai WHB, Xu Zhucheng was invited. 
Immediately after arriving in Beijing, the conference participants were made 
to hear recordings of Mao’s Contradictions speech (“Guanyu zhengque chuli 
renmin neibu maodun de wenti” 关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题). On February 
27, Mao had elaborated on “contradictions among the people:” with the transition 
to socialism, class struggle was basically completed, and the majority of problems 
would henceforth be treated as “contradictions among the people” that would not 
require class struggle. He told delegates that the atmosphere henceforth would no 
longer be that of “thunderstorms” (jifeng baoyu 疾风暴雨, i.e. class struggle) but 
rather “slight breeze and light rain” (he feng xi yu 和风细雨) or even a “slight 
drizzle” (maomaoyu 毛毛雨).86 If it was Mao’s intention to create a relaxed climate 
                                             
84 Numbers taken from Zhu Zheng. 1957 nian de xiaji: cong bai jia zhengming dao liang jia 
zhengming. Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1998, p. 23. This volume is the best account of 
the Hundred Flowers period written to date. For the documents of the propaganda conference see 
Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting (ed.). Dangde xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he 
wenxian. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, p. 164-81. 
85 See Xu Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” here p. 146. 
86 Ibid. Mao’s Contradictions speech was published only several months later with significant 
changes. For the original version see Mao Zhuxi wenxian sanshi pian. Beijing: Beijing teshu 
gangchang xuanchuan qinwuzu, n.d., cited in Michael Schoenhals. “Original Contradictions: On the 
Unrevised Text of Mao Zedong’s ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People’” in 
 329
for the Hundred Flowers, he succeeded in doing so, at least with the non-Party 
personnel among the propaganda cadres, who heard the recording of his speech 
with excitement. 
Shortly before the end of the propaganda conference, on March 12, Mao 
Zedong addressed the meeting.87 In this speech, Mao elaborated on the key 
themes of his Contradictions speech. Referring to the general principles of 
propaganda, Mao defined the scope of work for the attending cadres: “Our 
comrades doing propaganda work have the task to propagate Marxism. This 
propaganda is a gradual one; it must be done well so that people are willing to 
accept it. We cannot force the people to accept Marxism, we can only persuade 
them to accept it.”88 The Hundred Flowers policy did not refute the general 
ideological framework, but rather changed the methods used to elaborate this 
ideology. As for the new approach, Mao proposed: “we must [practice] slight 
breeze and light rain, learn lessons from the past to avoid future mistakes, and 
cure the sickness to save the patient; we must oppose using the method ‘killing 
people with a single strike.’”89 The formulations used were close to those of the 
Contradictions speech. In more concrete terms, Mao told the conference not to be 
afraid of voicing opinions or of one-sidedness: “Can we demand from people to 
overcome their one-sidedness step by step, and to look at problems in a 
comprehensive manner? I think we must demand this from them.”90 The stage was 
now set for the Hundred Flowers policy to be implemented with new vigour all 
across the propaganda sector. In an important addition, Mao explicitly extended 
the scope of the ‘Double Hundred’ significantly: “The policies of letting hundred 
                                                                                                                                      
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 16 (1986), p. 99-112. Zhu Zheng has reconstructed parts of 
the original speech from a series of RMRB editorials in 1957 nian de xiaji, p. 23-32. When the 
speech was published in RMRB on June 19, the “slight breeze and light rain” formulation was 
modified and the following section was inserted: “But the remnants of the landlord and comprador 
classes we have overthrown do still exist, the bourgeoisie does still exist, and the petty bourgeoisie 
has only begun to reform. Class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the 
class struggle of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological realm, are still protracted and 
tortuous, and sometimes even very sharp.” See Mao Zedong wenji, vol. 7, p. 230. 
87 His speech, “Zai Zhongguo gongchandang quanguo xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de 
jianghua,” was released in 1964 and is reprinted in Mao Zedong wenji, vol. 7., p. 267-83. As the 
editors of this edition comment (p. 282), the speech was heavily edited before publication; in 
particular, the need for class struggle was stressed, and a less lenient attitude towards intellectuals 
in general was introduced. 
88 Ibid., p. 270. 
89 Ibid., p. 274. 
90 Ibid., p. 276-77. 
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flowers bloom and hundred schools of thought contend are not only good ways to 
develop science and literature and art, but applied broadly, they are also good 
ways for all our work.”91 For the period ahead, the Hundred Flowers would 
dominate all sectors of public life. The task of the newspaper people now was to 
put into action this policy in the Chinese press and thus to become a public forum 
of debate. 
On the fringes of the conference, Xu Zhucheng and a select number of 
other participants were given an opportunity to get an even more thorough 
understanding of Mao’s view of the Hundred Flowers. On the afternoon of March 
10, they were invited to Zhongnanhai to a reception with Mao.92 In a very frank 
discussion, Mao asked the delegates about their opinion on the Hundred Flowers. 
Xu asked: “I have no clear ideas of how to propagate the ‘double hundred policy’ 
in the newspapers and I feel it difficult to pin down. I’m afraid of committing 
dogmatist errors if we grasp it too tightly, and of committing revisionist errors if we 
let it too loose. Could the Chairman instruct us on how to grasp it?”93 Mao evaded 
a direct answer on this question and told Xu “to learn fighting in the course of 
fighting.” However, he encouraged the journalists “not to fear one-sidedness” 
(pianmianxing 片面性). Without giving detailed advice, Mao thus opened up the 
newspapers for criticism and debate – criticism not only from CCP members, but 
also from people outside the Party, people like Xu. Xu received even more explicit 
support from Mao for his editorial policy. The Chairman confessed to him: “Your 
WHB is very good, from music and chess to calligraphy and painting, plum, orchid, 
bamboo and chrysanthemums, flowers and birds, insect and fish – everything’s 
there that one could wish for, really fine. When I get up in the afternoon, the first 
thing I do is reading your paper, then I read RMRB, and if there’s time I take a look 
at the other papers.”94 Mao enjoyed exactly those aspects of WHB that made it the 
                                             
91 Ibid., p. 279. 
92 The notes of that meeting were published in Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 186-95. 
For the following discussion I have relied on the account given in Xu Zhucheng huiyilu, and 
especially on his “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” the franker, unedited version. The quotes in the next two 
paragraphs are taken from this latter source. A translation, based on another version of the 
conversation from a Cultural Revolution source can be found in MacFarquhar et al (eds.). The 
Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, p. 249-72. 
93 Xu Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 146. 
94 Ibid. 
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intellectuals’ favourite paper. Mao’s statement was a humiliation for Deng Tuo, the 
editor-in-chief of RMRB, who sat directly opposite of Xu at the meeting. 
Still trying to figure out the amount of support Mao was prepared to give a 
non-Party paper like WHB, Xu tested the Hundred Flowers principle with a 
concrete issue and complained to Mao about the interference of the Shanghai 
authorities:95 
“To my understanding, the ‘double hundred policy’ means for politics and ideology to 
emphasize inviting criticism, to let the people speak their minds freely. If [some 
opinions] are incorrect, we should explain them patiently, and should not suppress 
them immediately; this is what appreciating criticism means.” The Chairman said: “This 
understanding is absolutely correct, good, speak on.” I said “When our WHB started 
the debate on film, we received many letters, some of them containing very sharp 
criticism, and also some that raised objections. We let [the debate] loose quite 
intentionally, so that everybody might have his say, and we planned to discuss the 
issue later. But in Shanghai we came under attack from all sides [weigong 围攻]. Thus I 
ask the Chairman, how shall we react?” 
 
Complaining openly about Ke Qingshi and Zhang Chunqiao to Mao was a very 
bold move for a non-Party intellectual like Xu Zhucheng, but again he received the 
Chairman’s support: “I will ask comrade Zhou Yang to write a small summary for 
your debate, this is called thesis, antithesis, synthesis, this is dialectics!”96 Xu 
could thus go back to Shanghai and tell his colleagues about the support he had 
secured from the paramount leader in Beijing. Mao, in turn, had encouraged WHB 
to widen the discussions and to get intellectuals from all spheres of life involved 
into the impending rectification movement. 
After the national propaganda conference, the propaganda apparatus 
began to move into higher gears. The speed adopted at different newspapers, 
however, was unequal. On April 1, the leadership of GMRB was reshuffled: long-
time editor-in-chief Chang Zhiqing 常芝青 retired in favour of Chu Anping. Chang’s 
departure was motivated by the status of his paper: GMRB officially belonged to 
the democratic parties. To convince the non-CCP personnel of their independence 
from the CCP, Chang, a longstanding CCP member, had to go and was replaced 
by Chu, an non-CCP intellectual (as noted above, personnel changes at GMRB 
had been in the making since mid-1956).97 
                                             
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., p. 146-47. 
97 See Mu Xin. Ban Guangming ribao shi nian zishu, 1957-1967. Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi 
chubanshe, 1994, p. 9-10. 
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Not all papers reacted as fast. The most notorious feet-dragger was RMRB. 
The CCP CC mouthpiece’s reluctance to join in the chorus of the Hundred Flowers 
caused an angry outburst by Mao on April 10.98 Mao met with Deng Tuo, Hu Jiwei, 
and other RMRB personnel and accused them of deliberately ignoring both his 
Contradictions speech and the national propaganda conference. Deng Tuo’s 
argument that the Party Centre had not officially released notice of the two 
meetings was brushed aside by Mao: even non-CCP papers had started reporting 
on the propaganda conference, why was the Party’s mouthpiece slower than the 
“democratic” newspapers? Mao was prepared to suspend fixed rules on reporting, 
such as Xinhua’s power to release news reports about key meetings like those of 
February and March, if doing so would be in the spirit of the current Party policy, 
the Hundred Flowers. Behind RMRB’s reluctance, Mao sensed opposition against 
his own policies: “I think you are deliberately singing a different tune, deliberately 
singing in praise is people like Chen Qitong 陈其通.99 You are not a Party paper, 
you are a faction paper. In the past I said you were bookish pedants making a 
newspaper, but that’s not right, in fact you are like dead people making a 
paper.”100 Mao’s often quoted outburst may have been not too far off the mark. 
Roderick MacFarquhar has pointed out that opposition to Mao’s policies was 
widespread within the Party, especially from Liu Shaoqi and Lu Dingyi.101 Such an 
argument seems plausible in the light of Deng Tuo’s complaints that he had tried 
to organize a number of articles on the issue that had been held back by Hu 
Qiaomu, as Hu admitted at the meeting.102 However, it is not entirely clear where 
the resistance Mao believed to exist did actually come from: Deng Tuo had 
complained repeatedly of having no real power at RMRB, and even offered to 
                                             
98 Timothy Cheek comments on the unwillingness of Deng Tuo and others at RMRB to get involved 
with the high tide of the Hundred Flowers. See Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China, p. 174-76. 
A word-by-word transcript of the infamous “bedroom meeting” where Mao voiced his anger can be 
found in the memoirs of Wang Ruoshui: Zhihui de tongku. Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1989, p. 
320-25. 
99 A group of cadres from the PLA’s General Political Department, including Chen Qitong had 
published several articles highly critical of the stories of Wang Meng and Liu Binyan and saw the 
official literary doctrine, Socialist Realism, under threat. The earliest article, “Women dui muqian 
wenyijie gongzuo de ji dian yijian” appeared in RMRB on Jan. 7. The promoters of the Hundred 
Flowers policy, notably Mao, saw this as an attempt to oppose the Party’s new policy. Mao was 
angered in particular by RMRB’s slow response to this issue. 
100 From Wang Ruoshui. Zhihui de tongku, p. 321. 
101 See The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, ch. 14, esp. p. 191-96. 
102 See Wang Ruoshui. Zhihui de tongku, p. 322. 
 333
retire at the meeting with Mao. The strong man in the shadows at RMRB was Hu 
Qiaomu, but it seems unlikely that opposition to a policy as important as the 
Hundred Flowers would come from Mao’s close aide. Neither did Lu Dingyi have 
enough influence in the PD, at least not against Hu. It may thus very well be that 
RMRB was prevented from bolder and more rapid moves by a combination of 
factors: the bureaucratic structures of the paper on the one hand, and a common 
sense of insecurity among newspaper personnel confronted with the rapidly 
evolving situation on the other. These were the very structural problems that Liu 
Binyan had made responsible for his newspaper’s state of freeze. 
In his speech at the propaganda conference and in his discussions with 
journalists, Mao had given hints as to the direction that the changes should take: 
he proposed a loosening of established rules that would mean in fact a less strict 
interpretation of the media concept. When he tried to develop the Hundred 
Flowers into a full-blown “rectification campaign,” the intellectuals (including non-
Party people) were invited to come forward with their complaints; they were 
expected to help the CCP to reform its ways and to become more effective in its 
mode of governance. Doing so was crucial to overcome bureaucratism and to 
prepare for the new tasks ahead, now that the transition to socialism was basically 
completed. In this context, the newspapers were called upon to become a platform 
for criticism and self-criticism. The important point behind this move is that the 
rectification movement has been initiated by the CCP itself, and its objective is to 
improve the Party’s way of rule. Only in this narrow framework, blooming and 
contending was considered legitimate – and thus the media concept remained 
intact, since it was not allowed to question the Party’s leadership role per se.  
WHB had reacted faster than RMRB to the changing atmosphere. Xu 
Zhucheng had relayed the spirit of Mao’s Contradictions speech back to Shanghai; 
other WHB staff had heard recordings of the speech there. On March 25, WHB 
started to study Mao’s speeches, and the paper’s column “Shehui daxue” 社会大
学 began to elaborate on the Contradictions speech. Xu himself could not return to 
Shanghai, as he was unexpectedly asked to lead a delegation of Chinese news 
personnel on an inspection tour through the Soviet Union. Xu left on March 27 and 
returned to Shanghai only on May 13, when the period of blooming and 
contending had already culminated. To be named the head of an important 
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delegation to the socialist brother nation was an unusual honour for a non-Party 
man like Xu Zhucheng and stresses the amount of trust the highest Party 
leadership placed in him.103 In Moscow, Xu even shook hands with Khrushchev; 
the photographs taken at this opportunity were used against Xu during the Cultural 
Revolution.104 Another obvious sign of support for WHB was a much-publicized 
visit by Lu Dingyi to the paper on April 11. Originally, Mao had been scheduled to 
visit WHB.105 WHB thus seemed to have support for its editorial policies from the 
highest echelons of the Party leadership when the Hundred Flowers moved into 
high gear. On May 1, 1957, RMRB officially announced the start of a rectification 
movement, the Party’s second after the Yan’an movement of 1942, and called on 
the intellectuals to come forward with criticism.106 
The role and function of the press was one of the most hotly debated issues 
during the Hundred Flowers period. The crystallization point of these debates was 
a seemingly minor issue: the Zuo Ye affair.107 Initially, the affair seemed more than 
unlikely to provoke the kind of reaction across Chinese newspapers it eventually 
did. The events are quickly reconstructed: in April 1957, a high-ranking delegation 
from the Soviet Union, led by K. Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Highest Soviet of 
the USSR, visited China. Interest in the visit was intense, and the delegation 
received ample coverage in the Chinese press wherever it went. Such was the 
case on April 17, when Voroshilov, accompanied by Liu Shaoqi, visited an 
agricultural exposition in Beijing. An aide (zhuli 助理) to the Chinese minister of 
agriculture was in charge of organizing the visit and leading the delegation through 
the exposition. If it weren’t for the later affair, nobody would remember the name of 
this minor official: Zuo Ye. When Voroshilov and Liu ceremonially shook hands on 
the crowded space outside the exhibition building’s entrance, pushing and shoving 
started among the sixty accredited Chinese reporters and journalists. Making 
matters worse, Zuo Ye blocked the reporters’ view. When a cameraman from the 
                                             
103 The decision to make Xu the head of the delegation was reportedly made by Mao Zedong. See 
“Yangmou qinliji,” p. 25. This was the second delegation, after the one led by Deng Tuo and Zhang 
Chunqiao that had visited the Soviet Union to learn from Pravda a year earlier. 
104 Xu Zhucheng huiyilu contains excerpts from Xu’s diaries of his trip to the Soviet Union (p. 267-
94). 
105 See Qin Benli. “Liu zai jiyi li de pianduan,” p. 138. It is unclear why Mao did not come. 
106 “Quan dang chongxin jinxing yi ci fan guanliaozhuyi, fan zongpaizhuyi, fan zhuguanzhuyi de 
zhengfeng yundong – yundong de zhuti: zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun.” 
107 For a short account see Gao Liang. “Zuo Ye shijian yingxiang suo ji” in Renmin ribao baoshi 
bianjizu. Renmin ribao huiyilu, p. 121-23. 
 335
Chinese Central Documentary Film Agency tried to pull the official aside, Zuo Ye 
exploded: “What?! Are you important or am I? If you push again I will make you 
scram!” (Zenme?! Ni zhongyao haishi wo zhongyao? Zai ji jiu jiao nimen gunchuqu! 
怎么？！你重要还是我重要？再挤就叫你们滚出去！). The reporters were aghast 
at the official’s rudeness, but under normal circumstances, the incident would 
probably soon be forgotten. 
However, when blooming and contending started in May, a short article 
appeared in Zhongguo qingnianbao with the title “The minister’s aide and the 
cameramen” (Buzhang zhuli he sheyingshi 部长助理和摄影师).108 After a short 
factual account, in which the author Hong Ke 洪克 even admitted that “there was 
quite some chaos” among reporters and by-standers, he addressed the crucial 
question: “This comrade [Zuo Ye] was clearly abusing people – he was abusing all 
of us reporters at the scene, because he said ‘you’ (nimen 你们).” The official’s 
misbehaviour could not be excused as a conflict between him and a single 
cameraman, but concerned the entire news corps. And it did not stop here: 
And then, this rude attitude even became an order that was communicated to us: a 
comrade of the Foreign Ministry’s News Bureau came and told me and a cameraman 
from Beijing ribao: “Stop shoving, if you shove again we will make you scram.” No 
longer able to bear such arrogant airs, I told him: “Comrade, no matter what you say, 
but you shouldn’t abuse people.” “That’s not me abusing,” he said, “I’m just 
communicating what others have said.” 
 
The scale of the April 17 incident was now growing. Zuo Ye’s outburst was no 
longer seen as the rash reaction of an individual official given a task too large for 
him to cope with, but rather as the manifestation of a contemptuous attitude that 
many cadres held towards journalists and reporters. 
The article analyzes the problem in more general terms: “The minister’s 
aide and we live in the same big socialist family, why doesn’t he comprehend that 
people are on equal relationships, their ranks and positions notwithstanding? Why 
doesn’t he understand that impertinent remarks and deliberate abuse are most 
impolite?” What is at stake are the ranks within Chinese society.109 As a cadre, the 
official of the Ministry of Agriculture believed to be in his right simply because of 
                                             
108 Zhongguo qingnianbao, May 7, 1957. The article appeared on page three. 
109 A cartoon on the bottom of the same page addressed the same issue: five chairs in a row, from 
a pompous armchair to a rickety stool, wait for cadres at five levels, from the bureau chief (juzhang 
局长) to the assistant (ganshi 干事). 
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his status. Yet what is the status of reporters within Chinese society? “This 
ministerial aide probably has not considered: behind the reporters, there stands a 
million-strong audience that hopes to see interesting pictures and films of 
everything that Voroshilov does in our country. If all the cameramen just ‘scram,’ 
then the minister’s aide cannot satisfy the audiences’ needs, no matter how 
‘important’ he may be.” The article’s author derived legitimacy for the journalists’ 
job from their social function: they were speaking to the masses, informing them – 
and were thus representing the masses’ interests. The official’s “importance” (“Are 
you important or am I?”) is relative to the journalists’ importance. The last 
sentence of the quote obviously mocks the official’s feeling important, but the 
implication of the argument reaches further: the journalists are connecting the 
officials, including the Party leadership (like Liu Shaoqi in this case) with the broad 
masses. Just like the masses, however, they feel the invisible wall between the 
officials and themselves. The issue of the “wall” (qiang 墙) or “ditch” (gou 沟) that 
separated the Party and the people, and that runs as a rift through the entire 
Chinese society was an issue that received much attention in the discussion of 
non-Party intellectuals in the second half of May. 
The article ends with two crucial sentences: “It must be said that recently, ... 
reporters have met with more than just a few unreasonable restrictions and 
impediments during their assignments; this has become a headache for the Beijing 
news circles. The behaviour of this ministerial aide is just an especially 
outstanding example among many.” The article explicitly stresses that the Zuo Ye 
affair is not an isolated phenomenon, but an illustration of a general practice. The 
concrete example is only the pretext for the discussion of the grievances of 
Chinese journalists in a segregated society, dominated by hierarchies in all 
spheres of life. The journalists felt mistreated by the officialdom: instead of earning 
recognition for their attempts to serve the readers, and thus the people, in the – 
from their perspective (here very literally from the cameraman’s perspective) – 
correct way, they had to bear abuse from officials who had in mind only their own 
status. It was this accusation that made sure that the Zuo Ye affair would not be 
limited to a single article. 
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Other newspapers reacted quickly. The next day, on May 8, WHB came 
forward with its own article on the affair. From the outset, WHB lifted the incident 
to a higher plane than Zhongguo qingnianbao had done. Firstly, WHB chose to run 
its article on page one. While being not much longer than the short piece from 
Zhongguo qingnianbao, its position identified it as an important issue. Secondly, 
the title of WHB’s article went directly to the main problem: the article in Zhongguo 
qingnianbao had proceeded from the incident itself; the WHB article was entitled 
straightforwardly “News reporters’ woes” (Xinwen jizhe de kumen 新闻记者的苦闷). 
The account of the original incident makes up only a third of the WHB article. 
The account’s most significant difference to the Zhongguo qingnianbao article is 
that WHB mentions Zuo Ye by name – Zhongguo qingnianbao had identified the 
official only by his position. Criticizing by name is not usual in Chinese newspapers; 
by doing so WHB added sharpness to the accusations against the official.110 WHB 
then moves on to list other areas where journalists feel unnecessary hardships 
placed upon them by the officialdom: “The example of comrade Zuo Ye’s 
treatment of the reporters is certainly a singular and outstanding case, but 
journalists performing the tasks they have been assigned to do frequently 
encounter a number of impediments.” The first of these is the elusiveness of many 
higher officials: reporters often must surmount numerous “passes” (guan 关) to 
see or interview even medium-level officials.111 The “pass” here is another 
formulation for the “wall” or “ditch” between Party and people. Another problem is 
the Party’s tendency toward secretiveness: even trivial matters were made into 
secrets, thus impeding the journalists’ work. Finally, there were many instances 
where newspaper people were simply treated with contempt: journalists in Guilin 
received the order to report from a gala meeting but were refused entry to the 
ballroom, so that the reporters had to watch from outside the window. 
WHB started where Zhongguo qingnianbao had ended its article: the Zuo 
Ye affair was only one manifestation of a generally problematic relationship 
                                             
110 On the problem of criticizing by name see Michael Schoenhals. Doing Things with Words in 
Chinese Politics: Five Studies. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 
1992, p. 34ff. 
111 Although this is not made explicit, the article seems to be directed primarily at local-level cadres 
– first of all in Shanghai, where WHB had a long-standing conflict with the authorities. 
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between the newspaper people and the officialdom. The paper justified its criticism 
with the current political campaign: 
Now that the Party has proposed the policy of “letting hundred flowers bloom and 
letting hundred schools of thought contend,” we have witnessed how the Chinese 
academic and intellectual circles have started to buzz with action. News work is also 
one [of these] flowers; if we want to make this flower blossom in the brightest colours, 
we must clear out of the way all the bricks and stones that weigh down on this flower, 
and thus create the conditions for the people’s news work. 
 
Referring indirectly to Mao’s call at the propaganda conference to make the 
‘Double Hundred’ policy the method for “all our work,” WHB claimed the right to 
speak out on behalf of the press people. Improving their situation would be 
instrumental to make “the people’s news work” function better. WHB places its 
own criticism under this broader goal. 
In its structure, the WHB article on page one does not follow the strictly 
logical argumentation of the Zhongguo qingnianbao article; it reads rather as a 
collection of illustrations. This is indeed the article’s intention, as the reader 
discovers who turns to the same issue’s second page, were he finds a carefully 
written editorial on the topic, carrying the programmatic title: “Respect news 
reporters” (Zunzhong xinwen jizhe 尊重新闻记者). This thoughtful and provocative 
essay addresses the problem of the news workers’ status and the treatment they 
receive in a sublime and sometimes satirical manner. While the editorial’s agenda 
is less obvious, its implications reach far beyond that of both the WHB and 
Zhongguo qingnianbao articles. 
The article starts with an appeal to the officially declared equality of all 
professions: “the revolutionary education of many years has all along told us: 
people’s professions are not divided into honourable and low; there is only the 
revolutionary division of labour.” Consequently, “news work is just one part of the 
revolutionary enterprise, it is the propagator and organizer of the Party’s and 
government’s cause.” The allusion to Lenin adds weight to the news worker’s 
claim of being an integral part of the revolution. As such, they deserve treatment 
equal to that other revolutionaries receive. The particular merit of the Chinese 
newspaper sector lies in the paper’s educative function: “for everyone able to read, 
the daily and indispensable spiritual nourishment is – the newspaper.” The 
journalists thus deserve respect and fair treatment because of their contribution to 
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the revolution and to the construction of socialism, a contribution that is not more 
and not less important than the contribution of others. 
For the authors of the editorial, the really troubling question is: why is the 
first thing that comes to the mind of the minister’s aide the question of who is more 
important? Inserting a little dialectics – “conscience is the reflection of being” – the 
editorial concludes that in the PRC, the thinking of many officials lags behind the 
reality of their social existence. This, so the editorialist, is exactly the problem that 
the Party’s rectification campaign is bound to address. For Zuo Ye, he has the 
advice: 
Dear ministerial aide, please take some time and read the RMRB editorial “Why do we 
need rectification?”112 There it says: “The people’s state protects the people. Only in 
the people’s state, the people can use, on a national scale and universal scope, the 
means of democracy to educate and reform themselves, and escape from the influence 
of the internal and external reactionaries, ... and transform their bad habits and bad 
thinking brought along from the old society.” 
 
The quotation from the RMRB editorial comes in fact from Mao’s “On the People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship.”113 The editorialist asks Zuo Ye to grasp the opportunity 
of the current rectification campaign and reform his ways as well as his thinking. 
The editorial now moves onto very dangerous terrain: Zuo Ye is a Party 
member, while WHB is run by non-Party intellectuals. In the course of the Hundred 
Flowers, people outside of the Party were explicitly called upon to help the CCP in 
its rectification, but the prospect of Party members (and cadres, for that!) being 
more backward than the journalists is disturbing indeed – because the backward 
thinking that Zuo Ye has put on display is a remnant of the “old society.” The 
editorial is not afraid to compare the situation of journalists before and after 1949: 
In the Chongqing and Nanjing years [i.e. 1927-1949], the GMD frequently blocked 
news and set up organs of news censorship, and even went so far as beating, arresting, 
and putting to death journalists. We remember that journalists reporting on the 
“National Political Assembly” (Guomin canzhenghui 国民参政会)114 were searched and 
there were such humiliating violations of human rights as conference delegates using 
the main door and journalists going through the side doors... 
The people’s political power we enjoy now respects journalists. But seeing journalists 
as a nuisance, keeping them at arm’s length and denying cooperation, looking at them 
in despise and without respect – all these old ways do still exist. This confirms that 
people’s thinking and their conscience is lagging behind the changes in the economic 
                                             
112 “Wei shenme yao zhengfeng?” in RMRB, May 2, 1957. 
113 “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng,” in RMRB, July 1, 1949. Repr. in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 4, p. 
1468-82. The quote appears on p. 1476. 
114 A consultative organ established in 1938; since 1945, the Assembly became increasingly 
ineffective due to the CCP’s boycott. It was abolished in 1948. 
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system, which means that changes in the superstructure have not kept pace with 
changes at the economic base. 
The incidents of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism that the journalists were 
confronted with in the past eight years are extremely large in number because of the 
special character of this trade: [the journalists] get in contact with a great many issues. 
Now the time has come for the journalists to voice their grievances. 
 
The contrast presented in these paragraphs is not really a contrast. All too obvious 
are the similarities between the journalist’s treatment under the old and the new 
regime. Easily can the reader get the impression that the CCP – or at least large 
numbers of its cadres – betray the very principles they are preaching. 
The editorial comes to the bold conclusion: “We can establish the following 
law: a regime that stands in opposition to its own people repels and distrusts its 
journalists (dang yi ge zhengquan fandui renmin de shihou, ta shi paichi jizhe, 
huaiyi jizhe de 当一个政权反对人民的时候，它是排斥记者、怀疑记者的).” The 
editorial leaves it up to its reader to make their own judgement about the CCP’s 
treatment of the journalists. The editorial operates on slippery terrain, because the 
“law” can be read in the reverse way: a regime that mistreats its journalists stands 
in opposition to the people. It is probably not in the intention of the editorialist to 
suggest such a conclusion, but from the examples cited in the editorial and the 
article on page one, such a reading does make sense. 
Does WHB stand in opposition to the CCP? The tone of the article and its 
end, where the editorialist greets the timely arrival of the Hundred Flowers 
campaign suggest that it is not. WHB is committed to the leadership of the CCP, 
but it demands fair treatment for journalists. WHB accepts the Party’s guidance of 
the press sector, but it wants to see guarantees for its own role in the Party-led 
project of socialism. And it is committed especially to the vision of the press as a 
means of enlightenment, as “spiritual nourishment” (jingshen liangshi 精神粮食) for 
the people. The open and critical attitude of the editorial is in line with the spirit of 
the Hundred Flowers period and the rectification campaign; this attitude 
notwithstanding, WHB remains loyal to the core substance of the media concept. 
As it turned out, it was no longer sufficient to just adherence to the key principles 
once the anti-Rightist campaign began. 
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WHB was not the only newspaper to join in the discussion of the Zuo Ye 
affair. Two days later, on May 10, RMRB published its statement on this issue. It 
refrained from editorializing on the affair and chose a more satirical approach that 
was published on page eight – the last page, not the first, where WHB’s article 
appeared; nonetheless RMRB had devoted considerable space on its page to the 
issue. RMRB’s coverage consisted of three parts: a satirical poem, a cartoon, and 
a short article. The article carries the title “We must learn to respect people” (Yao 
xuehui zunzhong ren 要学会尊重人). This title obviously is a reference to the WHB 
editorial “Respect news reporters,” but just as obviously it emphasizes a different 
point: mutual respect is the ethical bottom-line; only on this base can reporters 
demand respect for themselves. As the title indicates, the RMRB article takes a 
more balanced view than the WHB editorial. 
The article, written by Yuan Ying,115 the vice-head of RMRB’s literature and 
art department, refrains from summing up the Zuo Ye affair and refers the reader 
to Zhongguo qingnianbao and WHB. It follows WHB in the identification of the 
main problem: the official’s question “Are you important or am I?” He stresses that 
in fact all people at the scene were of equal importance and thus deserve equal 
treatment. The segregation of ranks (jibie 级别) itself is an incorrect form of 
behaviour in a socialist society. Only towards the end of the article the author 
leaves his conciliatory position and sides with the journalists: “Dear comrade [Zuo 
Ye], you’ve been wrong; on such occasions, the work of the reporters should be 
much more important than [that of] a ministerial aide. Without them [the reporters], 
millions of people wouldn’t get to see the pictures they long for. Isn’t this a very 
plain truth?” He ends the article, however, on a balanced note, rejecting any kind 
of “rankings” – mutual respect is the need of the day. 
Both the poem and the cartoon take up the same issue, yet in a decidedly 
more polemical way. The poem by Yuan Shuipai 袁水拍, the head of RMRB’s 
department of literature and art (he was later put in charge of the department of 
literature and art of the CCP PD), is entitled “Bureaucratic airs, scram!” (Guanliao 
                                             
115 The articles is signed Liang Ruhuai. On Yuan’s pen names see Yuan Ying. Fengyun ceji: Wo 
zai Renmin ribao de suiyue. Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an chubanshe, 2006, ch. 22. For Yuan’s view 
of the Zuo Ye affair see ibid. ch. 11. 
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jiazi gunkai! 官僚架子滚开！) and takes up the Zuo Ye affair to reflect on status 
thinking in the old and new Chinese societies: 
Whatever our forefathers did, they had to consult the imperial almanac; 
whatever we do today, we must consider the rankings. 
 
The old attitudes of discrimination are still present in modern society and may 
break through the surface at various opportunities – such as the scene at the 
agricultural exposition: 
You should be behind me, how come you’re in front of me? 
Don’t you know about high and low, honourable and base? 
So what is a journalist worth? 
My position exceeds yours by half a heaven’s height! 
 
The line of argument followed in this poem is in fact closer to the WHB editorial 
than to the RMRB article that appears below it; the author had certainly read the 
WHB piece, and his short poem is more an illustration of the former than of 
RMRB’s own article. The poem’s tone is sharper than that of the article, but this is 
justifiable for a satirical piece. It ends with the lines: 
Scram, yes, they should scram! 
Let all these bureaucratic airs and tunes, 
these rotten attitudes and arrogant manners, 
this snobbishness, kicking those below and flattering those above... 
let them scram, the whole lot altogether, 
don’t let them again do harm to our comrades! 
 
Here we are back in the argumentation of the RMRB article: the “comrades,” 
including the journalists are harmed by the arrogant behaviour of bureaucrats, a 
form of behaviour that actually is a remnant of the old order. News reporters, just 
like the other members of society have the right to claim fair treatment. 
The cartoon, drawn by the well-known cartoonist Fang Cheng 方成, 
illustrates both the poem and the article on the lower half of the page. Mocking the 
habit to think in terms of ranks, we see a man in a Mao suit, obviously a cadre. He 
has his arms folded behind his back and sticks out an immense round belly – sign 
of his overbearing self-consciousness and his arrogance. His posture is topped by 
the cigar he smokes. He stands at the highest of three steps and speaks loudly “I 
am important, hmm!” The next picture shows the same cadre who has now shrunk 
considerably: the posture is still the same, but what had been front is now his back, 
the immense belly has turned into a hump. Hands on his sides, he arches his back, 
bowing in front of an invisible superior. The cigar, still smoking, lies on the floor 
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behind his back. No longer on top, he now stands on the lowest of three steps, 
speaking in much lower voice to his superior: “You are even more important, 
hihi...” Status  thinking, that had always been present in Chinese society and had 
been reinforced by the 
Communist hierarchies, 
is not only 
incompatible with 
socialist ethics, or 
dangerous for the 
Party’s prestige, as the 
WHB editorial had 
argued, but is also silly 
and ridiculous. 
Ill. 1: “I am important!” (RMRB, May 10, 1957) 
 
With RMRB, China’s most prominent newspaper had picked up the Zuo Ye 
issue. In the course of the debate, other arguments had appeared and the 
discussion had gradually widened. On May 15, a weak after the WHB, GMRB 
joined the debate with a long article.116 
Instead of having its own staff commenting on the issue, GMRB had asked 
a scholar for his opinion: Jiang Yin’en 蒋荫恩, a professor of journalism at Beijing 
University, later to become vice-head of Zhongguo renmin daxue’s journalism 
department, must be considered an authority in the newspaper sector. Jiang 
indicates that he wrote his article on May 12; that it took three days to appear in 
the paper shows that GMRB attached much importance to the topic and to the 
article and had it inspected closely before publication. 
Jiang’s article is a well-balanced piece that argues for a better 
understanding of the difficult job of journalists and calls upon everyone to support 
reporters doing their work. He proceeds from the Zuo Ye affair but admits that this 
is only one of many instances of mistreatment of journalists in China: in general, 
people lack an understanding of the difficulties journalists face who 
enthusiastically do the tasks assigned to them; additionally, journalists stand in a 
bad reputation. This kind of thinking is a remnant of the “old” society. None of 
                                             
116 “Xinwen jizhe de zhiwu yinggai dedao zhongshi.” 
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these arguments is new; Jiang is confirming the logic of the WHB editorial and the 
RMRB article. However, he goes further than the previous articles in addressing 
two concrete problems in the news sector. The first is the lack of direct and active 
reporting: “Since liberation, most newspapers have not placed enough emphasis 
on gathering information; the papers rely on the Xinhua news agency, and Xinhua 
relies on ready-made material. At major news events we only seldom see any 
traces of journalists; society has gotten used to this and even treats it as normal.” 
Live reporting should be an integral part of newspaper making, yet Chinese 
newspapers find it convenient to rely on Xinhua dispatches. Of course, nobody 
knows better than Jiang that in most cases newspapers have no choice but to do 
so; the Party does not allow them to write their own reports. Thus, his reproach is 
directed not really at the newspapers, but rather at the CCP PD. 
The second problem concerns the reluctance of many leading cadres and 
work units to speak with journalists. Here, Jiang’s criticism is targeted directly at 
those responsible: 
Some leaders don’t like to meet journalists; some organs, factories and mining 
enterprises practice a closed-door policy towards journalists or impose unreasonable 
restrictions on their movements; some organs see the journalists as a nuisance when 
they receive foreign guests, fearing that the reporters may upset a prearranged scene 
and disturb their own work; and some personnel responsible for security have no 
understanding of the journalist’s work and interfere even where it is unnecessary, so 
that the work of the reporters is affected. 
 
In the case of foreign guests visiting China, Jiang argues, it might not be the 
presence of a crowd of reporters that creates a bad impression; to the contrary, 
the absence of journalists on the scene may suggest a lack of interest in the 
guest’s visit. The reluctance of not “some,” but in fact all Chinese leaders to speak 
to the press is a problem that weighs even stronger. Both local politicians and the 
highest leadership are notoriously hard to reach for comment, a situation that has 
not changed even half a century later. Public interviews, such as that with Zhou 
Yang, the vice-head of the PD, that WHB had published on April 9, 1957, were a 
rare exception to the rule and caused a sensation in China.117 Jiang, an alumni of 
the Missouri School of Journalism and well-versed in American journalism, did see 
clearly this anomaly and the problems it caused and called for changes. 
                                             
117 “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu fu buzhang Zhou Yang tongzhi da ben bao jizhe wen.” 
The interview was an event that deserved the prime position on the top of the first page of that 
day’s paper. 
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Both points addressed by Jiang would mean a departure from established 
newspaper practices in the PRC. They are concrete steps based on constructive 
considerations: the idea to reduce the reliance on Xinhua reports would make the 
papers livelier and thus serve the readers’ interests. Doing so, however, would 
require the CCP to give up a crucial instrument of control; compliance would be 
based on the journalists’ voluntary cooperation. It is doubtful whether the Party 
would accept such an arrangement. No particular reasons exist for the 
leadership’s reluctance to communicate with the press. The obsession with 
secrecy is not justified in view of the fact that the press is closely supervised by the 
Party anyway – and especially at lower levels Jiang is probably right to suspect a 
combination of distrust and indolence to be at work. More openness towards the 
public would not affect either the Party’s prestige or the effectiveness of the control 
of the press. 
In the course of a few days, the Zuo Ye affair set in motion an ever-
widening debate on the function of the Chinese press and on its particular 
problems. After newspapers across the nation had exploded with discussions on 
the situation of journalists and on the role of the press, the debate soon left behind 
the affair that had triggered it originally. The journalist’s demands initially met with 
success: meetings were convened in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and other 
places to discuss the Zuo Ye affair and allow journalists to voice their 
grievances.118 In Shanghai, the Municipal Party Committee responded to the 
journalists’ complaints and sent a circular to all work units demanding better 
cooperation with reporters. Yet the affair backfired once the anti-Rightist 
movement started. On July 10, the PD convened a meeting in Beijing with all sides 
concerned. Zuo Ye delivered a written self-criticism, but denied to have abused 
the journalists. The newspaper people in turn, including Deng Tuo and Yuan 
Shuipai, were criticized on this and a second meeting a few days later. Wu Yikeng 
吴一铿, the head of Zhongguo qingnianbao’s literature and arts department was 
named a Rightist because of the Zuo Ye affair.119 The brunt of the criticism, 
however, was reserved for WHB. 
                                             
118 See Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 179-81. 
119 Gao Liang. “Zuo Ye shijian yingxiang suo ji,” p. 122f. See also Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. 
Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 180f. 
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Before turning to the accusations levelled against WHB, I will take a closer 
look at the debate that unfolded on WHB’s pages in the weeks after the May 8 
article and editorial. To broaden the discussion under way, WHB decided to invite 
opinions from outside its boardroom. On May 21, the paper ran an article by Xu 
Junyuan 许君远, a former editor of Dagongbao 大公报, entitled “Should 
newspapers go on like this?”120 Xu’s long and balanced essay addresses the issue 
from an academic perspective. The author assesses critically the appearance of 
Chinese newspapers since 1949: “Since liberation, the newspapers have been 
able to stick closely to the government’s policies, and to carry out in a serious 
manner their propaganda tasks. They showed much scrutiny in the selection of 
news and with every word and every sentence held themselves responsible for the 
people. This aspect must be appreciated. But there are also less satisfying things.” 
These latter phenomena are closely related to the papers’ Party character. 
According to Xu, the newspapers have gone too far in their desire to educate the 
people: “All today’s papers act as the reader’s teacher – unlike before, when 
newspapers and readers were intimate friends. There is no doubt that we need 
teachers, but friends can also study and learn by mutual discussion.” “The only 
thing newspapers have done since liberation is teaching and preaching; they have 
neglected attracting and delighting [the readers], but exactly this is a fine tradition 
of the Chinese newspapers.” As a result, “there is a high wall between the 
newspaper and the readers.” The “wall” is a direct consequence of the party-
ization of the Chinese newspapers. The papers have one-sidedly emphasized 
their educational function, any entertaining elements have disappeared from their 
pages. Xu takes up here an issue raised by Liu Binyan that touches a core 
element of the CCP media concept: the newspapers are part of a normative 
project; with regard to the ideological backwardness of the masses the papers 
cannot but have an enlightening function. The author’s ostensible nostalgia leads 
him onto dangerous terrain. He tries to modify his criticism by acknowledging the 
need for education. All he hopes for, is to see a more reasonable combination of 
the two elements: “Most Party papers still put on a ‘Party face’ and refuse to smile; 
                                             
120 “Baozhi yingdang zheyang ganxiaqu ma?” After his paper, Dagongbao’s Shanghai edition was 
closed in 1952, Xu worked in the publishing industry. See Cai Bosheng. “Bu xunchang de jisao: 
jinian Dagongbao lao baoren Xu Junyuan bai nian danchen” at 
http://www.takungpao.com/news/2002-12-4/TK-82491.htm (downloaded Aug. 8, 2003). 
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is this really the style a Party paper must adopt?” The current practice, Xu warns, 
is counterproductive: the grey and drab papers that look all the same are in danger 
of losing their effectiveness as propaganda tools; their mass character – another 
key concern of the media concept – is on the brink of getting lost. 
What are the reasons for these developments? “As I, an outsider, see the 
situation, since liberation the newspapers have been organ-ized [jiguanhua 机关
化], there are no longer any differences between the news personnel and the 
cadres of other bureaucracies.” The transition of the newspaper sector from a 
competitive industry to a component of the propaganda machine has led to 
difficulties similar to those in the publishing industry: slowness to respond to 
demand, bloated administrative bureaucracies, and the declining enthusiasm on 
the side of the journalists to improve their paper and compete for recent and 
interesting news. Xu Junyuan concludes his article with a bold suggestion: “These 
days, loud voices have called for schools and magazines run by independent but 
like-minded people [tongren ban 同人办] – so cannot we also consider 
newspapers of this kind?” In 1949, the CCP had opted against the idea of 
intellectuals running publishing houses and newspapers on behalf of the CCP, 
bound to the Party’s line through their loyalty to the principles represented by the 
Party and its policies. In 1957, parts of the intelligentsia, including Xu, hoped for 
this question to be reconsidered. 
As Xu himself admits, he was an outsider, speaking from the position of an 
academic and referring to his expertise as both a newspaper reader and as a 
former journalist. Concerns similar to that of Xu Junyuan were also expressed 
from active newspaper personnel. The sharpest commentary on the newspaper 
issue was a signed article by the WHB editor-in-chief, Xu Zhucheng. Due to his 
mission to Moscow, Xu had missed most of the Hundred Flowers movement. The 
delegation had returned to Beijing on May 10, where Xu saw the recent WHB 
issues and expressed concern about the sharp tone of the articles but was calmed 
down by Deng Tuo; Deng complained that his own paper was still controlled all too 
closely.121 Xu returned to Shanghai only on May 14. During the absence of the 
editor-in-chief, Qin Benli had been in charge of WHB’s editorial department; it was 
                                             
121 Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 162f. 
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Qin who was responsible for WHB’s direction in the Hundred Flowers period. A 
veteran Party member, Qin had been in constant contact with the Shanghai 
propaganda authorities, and from Ke Qingshi he received instructions to 
“continuously increase the temperature” (jia wen zai jia wen 加温再加温).122 Upon 
his return, Xu did not immediately assume his work at the newspaper’s offices, but 
started to sum up his experiences in the Soviet Union (reports of this kind were a 
routine affair). In the meantime, a municipal propaganda conference had been 
convened in Shanghai, as had been mandated by the PD at the national 
conference in March. Over 2700 people participated in the conference, almost half 
of them non-Party personnel. On May 18, Xu was asked to address the 
conference, and wrote a short speech with the title: “The ‘wall’ can be brought 
down” (“‘Qiang’ shi nenggou chaidiao de” 墙是能够拆掉的). It was this speech that 
was published the following day in WHB.123 
“The ‘wall’ can be brought down” is a fascinating document due to the 
frankness with which the author talks about the problems that had plagued WHB 
and that were common problems of the entire sector. Xu understands his paper as 
a positive example of how the “wall” between Party and people, between Party 
and non-Party cadres, could be removed. He speaks from concrete experience 
and tells his audience more about the origins of this “wall” that had eventually led 
to the closure of WHB the year before: 
Shortly after liberation I was in Beijing and learned that the [Party] Center thought 
highly of some of the newspapers and hoped that we would play an active role. 
However, a few comrades in charge of news work adopted a derogatory and 
discriminating attitude towards newspapers like ours; they believed that since 
newspapers of this kind didn’t exist in some other socialist countries, we shouldn’t have 
them either. All along, they therefore took measures against our papers like remoulding 
or gradually extinguishing them. Especially during Peng Boshan’s 彭柏山 tenure as 
head of the [CCP Shanghai Municipal] PD, our WHB and the Xinminbao 新民报 were 
                                             
122 Xu Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou’ – 1957,” p. 147. The reasons for these instructions are unclear. What 
were Ke’s intentions? Was he trying to express his support for the Chairman’s policies, or did he 
feel that the wind was about to change and deliberately tried to “lure the snake from its hole,” only 
to take revenge later? The latter option sounds most plausible, given Ke Qingshi’s strained 
relationship with WHB, but then Xu Zhucheng must have mixed up the dates in his memoirs – Ke 
could not have known about an imminent policy change in early May, when the rectification 
campaign had only begun. An alternative explanation might be Ke’s well-known zeal to follow 
Mao’s instructions, in this case the Chairman’s call for rectification. In any case, it is clear that Qin 
Benli received signals form the Shanghai Party leadership to intensify WHB’s engagement in the 
rectification campaign. 
123 On the propaganda conference and Xu’s speech see Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao 
shilüe, p. 148, 163f. 
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pressured to the brink of suffocation. Under the high pressure of dogmatism and 
sectarianism, WHB almost breathed its last. Fortunately the Centre came to know 
[WHB’s situation] in good time and arranged for its relaunch. It is rumoured that the 
plan to scrap WHB and turn in into Jiaoshibao was devised by Peng Boshan. 
 
Xu denounces the policy of specialization and division of labour, a result of the 
CCP’s “Learn from the Soviet Union” policy, as dogmatism and sectarianism. Xu 
openly criticizes the propaganda leadership and even mentions by name Peng 
Boshan, the former head of the Shanghai PD (in 1955 Peng was named a 
member of the Hu Feng “anti-Party clique” and was removed from his job; for this 
reason, Xu Zhucheng considered it save enough to mention Peng by name).124 
With the insistence on an imported model, the Party had strangulated the 
enthusiasm of the non-Party newspaper people from Shanghai – not WHB alone 
was affected, but many more papers in Shanghai and elsewhere; in short, all 
newspapers that did not fit into the Party paper model. 
In the early 1950s, WHB was forced to accommodate to the new policies: 
Nominally I was chief of office [shezhang 社长] and editor-in-chief and comrade Yan 
Baoli 严宝礼 was vice chief and head of the administrative department [guanlibu 
zhuren 管理部主任], but de facto we were – speaking politely – not more than 
consultants that may or may not be needed. To be honest, for a long time I didn’t read 
my own newspaper – not because I wouldn’t care: but with my thirty years of 
experience in newspaper work and my conscience, I couldn’t bear to read a paper so 
full of dogmatic and stereotyped articles. In fact, a vice editor-in-chief and Party 
member was in charge of editorial work; he had never done news work before, and his 
education seemed to be not too good either, but he had one sort of talent, and that was 
to turn readable articles into something unreadable, to make all manuscripts into 
dogmatic and stereotyped articles. Instructions from above he handled as secrets from 
the leadership; he didn’t talk them over with the non-Party people and also didn’t 
discuss them consciously in the editorial committee, so that more often than not we 
had to listen to him like guessing a riddle – was he speaking his own opinion, or were it 
the [CCP] Municipal Committee’s intentions? Another comrade who nominally was 
secretary but in fact exercised powers over administrative and personnel matters was 
overweeningly arrogant, too; he was good at stirring up contradictions and making use 
of contradictions to cement his own authority. For a long time thus, there were 
contradictions at WHB not only between Party and non-Party people, but also within 
the Party, there was a wall within the wall, and a ditch outside it. Rank-and-file cadres 
had no confidence in the future of our paper and whiled away their days. Some cadres 
even were in constant fear of harassment and were afraid to offend these “wild beasts” 
[mengren 猛人], as we say in Cantonese. 
 
                                             
124 On Peng Boshan see Peng Xiaolian. “Wo de fuqin Peng Boshan” at 
http://www.gmdaily.com.cn/1_sz/2000/20000810/gb/2000^96^0^000809.htm (downloaded Aug. 8, 
2003). 
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The vice editor-in-chief whom Xu accused so bitterly was Zhang Shuren 张树人.125 
When the relaunch was prepared, Xu secured that Zhang stayed with Jiaoshibao 
and did not return to WHB; furthermore, Xu felt it necessary to secure guarantees 
of non-interference from the Shanghai authorities.126 While Xu only thinly veils his 
bitterness, what he describes was actually a common practice in the early 1950s: 
the CCP sent loyal Party people into newspapers it did not own directly; nominally 
in positions of the second line, such as vice editor-in-chief, they would exercise the 
real power within the paper through their contacts with the Party’s propaganda 
apparatus. It did not matter that many of them had no prior experience in 
newspaper making – the CCP had to deal with a serious shortage of qualified 
personnel. The Party’s personnel situation in the newspaper sector was not much 
better than in the publishing sector discussed in the previous chapter. 
The situation had greatly improved since WHB’s relaunch seven months 
earlier. Interestingly, Xu Zhucheng ascribes these improvements not to less Party 
supervision, but rather to more of it: “The leadership of the Party has strengthened 
and the relations between the Party and the non-Party people have become closer; 
less than a month after the reorganization of the Party group, the number of 
comrades requesting to join the Party rose to fifty or sixty. From our concrete work, 
everyone could deeply feel the Party’s concern and kindness.” Xu thus relativizes 
his earlier argument: the policy of specialization per se had been wrong, but not 
the Party’s leadership of the press. The damage had been done by overzealous 
local officials who had constrained the paper’s leeway to an inappropriate degree; 
now that Party had returned to a more collegial form of cooperation with the 
leadership of WHB, the situation had improved immensely. What Xu calls for is 
more room for the newspapers to chose the forms of this cooperation; he 
demands trust and promises loyalty. 
In order to stabilize the improvements that have been achieved and to avoid 
further clashes, Xu spells out a number of proposals he has drawn from his own 
experience of “bringing down the wall:” 
                                             
125 See Xu’s self-criticism “Wode fan dang zuixing,” WHB, Aug. 22, 1957. The other cadre attacked 
by Xu was Sun Kuijun 孙葵君. 
126 Zhang took revenge for Xu’s attacks when the anti-Rightist campaign started and in turn 
denounced Xu. See Zhu Zheng. 1957 nian de xiaji, p. 324. 
 351
First of all, when Party cadres are sent [to a work unit], [the Party] should be careful [to 
see if these people] are really appropriate [for their jobs]; it would be best if they had 
brought with them affection and attachment towards their new business, yet as a 
minimum they should have some understanding of the business; otherwise they cannot 
do their work properly, not to speak of directing that of others. People of low 
qualifications who do not meet the above conditions, and who do not study eagerly 
either, will certainly be outsiders on an insider’s job; they will use the Party’s prestige to 
bully and suppress others. 
 
It is evident that this is a reasonable demand, but Xu overlooks the Party’s general 
dilemma in the takeover years: the CCP would have been more than willing to 
place better educated cadres into positions of responsibility, if only it had enough 
people of this kind. Xu was lucky enough to convince an able and liberal-minded 
Party member like Qin Benli to come to WHB; even in 1957, the CCP had all too 
few such cadres. 
Xu goes on to express a wide-spread attitude of the Chinese intelligentsia 
towards their relationship with the CCP: 
For non-Party people in responsible positions, support for the Party finds expression 
not in abject obedience to some individual Party members, but rather in their loyalty to 
the cause of the people. ... We must proceed from the cause of the people and not 
from individual interests. When we are confronted with difficulties we cannot solve, we 
must reflect them [to our superiors]; if our superiors cannot solve them, we must reflect 
them to the Municipal Committee, and those that the Municipal Committee cannot 
solve we must reflect to the Centre; in the end [these difficulties] can be solved. 
 
The intellectuals are willing to follow the Party, because of the projects they see 
represented by the CCP. Conflicts such as those of WHB in the past are attributed 
not to the Party itself, but to individual Party personnel, particularly the lower-level 
cadres who are often ill-prepared for their jobs. Eventual problems can be solved 
as long as the “roads of communication” to the top leadership are open (Xu does 
not see or refuses to accept that the strict hierarchies of communication and 
command are a means of Party control themselves). This principle of mutual trust 
and cooperation appears again in the third point Xu makes: 
Last year I myself had doubts whether a non-Party man [like me] would be able to take 
charge of the leadership job. How would the leadership of the Party committee and my 
individual responsibility be arranged in practice? By now, I have basically come to grips 
with this problem. No undertaking could ever go without the leadership of the Party, 
everyone should have the full authorities of his post for his work; the concrete fashion 
in which leadership of the Party and individual responsibility are combined should 
depend on the concrete circumstances of the work unit in question. WHB now has not 
just a Party Committee, but has even set up a Party group a short while ago; yet I and 
comrade Yan Baoli think that we have full authority, we [members of the] democratic 
parties can display our capabilities in the way we should. The crucial point is whether 
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we can mutually support each other and respect each other, whether we can frankly 
discuss and frankly criticize each other. 
 
On balance, Xu dresses his sharp criticism of the circumstances prevailing in 
many newspapers (and at WHB until the 1956 relaunch) into a generally loyal 
attitude. He is willing to accept the Party’s claim for leadership in all areas of life, 
and is careful not to leave what he sees as the framework of the Hundred Flowers 
policy: frank but loyal criticism. The amount of independence he demands is 
contrasted by his willingness to cooperate even closer with the Party’s authorities: 
To constantly strengthen the internal unity of the different newspapers, to give free rein 
to the enthusiasm of the comrades working at the different newspapers, I hope that 
comrade Wei Wenbo 魏文伯, comrade Shi Ximin, and comrade Bai Yan 白彦127 will not 
only stay in touch with us responsible comrades, but will also manage to find time and 
visit our newspaper offices, talk to our editors, journalists, proof readers, and workers; 
this would help us to detect and solve eventual contradictions at an early time. 
 
Future conflict can be avoided only if the Party and the newspaper personnel unite 
to improve the media. With this proposal for closer cooperation and mutual trust 
Xu Zhucheng tried to demonstrate his willingness to stay within the bounds of the 
Hundred Flowers framework. He could not know that his efforts had already been 
overtaken by events in Beijing. 
Not all participants of the Shanghai propaganda conference and of a 
simultaneous conference of the Federation of Newspaper Workers in Beijing had 
shown the amount of restraint that speaks from Xu Zhucheng’s article, its 
openness notwithstanding. Other people from the propaganda sector had voiced 
opinions that far exceeded those of Xu. As was customary during the Hundred 
Flowers period, the newspapers, including WHB, sent reporters to the conferences 
who summed up the talks of the various speakers and noted their main points. A 
WHB report of May 17 gives an impression of at least some of the issues 
discussed in Beijing.128 
At the conference of the Federation of Newspaper Workers, a Xinhua 
reporter remarked: “‘News freedom has been snatched by bureaucratism, 
sectarianism, and subjectivism.’ He said: Today, many work units of the news 
sector have been turned into organs [jiguanhua 机关化]; layers [of authority] are 
                                             
127 Wen Weibo was a secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee; Shi Ximin was head of 
the Municipal Committee’s PD; and Bai Yan the Shanghai PD vice-head in charge of newspapers. 
See Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu. Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 9, p. 421, 429. 
128 “Baozhi yinggai dui shei fuze?” 
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numerous and their structure is bloated. Those editors and reporters who are 
skilled in writing and editing have all assumed ‘offices’ [guan 官]. Work efficiency is 
absolutely absent.” The bureaucratization of the press had also been noted by Xu 
Junyuan, and the decline of the effectiveness was a theme constantly addressed 
by propaganda personnel. Yet the claim that “News freedom has been snatched 
by bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism” – lock, stock, and barrel, was a 
bold denunciation of the CCP’s policy towards the press. Similar condemnations 
came from Zhang Liqun 张黎群, the editor-in-chief of Zhongguo qingnianbao: 
“Today, the newspapers have taken over the job of being notice board, 
gramophone, reprint copy, and ‘trouble maker’ [re shi sheng-fei 惹事生非]. As a 
consequence, the newspaper people have become hanger-ons, they can no 
longer think themselves.” Zhang’s observations were certainly correct. However, it 
was the Party’s aim from the outset to make the newspapers into nothing less than 
the “throat and tongue.” The CCP did not find a fault with this. By turning around 
the perspective, Zhang touched one of the core principles of the CCP’s media 
concept. 
Another speaker addressed the nature of news and the right of reporters to 
investigate current affairs for their articles: “Viewing for news is nothing peculiarly 
bourgeois. Any news, with the exception of military and diplomatic secrets, is open 
for grabbing. Right now, many important affairs are published only after several 
days, so that readers are more and more benumbed.” The speaker touched on a 
very sensitive subject, that is, the Party’s authority to regulate information flows 
and information access. If reporters were allowed to investigate freely into any 
subject except the narrowly defined state secrets, the Party’s control of the media 
would definitely be at stake – would high-level mismanagement or corruption be 
open to journalistic investigation and reporting? Could secret meeting transcripts 
appear in the press? Another delegate formulated this issue into the simple words: 
“News happen objectively, not every single event is related to classes.” This 
statement is clearly at variance with the CCP’s conception of news, based on the 
principles of Leninism. The questions discussed at the conference were on the 
border line of what the CCP could accept. Provocative enough was the title of the 
WHB article: “To whom should newspapers be responsible?” 
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In the course of the debate in the newspaper circles, opinions were voiced 
that were standing outside the CCP’s media concept. The discussions of the 
Hundred Flowers period developed a momentum that was no longer under the 
Party’s control. Since mid-May, the Chinese leadership and Mao Zedong became 
increasingly alarmed by the dynamics of the movement. Most disturbing were 
reports of unrest at universities in several Chinese cities, and even among 
workers,129 but the course of the debate in the crucial propaganda sector was 
alarming, too. Since mid-May, Mao Zedong became convinced that his decision to 
“open up” (fang 放) had triggered an attack from class enemies who had been 
lying hidden in Chinese society. He began to prepare for the counterattack that 
started on June 8, once again in the form of a newspaper editorial. 
During the high tide of the Hundred Flowers campaign in spring 1957, 
Chinese news workers started the most comprehensive debate on their own role 
and the function and character of the press since the establishment of the PRC in 
1949. The Zuo Ye affair was a window of opportunity for journalists to articulate 
their frustrations and the anger caused by the treatment of journalists that had built 
up in the course of several years since liberation. They called for more respect for 
their particular group and asked for adjustments in the system that would result in 
more freedom for journalists to manoeuvre and give them the opportunity to 
display their professional pride. While most of those who joined the debate were 
careful not to overstep the limits, the opinions they voiced became more diverse in 
the second half of May and finally threatened to question the CCP’s media 
concept. In all these debates, WHB played a crucial role; when the crackdown 
started, WHB therefore was among the first and most prominent victims of the 
anti-Rightist campaign. 
 
 
Counterattack. “Recorded for Reference” 
Different theories have been used to explain the reason for the sudden turn 
of the tide in mid-May 1957. Xu Zhucheng believes in a conspiracy, and in a not so 
secret conspiracy for this; thus the title of his two essays – Yangmou 阳谋, a “plot 
                                             
129 See the pioneering study of Elizabeth Perry. “Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957” in CQ 137 
(1994), p. 1-27. 
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in broad daylight.”130 Xu is convinced that Mao Zedong’s intention in 1956-57 was 
nothing else than “drawing the snakes out of their holes” (yin she chu dong 引蛇出
洞). The title of Zhu Zheng’s book (1957 nian de xiaji: cong bai jia zhengming dao 
liang jia zhengming 1957 年的夏季：从百家争鸣到两家争鸣) implies a different 
reading: Zhu proposes a progression from a genuine position of one-hundred 
flowers to one of only two flowers in the course of summer 1957. In particular his 
elaborate discussions of the different versions of Mao’s Contradictions speech and 
the motives driving the revision process serve to support this thesis.131 Roderick 
MacFarquhar comes to a conclusion similar to Zhu’s.132 
While final judgement on Mao’s motives remains elusive, the date of his 
change of mind can be established with relative certainty. Since May 15, Mao 
started drafting an essay that was originally planned to become a newspaper 
article but that eventually was circulated only as an internal document among a 
very small group of top CCP leaders in the second half of May. After June 8, it was 
sent to a slightly larger number of cadres in the CC and the provinces.133 Originally 
entitled “Turning into the opposite” (Zou xiang fanmian 走向反面), Mao settled for 
the final title “Things are about to change” (Shiqing zheng zai qi bianhua 事情正在
起变化). 
In his article, Mao presents a new assessment of the situation in China: 
“Over the past months, people have all criticized dogmatism, but have let off 
revisionism.134 Dogmatism needs to be criticized; if we do not criticize dogmatism, 
many mistakes cannot be corrected. Now we need to begin paying attention to 
criticizing revisionism. Once dogmatism has turned into its opposite, it becomes 
either Marxism or revisionism.”135 The Hundred Flowers movement was conceived 
as a rectification movement targeted primarily at the mistakes of the CCP. These 
                                             
130 It was Mao Zedong who had compared the Hundred Flowers to a “plot in broad daylight” in the 
July 1 RMRB editorial. See below. 
131 See 1957 nian de xiaji, ch. two and six. 
132 The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, p. 311-17. 
133 On the drafting process see Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wen’gao 6.475f. See also Zhu Zheng. 
1957 nian de xiaji, p. 82-87. 
134 Dogmatism (jiaotiaozhuyi 教条主义) was associated with Stalin and the denunciation of 
dogmatism referred to the Chinese reaction to the CPSU’s XXth Party Congress. Now feeling that 
the pendulum hat swung too far into the other direction, Mao warned of revisionism (xiuzhengzhuyi 
修正主义), the epithet later attached to Khrushchev and his policies. Comp. MacFarquhar. Origins, 
p. 53-56. 
135 Quoted after Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wen’gao 6.469-75, here p. 469. 
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mistakes were a result of a dogmatist approach to the Soviet Union that had led to 
mechanical copying of Stalinist policies. Closely following the recent policy 
reversals in the Soviet Union, the Party was now to cleanse itself from years of 
dogmatism. Non-Party people were invited to help the Party reform itself, to 
criticize the tendencies and positions Mao identified as bureaucratism. Now, 
however, this criticism had crossed the invisible line and revisionism was lurking 
on the horizon: according to Mao, voices calling for the restoration of the capitalist 
system had emerged among the tides of criticism. 
The first concrete issue Mao mentions in his article is the problem of the 
news sector. It is here that Mao sees the most disturbing instances of revisionism. 
In the course of his article, he addresses the news sector several times, and it 
ranks first whenever he enumerates the areas he feels concerned about. The 
problems in the news sector must be attributed primarily to the large percentage of 
intellectuals in charge of the Chinese newspapers:136 
Our Party has large numbers of recently admitted members from among the 
intelligentsia (and even more in the CYL), a part of whom is indeed caught up in quite 
serious revisionist thinking. They deny the Party character and class nature of 
newspapers; they confuse the distinction in principle between proletarian news work 
and bourgeois news work; they confuse the news work that reflects the collective 
economy of Socialist countries and the news work that reflects the anarchic and 
competitive economy of capitalist countries. They praise bourgeois liberalism and 
oppose the leadership of the Party. They approve of democracy but oppose centralism. 
They oppose the leadership, planning, and control – necessary but not 
overconcentrated – of the enterprise in culture and education (which includes the news 
sector) that is a precondition for the creation of a planned economy. 
 
Mao levels at least three grave charges at the intellectuals and journalists who had 
spoken out in the debates in the news sector; at the same time, he calls back to 
everyone’s attention the bottom line for the Chinese media, as stipulated by the 
Chinese media concept. The first criterion violated in the debates is the 
newspaper’s class character and their Party character, clause one of the media 
concept and an unquestioned credo ever since Lenin. All news are based on the 
social life and the economic system of a nation; they thus reflect the class relations 
on the economic base. According to this logic, news invariably have a class 
character. Since the CCP claims to represent the working classes, adherence to 
the Party is a conditio sine qua non for the news sector; a remark such as “News 
                                             
136 Ibid., p. 470. 
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happen objectively, not every single event is related to classes,” voiced at the 
Beijing conference and reported in WHB, was thus considered a violation of the 
media concept. Mao further rebukes the calls for more freedom that some 
journalists, including moderate voices such as Xu Junyuan, had voiced. The idea 
of intellectuals following the Party on a voluntary basis, without the bonds of Party 
control, was unacceptable to Mao. Finally, Mao sees at stake the normative 
function of the media, their enlightening mission. News and education are 
inseparable; newspapers and readers being just “friends,” rather than teacher and 
disciple, as Xu Junyuan had proposed, was anathema to Mao Zedong. Xu 
Junyuan’s article was written after Mao’s, who thus couldn’t have meant Xu in 
particular. Obviously, ideas like his were quite common in the debates of May 
1957. Mao now showed – internally, for the time being – the limits of the debate. 
The reasons for Mao’s distrust lie deeper, and only they can explain the 
vehemence with which the Chairman answered to the challenges. In the article, he 
explains his perceptions in the following way: the Rightists [youpai 右派] “first 
struggle for the overall control of the news, education, literature and art, and 
science sectors. They know that the CCP is no match for them in these areas, and 
this assessment is correct indeed.”137 The rightists who have come out of their 
hiding plan for nothing else but the takeover of political power in the superstructure. 
Just as last clause of the media concept predicted, the superstructure was 
becoming the battle field for sharpened class struggle after the preliminary victory 
of the Communist Party. Once in control of the commanding heights of the 
superstructure, they would fight openly for restoration of the bourgeois order: 
“Among the Rightists in the news sector, there are even signs that they [try to] 
instigate the worker and peasant masses to oppose the government.”138 Although 
he provides no concrete examples, Mao indicates that the country is on the brink 
of counterrevolution; probably the newspapers’ coverage of student unrest and of 
workers demanding improvements of their situation were enough to convince Mao 
that action was needed. The media concept was intended to serve as a bulwark 
                                             
137 Ibid., p. 471. 
138 Ibid., p. 471f. This seems to be an open reference to Liu Binyan and his story “Inside News.” 
Massive labour unrest had indeed engulfed Shanghai throughout spring 1957, as documented by 
Elizabeth Perry in “Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957.” 
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against any attempts at restoration; in the present situation, a further weakening of 
control in the media sector was to be prevented. 
The most open calls for restoration had come from people such as Xu 
Junyuan, who had drawn a rather rosy picture of the pre-liberation press and had 
argued for a return to a more varied conception of newspapers: “The bourgeoisie 
and large numbers of the intellectuals who have formerly served the old society 
always stubbornly try to express themselves, always recall with nostalgia the old 
world, and cannot quite get accustomed to the new world.”139 It is such people that 
attempt to bring down the new Chinese government, and it is among their own 
kind that they hope to find support for their ulterior intentions. Thus, Mao had laid 
out the danger that had surfaced in the Hundred Flowers movement. While the 
CCP would have to take swift and decisive action, the appropriate point of time 
had not yet come. Mao hoped for more Rightists to show their true faces. In the 
meantime, Mao laid out the two basic criteria used to separate Rightists from 
innocent people in the news sector. These were “chiefly to see if people truly want 
socialism and if they truly accept the leadership of the Communist Party.”140 
The time for action had come on June 8, 1957. It was RMRB’s famous 
editorial “What is this for?” (Zhe shi wei shenme 这是为什么) that formally started 
the anti-Rightist campaign. The authorship of this article has never been revealed, 
but it seems sure that both Mao and Hu Qiaomu were involved.141 Like the 
editorials of the previous days, that of June 8 speaks about the rectification 
movement still under way, but a closer look reveals a decisively different tone. 
Towards the end of the text the editorial declares: “Under the pretext of ‘helping 
the Communist Party to rectify its work styles,’ a small number of Rightists are 
challenging the leadership of the CCP and the working class, and they even 
publicly cry that the CCP should ‘step down.’ They plan to seize this opportunity to 
overthrow the CCP and the working class, and the great cause of socialism, to 
                                             
139 Ibid., p. 472. 
140 Ibid., p. 474. 
141 The most reliable hint comes from the memoirs of Wu Lengxi: Yi Mao zhuxi: wo qin shen jingli 
de ruogan zhongda lishi shijian pianduan. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1995, p. 39-40. Wu 
remembers that he was called to meet Mao on June 7 and was asked to take over RMRB from 
Deng Tuo. On this occasion, Mao told him about the editorial that would appear the next day. 
Besides Mao and Wu, Hu Qiaomu attended the meeting, who was probably also involved in writing 
the editorial. Zhu Zheng calls incorrect Li Weihan’s assertion (in his Huiyu yu yanjiu. Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986, p. 835) that Mao was the author of the editorial. See 
1957 nian de xiaji, p. 150f. 
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turn back history, and to return to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.” This 
interpretation of the period of blooming and contending did in fact mean the end of 
the Hundred Flowers. It was also a reversal of Mao’s February estimate of the 
situation in China in the Contradictions speech, where had declared that a time of 
“slight breeze and light rain” had begun. Now his assessment read: “Although 
large-scale class struggle in our country has already ended, class struggle itself is 
by no means over, especially on the ideological front.” The ideological front 
includes, of course, the news sector. After weeks of discussion on the issue of 
newspapers, the storm was impending. Things had reached the turning point, and 
shortly before the end of the editorial the dialectics was revealed to the public: 
“things which have reached their extremes will necessarily turn into the opposite 
direction” (wu ji bi fan 物极必反). 
In his essay “Things are about to change” Mao had expressed his anger 
especially with the news sector. Not before long, Mao would openly attack what he 
saw as the disloyalty of the media people, and in particular that of WHB. The first 
shot against the paper, however, came not from the Chairman’s own pen, but from 
a rather unlikely direction. 
On the bottom of the third page of its June 10 issue, WHB carried an essay 
entitled “Recorded for Reference: Random Notes While Reading Newspapers” (Lu 
yi bei kao – du bao ougan 录以备考——读报偶感). The author was Yao Wenyuan. 
The political change of course had taken WHB not entirely by surprise. Xu 
Zhucheng seems to have felt that the situation was precarious. While he got 
reassurances from Ke Qingshi as late as May 25, 1957, he urged the WHB 
editorial board to practice restraint when he relayed the “spirit” of Ke’s instructions 
to them; however, “under no circumstances let the readers feel from our headlines 
or news articles that WHB is closing [the debates] (shou 收).”142 Yet the publication 
of “What is this for?” on June 8 met WHB unprepared. Feeling pressured to 
                                             
142 Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 164. Why would Ke Qingshi encourage WHB 
to continue “blooming and contending?” He was a high-ranking CC member (Ke was elevated to 
the PB in 1958) and thus might have seen Mao’s “Things are about to change.” Given his earlier 
hate for the paper, we cannot but suspect that he was trying to “lure the snake from its hole” – with 
or without knowledge of Mao’s position paper. 
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respond to the RMRB editorial, WHB decided (possibly on instructions from Ke 
Qingshi)143 to print as a form of self-criticism Yao Wenyuan’s article. 
Why Yao Wenyuan? Yao seemed to be an unlikely candidate for an attack 
as fierce as that against WHB. A mere 26 years young, Yao had written as a 
literary critic for several newspapers and journals in Shanghai and beyond.144 In a 
very short time, his talent had come to the attention of his superiors in Shanghai: 
Yao was well-read, extremely sharp-witted, and had an elegant style; he had 
shown his abilities in the campaign against Hu Feng. His eloquence had not even 
escaped the attention of Mao Zedong, on who’s initiative Yao had travelled to 
Beijing to attend the national propaganda conference.145 Furthermore, Yao was an 
opportunist and had no scruples to follow any turn of the tide: he would adhere to 
whatever line the Party put forward. As Ye Yonglie has convincingly argued, his 
articles from the Hundred Flowers promoted the same ideas voiced by many 
intellectuals who were named ‘Rightists’ later.146 Yao was thus in a precarious 
situation himself, as he could easily be held accountable for these earlier articles. 
He was thus deeply indebted to Ke Qingshi and Zhang Chunqiao and reacted 
immediately when Zhang called him on June 6 and told him that the anti-Rightist 
campaign was about to begin and that WHB would be the first target.147 He took 
an afternoon thumbing through the WHB issues of the past month and spent a 
night writing “Recorded for Reference,” an essayistic masterpiece, a seminal 
article in contemporary Chinese newspaper history that deserves our full attention. 
In Yao Wenyuan, Ke and Zhang had found what they needed: a brilliant young 
man with the worst of intentions. 
“Recorded for Reference” picks up an especially delicate issue: the political 
character of editing. The question at stake was: does the work of presenting news 
                                             
143 There are no indications that WHB was forced to run Yao’s article, yet I consider it highly 
unlikely that the paper would voluntarily publish a malicious diatribe such as Yao’s. The fact that it 
was Zhang Chunqiao who asked Yao to write the article seems to confirm this interpretation. 
144 On Yao’s early career see Lars Ragvald. Yao Wenyuan as a Literary Critic: The Emergence of 
Chinese Zhdanovism. Stockholm: Department of Oriental Languages, 1978. Ragvald mentions the 
seminal June 10 article only in passing (p. 38) and provides no background information. 
145 In Beijing, Mao expressed his satisfaction with Yao to Xu Zhucheng, who in turn told Yao about 
the Chairman’s words. See Xu Zhucheng. “‘Yangmou – 1957,’” p. 146f. 
146 For this interpretation of Yao’s personality see Ye Yonglie. Yao Wenyuan zhuan. Changchun: 
Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1993, ch. 6. An analysis of Yao’s Hundred Flowers articles is on p. 146-
49. For a more conservative interpretation of Yao’s Hundred Flower articles see Ragvald. Yao 
Wenyuan as a Literary Critic, ch. 2. 
147 Ye Yonglie. Yao Wenyuan zhuan, p. 155. 
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to readers have political implications, and thus, is that of the editor in a 
newspaper’s boardroom a political one? With the argument that political relevance 
is not only inherent in the news story itself, but also in the way it is brought to the 
reader, WHB was later accused of “reactionary editing” (fandong bianpai 反动编
排). The innocently looking article reveals much of the subtleties of newspaper 
making in a closed political system such as the PRC, and in a high pressure 
environment such as during political campaigns. I will therefore devote the rest of 
this section to a close reading of Yao’s article. 
With a mere 950 words, Yao’s essay is not very long. What follows is a full 
translation: 
 
Recorded for Reference: Random Notes While Reading Newspapers 
Yao Wenyuan 
 
One and the same news item, handled by different comrade editors, can make 
a difference like night and day – this marvellous secret I have learned recently from the 
newspapers. 
A few days ago, Chairman Mao made a speech at a reception of delegates from 
the Communist Youth League.148 Although very short, this talk has a very profound 
meaning. JFRB published it as the prime news story with an eye-catching headline in 
especially large lead letters. RMRB printed it somewhere in the middle [of the page], 
with a headline somewhat smaller than that of JFRB; it highlighted [the sentence] “unite 
and fight resolutely and bravely for the great cause of socialism; any words or acts 
deviating from socialism are entirely wrong.” But WHB, however, has shrunk [this 
message] to a degree where a somewhat sloppy and careless reader simply will not 
find it, or, even if he sees it, may think this a news story of little or no importance. The 
total space it occupies is probably just as big as that of: two of the lead characters used 
for the headline in JFRB. 
Now what might be the reason that the editorial departments of three 
newspapers assess one and the same news story so very differently? Was it that JFRB 
considered this story to be especially important, or was it that the comrade editor at 
WHB felt that this talk was just some chatter about socialism, leadership of the Party, ... 
old phrases everybody has long since known by heart, nothing new, and therefore of 
little or no importance? Or might it have been that the editor thought that WHB’s 
readers are intellectuals and have nothing to do with the young people [to whom Mao 
was speaking]? Or could it be possible that the editor thought that giving prominence to 
this story would have a negative impact on “contending,” because during “contending” 
it might be inappropriate to talk much about stuff like leadership of the Party and 
socialism, and if I do bring up one or two sentences [of this kind], I will very probably 
meet with resistance from some people... 
I do not want to judge between right and wrong, maybe each has his own 
reasons, “this is one criterion, and that’s another” – because after all, different methods 
of newspaper making are a kind of “contending,” too; Chairman Mao has said that 
newspapers could be made this way or that, there are in fact two schools. I do not want 
                                             
148 This reception took place on May 25. Mao talked to delegates of third national congress of the 
CYL. 
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to analyze their [methods being] good or bad either, because now everybody still runs 
his affairs according to his own methods; take, for example, the speech of Li Weihan: 
RMRB stressed “Socialism is the political foundation of long-term coexistence” and 
used this as its headline; and it used as subheading the passage “...all in all, among 
the criticisms and the opinions raised from all different sides there are many correct 
ones that we must conscientiously accept and resolve; [yet] a considerable number are 
mistaken, and we must make further efforts to study and analyze them.”149 WHB, in 
contrast, titled “The Communist Party earnestly welcomes supervision, [criticism,] and 
help,” and [its subheading was]150 “I think that many criticisms and opinions are helpful 
to overcome the three big –isms,151 and to further strengthen and consolidate the 
Communist Party’s core leadership function.” Clear-sighted people will see at once that 
the focus of attention here and there is not the same. But I think that this kind of 
difference is a good phenomenon, much better than “a thousand pieces of the same 
tune.” And even less do I want to pursue the different people’s different state of mind 
that speaks from this focus, because I do not claim for me the ability “to know the 
answer before asking the oracle.” Thus, right and wrong, good or bad, and the reasons 
therefore, they all await further research into the matter. 
Someone might ask: so don’t you have an opinion of your own? Answer: I do. 
But I don’t want to tell. And the reason I won’t tell? I won’t tell either. This is not for 
“wanting to speak out but still waiting” (yu shuo hai xiu 欲说还休), in comrade Tang 
Tao’s 唐弢 words,152 but for another reason. But at the very least, all this overthrows 
one kind of theory: “The editing and type-setting of news has no political character;” 
editing and type-setting, too, has a political [character], and that is called “each 
according to his needs.” 
I like to read WHB very much, for it is fresh and substantial, and the coverage is 
so wide. Now today I feel very sorry to implicate WHB. Fortunately this article does not 
contain any “-ism,” and it does not hand out hats either, it does not even “adjudicate” 
right and wrong, so it probably will not be regarded by some people as a “stick” [gunzi 
棍子]. If it can bring newspaper readers and newspaper editors to reflect a little bit, then 
my purpose has already been reached. To conclude, I hope that this short article 
implicating WHB may be published on the pages of WHB’s supplement.  
 (June 6) 
 
                                             
149 Li Weihan, head of the CCP CC’s United Front Work Department, talked to a meeting of 
delegates from the different democratic parties on June 3. Reported in RMRB and WHB, June 4, 
1957.  
150 The original text in WHB and the reprint in RMRB four days later differ here slightly. The four 
characters wei fu biaoti 为副标题 (“its subheading was”) were omitted in WHB, creating a non 
sequitur. The words “and criticism” (he piping 和批评) are not in the June 4 headline, they are 
clearly a mistake, probably of the editor and not of Yao Wenyuan whose stylistically refined article 
would not have contained two conjunctions in one sentence (jiandu he piping he bangzhu 监督和批
评和帮助). Also, in the line above the inverted commas were set at the wrong place (“...piping he 
bangzhu wei biaoti” instead of “piping he bangzhu” wei biaoti). These mistakes are highly unusual 
for a quality paper like WHB and attest to the haste in which the text was prepared for publication. 
The reprint in RMRB on June 14 corrected all three mistakes and eliminated several unnecessary 
commas.  
151 Bureaucratism (guanliaozhuyi 官僚主义), sectarianism (zongpaizhuyi 宗派主义) and 
subjectivism (zhuguanzhuyi 主观主义), the three big evils to be targeted by the May rectification 
campaign. 
152 Tang Tao (1913-1992), writer and critic; Tang worked for WHB’s literary supplement Bihui 
before 1949 and was an influential professor in Shanghai thereafter. I have been unable to find out 
to what Yao Wenyuan is referring here. He might allude to one the satirical essays (zawen) for 
which Tang Tao was well known. I am grateful to Liu Dong for this hint. 
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“Recorded for Reference” attacks WHB on a front where the paper was 
particularly vulnerable: editorial decisions concerning what news should be carried 
and how they are to be presented are made in any newspaper under time 
constraints; in contrast to other media, the selection of news items cannot normally 
be double-checked with authorities, especially in the case of news stories just 
emerging. Under the conditions of the 100 Flowers, WHB even had reason to 
believe in its right to rely on its own instincts for editorial decisions: as Deng Tuo 
had encouraged the paper a year earlier, WHB was to make a difference from 
other papers. The editors at WHB were thus moving perfectly within the scope of 
the 100 Flowers context when setting their own accents in the editorial decision-
making process. It was Yao Wenyuan who had left this context, knowing 
beforehand (he wrote his article on June 6, that is before the anti-Rightist 
campaign started on June 8) that the crackdown was about to begin. Only from his 
position, which foreshadowed the anti-Rightist movement, the context had 
changed and WHB was standing outside the legitimate framework of newspaper 
making. It was Yao rather than WHB who was not respecting “the rules of the 
game;” fairness, however, was not Yao’s intention. 
What makes Yao’s article so malicious indeed are not so much the 
accusations which the author leveled against WHB – many more were to follow 
from all sides in the weeks ahead – but rather the tone of the article. Written in an 
elegant and fluid Chinese, loaded with allusions and a great amount of irony (and 
even self-irony), the casual tone of the article, sometimes even nearing the naive, 
grossly betrays the seriousness of the accusations it contained. It is this 
disproportion that gives the essay its pernicious rhetorical power. Neither does 
Yao make these accusations explicit: he pretends to stop short of giving a definite 
answer on how to judge WHB’s behavior; in fact, his very style has made his 
standpoint more than clear, leaving judgment to the reader is not more than a 
phrase. 
Yao Wenyuan’s accusations against WHB are based on relatively small 
details, yet the conclusions he draws (and hopes the reader to draw) are of 
enormous significance and have far-reaching consequences. This makes it even 
more important to pay scrutiny to Yao’s arguments, because a closer inspection 
reveals that what initially look as lucid observations are in fact distortions, 
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concoctions, and one-sided interpretations with the single purpose to publicly 
slander WHB. They nevertheless do reveal much about the practices of Chinese 
newspaper editing. 
Yao carefully selected two examples from WHB’s pages that he knew would 
have a maximum devastating effect to the newspaper. The first item he addresses 
is a news story delivered to the paper by the Xinhua news agency. It reported a 
meeting of Mao with delegates to the third national congress of the Communist 
Youth League that convened in Beijing from May 15-25.153 When receiving the 
delegates on May 25, Mao addressed them, but either he had not made a 
coherent speech, or it was decided that only excerpts should be published. Either 
way, the Xinhua report was extremely short, containing but a few introductory 
sentences, and then the following lines from Mao:154 
Your conference has been very good. I hope that you unite and become the leading 
core of the youth of the whole nation. 
The Chinese Communist Party is the leading core of the entire Chinese people. 
Without such a core, the cause of socialism cannot triumph. 
This conference of yours was a conference of unity, and will have a very large effect on 
all Chinese youth. My congratulations! 
Comrades, unite and fight resolutely and bravely for the great cause of socialism; any 
words or acts deviating from socialism are entirely wrong. 
 
Mao’s May 25 remarks, their shortness notwithstanding, were crucially important, 
as this was Mao’s first public indication of a change in the political direction – the 
May 15 memorandum “Things are About to Change” was still secret. A careful 
newspaper reader – such as Yao Wenyuan – would easily identify the key 
passage of the quotation: “unite and fight resolutely and bravely for the great 
cause of socialism; any words or acts deviating from socialism are entirely wrong.” 
The last sentence must have been extremely disturbing to readers at a time when 
blooming and contending had reached a feverish pitch and, according to some 
                                             
153 It was at this meeting that the organization changed its name from “New Democratic Youth 
League” to “Communist Youth League.” In the newspaper reports of May and June there is still 
some confusion about the name change and the organization is sometimes addressed as “Youth 
League” (Qingniantuan 青年团) and sometimes as “Communist Youth League” (Gongqingtuan 共青
团) 
154 It is quite certain that the report was not longer since no other newspaper I have seen did 
contain any more information. All papers have adopted the report directly from Xinhua with the 
reference “Xinhua she Beijing 25 ri dian” 新华社北京 25 日电. If Xinhua would have delivered a 
longer report or the whole speech and the newspaper had cited but fragments of it, this would have 
been marked as “Ju Xinhua she...” 据新华社... . None of the published collections of Mao’s works 
contains more than the above passage. 
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observers, was getting out of hand.155 Lacking any further explanation, newspaper 
editors were hard put to decide how to handle this “non-message” – there was 
after all little to report about. Its good relations with Beijing notwithstanding, WHB 
probably had not heard about Mao’s earlier memorandum. The Shanghai Party 
paper JFRB, on the other hand, might have known through Ke Qingshi. 
Newspaper editors were now confronted with a problem: how to treat an 
extremely short piece of little actual content; content, however, which might have, 
as Yao wrote, “a very profound meaning.” Different newspapers reacted differently, 
as Yao found out: JFRB made it the front-page lead story with a huge headline, 
although not much of a story followed below the headline. RMRB decided for an 
equally large format on a less prominent location. The editors at WHB opted for a 
somewhat smaller letter type and only a small headline. On WHB’s front page the 
article indeed looks a bit paltry, occupying a space “probably just as big as that of: 
two of the lead characters used for the headline in JFRB.”156 Yet Yao Wenyuan’s 
assertion that “WHB ... has shrunk [this message] to a degree where a somewhat 
sloppy and careless reader simply will not find it, or, even if he sees it, may think  
 
 
Ill. 2-4: Front page layout of JFRB, RMRB, WHB, June 26, 1957. 
The highlighted area marks the report on Mao’s speech. 
 
                                             
155 Such was the opinion of Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and other Politburo leaders concerned 
especially about blooming and contending at major universities. See MacFarquhar, Origins of the 
Cultural Revolution 1, p. 219-25. 
156 See illustrations 2-4 for the respective design of the three newspapers. 
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this a news story of little or no importance” is exaggerated because the WHB 
people paid attention to place the article at the very top of the page right in the 
middle between two more prominent articles. It was originally set in two columns 
but was reduced to one when placed on the newspaper side; if set in two columns, 
the entire page would have to be rearranged.157 
Yao Wenyuan’s accusations were in fact not that far off the mark; we must 
read them as a malicious denunciation of a common practice in Chinese 
newspaper making. As discussed in chapter four, political messages are 
communicated to informed readers by way of minor signals in the newspapers; the 
techniques for reading these signals are not normally talked about publicly. What 
Yao does in his article is to open a lid on the kinds of “esoteric communication” of 
the PRC political elite. In the case of the May 26 report, there are plausible 
reasons for the editors at WHB to tone down the rather disturbing message that 
Mao delivered. A brief look at the article in the upper left-hand corner, right next to 
the Mao story, shows this: a report on the closing ceremony of the session of 
Shanghai’s Political Consultative Conference, this article was entitled “Study the 
methods of correctly handling internal contradictions: Ke Qingshi stresses the 
importance of democratic consultations.” The design for next day’s paper had 
already been in place when the Xinhua message with the Mao quote arrived late in 
the evening.158 It is easily understandable that WHB wanted to avoid the 
embarrassing contrast between Mao’s dictum “any words or acts deviating from 
socialism are entirely wrong” and Ke’s message, stressing exactly the opposite, 
“democratic consultations” (minzhu xieshang 民主协商) on the same page – a 
contrast embarrassing to Ke, but also to WHB that gave more prominence to its 
own Shanghai article, while the report on Mao came from Xinhua. 
Furthermore, WHB had any reason to defend the policy of blooming and 
contending, as it had done in the weeks before, when the paper had run an 
editorial policy more outspoken than RMRB, and was ready to touch more 
                                             
157 Thus recalled by Qin Benli, vice editor-in-chief and responsible for the final design of WHB’s 
edition while Xu was busy with other work. See Qin’s self-criticism made during the anti-Rightist 
campaign, quoted in Wenhui bao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 184f. 
158 Ibid. 
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controversial issues.159 By late May, WHB was involved into the Hundred Flowers 
debates all too deep to order a sudden retreat on as yet rather ambiguous signals. 
Finally, we must examine Yao’s remarks on the size of headlines – this, too, being 
a common marker for the relative importance of news stories, and identified as 
such by CCP leaders.160 WHB’s headline is indeed much smaller in comparison 
with those in the two other papers mentioned by Yao. Seen in perspective, 
however, this headline shrinks even more: after resuming publication in October 
1956, WHB tried to appeal to readers, among other measures, by more interesting, 
daring, and larger headlines. This method of attracting readers is visible all 
through the May issues, especially when compared with the headlines in the rather 
conservative RMRB, but also with JFRB. A small headline in WHB thus becomes 
even smaller. 
Yao Wenyuan’s assertions thus cannot easily be dismissed. WHB used the 
entire repertoire of editing techniques for its purposes: to promote a policy 
direction that until shortly before had been openly favoured by Mao Zedong and 
many members of the CCP leadership. The paper was fighting for its stakes in 
setting itself off against advances from other quarters in the Party who sought to 
restrict the rectification campaign under way. The decision to treat with only the 
modicum of attention necessary a short piece of news that had arrived late in the 
evening when the paper’s design was already in place, and that contained an 
unwelcome message, must be read in this context. 
Nevertheless, Yao’s accusation was unfair. Yao’s comparison of the three 
papers implies that JFRB and RMRB were giving the message, and especially 
Mao’s utterings, the due attention it deserved (with all political implications that 
might have), while WHB did not. A short survey of other newspapers reveals, 
however, that WHB was not the isolated case that Yao tried to construct. As table 
1 shows, a clear pattern in the selection of headlines and the prominence given to 
the Xinhua report is hardly discernible. The other newspaper singled out for its 
bourgeois tendencies in the anti-Rightist movement, GMRB, had placed the report 
on its front page, with Mao’s quote framed and set in bold characters – hardly a 
                                             
159 Roderick MacFarquhar has shown that RMRB had defied blooming and contending nearly all 
through May 1957, a policy he says was probably pushed through a Liu Shaoqi – Lu Dingyi – Hu 
Qiaomu – Deng Tuo chain of command. See Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, p. 212-17. 
160 There is an entire chapter on how to compose headlines in Hu Qiaomu’s Tantan baozhi 
gongzuo. Xinwen yanjiusuo, n.p., n.d. [1977], p. 193-204. 
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sign of defiance. Anhui ribao 安徽日报 and Zhongguo qingnianbao had chosen a 
similar design, and the former even ran the sentence “any words or acts deviating 
from socialism are entirely wrong” as headline. But Dazhong ribao 大众日报, the 
organ of the CCP Shandong provincial committee, and the army paper Jiefangjun 
bao 解放军报 (JFJB) had opted for a considerably less prominent format. 
Especially JFJB, run by army cadres and not by intellectuals like WHB, should 
have been interested in the signs hinting at the winding up of the rectification 
movement. Neither Dazhong ribao nor JFJB published issues on June 26, which 
was a Sunday; their reports ran in the June 27 and 28 editions, respectively. All 
the more remarkable is the tuned down format of the report, for they had 
considerably more time to prepare their editions.  
 
Table 1: Newspaper Coverage of the Xinhua May 25 Report 
 
Paper Position of 
article 
Headlines 
Anhui ribao page one top 
(头版头条) 
毛主席勉励青年团结起来，为社会之以事业勇敢奋斗 
他说：一切离开社会主义的言论行动是完全错误的 
Dazhong 
ribao (5.27) 
small article, 
upper right 
corner, small 
headline 
毛主席接见团代大会代表 
希望青年团作为全国青年的领导核心 
GMRB 头版头条, quote 
frame, in bold 
print 
团结起来，作为青年的领导核心，为社会主义事业而奋斗 
青年团第三次代表大会胜利闭幕 
毛主席和中共中央领导人接见全体代表和各国青年代表 
Jiefangjun 
bao (5.28) 
quotation only, 
in ornamented 
frame, upper 
right corner 
- 
JFRB 头版头条, quote 
bold in text 
青年团全国代表大会闭幕 
毛主席向代表讲话 
团结起来，坚决地勇敢地为社会主义的伟大事业而奋斗。一切
离开社会主义的言论行动是完全错误的 
Nanfang 
ribao 
- - 
RMRB right middle, 
quote in text, 
not bold, small 
毛主席勉励青年团代表大会全体代表 
坚决勇敢为社会主义事业奋斗 
他说：一切离开社会主义的言论行动是完全错误的 
WHB top center, very 
small 
毛主席接见团代会代表 
Zhongguo 
qingnianbao 
头版头条, quote 
larger, italicized 
青年团第三届全国代表大会胜利闭幕 
毛主席向大会祝贺并作亲切指示 
中共中央领导人也接见了全体代表 
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Nanfang ribao 南方日报, the organ of the Guangdong CCP provincial committee, 
finally, was taking the cake: the paper failed to mention Mao’s talk entirely on June 
26 and on the following days. While it reported extensively on page one on the 
closing ceremony of the CYL meeting, it did not mention Mao’s talk with a single 
word. It remains unclear whether the editors of the paper simply oversaw the 
Xinhua message that arrived late that evening, or if the failure to report it was a 
deliberate insult to Mao from Tao Zhu 陶铸, the first secretary of the Guangdong 
CCP Provincial Committee. Tao reportedly had resisted several of the policy 
directives of the Hundred Flowers period.161 Yet given his opposition to blooming 
and contending, he would probably have welcomed a decision to restrict blooming 
and contending, one more reason to give prominence to the report. A mistake by 
oversight, on the other hand, is hardly possible since it could have been corrected 
easily one or two days later. While the exact motives remain unclear, it emerges 
that in a high-pressure situation like that of the evening of May 25, newspapers 
were left on their own to decide on how to handle the Xinhua story; the papers 
apparently welcomed an opportunity for autonomy on this micro-level to express 
their particular concerns, as WHB’s reaction shows. Yet Yao Wenyuan went too 
far when sorting out the good and the bad folks, putting the blame squarely on 
WHB. His next ‘proof’ for WHB’s bad intentions is even less convincing. 
The second example Yao Wenyuan used to prove his point was a news 
story from June 4. This message, also on the front page, reported a speech that Li 
Weihan, the head of the CCP CC’s United Front Work Department, had delivered 
to a meeting of the democratic parties on the day before. This time Yao addressed 
another key means frequently used by newspapers to get through their own 
messages: while Xinhua provides the newspapers all around the nation with news 
stories that are often fixed and cannot be changed at will, about the only avenue 
for setting individual accents, apart from the prominence attached to a report 
through location, size, and letter type, is the composition of headlines, by way of 
which different aspects of the same story might be highlighted. This is what Yao 
demonstrated in the case of the Li Weihan story. 
                                             
161 See MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution 1, p. 230-34, for Tao’s refusal to do 
manual labour and related issues. 
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Different accents are clearly visible from the two paper’s headlines: RMRB’s 
“Socialism is the political foundation of long-term coexistence” seems to 
foreshadow the tightening of the public debates, while WHB’s headline “The 
Communist Party earnestly welcomes supervision and help” implies a very 
different message. The contrast becomes even clearer if the subheadings are 
considered, as Yao had done: “...all in all, among the criticisms and the opinions 
raised from all different sides there are many correct ones that we must 
conscientiously accept and resolve; [yet] a considerable number are mistaken, and 
we must make further efforts to study and analyze them.” RMRB carefully pointed 
to the two sides of blooming and contending; the second sentence hints to 
“mistaken” (cuowude 错误的) ideas – not of the Party, but among the criticisms 
voiced in the debates. This half-sentence opened up the eventuality that 
rectification may shift from the Party to the non-Party intellectuals. WHB stressed 
an almost contrary aspect: “I think that many criticisms and opinions are helpful to 
overcome the three big –isms, and to further strengthen and consolidate the 
Communist Party’s core leadership function.” While RMRB seems to urge for 
restraint, WHB tried to encourage further criticism. 
Both subheadings quote from the same speech, but the two papers 
construct contrary agendas by selectively quoting those passages from Li 
Weihan’s speech that support their own agenda. Although Xu Zhucheng had told 
his colleagues to reduce the temperature gradually, WHB was deeply involved in 
the Hundred Flowers campaign and would rather stress those aspects of Li’s 
speech that would confirm its own editorial policy of the past weeks. If 
MacFarquhar’s observation of RMRB’s general reluctance to get involved in the 
Hundred Flowers campaign is correct, the paper’s interest in those passages of 
the speech that urge restraint would be in its natural interest. Selectively quoting of 
authoritative texts has been an ancient means of manipulating messages in public 
discourse. Yao’s contention that “clear-sighted people will see at once that the 
focus of attention here and there is not the same” is certainly correct; he decodes 
for the less “clear-sighted” (mingyan 明眼) or sophisticated reader a common 
practice of Chinese newspaper making and introduces him to some aspects of the 
esoteric political communication. 
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Yet Yao Wenyuan’s own intentions are no less manipulative than those of 
the two papers. In fact, he works with exactly the same tactics he observes in the 
papers: selectively quoting. What Yao fails to mention is that JFRB reported Li 
Weihan’s talk with a headline almost identical with WHB’s (“Zhonggong chengken 
huanying jiandu bangzhu” 中共诚恳欢迎监督帮助; the WHB headline had read 
“...jiandu he bangzhu” 监督和帮助). The subheading, too (“Li Weihan speaks at the 
conference of democratic personages [minzhu renshi 民主人士, i.e. 
representatives of the “democratic parties”]; the problems raised at the conference 
will be studied and resolved one by one”), was rather neutral and did not point in 
the direction of RMRB’s headline. JFRB’s headline obviously would have upset the 
carefully constructed first argument of Yao’s article. Yao had imputed ulterior 
motives to WHB with the help of a quotation from Mao: “Chairman Mao has said 
that newspapers could be made this way or that, there are in fact two schools.” 
The quotation in Yao’s text is not marked by inverted commas and could not be, 
because it is corrupted. There is no published text containing anything like the 
above quote. The most probable source of the quotation is Mao’s April 1957 
meeting with the RMRB editors. Mao is reported to have remarked the following: 
“Hundred schools, that is in fact two schools, one bourgeois and one proletarian. 
Seventy to eighty per cent of the intellectuals are standing in the middle of the 
road. Contending means these two schools competing to win over the middle-of-
the-road intellectuals.”162 While Mao talked to the newspaper personnel, he was in 
fact speaking about the situation of the intellectuals in the context of the Hundred 
Flowers; in the sentence that follows he argues that even criticism of the basic 
principles (jiben yuanli 基本原理) of Marxism is permissible. Yao quotes Mao here 
out of context. What is worse, he violates a general rule of Chinese journalism: it is 
strictly forbidden to quote without authorization from speeches of the leadership 
that have not yet been officially released. That Yao feels free to do so shows that 
he must have had immense trust in his source – probably Zhang Chunqiao or 
even Ke Qingshi. Only high-level cadres might have had access to remarks such 
as those quoted; and only with their backing would Yao dare to use the quote. It is 
indeed remarkable that WHB decided to run Yao’s article with an unofficial quote; 
                                             
162 Quoted after Wang Ruoshui. Zhihui de tongku, p. 323. 
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this might be seen as a sign of either the haste in which the article was prepared, 
which left no time to verify the quote, or the pressure that was put on the paper to 
print the article. Whatever the exact reasons may have been, the short quote is 
certainly taken out of the original context and thus seems to fit perfectly with the 
argument that Yao was constructing, and illustrates Yao’s intention: to do as much 
harm to WHB as possible.163 
In his first argument, Yao had implied the existence of two schools or lines 
in the newspaper sector: a proletarian line, loyally following the Chairman, 
represented by JFRB and RMRB, and a capitalist line, opposing Mao, with WHB 
as its representative. Unfortunately, JFRB’s handling of the Li Weihan speech, and 
especially the headline of the JFRB article would upset the delicate logic of the 
first argument. To avoid any contradictions in his article, Yao simply leaves out 
JFRB in the second comparison. It is unlikely that Yao had not seen the JFRB 
issue of June 4, as JFRB was Shanghai’s premier paper; Yao’s article is in fact too 
carefully researched to allow for a mistake like this. The only explanation is that 
Yao omitted JFRB to further his own agenda and deliberately accepted a distortion 
of the truth as long as his argument sounds plausible. This technique is even less 
fair than the rather subtle manipulations through which the newspapers worked 
when composing their headlines, but it is in fact just another common way through 
which arguments of public discourse are made in the difficult and politically 
charged environment of China. 
Yao ends his article with a mockery of the ‘blooming and contending’ policy. 
He had made his intentions more than clear in the course of his argumentation; his 
refusal to spell out his accusation is no more than coquetry. During the Hundred 
Flowers period, the public voicing of dissenting opinions had been the rule of the 
day; it is against this rule that Yao turns here. Poking fun at all those who had 
dared to follow the Party’s call to speak out, Yao writes with the knowledge of the 
reversal of the political line. He is absolutely conscious of what he is doing: his 
youth notwithstanding, he had earned himself a name through his interventions in 
various issues, notably the Hu Feng campaign – thus his self-ironic reference to 
                                             
163 On quoting and misquoting see Mittler. A Newspaper for China? MS, p. 112f. Rudolf Wagner. 
“Der vergessene Hinweis: Wang Pi über den Lao-tzu” in Jan Assmann, Burkhard Gladikow (eds.). 
Text und Kommentar: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation IV. München: Wilhelm Fink, 
1995, p. 257-78, esp. p. 264ff. 
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the “stick” (gunzi 棍子) and the hats (maozi 帽子) he had become famous for. The 
article is, of course, just another example of what Yao Wenyuan was best in: 
polemical attacks against his opponents in the realm of literary criticism. 
With his article “Recorded for Reference” Yao Wenyuan announces nothing 
less than the anti-Rightist campaign. In minute detail he has “recorded” WHB’s 
conduct during the Hundred Flowers period; he delivers ammunition to those who 
will carry out the campaign. This is why he stops short of answering the three 
questions: “Thus, right and wrong, good or bad, and the reasons therefore, they all 
await further research into the matter.” Given Yao’s careful investigation, further 
research is certainly not what is needed; rather, the final verdict needs to be 
spoken over WHB’s behaviour: had the paper operated within the limits that the 
Party had set for good and bad, right and wrong – had WHB kept with the spirit of 
the media concept? It was not up to Yao to make this final judgement. Rather, 
Mao Zedong himself would emerge to judge on the three questions that Yao had 
refused to answer, and especially on the last one, the reasons: what were the 
motivations that had driven WHB in its editorial policy?. And when the Chairman 
did make up his mind, he used Yao Wenyuan’s article as public reference material 
for his own accusations. 
The reversal of the political line came as a shock to those who had thrown 
themselves into the Hundred Flowers debates. The turning point, however, came 
not all that sudden: Mao Zedong had become suspicious in mid-May, and in his 
May 25 speech he had given the first public sign of the impending change in 
politics. This decision was made public with the June 8 editorial “What is this for?” 
When Yao Wenyuan’s article appeared two days later, the lines of argument for 
the upcoming anti-Rightist campaign began to emerge: Yao had concentrated on 
what became known as “political editing,” or in this case, “reactionary editing” 
(fandong bianpai 反动编排). As Yao Wenyuan had summed up the merits of his 
article: “But at the very least, all this overthrows one kind of theory: ‘The editing 
and type-setting of news has no political character;’ editing and type-setting, too, 
has a political [character], and that is called ‘each according to his needs.’” 
“Political editing,” that is, the communication of political messages through the 
subtle means of layout composition, was but one of the accusations levelled 
against WHB. It is, however, very well-suited to illustrate how narrowly the media 
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concept could be interpreted. The charges brought against WHB and its 
leadership did concentrate on the last sentence of the media concept: the media 
“are a weapon as well as a battleground of class struggle and must fight against 
any attempt of the enemy to gain ground in the superstructure.” The Stalinist 
dictum of the sharpening of class struggle after the revolution now moved into the 
centre of the debate and clashed with the liberal interpretation based especially on 
the clauses (3) to (5). The inherent tension of the media concept finally broke open, 
with disastrous consequences. 
Through implication Yao Wenyuan had accused WHB’s leadership of 
nothing less than abusing the newspaper as a platform for reactionary forces who 
called for the overthrow of the CCP’s rule. This was in fact a worst case scenario: 
when the rules had been loosened (fang 放) to overcome the difficulties in the 
media sector, and to make the newspapers more effective tools for the Party, the 
opposite had happened: in Yao’s reading, the class enemy had used the 
opportunity to launch an attack against the foundations of the CCP’s power. Mao 
endorsed this assessment a few days later. 
 
 
The Aftermath: Criticism and Self-Criticism 
On June 14, Yao Wenyuan’s article was reprinted in RMRB, where it 
appeared with an introduction almost as long as the original article: “The 
Bourgeois Tendencies of WHB During a Certain Time” (Wenhuibao zai yi ge 
shijian nei de zichanjieji fangxiang 文汇报在一个时间内的资产阶级方向). The 
introduction was signed “editorial board” (ben bao bianjibu 本报编辑部). Neither 
the headline nor the article itself leaves any doubt about the author’s reading of 
Yao Wenyuan’s article. The author was none other than Mao Zedong. 
In the article, Mao comes straight to the point: “In the past, the Shanghai 
WHB and the Beijing GMRB have printed large numbers of good reports and 
articles. However, within a short period of time, the basic political orientation of 
these two newspapers has changed into the orientation of the bourgeois press.” 
While Mao defines the scope rather narrowly as a “short period,” the accusation 
itself is grave: “For some time, these two papers have used the slogan of ‘letting 
hundred schools of thought contend’ and the CCP’s rectification movement to 
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publish large amounts of articles that express bourgeois viewpoints and do not 
engage in [constructive] criticism at all, and have carried seditious reports; they 
may be found in the papers in question. Some people in these newspapers have 
committed great mistakes with regard to the standpoint of newspapers.” It is not 
just individual reports and articles that are found at variance with the correct Party 
line, but the point of view of the leadership of the two papers: “They have mixed up 
the difference in principle between the newspapers of the capitalist countries and 
those of a socialist nation.164 In this respect, some editors and reporters at some 
other newspapers are also in fault, as are some professors of the news 
departments of some universities – [this problem] concerns not only WHB and 
GMRB, it is only especially prominent with these two papers.” Mao obviously 
refers to the debates that had taken place across the newspaper sector 
concerning the role and the function of the newspapers. An avid reader of WHB, 
Mao possibly even had in mind Xu Junyuan’s May 21 article. From the lines above 
a hierarchy emerges: no Chinese newspaper could be sure to have behaved 
entirely correct during the Hundred Flowers period, all papers were invited to 
inspect their reporting during the April and May period. A little later in the article, 
RMRB admits that it has committed errors, too (that is, Mao accuses RMRB of 
committing errors). Yet two papers in particular stand out from the rest for their 
particularly serious mistakes, WHB and GMRB. Among these two, the former 
clearly is the major culprit, as the headlines mentions only WHB, and not GMRB. 
Why WHB and GMRB? They are the only non-Party newspapers in the 
PRC’s first league papers. Yet this status does not mean that the Party’s media 
concept doesn’t apply to them: “Non-Party papers naturally need not be run 
exactly like Party papers, they should have their own characteristic features. 
However, their basic orientation must be in line with that of the other papers...” The 
reason for this demand is to be found in the politicization of Chinese society and 
the international environment, where class struggle still exists: “... because in a 
socialist country, the newspapers – through the means of the news – are the 
reflection of the socialist economy, that is, the planned economy based on public 
ownership; they are different from the newspapers of the capitalist countries that 
                                             
164 This sentence is an almost verbatim quote from Mao’s “Things are about to change.” See 
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wen’gao 6.470. 
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are – through the means of the news – the reflection of an economy [characterized 
by] a state of anarchy and the competition of interests groups.165 As long as class 
differences exist in the world, the newspapers are always a tool of class struggle.” 
The basic character of newspapers could not be spelled out any clearer: Mao calls 
the last clause of the media concept back into the minds of Chinese newspaper 
personnel. The Hundred Flowers policy had been intended as an experiment to 
improve the efficiency of the papers; stress on other elements of the concept had 
therefore been tolerated, but in general the validity of the media concept – in its 
entirety – had not changed. With the argument of class struggle and the definition 
of newspapers as “tools” (gongju 工具), Mao now bluntly rebuked not just any 
proposals that had left the framework of the media concept, but also brushed away 
all other interpretations of the concept that would have shifted the balance towards 
different elements – no matter how modest the proposed changes might have 
been. 
Mao calls on the papers to inspect their behaviour and practice self-criticism: 
“We are waiting in anticipation.” This is the reason for the reprint of Yao 
Wenyuan’s article on RMRB’s pages: “Yao Wenyuan’s article only implicitly 
addresses WHB’s bourgeois orientation and has observed that some people at 
WHB stand on bourgeois positions and engage in class struggle against the 
proletariat, a trend both obvious and harmful. It is a good article, and therefore we 
reprint it here.” WHB is accused of nothing less than launching class struggle, a 
crime not far from rebellion and counterrevolution. With Yao’s article appearing in 
the organ of the CCP Central Committee, its status has changed entirely. It was 
originally presented as a self-criticism of WHB, printed at the bottom of the third 
page of the paper. The article’s prominence was upgraded first through the move 
from a Shanghai to a Beijing paper. Secondly, it appeared at the bottom of page 
one in RMRB, drawing considerably more attention than on its rather obscure 
position in WHB. Mao’s introductory article gives Yao’s essay even more stress. 
Mao’s authorship of the June 14 RMRB article was not revealed publicly. 
The article appeared in the name of RMRB’s editorial department” and was dated 
                                             
165 This sentence, too, is taken almost literally from “Things are about to change.” See ibid. 
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June 13.166 Mao’s involvement, however, was no secret at the time of publication: 
Deng Tuo had warned WHB in advance of the article.167 A Xinhua dispatch had 
distributed the article in the night and ordered newspapers nationwide to reprint it. 
WHB had to react immediately and published Mao’s article in its June 14 issue on 
page one. A headline in bold type face reading “RMRB Editorial Department 
Publishes Article: ‘The Bourgeois Tendencies of WHB During a Certain Time’” 
called attention to it. The article was accompanied by a short Xinhua report below 
listing complaints of newspaper readers of WHB’s editorial policy. On the top of 
the page, WHB published a hastily written self-criticism.168 In this editorial, WHB 
admitted its errors – it had no other choice after the RMRB article. WHB’s self-
criticism remained vague and confirmed mainly that the paper had had an 
incorrect understanding of the Hundred Flowers policy; Xu Zhucheng, the 
editorial’s author, apparently still hoped to justify himself in the terms of the 
‘blooming and contending’ policy, which had after all been an initiative of Mao. 
In the days immediately after the publication of Yao Wenyuan’s article, the 
other Shanghai papers responded with more of the same: critical articles obviously 
signed by pseudonyms denounced WHB’s editorial policy in the style of Yao.169 
These articles showed no longer restraint but announced their charges openly: the 
tide had turned and they were sure to be on the safe side. Yet Mao’s 
condemnatory piece in RMRB lifted the WHB affair to a new level of prominence. 
                                             
166 There is no doubt concerning Mao’s authorship, as the article was reprinted in Jianguo yilai Mao 
Zedong wengao 6.508-09. 
167 Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 165. This was probably the last service Deng 
was able to do for WHB before he himself was sidelined. Mao had handed the editorial to Wu 
Lengxi, who was soon to replace Deng as editor-in-chief (Wu took formally over on June 29). 
However, Deng was not named a Rightist and stayed with the paper for another year before he 
was transferred to the CCP Beijing Municipal Committee. The order to reprint the Yao Wenyuan 
article had come from Mao. See ibid., p. 154. 
168 “Mingque fangxiang, jixu qianjin.” The editorial misquotes a sentence of the RMRB article 
(writing faxian 发现 instead of biaoxian 表现, which does not make sense grammatically) and lacks 
a coherent logic. Both are signs of the haste in which it was prepared. This misquote is especially 
embarrassing, since the correct version appears in the reprint of the RMRB article immediately 
below the editorial and is thus visible for every reader. I rule out the possibility of the misquote 
being a deliberate attempt of protest or a signal to the readers of the situation – WHB still hoped to 
limit the damage done, and any sign of protest would have eliminated the last hopes the editors 
might have had. 
169 See for example Shui Luo 水洛. “Dui Wenhuibao jin zhongyan” in JFRB, June 12. Interestingly, 
this article gives a clear definition of the time when WHB committed mistakes, saying that these 
had emerged “since the propaganda conference in March” and especially “in the past one or two 
months.” It is possible that the Shanghai PD which is in charge of JFRB wanted to restrict the 
damage done. 
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Even after the June 14 article, Xu Zhucheng hoped to escape the worst of the 
storm: for one, he had not been in Shanghai during most of the period of 
“blooming and contending.” Mao’s article, speaking about a “short time” seemed to 
indicate that it was especially the time of his absence when the gravest mistakes 
were made. The brunt of the blame would therefore be born by Qin Benli who had 
been in charge of the paper during Xu’s absence. Xu must also have read the 
sentence “from the last few days’ issues of these two newspapers, we already 
seem to have observed some change in direction” as an encouragement of his 
own position. Furthermore, Mao’s praise of WHB at the Zhongnanhai reception in 
March was still ringing in Xu’s ears. All along, he had received support from Deng 
Tuo and had been reassured of the Party Centre’s confidence in his paper. Xu 
therefore initially hoped to avoid making public self-criticisms.170 
On the morning of June 14, Xu and Qin went to Ke Qingshi, who confirmed 
Mao’s authorship of the article to them. Ke made no secret of his anger and 
heaped abuse on the intellectuals: “The Chinese intellectuals can be characterized 
with only two words: the first is indolent; they are usually unwilling to undergo self-
inspection, and often they even get arrogant. The second word is despicable: if 
you don’t flog them for just three days, they will swell with pride of themselves.”171 
Nevertheless, he promised to help WHB – apparently, Ke was concerned about 
his own position and influence in Beijing; he was enraged by interference into his 
home turf and went as far as ordering WHB not to print Xinhua releases that 
named Shanghai people as Rightists if he had not approved of them first.172 Qin 
Benli recalls that Ke showed an unusual amount of support for him and Xu 
Zhucheng. During the early days of the anti-Rightist storm, Qin, the paper’s 
contact man to the Shanghai Party, was standing in close contact with Ke Qingshi, 
and met him almost daily. He tried to shoulder the greater part of the blame 
himself, and originally Ke agreed to help Xu to avoid the worst.173 Yet the feared 
“one-voice-hall” of Shanghai did either not plan to make good on his promises, or 
he was forced to give in to the pressure from Beijing. After July 1, when Mao fired 
the second shot against WHB, Xu Zhucheng’s position became untenable. 
                                             
170 Xu Zhucheng. “Yangmou qinli ji,” p. 27f.  
171 Ibid., p. 28. 
172 Qin Benli. “Liu zai jiyi li de pianduan,” p. 138f. 
173 Ibid. 
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Xu Zhucheng and Qin Benli relayed Ke’s message to the editorial 
department at a meeting that same afternoon. Immediately thereafter, WHB 
started to write self-incriminations in order to comply with the order from Beijing. 
On June 16, WHB published its first comprehensive self-criticism.174 The June 16 
editorial repeats and paraphrases all the core passages of Mao’s RMRB article. 
WHB admitted to have “used an objectivistic news concept to produce our paper; 
as a result, this has necessarily been beneficial to the bourgeoisie’s attacks on the 
proletariat in the class struggle.” WHB stops short of an important point: it admits 
of having provided the bourgeoisie with conditions for reactionary activities, but it 
does not admit of being guilty of actively working against the Party and of 
consciously adopting a bourgeois point of view, as both Yao Wenyuan and Mao 
had implied. WHB still tried to defend itself by attributing its errors to an insufficient 
understanding of the Party’s policy. To demonstrate its willingness to reform, the 
paper now subscribed to the correct interpretation of the media concept: 
The newspapers of socialist countries such as ours are papers that propagate the 
proletarian ideology and represent the interests of the masses; our newspapers can 
and should have their own characteristic style, but they must all be in line with the 
above basic orientation. If they ignore this basic orientation, they will certainly slide into 
the mud pit of the bourgeois newspaper concept. Because in the struggle between the 
two roads [bourgeois and proletarian], whoever does not opt for the one direction, will 
certainly walk into the other; there is no third road. 
 
With this confession, WHB hoped to be on the safe side. 
Yet from Beijing, where the political situation was evolving ever more rapidly, 
WHB’s initial steps were seen as slow and insufficient. The publication of the 
revised text of Mao’s Contradictions speech in RMRB on June 19 added a new 
dimension to the anti-Rightist campaign. The text of the speech, on which many 
intellectuals like Xu Zhucheng had grounded their hopes, was now publicly 
available, but it did no longer support the newspaper peoples’ actions, but rather 
the accusations levelled against them. On this basis, the wave of criticism and 
self-criticism could begin in earnest. 
Xu Zhucheng was called to Beijing to participate in the second news 
workers conference in the capital, convened by the All-China Federation of 
                                             
174 “Huanying ducu he bangzhu,” editorial. WHB’s earliest reaction to the charges levelled against 
them had come on June 11, only a day after the publication of Yao Wenyuan’s article: the paper 
carried a bold black headline with a bold frame running over the entire issue: “any words or acts 
deviating from socialism are entirely wrong!” With the quotation from Mao’s May 25 speech, WHB 
hoped to make good for its earlier underreporting of the issue – an answer to Yao’s accusation. 
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Newsworkers from June 24 until mid-August. In stark contrast to the March 
conference, the agenda of this meeting centred on criticizing the Rightists. Xu 
Zhucheng was made to attend struggle meetings at both the Political Consultative 
Conference, the league of the democratic parties, and at the Association of News 
Workers, the latter being much worse an experience. Deng Tuo’s efforts to cover 
Xu were to no avail. Pu Xixiu, WHB’s Beijing bureau chief, fared even worse: she 
had to endure more struggle sessions at the Women’s Federation and also at the 
WHB Beijing Bureau, where the campaign had begun under the participation of a 
RMRB cadre. Xu Zhucheng was subjected to further struggle meetings after his 
return to Shanghai.175 
It did not help Pu Xixiu that she had been on an inspection tour of the 
Northeast for nearly the entire month of May; hence she had hoped that she could 
not be made responsible for WHB’s mistakes at the height of “blooming and 
contending.” On June 24, GMRB published Pu Xixiu’s first self-criticism.176 The 
situation was now much worse than two weeks earlier. Pu was accused of 
participation in the conspiracy of Zhang Bojun 章伯钧 and Luo Longji 罗隆基, the 
two vice-heads of the Federation of Democratic Parties (Minmeng 民盟). Zhang 
and Luo had by then emerged as the two main targets at the centre of the anti-
Rightist campaign; they were accused of leading an anti-Party conspiracy.177 Pu 
was said to have been Zhang and Luo’s link to the press, an allegation she 
publicly denied in her June 24 article. In this article, she is concerned mostly with 
refuting the accusations concerning her association with Luo Longji.178 To “draw a 
clear line,” she joined in the chorus denouncing Luo’s crimes and delivered further 
details of his words and deeds for use in the struggle; in this way, Pu hoped to 
prove her loyalty to the CCP. Only in a short paragraph, she turns to the issue of 
the press and defends WHB against the charges levelled against the paper in the 
past two weeks: 
                                             
175 See Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 166-70. For Pu Xixiu see also Xie 
Weiming. “Fanyou fengbao zhong de ‘Beiban;’” and Zhu Zheng. Baoren Pu Xixiu. Wuhan: Hubei 
renmin chubanshe, 2005, esp. ch. 6-7. 
176 “Huaqing jiexian, canjia zhandou.” 
177 On the “Zhang-Luo conspiracy” see Zhu Zheng. 1957 nian de xiaji, ch. 7; and Zhang Yihe. Zui 
hou de guizu, ch. 2 and 6. 
178 Pu Xixiu is widely rumored to have had a romantic relationship with Luo. See, for example, 
Zhang Yaojie. “Caizi ben fengliu: Luo Longji de qinggan rensheng,” in Zhonghua dushubao, 2 Aug. 
2004, via http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenhua/1088/2680785.html (downloaded 18 Apr. 2007). 
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Some people have said that WHB is connected to Luo Longji; that does not correspond 
to the truth. WHB is entirely a newspaper of the people, and has received boundless 
care and support from the Party. The editorial direction of the relaunch in October last 
year has been formulated completely with the help of the CCP PD and after asking all 
sides for opinions. Our newspaper is currently carrying out an in-depth internal 
investigation to determine why our paper has recently walked in the capitalist direction 
for a short period; we have already corrected [these errors]. 
 
Pu Xixiu denies the gravest accusation, WHB’s supposed contact with the Zhang-
Luo anti-Party conspiracy. She also admits publicly for the first time of the CCP 
PD’s involvement in conceptualizing the paper’s editorial policy after the relaunch. 
Pu was later censored for revealing this fact. 
WHB’s efforts to exculpate itself were not recognized in Beijing, where the 
paper was seen as too slow and reluctant to confess its mistakes. Mao Zedong in 
particular was not satisfied with WHB’s self-criticism. On July 1, he came forward 
with another sharp critique of the paper, once again on the pages of RMRB. How 
far the situation had deteriorated for WHB is visible from the fact that Mao bluntly 
rejected Pu Xixiu’s most important denial – her contact to Luo Longji. He angrily 
denounced the “Democratic League Rightist structure” (Minmeng youpai xitong 民
盟右派系统) and its chain of command: “Luo Longji – Pu Xixiu – WHB editorial 
department.” Pu Xixiu was accused by name as “an able woman general” listening 
to the instructions of Luo Longji and actively participating in the conspiracy. Her 
fate was thus sealed, as was that of GMRB’s Chu Anping. 
Mao drew a comparison between GMRB and WHB: Chu Anping had been 
dismissed from his post on June 8, the very day of the RMRB editorial “What is 
this for?” Since then, GMRB had made a successful effort to correct its mistakes 
and to engage in self-criticism. WHB had also admitted errors, but Mao was far 
from satisfied with WHB’s behaviour. To the contrary: 
On June 14, WHB has made a self-criticism and has admitted some mistakes. 
Engaging in self-criticism is very good, and we welcome [this step]. However, we think 
that WHB’s criticism is not enough. This being not enough is of an essential character. 
This means that WHB has essentially not made any self-criticism. To the contrary, in 
the June 14 editorial, it has defended its mistakes: “We had a one-sided and mistaken 
understanding of the Party’s policy of ‘blooming and contending,’ thinking that we could 
help the Party correcting its work styles simply by unreservedly encouraging blooming 
and contending, and that printing too many affirmative opinions or even criticizing false 
opinions would affect blooming and contending negatively.” Is this correct? No! During 
springtime, WHB has carried out the anti-Communist, anti-people, and anti-socialist 
direction of the Democratic League CC, has frenziedly attacked the proletariat, and has 
run diametrically against the policy of the Communist Party. Its policy was to squash 
the Communist Party completely, to create chaos and confusion, with the intention to 
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replace [the CCP] – is this really “helping the Party to correct its work styles?” It is a lie, 
in reality it is nothing but deceit. 
 
The fierceness of Mao’s accusations made it abundantly clear that Xu Zhucheng’s 
carefully worded efforts to lead his paper out of the centre of the storm had been in 
vain. His attempts to explain the reasons for WHB’s mistakes proved to be 
counterproductive. The accusation that WHB had implemented the “anti-
Communist, anti-people, and anti-socialist” line of the Democratic League was 
only a little short of the paper being named counterrevolutionary, a capital crime 
punished by the legal code. It was now also becoming clear that Xu Zhucheng 
himself would not be able to escape responsibility. The public self-criticism was 
exposed by Mao as an intrigue with the intention to deceive the people. Mao 
reiterated this claim later in the article: 
WHB has acted in accordance to the above reactionary direction, and on June 14 has 
cheated the people, pretending to have good intentions. WHB has said: “these 
mistaken ideas could arise because in our heads there still exist the remnants of the 
concepts of bourgeois newspaper making.” No, it should read “are still full of” [instead 
of remnants]. For several months they have been the throat and tongue of the 
reactionaries, frenziedly attacking the proletariat; the orientation of their paper has 
become anti-Communist, anti-people, and anti-socialist, that is, the bourgeois 
orientation – can this come from a few remnants of capitalist thinking? ... To the 
present day, WHB has refused to criticize itself for large-scale reporting reactionary 
news that run counter to facts, large-scale publishing of reactionary talks and speeches, 
and the large-scale employing reactionary editing that has been used as a tool to 
attack the proletariat. 
 
WHB was now accused of actively and consciously serving the anti-Communist 
conspiracy. Mao Zedong argues from his interpretation of the media concept: just 
as the CCP organizes the media under its control to serve as its “throat and 
tongue” in the class struggle on the ideological front, so does the class enemy. 
WHB had been nothing less than the mouthpiece of the revisionists; it had helped 
preparing the public for the enemy’s attack. In this understanding, the fears of the 
CCP, as predicted by Stalin in the Short Course, had become true: the remnants 
of the bourgeoisie had launched their attack at the first opportunity that was given 
to them. This opportunity, as Mao confessed now, had not come by chance: it had 
been an intrigue carefully planned by the Party – or rather, as Mao said, an 
“intrigue in broad daylight” (yangmou 阳谋), because the original intention, to “lure 
the snakes from their holes” (yin she chu dong 引蛇出洞) had been clear from the 
beginning. 
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WHB had walked into a trap and was punished for the active support it had 
given to the people who were now declared Rightists. The hopes for a broader 
interpretation of the media concept and for more freedom for individual 
newspapers to chose their own ways of serving the Party and the Party’s goals, 
had vanished. Pu Xixiu had admitted that WHB had in fact been led by the PD, but 
not even the paper’s close contacts to the Party authorities in Beijing (through Xu 
Zhucheng and Deng Tuo) and Shanghai (through Qin Benli and Ke Qingshi) could 
prevent it from falling out of favour because of running an editorial line slightly 
more liberal than that, for example, of Deng Tuo’s RMRB. 
Xu Zhucheng and Qin Benli had learned of Mao’s authorship of the July 1 
article in advance from Ke Qingshi.179 Having aroused the wrath of the Chairman, 
the fate of both men was sealed. Xu Zhucheng did not even return on his post 
after the criticism meetings; he was declared a Rightist in August and was sent to 
a “reform through labour” study class near Shanghai for half a year.180 Qin Benli 
continued on his job as editor-in-chief until mid-July, when he was named a 
Rightist and replaced by Chen Yusun 陈虞孙, a senior Shanghai propaganda 
cadre who had worked for WHB before. 
With a new leadership, WHB had to address the problems and the 
accusations left behind from the storm. The paper started to confess its “crimes” 
on July 2 with an editorial entitled “Apologizing to the people.”181 The editorial had 
been written by Jiang Wenjie 蒋文杰, a cadre of the Shanghai PD, and had been 
inspected by Ke Qingshi prior to publication.182 The editorial proceeds from Mao’s 
July 1 editorial and denounces Pu Xixiu and Xu Zhucheng; both are made 
responsible for the implementation of what was now called the “Zhang [Bojun]-Luo 
[Longji] line” at WHB. Xu Zhucheng was accused of blocking the efforts of “a Party 
member vice editor-in-chief,” obviously Qin Benli, to reign in on the paper’s 
excesses.183 Yet the accusations could no longer be limited to Xu and Pu alone, 
                                             
179 Qin Benli. “Liu zai jiyi li de pianduan,” p. 139. Xie Weiming. “Fanyou fengbao zhong de ‘Beiban,’ 
p. 294. 
180 See “Yangmou qinliji,” p. 29f. Other WHB staff fared much worse. Xie Weiming of the Beijing 
office, for example, spent years in the notorious Beiyuan 北苑 and Qinghe 清河 prison farms near 
Beijing and Tianjin. See Xie’s “Fanyou fengbao zhong de ‘Beiban’,” p. 298-300. 
181 “Xiang renmin qing zui.” 
182 Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 155f. 
183 I have found no evidence of disagreements between Xu and Qin, as the editorial suggests. The 
only exception is the two men’s relationship with Ke Qingshi: while Xu obviously hated the “one-
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the entire editorial board had to admit errors: “Naturally, the majority of people in 
our editorial department had held bourgeois news concepts themselves and were 
accustomed to life in the old ways; when they were hoodwinked by the flowery 
words and clever rhetoric of Xu Zhucheng and Pu Xixiu, they were infected by the 
political disease.” The paper admitted (or rather, it was made to admit by the 
Shanghai PD) in principle to a bourgeois reactionary line in newspaper making. 
This aberration from the correct political line was indeed the paper’s gravest 
mistake: from the perspective of the anti-Rightist movement, class struggle was 
continuing even after the founding of the PRC – and it was nowhere as acute as in 
the superstructure. WHB had not guarded itself sufficiently against these dangers: 
“In the editorial department of a socialist newspaper, we must be constantly on 
alert to fight against bourgeois news concepts and standpoints – how can a 
stranger be allowed to sleep beside our bed? If we are not determined to wipe out 
bourgeois newspaper concepts, they are certain to be the source of endless 
trouble, and will bring about calamity upon calamity.” WHB had disregarded these 
warnings, and, according to the editorial’s interpretation, had become a victim of 
the bourgeoisie’s attempted take-over. The blame was to be found nowhere else, 
but at the paper itself. The last sentence of the media concept, the one 
emphasizing the media’s role as a weapon and site of class struggle, had become 
the single aspect dominating the discussion on the press. 
A second editorial appearing on the following day addressed the question of 
the newspaper’s loyalty to the Party and the people: “What does the tradition of 
WHB stand for? True, in those dark past years of reactionary rule [before 1949] we 
had the courage to speak the words that the people wanted to speak, to launch a 
brave and merciless struggle against the reactionary regime. But the sources of 
this glorious tradition were: the Party, and the people. Without the leadership and 
the help of the Party this glorious tradition could not even be imagined.”184 The 
leadership through the CCP is the precondition for all newspapers, no matter if 
                                                                                                                                      
voice-hall,” Qin seems to have been in close contact with Ke. This point notwithstanding, I would 
suggest that the editorial’s argument here was a last-minute (unsuccessful) effort of the Shanghai 
propaganda authorities to protect an able newspaper man like Qin Benli. With regard to Xu 
Zhucheng’s long absence from Shanghai, the argument of Xu promoting a more aggressive 
editorial policy than Qin does not sound convincing. 
184 “Tongqie gaizao ziji,” WHB, July 3, 1957. 
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they are Party or non-Party papers. It is the Party that represents the people, 
WHB’s source of legitimacy. 
Together with the two editorials confessing its mistakes, WHB published a 
lengthy two-part self-criticism, entitled “Our first steps of investigation” and signed 
“editorial board of our paper.”185 In this comprehensive examination of the 
mistakes WHB was said to have committed, the paper admitted numerous faults 
and confirmed the basic political line that had emerged in Beijing over the past 
weeks, when the anti-Rightist campaign gathered steam. First of all, the article 
affirms all the basic aspects of the media concept: “Socialist newspapers have 
different functions because of the division of labour. But, to stand firmly on the 
standpoint of the working class, to propagate and implement the Party policies, 
and to defend the interests of the working class and the entire nation – this is the 
common characteristic that all newspapers in a socialist country must display.” 
The fundamental lines of the media concept, and especially their generally 
propagandistic nature, apply to both Party and non-Party papers. For WHB this 
means: “As a newspaper targeting the intellectuals we must ..., under the 
leadership of the Party, stand firmly on the standpoint of the working class, 
influence and help the intellectuals, make them step by step grasp Marxism-
Leninism, and gradually establish the worldview of the working class, the 
Communist worldview. This is the basic task of our paper.” The “basic task” has 
two aspects. The first concerns the paper’s position and is an affirmation of the 
first sentence of the media concept: “The media must represent the unified, single 
voice of the party.” Its special status as a paper targeting the intelligentsia 
notwithstanding, WHB must argue always from the perspective of the Party and 
the working class. Yet it is just this status that brings with it a burden even more 
onerous: it must help to educate and to enlighten the most backward portion of the 
population (“to assist the party, the avant-garde of the working class, to raise the 
consciousness of the people,” as the third clause of the media concept says). After 
the founding of the PRC, in a reversal of the original situation, the ideologically 
most backward group of society is no longer the semi-literate peasants masses, 
but rather – the bourgeoisie. 
                                             
185 “Women de chubu jiancha,” WHB July 2-3, 1957. 
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But it is the last element of the media concept that was highlighted during 
the anti-Rightist campaign. The control over the media is so important because 
they might be used in class struggle – by both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. 
WHB now admitted to have “become the mouthpiece... of the Rightists.” Just as 
the CCP uses the media as a tool in its own struggle, the bourgeoisie had tried to 
usurp the newspapers: “Day after day, the newspapers meet with their numerous 
readers, they are a powerful ideological weapon. To realize their anti-Party, anti-
people, anti-socialist goals, the Rightists begin their plottist activities exactly with 
usurping the leadership power of the newspapers.” This interpretation of WHB’s 
behaviour during the Hundred Flowers period explains the vehemence of the 
attacks now hurled against the paper. Its error was nothing short of a “line error” 
(luxian cuowu 路线错误), that is, WHB had embarked on the capitalist road. 
This line error had manifested itself in numerous ways on WHB’s pages. 
The largest part of the article discusses in minute detail many of the debates, 
articles, and editorials of the past months, and that were now found to contain 
grave political mistakes. Among these is, for example, Xu Zhucheng’s article “The 
‘wall’ can be brought down.” His frank description of WHB’s experience in 
overcoming the difficulties caused by the Party’s “division of labour” policy were 
now held against Xu; especially his effort to get rid of the former vice editor-in-chief 
Zhang Shuren was denounced. Similarly, Xu Junyuan’s article was said to 
“completely deny the achievements of our newspaper work since liberation.” 
Finally, the Zuo Ye affair was brought up against WHB. While the authors of the 
self-criticism admitted that Zuo’s behaviour had been incorrect, WHB was said to 
have played up the incident and instigated a major debate that resulted in some 
authors calling for “bourgeois ‘press freedom.’” While the interpretation of this 
process proceeds from the perspective of the anti-Rightist campaign, the 
description of the process itself – a minor incident being employed to raise a ever 
widening scope of problems – was not too far off the mark, as I have shown above. 
Mao’s July 1 editorial had made it clear that the Party leadership wanted to 
more introspection from the paper; the charges were not limited to Pu Xixiu and Xu 
Zhucheng, who were made to bear the brunt of the attacks. Consequently, WHB 
pledged guilty of mistaken thinking and bourgeois influences across the board. 
“Quite a few comrades in the editorial department had serious bourgeois ideas 
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and serious bourgeois news concepts.” These ideas were a left-over from the 
journalists’ past experience: 
In the editorial department of our newspaper, there are many so-called “old hands” 
coming from the old society. In the course of the thought reform movement, they made 
some initial criticism of their bourgeois ideas and their bourgeois news concepts, but 
they have not completed their transformation and they have not tried hard enough to 
study Marxism, to reform their thinking, and to grasp the communist worldview. The 
thoughts and feelings of many people have not yet shifted to the side of the working 
class. 
 
WHB was still a far way from its basic task, as outlined at the beginning of the 
article: in order to remould the intellectuals’ thinking and to instil them with a 
Marxist worldview, the paper first of all had to grasp firmly this worldview itself. 
WHB’s earlier practice had shown its failure to do so, and in the future it would 
have to live up to its pledges – it would have to implement the media concept in 
the way the Party regarded as proper. 
With the extensive self-criticism published on July 2 and 3, the anti-Rightist 
campaign was far from over for WHB. Many more condemnations of the paper’s 
behaviour during spring 1957 and the preceding period followed, but the 
arguments are mostly repetitive. WHB was forced to confess its “anti-Party, anti-
people, and anti-socialist” crimes; many of these articles obviously distorted the 
truth, but WHB was given little room to manoeuvre. On August 22, the paper 
published a self-criticism of Xu Zhucheng that filled almost the entire page.186 In a 
more or less mechanical way, Xu admitted to all the charges levelled against him 
and pledged to submit to the Party’s re-education, as was expected of him. His 
self-criticism centres around the accusation of “singing a different tune” (chang 
duitaixi 唱对台戏). The editorial line he had proposed for WHB “completely 
negated the public character of the people’s newspapers, was aimed to make 
WHB into a paper with a content totally different from the people’s newspapers, 
and to sing a different tune from the Party papers.” In doing so, he had violated the 
most important rule of he media concept, the leadership of the Party. Xu admits to 
opposing the CCP’s leadership and addresses in particular his squeezing out of 
Zhang Shuren and Sun Kuijun, the Party’s representatives at WHB whom Xu had 
prevented from returning to the paper after its 1956 relaunch. Xu mentioned in 
                                             
186 “Wode fan dang zuixing.” The editor’s note to the article for the first time openly declared Xu 
Zhucheng a Rightist. 
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particular his May 19 article “The ‘wall’ can be brought down,” where he had 
presented his actions against Zhang and Sun as his own experience in “bringing 
down the wall” and recommended it for emulation. His insight now was that “in this 
way I ignored my own conscience, opposed them and squeezed them out, and 
thus in fact opposed the leadership of the Party.” Xu explained his deviation from 
the correct path by his mistaken adherence to bourgeois conceptions of 
newspaper making – ideas that long since been abolished. 
Xu’s confession was the result of numerous criticism sessions in both 
Beijing and Shanghai. WHB underwent a protracted process of self-inspection and 
reform. A total of 21 people were denounced as Rightists, eleven of whom were 
criticized publicly. Seven out of ten journalists of WHB’s Beijing bureau were 
branded as Rightists.187 The new leadership was publicly announced not before 
Spring 1958: Jin Zhonghua 金仲华, a vice-mayor of Shanghai, was transferred 
from Xinwen ribao 新闻日报 to become chief of office (shezhang 社长), while Chen 
Yusun, a WHB veteran, took over as editor-in-chief. With Liang Keping 梁柯平, a 
trusted Party member was placed in charge of the Beijing bureau.188 Yet even the 
personnel changes could not wipe out WHB’s image as a rightist newspaper, and 
its print run declined to about 20-30,000.189 From the political leadership WHB 
earned late recognition for the efforts to mend its ways. In a talk on October 13, 
1957, Mao Zedong finally expressed satisfaction with the paper’s reaction to the 
July 1 editorial.190 
 
 
Conclusion 
WHB was but one casualty of the anti-Rightist campaign – many other 
newspapers and many more journalists were equally affected, to varying degrees. 
In the weeks and months after the end of “blooming and contending,” the Party 
                                             
187 For the numbers see Wenhuibao baoshi yanjiushi. Wenhuibao shilüe, p. 161. 
188 Ibid., p. 187. 
189 Ibid., p. 185. 
190 “Jianding de xiangxin qunzhong de daduoshu” in Mao Zedong xuanji 5.480-95, here p. 486. The 
ordeal for WHB’s former crew, however, was far from over, and in particular during the Cultural 
Revolution, the old charges were brought back against them. See, for example, “Ba xinwen 
zhanxian de da geming jinxing daodi: pipan Zhongguo Heluxiaofu fangeming xiuzhengzhuyi de 
xinwen luxian.” The article, signed by “editorial department” (bianjibu) of the “two papers and one 
journal,” i.e. RMRB, Jiefangjun bao, and Hongqi, was published on Sept. 1, 1968. 
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worked to restore full control over the press; the literal interpretation of the CCP’s 
media concept, with special stress on the concept’s last element, or class struggle, 
was applied to all aspects of media life in the PRC. 
Under the impression of the ‘thaw’ that followed Stalin’s death and 
especially the CPSU’s XXth Party congress, the Chinese Party leaders initially had 
hoped to address a number of problems that had accumulated since 1949 and by 
1956 seemed to obstruct the CCP’s ambitious project of the transition to socialist 
forms of economic management. The rigid forms of organization in particular were 
found to tie down the enthusiasm of many cadres and nurtured bureaucratic 
structures, thus hampering development. In the media sector, a lack of competition 
and a mechanical mode of studying the Soviet Union’s (pre-1956, i.e. before the 
“Thaw”) experience had made the press look monotonous and drab. The 
disappearing of competition had led to the journalists toeing the Party line and 
protecting their careers; the effectiveness of the newspapers as instruments of 
political propaganda and education had suffered enormously. 
In the course of the Hundred Flowers movement, journalists – together with 
many other groups of intellectuals – were given an opportunity to talk openly about 
the structural problems that plagued the Chinese newspaper sector and to submit 
proposals on how to redress the situation. To jump-start reforms in the media 
sector, the CCP launched a reshuffle of its primary mouthpiece, RMRB. Other 
papers followed, and when WHB was relaunched in October 1956, it became a 
platform for experiments that the Party leaders hoped would shake up the media 
sector and provide new stimuli for its news work. 
Only after Mao’s Contradictions speech and further interventions of the 
Chairman, who even encouraged individual journalists such as Xu Zhucheng, did 
the intellectuals embrace the Hundred Flowers policy and ‘blooming and 
contending’ moved into high gears. Yet during May 1957, the movement gained a 
momentum of its own that was hard to control by the Party, who was surprised by 
the outpouring of criticism and the scope of the suggestions voiced in the debates. 
Journalists criticized the narrow interpretation of the media concept which in their 
eyes had become all but a straightjacket. 
Probably the most contentious issue was the relationship between 
journalists and the Party; between the professional newspaper personnel and the 
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administrative bureaucracies. The Zuo Ye affair set in motion a discussion on the 
role of journalists in a cadre society such as the PRC: many newspaper people felt 
mistreated by the Party; they were looked upon with contempt by people whom 
they felt were outsiders with little understanding of the complexities of professional 
press work – people who drew their prestige from their political credentials. The 
divide between ‘red’ and ‘expert’ people inside the newspapers was characterized 
by Xu Zhucheng as a wall that had to be brought down if the newspapers were to 
unfold their full efficiency. 
The newspaper people who dared to speak out did touch several central 
aspects of the media concept. At stake was, among other things, the 
understanding of the principle of Party leadership. In the course of the discussion, 
the need for direct overall control was questioned: journalists such as Xu 
Zhucheng hoped to demonstrate their loyalty to the CCP and its policies by way of 
their performance; the forms of loyalty proposed included loyal criticism – such as 
the Party had invited for its rectification campaign. Other issues concerned the 
variety of news: journalists wanted to present their readers with a greater diversity 
of themes and of news sources, and they hoped to present a more objective 
picture of Chinese society, instead of delivering a constant stream of positive 
reporting that in the long run would endanger the newspapers’ credibility with their 
audiences. 
So was the CCP’s media concept challenged in the course of the Hundred 
Flowers movement? For all practical purposes, it was not. With the media concept, 
the CCP had imposed a comprehensive normative framework on the entire 
Chinese media sector, with the Party in a position of ultimate power. What 
happened during the debates of May 1957 was that intellectuals and journalists 
reacted to the Party’s initiative and called for a redefinition of the relationship 
between the Party and the journalists in the form of a liberal interpretation of the 
media concept. But – with a few exceptions, such as some of the opinions voiced 
at the Beijing and Shanghai meetings reported in WHB on May 17 – the Party’s 
leadership itself was not called into question. To the contrary, by “blooming and 
contending,” the newspaper people tried once more to show their loyalty to the 
Party by responding to the CCP’s latest policy shift: the Hundred Flowers 
campaign. They made use of the campaign on their own account to ask for better 
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working conditions and to demand more influence for themselves in the political 
process. But they did not oppose the CCP itself: even under the conditions of the 
Hundred Flowers it would have been unthinkable to deny the Party’s leadership 
authority publicly. The mechanics of control, which I have discussed in chapter 
four, proved to be too deeply entrenched and thus prevented the journalists from 
more far-reaching proposals. To oppose the Party openly in writing could not be 
imagined – and even less to publish such opinions. Neither did the journalists give 
up the normative mission ascribed to their work. To bring enlightenment to the 
people’s masses was the ultimate goal of both the CCP and the journalists 
throughout the campaign. What was at stake was the best way to do so: would the 
stress on political issues and ideology deliver quicker and more sustainable results, 
or could more diversity and openness have a mobilizing effect? Even Xu 
Junyuan’s idea of “friends” learning from each other, that he used to illustrate the 
relationship of newspapers and readers, did emphasize the idea of learning. 
Yet when the campaign went on and the discussion heated up, it did not 
help that the absolute majority of the press people stayed within the framework of 
the media concept. The Party, and especially Mao Zedong, decided to interpret 
the journalists’ opinions as a betrayal of the Party and the Party’s principles. The 
explanation for this turnaround ultimately lies in the media concept itself: its 
inherent tensions, a consequence of different influences that reached China in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, led to the clash of summer 1957. With the concept’s 
last aspect, the media’s being both a weapon and a site of increased class 
struggle, the argument for the anti-Rightist campaign was created and clause (6) 
proved to be a fatal self-fulfilling prophecy: since the media were to be used as a 
weapon in this class struggle, any opinion seemingly at variance with a given 
viewpoint of the CCP could be interpreted as the first signs of an attack of the 
class enemy. This is what Yao Wenyuan did when he read the subtle details of 
WHB’s page layout in a way that would fit the class struggle argument. As soon as 
the Party leadership, and in this case Mao Zedong, were convinced that opposition 
to the Party existed, a new, narrow interpretation of the media concept triumphed. 
The onslaught of the anti-Rightist campaign wreaked havoc among the 
newspaper people. Entire editorial boards were denounced as Rightists, for the 
press had played a key role in the Hundred Flowers campaign. As a result, the 
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Party discarded its original goal of making the Chinese newspapers a more 
effective instrument of socialist construction in the PRC, a goal that both Party 
leaders like Liu Shaoqi and a young writer like Liu Binyan had discovered as 
immediately desirable. The direct consequences of the narrow interpretation of the 
media concept that emerged from the anti-Rightist campaign became visible 
during the Great Leap Forward, when the press failed to intervene and prevent, 
through loyal criticism, the worst of excesses.191 Yet the freeze in the press sector 
was there to stay and prevailed until the end of the Cultural Revolution. The 
function of the newspapers and their status in relation to the Party could not be 
discussed for the next twenty years. 
The question that remains is: why was WHB not closed down, given its 
blatant failures? There would certainly have been enough arguments for an quick 
dismantling of the paper, and doing so would probably have been easier than 
finding a new leadership – after all, practically all high posts had to be redistributed 
after the departure of Xu Zhucheng, Pu Xixiu, Qin Benli, and many others. Yet the 
Party decided not to scrap the newspaper. The reasons must probably be sought 
once again with Mao Zedong: over the past year, Mao had invested too much 
prestige in the paper; to close it down would amount to a loss of face for the Party 
leader. WHB’s relaunch had been initiated and decided by the highest CCP 
authorities, if not by Mao himself. He had time and again come out publicly in 
support of WHB, especially when he felt betrayed by the Party’s main mouthpiece, 
RMRB. Closing WHB or merging it with another Shanghai paper would have been 
an embarrassment for the Chairman. His personal involvement was responsible 
also for his disappointment with the paper’s performance and finally for the wrath 
that speaks from the two editorials Mao wrote to denounce WHB. What was at 
stake was the prestige of the CCP, both domestically and internationally, as Mao 
indicated several months later, when he finally expressed satisfaction with WHB’s 
efforts of self-criticism and reform: “We don’t need to shut down papers as they did 
in Poland, all we need is to do is publish one or two editorials in the Party paper. In 
the case of WHB, we have written two editorials and criticized it; when the first 
                                             
191 Compare the argument of Amartya Sen that a democratic system and a free press in India had 
been instrumental in preventing any major famine after the country’s independence in 1947, 
whereas the Chinese political and ideological system – and the restrictions placed on the press – 
were directly responsible for the monumental dimensions of the 1958-60 famine. See Jean Drèze, 
Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 210ff. 
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proved not sufficient and did not solve the problem thoroughly, we wrote another 
one, and [the paper] changed itself... shutting down a paper only creates 
trouble.”192 The CCP had avoided a Hungarian or Polish “solution.” The anti-
Rightist campaign left the CCP with more power in the media sector than ever 
before. 
                                             
192 “Jianding de xiangxin qunzhong de daduoshu” (dated Oct. 13, 1957) in Mao Zedong xuanji 
5.480-95, here p. 486. On Oct. 2, little more than a weak earlier, Po prostu, the most outspoken 
paper in Poland during the 1956-57 period had been closed on orders of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the 
First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. See Tomasz Goban-Klas. The Orchestration of the 
Media: The Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Poland and the Aftermath. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994, p. 116. 

Chapter Seven 
Bombard the Headquarters: 
The Red Guard Press of the Cultural Revolution 
 
To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create 
public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the 
revolutionary class as well as for the counterrevolutionary class. 
(Mao Zedong, 8 August 1966) 
 
The Red Guard newspapers have made a tremendously useful and 
valuable contribution to the experience of the proletarian press, a 
contribution that deserves to be seriously studied and explored by every 
revolutionary news worker. Let us loudly and with revolutionary enthusiasm 
praise this great new thing of historical significance, let us loudly and with 
revolutionary enthusiasm praise this great innovation in the history of the 
proletarian press! 
(Chen Chen. “In Praise of the Red Guard Newspapers,” Sept. 1967) 
 
The Cultural Revolution remains one of the most contested events in 
modern Chinese history, a fundamental makeover of the basic social relations, a 
reformulation of the ideological framework and of many major intellectual 
categories, and a turning point for the institutional history of the PRC. The earliest 
programmatic attempt to define the Cultural Revolution declared: “The Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution now unfolding is a great revolution that touches 
people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the 
socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage.”1 The 
Chinese nation’s proceeding to this new stage could not leave the media 
unaffected. To the contrary, the Cultural Revolution had a profound impact on the 
media in the three aspects listed above: the media’s role in society, the ideological 
underpinnings of the media’s work, and the institutional framework under which 
the media operated. In fact, the media found themselves at the very centre of 
events. The “August 8 Decision” continues:2 
At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party, Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung said: To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to 
create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the 
revolutionary class as well as for the counterrevolutionary class. This thesis of 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung has been proved entirely correct in practice. 
 
                                             
1 “Zhongguo gongchangdang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu wuchanjieji wenhua dageming de 
jueding” (8 Aug., 1966). Quoted after Union Research Institute (ed.). CCP Documents of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1967. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968, p. 42-54, 
here p. 42. Chinese text in ibid., p. 33-41, here p. 33. 
2 Ibid. The Mao quotation is this paragraph, which was soon elevated to programmatic status, will 
be discussed in detail below. 
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As an essential part of the superstructure – which is generally codeterminous with 
the propaganda-education xitong – the media are one of the focal points of the 
movement. The Cultural Revolution is a “cultural” revolution in the very sense of 
the word, aimed not at the economic basis of the socialist state, that had been 
thoroughly transformed in the 1950s, but rather at the superstructure, where newly 
emerging elements of the bourgeoisie are to be found. It is not surprising at all that 
the Cultural Revolution was launched with a newspaper article in November 1965, 
that the first institution to come tumbling down under the barrage of attacks in 
spring and summer 1966 was the Party’s Propaganda Department, and that the 
first work unit where “revolutionary rebels” (geming zaofanpai) seized power on 4 
Jan. 1967, was the Shanghai daily Wenhuibao. What is the impact of the Cultural 
Revolution on the media? And how was the Party’s media concept affected, or 
what role did it play under the new circumstances? 
During most of the decade preceding the Cultural Revolution, the media 
closely followed the trajectory of the Chinese polity. With the anti-Rightist 
Campaign, the CCP had reasserted full control over the media sector, closing 
those niches of public debate that had been opened up during the Hundred 
Flowers Movement. The logic of the anti-Rightist campaign emphasized the sixth 
element of the media concept, the idea that the media were both the Party’s tool in 
class struggle, and a major arena of class struggle. Stress on upholding the 
correct class standpoint and close association with the Party’s political line has 
been made responsible for the media’s willingness to accept at face value the 
overblown statistics during the Great Leap Forward, and the failure of the country’s 
newspapers to report on the excesses of the Great Leap and the ensuing large-
scale famine.3 Once the Party decided on a course of retrenchment to revive the 
agricultural and industrial sectors in 1961 and 1962, the intellectual sphere 
experienced a loosening of controls that led to a limited ‘thaw,’ a return to more 
pluralism of ideas, at the expense of politics.4 Liu Shaoqi famously ordered to 
media to place more emphasis of entertainment, captured in the slogan 
                                             
3 The argument relating to the press and responses to famine is developed, among others, in Jean 
Drèze and Amartya K. Sen. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 210-15. 
4 Comp. Merle Goldman. China’s Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981, ch. 1-4. 
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quweixing.5 Still under the impression of the anti-Rightist campaign, however, 
intellectuals and media personnel mostly decided not to question of the Party’s 
policies openly, instead, they reverted to indirect means of allusions, mockery, and 
satire.6 The genre of zawen, or satiric essays, surged in popularity; yet it did so 
less in literary journals than on the pages of the nation’s pre-eminent 
newspapers.7 Yet with Mao’s call to “never forget class struggle” at the Tenth 
Plenum in September 1962 – the speech from which the “August 16 Decision” 
quotes – the ideological climate went into a downward spiral until Yao Wenyuan 
declared three years later: “The objective existence of class struggle will 
necessarily be reflected in this or that form in the ideological sphere, or through 
the pen of this or that writer. Regardless of whether this writer is conscious of it or 
not, this is an objective law which is independent of one’s will.”8 Yao’s attack on 
Beijing’s vice-mayor Wu Han, one of the “Three Family Village” authors, the 
Cultural Revolution started, assaulting first the Party authorities in charge of the 
cultural sphere, and then the newspapers and journals that had printed in the early 
1960s those plays and essays that were now interpreted as a conspiracy against 
the Communist Party and the socialist state.9 
How did the Cultural Revolution affect the media? What did the upheaval in 
the ideological sphere mean for the definition of what the media are and what they 
are supposed to be? How did the Party’s media concept fare once the very 
                                             
5 Liu promoted the concept of quweixing for the first time in his conversation with journalists from 
Xinhua she in 1956. I discuss quweixing and its implications in more detail later in this chapter. 
6 Rudolf G. Wagner. The Contemporary Chinese Historical Drama: Four Studies. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. Jonathan Unger (ed.). Using the Past to Serve the Present: 
Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. 
7 Deng Tuo’s Evening Chats in Beijing (Yanshan yehua) were published on the pages of Beijing 
wanbao from March 1961 until Sept. 1962, while the famous column “Notes from the Three-Family 
Village” (Sanjiacun zhaji) appeared in Qianxian, the theoretical journal of the CCP Beijing Municipal 
Committee, from September 1961 to July 1964. “Notes” was co-authored by Deng Tuo, Beijing 
vice-mayor Wu Han, and Liao Mosha, who headed the UFWD of the Beijing Municipal Committee. 
8 Yao Wenyuan. “Ping xinbian lishiju Hai Rui ba guan,” in Wenhuibao, 10 Nov. 1965. Translation 
taken from Harold C. Hinton (ed.). The People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary 
Survey. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1980, vol. 3, p. 1472.. 
9 The primary target at RMRB was Deng Tuo. Deng had been replaced as the paper’s editor-in-
chief by Wu Lengxi in June 1957, but he remained deputy editor-in-chief until he was transferred to 
the CCP Beijing Municipal Committee a year later, where he was in charge of culture and 
education affairs. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, Deng’s Evening Chats in Beijing and his 
other zawen ventures were singled out as his main offence. Once the hunt for the capitalist 
conspiracy grew, Lu Dingyi, the head of the Propaganda Department was identified as the black 
hand behind Deng Tuo. See Timothy Cheek. Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng Tuo 
and the Intelligentsia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, ch. 4 (on Deng’s purge), ch. 5 (on his 
Evening Chats and Notes), and ch. 6 (on the CR). 
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institutions crumbled away that had been so closely associated with it? A paradox 
emerges with view to the CCP’s control of the press during the Cultural Revolution: 
the institutional structure that had been built over decades to make the media 
concept work, was rendered all but dysfunctional in the earliest months of the 
Cultural Revolution; the Propaganda Department was not rebuilt until 1977. At the 
same time, however, the Party never lost control of the press. Once freed from 
their institutional shackles, the newspapers did not become platforms of competing 
opinions or revoke their duty of speaking with a single voice for the Party, or the 
Party’s highest representative, Mao Zedong. It is amazing to see that throughout 
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the media concept continued to dominate 
the agenda and the behaviour of the Chinese press. As I will show in this chapter, 
the Party’s media concept became the defining ideology even for an entirely new 
type of paper that had never been under institutional control, the Red Guard 
papers. How is the continuing power of the media concept to be explained? In this 
chapter I argue that the flexibility inherent in the concept and the indirect means 
through which it had been implemented since 1949 made it adaptable even in a 
radically different polity; due to the indirect means of control introduced by the 
CCP in accordance with the media concept, the ideas themselves were tied so 
loosely to the institutions supporting them that they continued to persist even when 
the institutional apparatus collapsed. Consequently, while the cultural 
revolutionaries singled out class struggle as the single defining characteristic of 
their approach to the media, it is possible to show that each element of the media 
concept remained relevant in Cultural Revolution discourses on the media and 
their role. 
This chapter starts with a general discussion of the press and its role in the 
early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). With the emergence of wall 
posters and leaflets composed by Red Guards and rebel factions, soon to be 
followed by serial publications, including journals and newspapers, the structure of 
the Chinese public sphere underwent a significant shift. At the centre of these 
changes lies the issue of xiaobao, or Red Guard tabloids, and their position and 
functions within the press structure. In the second part of this chapter, I will turn to 
self-referential texts from the Red Guard press in a way similar to that of the 
previous chapter. Through a case study of one xiaobao, I will attempt to the 
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delineate the arguments used both denounce the pre-Cultural Revolution Chinese 
newspapers, and to define the role of the press, and in particular the Red Guard 
papers, in the new setting of the Cultural Revolution, in order to understand the 
reasons for the continued relevance of the Party’s media concept even in the 
absence of a formal institutional structure of control in the propaganda sector. 
 
 
Revolutionizing the Chinese Press 
The myth that during the Cultural Revolution all but a tiny handful of 
newspapers were shut down and the number of papers published reached the 
lowest level since 1949 is widespread in Chinese mainstream sources, and has 
been accepted at face value by a number of Western observers.10 The idea of a 
‘dearth of newspapers,’ however, is utterly wrong; nothing could be further from 
the truth. Early in the Cultural Revolution, and especially since January 1967, 
thousands of new papers appeared across the nation, not to speak of leaflets, 
handbills, and other collections of study materials. This explosion of publishing 
activity saw the amount of material published and circulating skyrocketing, to the 
point where even major newspapers such as WHB faced supply shortages of 
newsprint.11 If estimates of more than 10,000 newspaper and periodical 
publications nationwide are correct, then the Cultural Revolution was the period 
not with the smallest, but arguably that with the largest number of publications by 
far, in all of twentieth-century China.12 
                                             
10 See for example Dai Bang. “Jianguo yilai baozhi gongzuo de huigu,” in Zhongguo xinwen 
nianjian 1983. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1983, p. 16-19, here p. 18. Compare also the 
general assessment in Fang Hanqi (ed.). Zhongguo xinwen shiye tongshi. Beijing: Zhongguo 
renmin daxue chubanshe,1999, vol. 3, p. 319. Zhao Yuezhi speaks of the Cultural Revolution as 
“the dark age of Chinese journalism.” Media, Market, and Democracy: Between the Party Line and 
the Bottom Line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998, p. 32. For an especially farcical 
depiction of the Cultural Revolution see Hugo de Burgh. The Chinese Journalist: Mediating 
Information in the World’s Most Populous Country. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 65-62. 
11 In Shanghai, consumption of newsprint soared 70 per cent in a single month, from December 
1966 to January 1967, rising from 162 tons to 272 tons, a rate that alarmed the Shanghai 
authorities. See Jin Dalu. “Shanghai wenge yundong zhong de qunzhong baokan,” in Shilin 2005.6, 
p. 101-12, here p. 101. 
12 The National Library in Beijing holds over 2,600 different xiaobao; this collection, however, is 
probably incomplete, especially with regard to smaller papers published in the provinces. The 
10,000 estimate comes from Chen Donglin. “‘Wenge zuzhi baokan dang’an yu dangdai Beijing shi 
yanjiu,” in Beijing shi dang’anguan (ed.). Dang’an yu Beijing shi: Guoji xueshu taolunhui lunwen ji. 
Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an chubanshe, 2003, vol. 1, p. 386-400, here p. 386. 
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The ‘dearth of newspapers’ myth hinges on the question of how bona fide 
newspapers or periodicals are defined. The number of 43 newspapers in print 
1967 nationwide, given by official statistics, is a retroactive application of the 
reform era view that only papers properly registered and approved for publication 
by the provincial and national Party and government authorities count as 
publications.13 This view, however, was not shared during the most crucial phase 
of the Cultural Revolution, neither were there any functioning organs that could 
have administered the registration of new papers: the Propaganda Department 
had been rendered dysfunctional after the ouster of its head, Lu Dingyi, and the 
denunciation of the Department as the ‘Demon’s Den’ (Yanwang dian 阎王殿), an 
appellation coined by Mao.14 The Ministry of Culture, which had exercised 
oversight over publishing affairs until 1966, had ceased to function, too. With the 
discrediting of the CCP’s formal institutional apparatus, aspiring new publications 
were seeking and receiving alternative sources of legitimacy: repeated affirmations 
from the Cultural Revolution Small Group (CRSG) and its members (mostly Jiang 
Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng), from the Central Committee, and from Mao 
Zedong provided the “mass organization publications” (qunzhong zuzhi baokan 群
众组织报刊) with sufficient legitimacy to function as officially approved players in 
the public sphere. 
The origins of the Red Guard papers, or, as they were commonly called, 
xiaobao 小报, can be traced back to the wall posters (dazibao 大字报) that had 
been the most important means of public communication at the grass roots level in 
the early months of the Cultural Revolution. On August 5, Mao wrote “Bombard the 
Headquarters – My Big-Character Poster,” praising the wall posters of the past 
weeks.15 Mao’s public endorsement not only lent the medium itself an 
unprecedented degree of legitimacy, but also symbolized the coming down of the 
barrier between official and unofficial publications: not only can newspaper content 
                                             
13 The number of newspapers is officially now given as 343 in 1965, dropping to 49 in 1966, 43 in 
1967, and 42 in 1968 and 1969. Guojia tongjiju guomin jingji zonghe tongji si (ed.). Xin Zhongguo 
wushi nian tongji ziliao huibian. Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999, p. 106. 
14 In March 1966, Mao complained to Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiu about 
disobedience from the Propaganda Department; in this context he called for a “smashing of the 
Demon’s Den and releasing the small devils.” See Renmin ribao wuchuanjieji gemingpai, Shoudu 
xinwen pipan lianluozhan (ed.). Xinwen zhanxian liang tiao luxian douzheng dashiji, 1948-1966. 
N.p., n.d., p. 33. 
15 “Paoda silingbu: Wo de yi zhang dazibao,” in RMRB 5 Aug. 1967.. 
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appear in wall posters, but wall posters themselves can enter the official press. 
From wall posters and leaflets, now endowed with public power, it was a small 
step to the first Red Guards publications. The borders here are fluid again: while 
the first new papers appeared in early September 1966,16 Red Guards in a 
number of schools and universities had appropriated the editorial power of school 
organs and had made them their mouthpieces.17 Since October 1966, Red Guard 
papers began to mushroom across the nation. 
The retroactive collective dismissal of the Red Guard press suggests that the 
unofficial Cultural Revolution publications were short-lived, irregular, and poorly 
edited pamphlets that had little in common with what the Party regarded as proper 
newspapers before 1966 and after 1978. This characterization is true for a fair 
amount of Red Guard papers, but by no means for all. The term xiaobao is in itself 
misleading: it refers in most cases to the tabloid format in which most Red Guard 
papers were printed (for lack of printing facilities and broadsheet newsprint), and 
not to the actual content or social status of the papers. One quite common 
characteristic of the Red Guard press is their irregular publication. While most of 
them apparently aspired to a more regular – biweekly, weekly, or three-day – 
publication schedule, the actual publication dates were often dictated by access to 
printing facilities and supplies of newsprint, and to the general volatility of the 
political situation, especially in the course of 1967. It should be remembered, 
however, that the same conditions also affected some of the most prominent 
‘offcial’ publications, such as the Central Committee organ Hongqi.18 
                                             
16 The two earliest papers are said to be Hongweibing bao (ed. Shoudu da-zhuan yuanxiao 
hongweibing silingbu) and Hongweibing (ed. Beijing liu zhong hongweibing). Both papers published 
their first editions on 1 Sept. See Chen Donglin. “‘Wenge’ zushi baokan dang’an,” p. 387. 
17 The most celebrated case is that of Beida. On August 22, Red Guards had taken over the school 
publication of Beida and renamed it Xin Beida. Mao Zedong personally wrote the three characters 
for the masthead, providing the new publication with maximum legitimacy. On 24 August, RMRB 
published an editorial hailing the birth of this new publication as a major victory: ‘Huanhu Xin Beida 
zai douzheng zhong dansheng.” 
18 Actual publication schedule for Hongqi and Xinwen zhanbao, 1967: 
HQ XWZB HQ XWZB HQ XWZB HQ XWZB 
1: 01/01   3: 05/14 11: 07/09 8: 07/09  16: 09/14 
2: 01/16  7: 05/20   9: 07/17 14: 09/17 17: 09/15 
3: 02/03  8: 05/23 4: 05/23 12: 08/01 10: 07/30  18: 09.21 
4: 03/01  9: 05/27 5: 06/01 13: 08/17 11: 08/12  19: 09/28 
5: 03/30   6: 06/14  12/13:08/23 15: 10/06  
 1: 04/28 10: 06/21   14: 09/01  20: 10/18 
6: 05/08 2: 05/06  7: 06/30  15: 09/03 16: 11/23  
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The majority of the Red Guard papers were indeed short-lived: many ceased 
publication after a few or even a single issue, often due to shifts in the composition 
of factional alliances, and later to the efforts of provincial and national authorities 
to rein in the proliferation of publishing by mass organizations. A number of Red 
Guard papers, however, proved relatively long-lived: well-respected Red Guard 
publications that were often closely associated with the CRSG, such as Xin Beida 
or the two papers named Jinggangshan (published by Red Guards at Tsiinghua 
University and Beijing Normal University), lasted well into 1968 and sometimes 
even longer.19 The most resilient xiaobao, the Shanghai-based Gongren zaofan 
bao 工人造反报, was established in December 1966 and closed its doors on 15 
April, 1971 (more on this paper below).20 
The quality of printing and editing, too, varies significantly among the 
heterodox body of the Red Guard press. Small papers, especially those published 
by individual factions at the work unit level had to resort to mimeograph equipment 
to print their publications, often on very poor, locally produced paper. The larger 
rebel organizations, however, forced the erstwhile Party authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions to approve them access to financial support, a practice that 
was tearing gaps into local budgets and that worried the leadership.21 With these 
funds, the Red Guards could secure access to high quality newsprint and to 
printing facilities – after the closing of many pre-1966 publications, many presses 
stood idle and could accept printing jobs from various rebel organizations. Even 
where Red Guards did receive no funding for their publications, most papers were 
profitable, since they were sold on the streets and incurred no personnel costs, as 
writing and editing was performed by the publishers themselves, usually on a 
voluntary basis.22 Most of the larger Red Guard papers were printed with lead 
letters, which allowed for a clear print face; some of the largest even used 
                                                                                                                                      
The comparison between Hongqi and Xinwen zhanbao, a xiaobao, shows that the latter in fact 
observed a more regular publication schedule than the CC’s theoretical organ. 
19 Xin Beida was founded on 22 Aug. 1966 and ceased publication on 17 Aug. 1968; in the two 
years of its existence, it published 200 issues. The Qinghua Jinggangshan was established on 1 
Dec. 1966 and closed down on 19 Aug. 1968, after 157 issues. The Beishida Jinggangshan 
published a total of 120 issues between 9 Dec. 1966 and 21 June 1968. 
20 Dates taken from Zhao Feng. Wenhua dageming cidian. Taibei: Taiwan donghua shuju, 1993, p. 
371f. See further Jin Dalu. “Shanghai wenge yundung zhong de qunzhong baokan,” p. 104. 
21 Chen Donglin. “‘Wenge’ zuzhi baokan dang’an,” p. 393. 
22 Ibid. p. 394. 
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industrial rotating presses that could produce print runs of over 10,000 copies.23 
The largest circulation paper, Shoudu hongweibing, published seven local editions 
besides its main edition in Beijing, and in its heyday printed a staggering 500,000 
copies.24 Chen Donglin has observed the exceptionally high quality of editing in 
most Red Guard publications: at a time when even small cases of inattention, such 
as a wrong or missing character, could bring about charges of intentional 
manipulation and secret opposition to the Party line, the editors of the Red Guard 
papers invested a disproportional amount of time into the proofreading process.25 
A striking characteristic of many Red Guard papers is how similar their visual 
appearance is to that of the ‘official’ papers: in many cases, only the tabloid format 
differentiates the layout of the Red Guard publications from newspapers like 
RMRB, as the illustrations below show: 
   
Ill. 1a: Jinggangshan (Beishida)  Ill. 1b: Renmin ribao     Ill. 1c: Xinwen zhanbao 
 
The xiaobao were closely modelled after the dabao, the large papers. The 
calligraphy of the papers’ masthead is almost without exception borrowed from 
Mao Zedong, who had also written the masthead for RMRB and other PRC 
                                             
23 On printing processes see ibid. In May 1967, print runs for the large Red Guard papers in 
Shanghai varied between 70,000 and 150,000. See Jin Dalu. “Shanghai wenge yundung zhong 
dequnzhong baokan,” p. 103. 
24 Shoudu hongweibing was founded on 13 Sept. 1966; in spring 1967, however, its publisher, a 
consortium of Red Guard organization, split into two factions that resulted in a split of the paper as 
well. The last issue was published on 6 Sept. 1967. On Shoudu hongweibing see Chen Donglin. 
“‘Wenge’ zuzhi baokan dang’an,” p. 395f.  
25 Ibid., p. 393. 
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papers.26 In emulation of RMRB, quotations from Chairman Mao are an 
indispensable element of the front pages of most Red Guard papers; quotations 
from the Chairman in the text are set in bold print, a practice that RMRB had 
started, too, in January 1967.27 While the Red Guard press rarely published 
Xinhua despatches, it took up the practice of reprinting important editorials from 
the ‘large papers,’ especially RMRB, Jiefangjun bao, and Hongqi, the ‘two papers 
and one journal’ (liang bao yi kan 两报一刊) that were supposed to act as the 
voice of the CRSG. Articles written by the paper’s own staff are usually marked as 
‘ben bao xun’ 本报讯, another practice they learned from the main papers. Finally, 
all xiaobao paid attention to the practice of publishing founding editorials (fakan ci 
发刊词), editorials (shelun 社论), and commentator articles (ben bao pinglunyuan 
本报评论员) to draw attention to important themes and make clear the 
fundamental positions of their paper. 
The desire of the Red Guard papers to model themselves after the ‘big 
papers’ raises the question of the relations between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
publications and the structure of the public sphere at the height of the Cultural 
Revolution. In a recently published article, Jin Dalu has introduced a segmentation 
of the Cultural Revolution press into four layers that offers a useful starting point 
for discussing the changes in the Chinese public sphere.28 At the topmost level, 
Jin defines the remaining ‘official’ newspapers, such as RMRB or, in the case of 
Shanghai, WHB and JFRB.29 These papers, originally identified as the paragons of 
a capitalist ‘black line’ (hei xian 黑线) in the news sector, had been reformed after 
the onset of the Cultural Revolution, and especially after the January power 
seizures, and had thus regained their authoritative status. Secondly, there are a 
                                             
26 The precedent set by Xin Beida has been mentioned above. Papers not adopting Mao’s 
calligraphy as a legitimizing symbol were the rare exception. The first issue of Shoudu hongweibing 
prints the name of the paper in a regular type font, but the editors immediately recognized their 
mistake. From the second issue on, they adopted Mao’s calligraphy. The provenance of the 
characters can be easily identified with the help of Zhongyang dang’anguan (ed.). Mao Zedong 
shufa da zidian. Beijng: Renmin chubanshe, 1993. Comp. also Richard Curt Kraus. Brushes with 
Power: Modern Politics and the Chinese Art of Calligraphy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991; on the Cultural Repolution see p. 96-108, the Xin Beida masthead is mentioned on p. 104. 
27 Mao quotations appeared in bold print in RMRB starting from 1 Jan. 1967. For some time in late 
1966, RMRB had experimented with setting Mao quotations in italics. 
28 “Shanghai wenge yundung zhong de qunzhong baokan.” 
29 The city’s third major paper, Xinmin wanbao, had been closed on 22 Aug. 1966. Fang Hanqi 
(ed.). Zhongguo xinwen shiye biannian shi. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2000, vol. 2, p. 
1831. 
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significant number of large and relatively stable Red Guard papers, usually 
published by broad coalitions of rebels organizations, often on a city-wide level, or 
by the major Red Guard groups in the most prestigious universities, such as Xin 
Beida and Jinggangshan. The largest, third layer is composed of the numerous 
papers and publications put out by various factions and rebel groups, usually at 
the work unit level, that were in many cases less concerned with national themes, 
such as the denunciation of Liu Shaoqi an other top capitalist roaders, than with 
the struggle against former leading personnel within the work units, and with 
factional battles and infighting on the grassroots level. At the bottom of this 
hierarchy, a hard-to-define number of underground publications is to be found. 
These mostly very short-lived papers, often produced by anonymous sources, 
contained either heterodox and dissenting views, or indulged in gossip, slander, 
and sometimes pornography. In the ongoing chaos, especially of summer and fall 
1967, and in the absence of a functioning institutional structure, motives other than 
revolutionizing the nation appeared, including that of profit making. The number of 
these publications, however, remained small throughout; only extremely few 
examples of this sort did ever achieve publicity.30 This does not mean, however, 
that provincial and national authorities did not point to this fourth kind of 
publications during periodic attempts to rein in the grassroots publication activities. 
The borders between these four layers of the Cultural Revolution public 
sphere, however, were fluid; the different genres of papers are characterized less 
by their distinction than by their interaction. First of all, the ‘official’ papers did 
regularly reprint articles from various Red Guard sources, usually those of the 
second kind;31 these papers, in turn, from time to time invited members from 
                                             
30 The best-known case of public dissent in the early Cultural Revolution is the long essay 
“Chushen lun” by Yu Luoke, that caused a sensation when it appeared in Zhongxue wengebao on 
18 Jan. 1967. The ensuing debate catapulted this paper to prominence until Qi Benyu, a member 
of the CRSG, publicly criticized the essay and its author on 14 Apr. See Chen Donglin. “‘Wenge’ 
zuzhi baokan dang’an,” p. 396f. On the Yu Luoke incident see further Xu Xiao, Ding Dong, Xu 
Youyu (ed). Yu Luoke: Yizuo yu huiyi. Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 1998. 
31 On 1 Feb. 1967, for example, RMRB, JFJB, and Hongqi reprinted an editorial from Shoudu 
hongweibing: “Dadao ‘si’ zi, shixing geming zaofanpai da lianhe” (orig. publ. on 25 Jan.). RMRB 
also published articles from Xin Beida and the two Jinggangshan papers. See Chen Donglin. 
“‘Wenge’ zuzhi baokan dang’an,” p. 395. Comp. also Fan Hanqi (ed). Zhongguo xinwen shiye 
tongshi, vol. 3, p. 339f. 
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different work units to write articles for them,32 thus crossing the border between 
the second and third kinds of papers. Gossip that had been picked up by the 
underground papers sometimes made it into the more respectable xiaobao. In the 
other direction, Red Guard papers on all levels reprinted articles and editorials 
from the top papers on their own pages, especially when doing so would bolster 
their own particular political positions.33 In this way, the xiaobao entered into a 
symbiotic relationship with the dabao, functioning both as feeders and as 
transmitters for the ‘official’ press. 
A particularly interesting case is that of the well-known Gongren zaofanbao. 
Founded in Shanghai on 28 Dec. 1966, it became the organ of the Shanghai 
Workers’ Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters (Shanghai gongren geming 
zaofan zong silingbu, short Gongzongsi), the largest radical mass organization in 
the city, led by Wang Hongwen.34 After the January 1967 power seizure in 
Shanghai, Gongzongsi had become the de facto dominating force of Shanghai 
politics; Gongren zaofanbao was therefore sold publicly since February and in 
August was approved to enter the nationwide newspaper distribution system of the 
Chinese Post.35 Many work units consequently ordered regular subscriptions of 
Gongren zaofanbao; a January 1968 report put the figure of such publicly paid 
(gongfei 公费) subscriptions at 70,000, out of a total regular printrun of 165,000. 
The high rate of gongfei subscriptions signals that by that time the paper was no 
longer seen as a xiaobao; in fact, since December 1967 the Shanghai authorities 
                                             
32 See, for example, Xinwen zhanbao 8 (9 July 1967), p. 1, 2; Xinwen zhanbao 9 (16 July), p. 1; 
Xinwen zhanbao 10 (30 July), p. 3; Xinwen zhanbao 11 (12 Aug.), p. 3; Xinwen zhanbao 12/13 (23 
Aug.), p. 5. 
33 The following examples are taken from the Beishida Jinggangshan: “Duoqu xin de shengli,” 
editorial, Hongqi 1966.16, p. 14-16, repr. Jinggangshan 2 (19 Dec. 1966), p. 1; “Fandui jingjizhuyi, 
fensui zichanjieji fandong luxian de xin fanpu,” joint editorial with RMRB, Hongqi 1967.2, p. 19-21, 
repr. Jinggangshan 5 (12 Jan. 1967), p. 1-2; “Zhua geming, cu shengchan: chedi fensui zichanjieji 
fandong luxian de xin fanpu – gei Shanghai quan shi renmin shu,” orig. WHB 5 Jan. 1967, repr. 
with editor’s note in RMRB, 4 Jan., 1967, repr. Jinggangshan 5 (12 Jan. 1967), p. 2-3; Lin Jie. “Zai 
wuchanjieji wenhua da geming zhong huo xue huo yong Mao zhuxu zhuzuo,” Hongqi 1967.2, p. 
42-43, repr. Jinggangshan 9 (28 Jan. 1967), p. 3. 
34 On Gongzongsi see Li Xun. Da bengkui: Shanghai gongren zaofanpai xingwang shi. Taibei: 
Shibao wenhua, 1996, p. 73-100 and passim; id. “Gongren jieji lingdao yiqie? ‘Wenge’ zhong 
Shanghai ‘Gongren zaofanpai’ ji gongren jiejie de diwei,” in Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu 2006.2, p. 
44-56; Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun. Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p. 29-70 and passim; Elizabeth J. Perry. Patrolling the Revolution: 
Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, p, 
212-14 and 239-40; Ye Yonglie. Wang Hongwen zhuan. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 
1993, p. 75-81 and passim. 
35 Jin Dalu. “Shanghai wenge yundong zhong de qunzhong baokan,” p. 111. 
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were generally refering to the “three papers:” with WHB and JFRB, Gongren 
zaofanbao thus formed the troika of the radical press in Shanghai, becoming an 
official organ of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.36 It enjoyed this prestige 
until its demise by order of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee on 15 April, 
1971.37 The case of Gongren zaofanbao shows that even the border between the 
‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ press was, to a certain extent, permeable: it was possible 
for a xiaobao to become a dabao. 
The public sphere of the Cultural Revolution (at least during the period from 
mid 1966 to mid 1968) must thus be regarded as a complex space with a very 
large number of different players, in different categories. The interaction of these 
players and the permeability of the border separating the different categories 
makes clear that the question of the legitimacy of the ‘unofficial’ papers is much 
more difficult than the retroactive exclusion of the xiaobao tries to suggest. The 
publishers of the xiaobao could boast legitimacy for their publications within the 
polity of the Cultural Revolution; this legitimacy was derived from the recognition 
extended to them by top Party leaders, including Mao Zedong. The strong reliance 
on personalized sources of legitimacy and the lack of an institutionalized 
guarantee for their existence, however, made their status vulnerable and highly 
volatile. The lower an ‘unofficial’ publication ranged on the scale introduced above, 
the more likely it was to be shifted from the ‘legal’ to the ‘illegal’ category by 
political events beyond their control. In such an instable setting, a major concern 
for the more theoretically oriented of the Red Guard papers was to explain their 
legitimacy to the public, a topic I will come back to in the next section of this 
chapter. 
The official line towards the ‘unofficial papers’ was subject to great 
fluctuations during the crucial years of 1967 and 1968. A major turning point were 
the power seizures at WHB and JFRB in early January 1967, followed by the 
takeover of press organs across the nation. On January 19, RMRB reprinted a 
WHB editorial “Long Live the Rightful Revolutionary Rebellion,” and followed three 
days later with its own editorial “Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite, Seize the 
Power from the Capitalist Roaders!,” thus boosting the drive to emulate the 
                                             
36 Ibid., p. 104. 
37 For further information on Gongren zaofanbao see the short entry in Zhao Feng (ed.). ‘Wenhua 
dageming’ cidian, p. 371f.; and Li Xun. “Gongren jieji lingdao yiqie?” 
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example of the Shanghai papers.38 The takeover of editorial power by the rebel 
factions was a sign that mass involvement in the running of newspapers was the 
line of the day, while the old principle that newspapers were produced by 
specialists was to be reconsidered; this in turn strengthened the position of the 
xiaobao, which defined themselves as publications of the masses (qunzhong zuzhi 
baokan 群众组织报刊) in the first place. The chaos following the ‘January Storm,’ 
however, seems to have severely affected the proper functioning of the press. In 
the course of general retrenchment in March, the CC issued a document that tried 
to limit the influence of diverse rebel factions on the provincial newspapers and 
imposed restrictions on what could be reported.39 
In May 1967, the central leadership for the first time acknowledged the Red 
Guard press in an official document. Issued in the name of the CC, the “Opinions 
Regarding Improvements in the Propaganda of Publications by the Revolutionary 
Mass Organizations,” were an attempt to establish rules for the rapidly proliferating 
xiaobao.40 Four of the “Opinions’“ seven points concern bans on certain kinds of 
content: (1) the xiaobao are forbidden to publish any speeches, orders, or 
directives of Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, the CC, or the Central Military Commission 
that have not yet been officially issued: (2) any attacks against the PLA are 
forbidden; (3) state secrets of all kinds must be carefully guarded; (4) international 
issues and foreign affairs are the exclusive terrain of the Centre and are off limits 
for the mass organizations and their papers. Two of the remaining points try to 
regulate the paper’s content: article seven asks the Red Guard papers not to 
propagate gossip and “street talk” (malu xinwen 马路新闻), while article five 
requests that the publishers uphold the dignity of the press and to refrain from 
printing indecent and vulgar “yellow news;” instead, the criticism of capitalist 
                                             
38 “Geming zaofan you li wansui,” in RMRB, 19 Jan., 1967; “Wuchanjieji gemingpai da lianhe, 
duozou zibenzhuyi daolu dangquanpai de quan!” in RMRB, 22 Jan. 1967. The 19 Jan. reprint was 
accompanied by RMRB’s own endorsement of the power seizures in Shanghai’s premier papers: 
“Rang Mao Zedong sixiang zhanling baozhi zhendi,” RMRB, 19 Jan., 1967. 
39 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu ge sheng, shi, zizhiqu baozhi de ji xiang yijian” (16 Mar. 1967) 
[Zhongfa (67) 104], in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian huibian, 1966.5-1968.5, n.p., 1968, quoted 
after Song Yongyi (ed.). Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku (2nd ed.). Hong Kong: Xianggang 
Zhongwen daxue Zhongguo yanjiu fuwu zhongxin, 2006. 
40 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu gaijin geming qunzhong zuzhi de baokan xuanchuan de yijian” 
(14 May 1967) [Zhongfa (67) 157], in Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, Guowuyuan mishuting 
wenhua geming lianhe jiedaishi (ed.). Wuchanjieji wenhua dageming you guan wenjian huibian. 
Beijing: 1967, vol. 3, quoted after Song Yongyi (ed.). Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku. 
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roaders should concentrate on political and ideological issues. By pointing out the 
correct direction of criticism, however, the document stresses the denunciation of 
various capitalist roaders as one of the main functions of the ‘unofficial’ press and 
thus defines their task within the larger public sphere. 
In this respect, article one of the “Opinions” goes the furthest, by delineating 
the editorial line of the Red Guard press: “The papers of the revolutionary mass 
organizations shall strictly follow the instructions of Chairman Mao, vice Chairman 
Lin, the CC, and the Central Military Commission; they shall consult the important 
editorials and commentaries of RMRB, Hongqi, and JFJB for their own 
propaganda.”41 Tying the editorial position of the ‘unofficial’ press closely to that of 
the main papers, the Party Centre hoped to provide clear instructions for the 
papers’ editorial position. In the absence of a functioning institutional structure for 
the direction of the press, the papers under direct control of the CRSG assume 
part of this function. The interaction between dabao and xiaobao thus lends the 
latter legitimacy. The most explicit endorsement of the Red Guard press, however, 
can be found at the very beginning of the document:42 
To all central departments, the Party committees at the various levels, the revolutionary 
committees of the provinces and cities, the military regions, the Party committees in the 
military subregions, and all revolutionary mass organizations: 
In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the various papers and leaflets compiled 
and printed by revolutionary mass organizations are playing an important role on the 
propaganda front. 
 
The “Opinions,” through both its title and this introduction, do thus unequivocally 
acknowledge the xiaobao as an essential part of the country’s media apparatus. 
The pattern of this recognition does in fact follow closely that of the official 
endorsement of their publishers, the Red Guards: the “8-8 Circular” from August 
1966 had recognized the Red Guards as an essential instrument of the Cultural 
Revolution.43 Although formed spontaneously and thus outside of the Party’s 
formal organizational structure, they were declared a product of the historical 
circumstances and were justified in their existence through Mao’s personal 
attention and their loyalty to the goals of the Cultural Revolution. In the same way, 
the propaganda instruments of the Red Guards, the xiaobao, had early on 
                                             
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 “Zhongguo gongchangdang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu wuchanjieji wenhua dageming de 
jueding” (8 Aug., 1966), p. 43 (English) and 34 (Chinese). 
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received Mao’s personal support, such as through his writing of Xin Beida’s 
masthead. Now the Red Guard papers obtained endorsement in writing from the 
Party Centre. At the same time, the document shows tentative steps to incorporate 
the xiaobao into the larger media system of the PRC: the “Opinion’s” four points 
banning certain types of content are notably similar to the kind of content 
regulations that have been discussed in chapter four; their appearance in the 1967 
document suggests the Party’s efforts to extend the mechanics of media control to 
the ‘unofficial’ press as well. With its generally positive appraisal and the concrete 
prescriptions, the “Opinions” are an attempt to make the xiaobao a permanent 
element of the larger structure of the state-controlled public sphere. 
The “Opinions” gave Red Guard organizations across the nation and their 
publications a strong boost. The xiaobao received further impetus from the tide of 
criticism that began after the ‘Wuhan incident’ of July 1967, when the Cultural 
Revolution entered one it its most radical phases.44 On August 14, a document 
was issued in the name of the CC called “Circular on the Problem of Criticising by 
Name in the Newspapers.”45 The “Circular” published an extensive list of 
altogether 55 senior officials that could be criticized by name in newspapers on the 
national and provincial level. It declared: “In order to link this revolutionary great 
criticism even closer with the struggle-criticism-transformation in the various 
districts and units, it is necessary to criticise publicly and by name in the national 
and local press a number of capitalist roaders in the central organs, the CC 
regional bureaus, and the province and city-level Party committees.”46 For the 
xiaobao, which all along had taken a more liberal attitude with regard to criticizing 
by name, the new wave of public criticism provided the opportunity step up the 
denunciation of various capitalist roaders, revisionists, and counterrevolutionaries 
in their respective jurisdictions – “revolutionary great criticism” had been their main 
                                             
44 On 20 July, 1967, two members of the CRSG, Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi (the minister of public 
security) who had been sent to Wuhan to mediate between radical and conservative mass 
organizations, were detained by troops loyal to Chen Zaidao, the commander of the Wuhan military 
region. The insurgence was ended by Zhou Enlai, who was dispatched to Wuhan. In the wake of 
the incident, the city was occupied by large contingents of PLA forces and Chen Zaidao was 
purged; more importantly, violence across the nation flared up again, with army units in many 
places becoming the latest target of attacks. 
45 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zai baokan shang dianming pipan wenti de tongzhi” (14 Aug. 
1967) [Zhongfa (67) 251], in Union Research Institute (ed.). CCP Documents of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, p. 495f (English translation on p. 497-99). 
46 Ibid., p. 495 (English trsl. p. 497). 
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occupation in the past, and the May 14 “Opinions” had confirmed them in this 
function. The renewed call from the Centre for criticism in August mentioned only 
the central and provincial papers, but the document’s distribution key included “all 
revolutionary mass organizations;” the latter euphorically greeted the news from 
Beijing with a tide of denunciations that swept through all kinds of xiaobao in late 
August and early September.47 
On the other hand, protracted factional struggles, the stalemate in the process 
of forging new interim organs of power sharing (the Revolutionary Committees 革
命委员会), and armed clashes across the nation continued to worry the leadership 
in Beijing. The floating population of revolutionary rebels who were participating in 
factional conflicts in other regions were are particular cause of concern for the 
moderate parts of the Party leadership. On 30 June, 1967, the Beijing Municipal 
Revolutionary Committee had published a set of measures calling on out-of-city 
Red Guards to return to their home places and to confine the activities of mass 
organizations to their campuses and work units, a step that, if it were followed 
through, would have greatly influenced the publication of xiaobao, which were 
designed to draw larger publicity to their immediate issues of concern.48 The 
Beijing Revolutionary Committee reiterated its points in a proclamation dated 
September 8, in short and unequivocal language:49 
(1) In accordance with directives from the Centre, people from all places who have 
come to Beijing (with the exception of those invited by the Centre to discuss problems) 
must promptly and without exception return to their home places and wage revolution 
there. 
(2) Out-of-town people are forbidden to set up liaison stations in universities and 
schools, organs, and work units in Beijing, and they are not allowed to publish 
newspapers in Beijing. Violators will be closed down by the Revolutionary Committee. 
 
                                             
47 To cite but one example, Xuanchuan zhanbao published five issues in the three weeks between 
August 23 and September 15, more than twice its usual average. Compare the table in note 18 
above. Among those criticized by name were Liu Shaoqi and Tao Zhu, but also Mu Xin, the editor-
in-chief of GMRB, and Zhao Yiya, the editor-in-chief of the PLA organ JFJB. The names of the 
latter two had not appeared on the list in the August 14 “Circular.” 
48 Beijing shi geming weiyuanhui jiedaizu. “Beijing shi geming weiyuanhui dui wen-jiao weisheng 
fangmian ruogan juti wenti de jieshi” (30 June 1967), quoted after Song Yongyi (ed.). Zhongguo 
wenhua dageming wenku. 
49 “Beijing shi geming weiyuanhui, Beijing weishuqu silingbu bugao” (8 Sept. 1967), in Zhonggong 
zhongyang bangongting, Guowuyuan mishuting wenhua dageming lianhe jiedaishi (ed.). 
Wuchanjieji wenhua dageming youguan wenjian huibian (di si ji). Beijing: 1967, quoted after quoted 
after Song Yongyi (ed.). Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku. 
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The document entrusted the military to enforce the regulations. In the wake of the 
purge of the “516 Group” and the reorganization of the CRSG,50 regional 
authorities across the nation stepped up pressure to rein in Red Guard 
factionalism and moved to suppress many rebel organizations and their various 
activities. Under these circumstances, the climate for the publication of xiaobao 
changed significantly. In September and October 1967, the overwhelming majority 
of Red Guard papers, in particular those of the third kind (in Jin Dalu’s terms) 
ceased publication; most of those that remained were published by large city-wide 
or province-wide coalitions of rebel organizations that participated in the emerging 
power sharing structures and thus enjoyed some degree of institutional legitimacy. 
By mid-1968, however, when the rebuilding of the state apparatus was well 
underway and the Red Guards were forcefully sent to the countryside, most of the 
remaining xiaobao were shuttered. What remained were those few papers, such 
as Gongren zaofanbao, that had made the transition to dabao. 
 
 
The Media Concept Revisited: Xinwen zhanbao 
In the preceding section, I have discussed the rise and fall of the xiaobao, a 
type of press operating outside the institutional framework that had, since 1949, 
been one of the most important pillars of the Party’s control of the press. The Red 
Guard publications derived their legitimacy directly from the ideological authority of 
Mao Zedong and the CRSG; with encouragement from the Party Centre, the Red 
Guards could go ahead, overthrow the leadership at the old newspapers and 
revolutionize them, and set up their own press organs. The revolutionized dabao 
and the xiaobao were closely intertwined; yet the latter remained vulnerable to 
shifts in the power constellation and the political line, such as those in late 1967 
and 1968 that eventually ended their existence. The discussion above has drawn 
chiefly on Party documents and their attitude towards the Red Guard press. 
However, a number of key questions remain to be answered: what happened to 
the Party’s media concept in the Cultural Revolution? Did the xiaobao accept the 
                                             
50 After the escalation of violence after the Wuhan incident and several wall poster attacks on Zhou 
Enlai, the CRSG was reorganized and four its most radical members – Wang Li, Mu Xin, Lin Jie, 
and Guan Feng – were purged. Together with Qi Benyu, who was removed from power four 
months later, they became known as the 516 or May 16th Group. Their dismissal paved the way for 
the stemming of the worst violence and a gradual return to order. 
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demands of the media concept? Finally, how is the almost complete absence of 
dissenting voices in the Red Guard press to be explained? 
To answer these questions, I will now turn to the perspective of the xiaobao, 
their vision of the Chinese press, and their idea of their place within the Chinese 
public sphere. For this purpose, I will take a closer look at self-reflexive texts on 
the question of news and the press, found in particular in the xiaobao produced by 
Red Guards from the news sector. Based on a case study of Xinwen zhanbao, the 
radical organ of a coalition of rebel factions from Beijing-based news units, I will 
reconstruct the attitude of the xiaobao towards each of the clauses of the media 
concept. I argue that the Red Guards never tried to reject the media concept; 
rather, they were searching for a more literal interpretation of the media concept, 
which now came to be closely associated with Mao Zedong himself. At the same 
time, the Red Guards accused their enemies, and the ‘capitalist roaders’ in the 
news sector – that is, the leadership of the Propaganda Department and the chief 
editors of most newspapers – in particular, of not or incorrectly implementing the 
media concept. Because the Red Guard’s own legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
their papers was tied so closely to the ideological authority of the Cultural 
Revolution leadership, and especially to Mao Zedong, deviance from the media 
concept was all but impossible. The discourse on the role of the press in the 
xiaobao thus stayed carefully within the parameters of the media concept, and as 
a consequence, the expression of heterodox ideas in the Red Guard press 
remained the rare exception to the rule. The media concept continued to dominate 
the Chinese press – dabao and xiaobao – throughout the Cultural Revolution, and 
was adapted even to the structural changes of the public sphere. 
In late 1966 and early 1967, a number of xiaobao appeared in the press and 
publication sector, organized by Red Guards from the major work units in the 
media sector, such as the Xinhua News Agency, GMRB, but also provincial outlets 
including Guangzhou ribao, Guangxi ribao, and Fujian ribao.51 The most important 
                                             
51 All of the below repr. in Song Yongyi (ed). A New Collection of Red Guard Publications: Part I + 
II. Oakton: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1999-2001. Xinhua zhanbao, publ. by Xinhua 
she Xinhua gongshe wei renmin fuwu hongweibing (4 issues, 12 May – 15 Sept. 1967. Repr. in 
Part II, vol. 34, p. 13276-91); Xinwen zhanxian, publ. by Xinhua she geming lianhe weiyuanhui, 
Xinhua she xinwen zhanxian hongweibing (19 issues known, 22 Apr. – 16 Sept. 1967. Repr. in Part 
II, vol. 36, p. 14026-89); Guangming zhanbao, publ. by Guangming ribao geming zaofan zongbu 
(23 issues, 16 Aug. 1967 – 5 Sept. 1968. Repr. in Part I, vol. 5, p. 2119-206); Guangzhou ribao 
hongqi, publ. by Guangzhou pi Tao lianwei Guangzhou ribao hongqi bianjibu (issue 8: 31 July, 
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of these was Xinwen zhanbao.52 Founded by a coalition of rebel groups called 
“Capital News Criticism Liaison Station,” Xinwen zhanbao had, with twenty issues, 
one of the longest publication histories among the xiaobao in the news sector; it 
had extensive ties with other papers,53 and was closely linked to the CRSG.54 
Importantly, in the half year of its existence, Xinwen zhanbao produced a 
significant amount of theoretical reflections on the Chinese media and is an 
essential source for the events of the Cultural Revolution in the news sector. 
Xinwen zhanbao was founded in late April 1967 by the “Capital News 
Criticism Liaison Station” (Shoudu xinwen pipan lianluo zhan 首都新闻批判联络站), 
a coalition of twelve radical Red Guard groups from three major universities (the 
journalism departments of Zhongguo renmin daxue 中国人民大学 and Beijing 
University, and the Beijing Broadcasting Institute) and nine media units (including 
Xinhua she, GMRB, Gongren ribao, and Zhongguo qingnian bao); they were 
joined by a rebel group from WHB’s Beijing bureau.55 The paper, founded as a 
response to the more conservative Xinwen zhanxian,56 held close contact with the 
CRSG through its umbrella organization, the Red Guard Congress (Hongdaihui 红
代会).57 Thanks to the provenance of its members – the nation’s top research 
institutions in journalism and media studies, and the most influential media units – 
the Liaison Station had access to an extraordinary amount of material and had the 
resources to engage, beyond accusations and denunciations, in theoretical 
discussions of news and media as well. 
                                                                                                                                      
1967. Repr. in Part I, vol. 5, p. 2222-5); Paosheng long, publ. by Guangxi ribao she 58112 geming 
lianhe zongbu (issue 14: 20 June 1967; issue 17: 2 July 1967. Repr. in Part I, vol. 11, p. 4947-58); 
Ying gutou bao, publ. by Fujian ribao gezaohui gongren ying gutou zhandoudui (issue 9: 27 Nov. 
1967. Repr. in Part I, vol. 17, p. 8141-44). 
52 I am using the reprint in Song Yongyi (ed). A New Collection of Red Guard Publications: Part II, 
vol. 36, p. 13946-14025. I the following, I will refer directly to the issues of Xinwen zhanbao, rather 
than to the reprint. 
53 Numbers 14 and 17 were joint issues with Xinhua zhanbao; numbers 15 and 16 joint issues with 
Guangming zhanbao. Xinwen zhanbao published articles written by Red Guard organizations from 
Qianjin bao (the former Tianjin Dagong bao) (issues 3, 7, 12/13, and 17), the Xinhua News Agency 
(issues 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, and 18), Zhongguo qingnianbao (issues 4, 8, 9, and 18), Shanxi 
ribao (issue 6), Gongren ribao (issues 11, 15, and 20), RMRB (issue 12/13), JFJB (issue 12/13), 
Zhongguo funü (issue 12/13), and GMRB (issues 15 and 16). 
54 On the pages of Xinwen zhanbao, Speeches, directives, and conversations of members of the 
CRSG figure prominently, to whom the paper was linked through its umbrella organization. 
55 See “Shoudu xinwen pipan lianluozhan,” in Xinwen zhanbao 1 (28 Apr. 1967), p. 2. 
56 Xinwen zhanxian, which published its first issue on 22 Apr. 1967, was run by a rival Red Guard 
faction from Xinhua she. 
57 The leaders of the Red Guard Congress, notably Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu, were known to be 
very close to the CRSG. 
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The founding issue of Xinwen zhanbao, published on 28 April 1967, gives a 
fair impression of the main categories of content to be found in this and other 
xiaobao from the news sector. In addition to an oversized portrait of Mao 
Zedong,58 the front page carries a collection of quotations from Mao Zedong 
related to press and propaganda issues, with the programmatic title “Chairman 
Mao on Newspapers: The Party Papers are a Tool of the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat.”59 Page two contains an editorial entitled “Smash Liu Shaoqi’s 
revisionist news line,”60 a report on the founding of 首都新聞批判聯絡站, and a 
short section called “Briefing of important news” (Yaowen jianbao 要闻简报), with 
short messages, all relating to the news sector. Page three carries a page-long 
article denouncing Liu Shaoqi’s counterrevolutionary policies for the news sector. 
Page four, finally, must be regarded as the exact inversion of page one: under the 
heading “Liu Shaoqi’s black words in the press circles,”61 the reader finds an 
extensive list of quotations from Liu on the press (a sequel was published in the 
next issue). With the instructions from Mao on the one hand, and the quotations of 
Liu on other, the discursive field for the assessment of the Chinese press and the 
theoretical lines guiding it has been marked out. 
The dominating theme of the debates on the pages of Xinwen zhanbao is 
class struggle and the struggle between the “two lines,” i.e. the revolutionary line 
of Mao Zedong and the revisionist line allegedly represented by Liu Shaoqi.62 The 
most programmatic expression of this ideological position is a quotation attributed 
to Mao Zedong, which comes in fact from the “8-8 Decision” from August 1966:63 
 
 
 
                                             
58 On this picture from an unknown source, Mao is sitting in an armchair, smoking and reading a 
newspaper. The pictures seem the stem from the mid 1960s; unfortunately, it is unclear what paper 
Mao is reading. 
59 “Mao zhuxi lun baokan: dangbao shi wuchanjieji zhuanzheng de gongju,” in Xinwen zhanbao 1 
(28 Apr. 1967), p. 1. 
60 “Polan Liu Shaoqi xiuzhengzhuyi xinwen luxian” in Xinwen zhanbao 1 (28 Apr. 1967), p. 2. 
61 “Liu Shaoqi zai xinwenjie de heihua,” Xinwen zhanbao 1 (28 Apr. 1967), p. 4. 
62 An extensive documentation of this struggle is a pamphlet compiled by the editors of Xinwen 
zhanbao and a rebel group at RMRB. See Renmin ribao wuchanjieji gemingpai, Shoudu xinwen 
pipan lianluozhan (ed.). Xinwen zhanxian liang tiao luxian douzheng da shiji, 1948-1966 (chugao). 
N.p., n.d. An extract of this pamphlet, covering the years 1958-1962 was published in Xinwen 
zhanbao 12/13 (23 Aug. 1967), p. 7-8. 
63 “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu wuchanjieji wenhua dageming de 
jueding,” p. 33 (Chinese) and p. 42 (English). 
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To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create public 
opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as 
well as for the counter-revolutionary class. This thesis of comrade Mao Zedong’s has 
been proved entirely correct in practice. 
 
The media, so Mao, are the foremost site of class struggle: the class enemy will 
take to the institutions of the propaganda and education xitong to prepare the 
ground for his comeback; the task of the revolutionary classes in the PRC is thus, 
to prevent the media from falling into the hands of the bourgeoisie, or, if this has 
already happened, to wrest back control of the media. For the cultural 
revolutionaries, this logic justified their attack against the leadership of major 
media units across the nation, and it legitimized the establishment of the rebel’s 
own organs of public opinion, the xiaobao. “To overthrow a political power…” 
consequently became a ubiquitous slogan, by far the most often cited quotation by 
Mao Zedong on press and propaganda issues in the Red Guard publications of 
the news sector.64 It set the dominating theme, the programmatic framework in 
which the discussion of all other elements of the media concept was embedded. I 
will run now through the first five clauses of the media concept, as outlined at the 
end of chapter two, before coming back to the main theme of class struggle and its 
relevance for the xiaobao and their understanding of their own role. 
Xinwen zhanbao contains a number of long, programmatic articles that try 
define the fundamental nature of the media and their function within the socialist 
state. These articles are obviously not essays written by middle school or 
university students; they must have been authored by seasoned ideologues and 
media insiders among the ranks of the radical factions. The authors usually 
proceed from an all-out critique of the theories and practice of newspaper making 
by their adversaries; they frame their own arguments against this negative plane. 
While criticism and denunciation occupies the overwhelming majority of space in 
most articles, efforts to come up with ideas about how newspapers shall be run in 
the future can be found from time to time. One such article appeared on the front 
page of the eighth issue of Xinwen zhanbao. Under the title “Don’t allow Liu 
Shaoqi to distort the political direction of the Party papers,” the article denounces 
                                             
64 On the pages of Xinwen zhanbao, it appears in practically every article discussing the theme of 
news and the press, sometimes twice on a single page. See, for example, issue 1, p. 1, p. 2, p. 3; 
issue 2, p. 1, p. 2; issue 3, p. 2, p. 3, p. 4; issue 6, p. 3, p. 4; issue 11, p. 3 (twice); issue 12/13, p. 3, 
p. 6, p. 7; issue 14, p. 3; issue 16, p. 1; issue 17, p. 3; issue 18, p. 2; issue 19, p. 4. 
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the “three black flags” (san mian hei qi 三面黑旗)65 of Liu Shaoqi’s newspaper 
theory.66 These are: the bourgeois concepts of ‘truthfulness’ (zhenshi 真实), 
‘impartiality’ (gongzheng 公正), and ‘objectiveness’ (keguan 客观); the bourgeois 
idea of ‘press freedom’ (xinwen ziyou 新闻自由); and the equally bourgeois theory 
of ‘entertainment’ (quweixing 趣味性). 
The chief accusation of the authors is that Liu, in his writings on journalism, 
had deliberately negated the first clause of the Party’s media concept, the 
requirement that “the media must represent the unified, single voice of the party.” 
Liu Shaoqi had committed the crime of negating the newspapers’ Party character 
(dangxing or partiinost). This is crucial because:67 
Our great leader Chairman Mao has said: “As long as class differences still exist in the 
world, newspapers will be a tool of class struggle.”68 The proletarian press is a tool of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore it must resolutely stand on the side of the 
proletariat and make propagating and defending the invincible Mao Zedong Thought its 
most basic task. This is the most basic political direction of the proletarian press. But 
the largest capitalist roader inside the Party and his followers bitterly hate the brilliant 
Mao Zedong Thought; they do what they can to oppose the propagation of Mao 
Zedong Thought in the proletarian press and make every effort to push through their 
reactionary bourgeois news principles. 
 
As evidence for Liu’s position, the article quotes his 1956 conversations with 
Xinhua staff members (see chapter six). Discussing the problems of truthfulness 
and objectivity, Liu had applied criteria that in itself were alien to the socialist 
conception of newspapers: in a class society, objectivity – that is, a position 
beyond or above that of any single class – does not only not exist; the very idea of 
its existence and desirability reflects a bourgeois state of mind. It needs to be said 
that the article quotes Liu Shaoqi out of context; Liu’s remarks had been carefully 
balanced with his insistence to take into account one’s class standpoint (lichang 立
场). But this is not relevant to the Cultural Revolution authors, for whom the very 
idea of “objectivity” – and, in the same vein, “truthfulness” and “impartiality” – 
                                             
65 An apparent pun on the better known “three red flags” (san mian hongqi 三面红旗) of radical 
Maoist policies since 1958 – the General Line, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s 
Communes. 
66 Hongdaihui Zhongguo renmin daxue san hong xinwen bingtuan. “Bu xu Liu Shaoqi cuangai 
dangbao de zhengzhi fangxiang,” in Xinwen zhanbao 8 (9 July, 1967), p. 1. 
67 Ibid. 
68 This is a quotation from Mao’s 1957 article “Wenhuibao zai yi ge shiqi nei de zichanjieji 
fangxiang.” 
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become evidence of Liu’s attempt to negate the newspaper’s party character. 
Once again, the article quotes Mao Zedong and then elaborates:69 
Chairman Mao has said: “What Hu Feng called ‘uniformity of public opinion’ means that 
we don’t allow the counterrevolutionaries to express counterrevolutionary opinions. 
This is correct, our system will not allow freedom of speech to any and each 
counterrevolutionary, but will restrict this freedom to the rows of the people.”70 Our 
country practices the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the proletarian press is an 
important tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It knows only one standpoint, and 
this is the standpoint of the proletariat; it can be only one kind of voice, and this is the 
voice of the proletariat; and it knows only one freedom, and this is the freedom of 
speech of the proletariat and the other labouring people! Its purpose in the dictatorship 
is exactly to curb the freedom of speech of the class enemies and to deny them the 
right to speak! 
 
In August 1950, Hu Feng had complained of the one-sidedness of the press and 
the enforced “uniformity of public opinion.”71 Expanding on Mao’s argument in his 
attack on Hu, that the press will allow a voice only to those people and groups 
agreeing with the Party line, the article gives a narrow interpretation of the way in 
which the press had to act as the single and unified voice of the Party. Once the 
press becomes “a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which is commanded 
by the Party, “news freedom” is of course an absurd notion, because it would 
require the press to abolish its Party character and open its pages to the class 
enemy, the very subject of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Neither are 
truthfulness, impartiality, and objectivity meaningful concepts: they are no longer 
treated as neutral categories, but rather as inherently biased to start with, as 
implying a departure from the basic obligation of the press to represent only the 
voice of the Party. 
This brings us back to the article’s deliberate distortion of Liu Shaoqi’s 1956 
remarks through means such as selective quotation and decontextualization, and 
the relevance of this technique for the construction of a Cultural Revolution 
newspaper theory. Distortions such as those in the Xinwen zhanbao article are 
common in all Cultural Revolution press sources, and they abound in the xiaobao. 
The ubiquity of this argumentative technique must be seen as a direct 
                                             
69 “Bu xu Liu Shaoqi cuangai dangbao de zhengzhi fangxiang.” 
70 From an “editor’s note” (anyu), written by Mao, that accompanied the second batch of anti Hu 
Feng materials: “Guanyu Hu Feng fangeming jituan de di er pi ziliao,” in RMRB, 24 May 1955. 
71 In a letter to Zhang Zhongxiao dated 13 Aug. 1950 that is excerpted in ibid. In this letter, Hu 
Feng cites the official Wenyibao as one example of how public debate in the literature and arts 
sector had been strangulated by Party fiat (according to the editors of Hu Feng quanji (Wuhan: 
Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1999, vol. 9, here p. 651), the original letter has been lost. 
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consequence of the peculiar interpretation of the first clause of the media concept: 
once the legitimacy of objectivity and truthfulness itself is negated, there is no 
longer any need to also present material that might exonerate Liu, nor would there 
even be a justification for doing so. To the contrary, the radical interpretation of 
partiinost dictates that the papers highlight the class enemy’s crimes and 
exclusively his crimes – only this is the true perspective of the proletarian press. 
This mode of thought in fact follows the logic established by Yao Wenyuan a 
decade earlier in his essay “Recorded for Reference,”72 discussed in the previous 
chapter. The denunciation of Liu Shaoqi’s remarks is thus turned into a 
prescriptive formula for the producers of the Red Guard press, an essential part of 
theoretical premises of the Red Guard press. 
 The last of the three “black flags” attacked in the long Xinwen zhanbao 
article addresses the issue of entertainment, as quweixing might be translated. 
This problem directly touches upon the second clause of the media concept: the 
media “are indispensable tools of party propaganda and party building.” How is 
this mission statement to be understood? How far must the Party papers go in 
supporting the dual efforts of propaganda and organization? Inversely, how far are 
they allowed to stray from these tasks? Are entertainment, or other forms of non-
political writing acceptable on the pages of the Party press? The quweixing issue 
touches upon these questions. 
In his 1956 talks to Xinhua journalists, Liu Shaoqi had addressed the question 
of entertainment, speaking approvingly of proposals from the journalists who had 
raised the issue of “general interest” (pubian xingqu 普遍兴趣): “[Press reports] 
must be of general interest, and at the same time attract the interest of a small 
number of specialists.”73 Liu explicitly contrasted this form of reporting with an 
exclusive focus on politics: “News must possess intellectual appeal and artfulness; 
they mustn’t only stress politics and [class] standpoint, they must also emphasize 
                                             
72 In the decade since 1957, Yao had perfected his polemic style of writing, which consequently 
became the basic formula of Cultural Revolution rhetoric. The master piece that served as the 
model for writers throughout the Cultural Revolution is, of course, his essay November 1965 essay 
“Ping xinbian lishiju Hai Rui ba guan” that had launched the Cultural Revolution. 
73 “Dui Xinhua she gongzuo de di yi ci zhishi” (28 May, 1956), in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 
xinwen yanjiusuo (ed.). Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen gongzuo wenjian huibian. Beijing: Xinhua 
chubanshe, 1980, vol. 3, p. 364. 
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intellectual appeal, artfulness, and entertainment.”74 It was on these remarks that 
the authors of the denunciation jumped (they are quoted verbatim in the article), 
once again from a class struggle logic. While Liu’s stated purpose was to interest a 
larger number of readers, including intellectuals and specialists (who were coveted 
by the CCP at the time of Liu’s speaking), these intentions were interpreted as 
incompatible with the goals of Party propaganda and organization in the Cultural 
Revolution. The effort to raise the tastes and cultivate the interests of a broader 
audience were now seen as a complot:75 
We have exposed them – in the name of spreading knowledge and entertaining, they 
try to usurp the battlefield of propaganda from our Party, edge all revolutionary content 
out of our newspapers, so as to allow the corrupt ideologies of feudalism and 
capitalism to spread freely, to poison out lives and corrupt our souls, and make us 
‘peacefully evolve’ amidst ‘knowledge’ and ‘entertainment!’ This is like murder with an 
invisible knife! 
 
Thus, the media’s exclusive task is to serve as the mouthpiece of Party 
propaganda and, through its focus on politics, as the Party’s organizational tool, 
strengthening the unity of the Party membership in the ongoing class struggle 
against the bourgeoisie. 
Following the logic developed in the long article analyzed above, Xinwen 
zhanbao took pains to expose the misbehaviour of the Chinese press under the 
influence of Liu’s “three black flags.” A good example is an article that appeared a 
a month later. Written by the “Huaihai Combat Regiment of the Xinhua Commune 
at Xinhua she,” this article denounces a 1963 dispatch from Xinhua’s foreign 
service. The title is programmatic: “The opium that benumbs the revolutionary 
masses: about a report of ‘general interest.’”76 The incident related in the article 
concerns a visit by Liu Shaoqi and his wife, Wang Guangmei, to the beach resort 
of Ngapali in Burma. The original message, a little over 500 characters, is indeed 
written in an unusual style: praising the beautiful white beach, the coconut palms 
and the light evening breeze rather than friendship between the Chinese and 
Burmese people, the authors comment on an ad hoc football match involving, 
among other dignitaries, Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi and the Burmese 
                                             
74 Ibid., p. 365. 
75 “Bu xu Liu Shaoqi cuangai dangbao de zhengzhi fangxiang,” in Xinwen zhanbao 8 (9 July 1967), 
p. 1. 
76 Xinhua she “Xinhua gongshe” Huaihai zhantuan. “Mazui geming renmin de yapian: cong yi ze 
you ‘pubian xingqu’ de baodao tanqi,” In Xinwen zhanbao 11 (20 Aug. 1967), p. 4.  
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general Ne Win as players; they day ended with a grill party on the beach. For the 
Cultural Revolution rebels, the indulgent behaviour of Liu was as utterly 
unacceptable as the form of the report itself:77 
This ‘common interest,’ ‘general interest,’ and ‘entertainment,’ which China’s 
Khrushchev has been preaching, are pure nonsense. In a class society, how could 
there exist ‘interests’ that transcend class boundaries? How could there be ‘common 
interests’? All thinking and all interests do carry the stamp of a class. China’s 
Khrushchev fraternizing with Burma’s Chiang Kai-shek does only confirm that these 
two are the same kind of maggots from the manure pit, the same stinking pack. 
 
 
The offending article had 
appeared on the first page 
of RMRB, 25 Apr. 1963. In 
order to prove their charges, 
the authors of the 
denunciation reproduced the 
article in Xinwen zhanbao, 
where it is accompanied by 
an illustration produced by 
the “Xinhua Commune Fine 
Arts Soliders.” The cartoon shows Liu Shaoqi, Wang Guangmei, and Ne Win on 
the beach, framed by two palm trees; all three are in high spirits, with the Chinese 
guests toasting their uniformed host. Scattered fish bones litter the ground, while a 
deer is roasting over the fire. The general’s hands are dripping from what might be 
interpreted as either grease or blood; his sabre, too, carries stains of unclear 
provenance. The football next to the fire is a reminder of the afternoon’s games. In 
all, the cartoon illustrates the debasement of Liu who associates with the likes of 
Ne Win, the frivolity of Xinhua of reporting on this occasion in the way it did, and 
the grave misjudgement of RMRB for highlighting such a story under the pretext of 
providing a more human image of the state president and catering to ‘general 
interest.’ 
 Is, then, entertainment principally forbidden, in the eyes of the Cultural 
Revolution newspaper makers? Not at all, as the above cartoon illustrates. 
Entertainment is, of course, appreciated even by the Red Guards and their 
                                             
77 Ibid. 
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xiaobao, on the condition that is serves the purposes of Party propaganda and 
organization. The numerous cartoons that dot the pages of many xiaobao, drawn 
with varying degrees of proficiency, attest to this practice. As long as they uphold 
the general theme of class struggle and the general political line, even jokes are 
welcome. Under the heading “Absurdities from Imperialist and Revisionist 
Newspapers” (Di-xiu baokan chouwen 帝修报刊丑闻) Xinwen zhanbao published 
the following joke:78 
There are three famous newspapers in the Soviet Union: The Truth [Pravda], News 
[Izvestija], and Russia [Rossija]. A man wants to buy a paper at a news stand and gets 
the response: Russia is still there, but there’s no Truth, and News have been sold out 
as well. 
 
While the entertainment value of this example may be debatable, jokes belong to 
the accepted repertoire of Culture Revolution newspaper making. 
The third clause of the media principle defines the media as the tool of the 
Party, as the avant-garde of the working-class, to raise the consciousness of the 
people. The Cultural Revolution authors do wholeheartedly agree with this 
stipulation. On their own, the people are bound to be led astray by the sinister 
machinations of the class enemy; it is therefore the purpose of the Party papers to 
expose the harmful intentions of these hostile elements in broad daylight, and to 
guide the working classes on the correct revolutionary path. Exposing and guiding 
are two interlocking elements, only in combination can they lead to a higher level 
of consciousness. 
The editorial in the first issue of Xinwen zhanbao – appropriately titled “Smash 
Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist news line” – explains how these two mechanisms interact 
on the pages of the Cultural Revolution press, in large and small papers alike.79 
The central task at the current moment, is to expose the “crimes” (zuixing 罪行) of 
Liu Shaoqi on the news front, “holding high the great banner of revolutionary 
criticism, closely rely on the great revolutionary masses of workers, peasants, and 
soldiers, set in motion a great mass criticism movement, and to smash thoroughly 
Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist news line!”80 Criticism is the means through which the 
various misdeeds of Liu and his followers – the article mentions Lu Dingyi, Hu 
                                             
78 Xinwen zhanbao 9 (16 July, 1967), p. 4 
79 “Polan Liu Shaoqi xiuzhengzhuyi xinwen luxian,” in Xinwen zhanbao 1 (28 Apr. 1967), p. 2. 
80 Ibid. 
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Qiaomu, and Wu Lengxi, his trusted lackeys – will be exposed. It is important that 
this criticism takes the form of mass criticism, that it requires active involvement of 
the masses: through their participation in the process of exposing and criticising 
the revisionist line, the masses are supposed to educate themselves, to raise their 
consciousness. And the newspapers, first of all the xiaobao, become the premier 
platform of this criticism movement. 
The second element in the process of raising consciousness is guidance. The 
press does of course play a crucial role in providing the correct kind of guidance. 
The editorial continues:81 
Guidance through the newspaper is of utmost importance. This guidance is an 
ideological guidance, a political guidance, the guidance of direction [方針] and policies, 
in one sentence: it is the guidance through Mao Zedong Thought, it is using Mao 
Zedong Thought to agitate among the masses, to organize the masses, and to arm the 
masses. 
 
Mao Zedong Thought is the single most important means of guidance for the 
masses, and the newspapers function as a relay for this guidance. The ubiquity of 
Mao quotations in the texts of not just the Red Guard papers, but in the Cultural 
Revolution press in general, is a clear sign for its assigned role, as are the Mao 
quotations that usually appear next to the masthead, again in both major papers 
and xiaobao (see Ill. 1a – 1c). Exposing and guidance stand in a dialectical 
relationship, enshrined in one of the most often-quoted Red Guard slogan “there is 
no construction without destruction” (bu po bu li) that is cited by the editorial as 
well. To sum up the function of Mao Thought as the “bright guiding light” (zhi lu 
ming deng 指路明灯), the editorial invokes another famous quotation from the 
Chairman: “The Golden Monkey wrathfully swung his massive cudgel, and the 
jade-like firmament was cleared of dust.”82 It is of course Mao’s Thought itself that 
serves as the great cudgel for the Red Guards to smash the revisionist line and 
guide them to the correct path. The ultimate goal of the dialectical process of 
criticism and guidance, thus, is to raise the consciousness of the Chinese working 
class, and it falls upon the media to the space for both sides of the coin. 
                                             
81 Ibid. 
82 From Mao’s 1961 poem “Qi lü – he Guo Moruo tongzhi.” Translation taken from Mao Tsetung 
Poems. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976, p. 81. This line achieved fame early in the 
Cultural Revolution when it appeared in a RMRB editorial “Hao de hen!” (23 Aug. 1966) that 
publicly endorsed the Red Guards and the notion that “to rebel is justified.” 
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Focussing on the concrete concerns of the masses and involving the masses 
in the process of newspaper making had emerged in the early 1940s as a central 
demand of the press, and had been incorporated into the media concept. Yet how 
to define “the concerns of the masses,” and to what degree they were to be 
involved, remained a perennial problem after 1949. The “mass factor” in the media 
sector is ultimately linked to the larger debate about “red” and “expert” in the late 
1950s and 1960s.83 This debate was revisited once the Cultural Revolution started; 
it is little surprising that the Red Guards associated the “expert” line with Liu 
Shaoqi, who had supposedly used this issue to deny the revolutionary people 
access to the Party’s communication channels. Inversely, the implementation of 
the “mass line” was tied to Chairman Mao. 
The contrast was made explicit in an article by “Lu Qun” 路群 (an inversion of 
qun lu 群路, short for qunzhong luxian 群众路线, or mass line) that appeared in the 
tenth issue of Xinwen zhanbao. Under the title “Fiercely attack Liu Shaoqi’s 
‘experts’ newspaper line,”84 the author(s) denounce the principle of journalistic 
professionalism, in contrast to mass involvement in the press. The article starts 
with a quotation:85 
Chairman Mao has taught us: “The people, and only the people, and the moving force 
creating world history.”86 The mass line is the fundamental line of a proletarian political 
party. How they treat the masses is the benchmark for revolution, non-revolution, and 
counterrevolution, and it has always been the focus for the revolutionary line of the 
proletariat and the reactionary line of the bourgeoisie. In the same manner, there exists 
a fierce two-line struggle on the question of how to run newspapers. 
 
The binary of class-line struggle is applied to the question of professionalism, too. 
In what follows, the author(s) prove their point with a series of quotations from Liu 
Shaoqi on the issue of professionalism; he is accused of having seized the power 
of the press, handing it over to his reactionary allies, and denying the working 
classes access to the press. Thus, the papers have become tools of the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Liu had affirmed the authority of specialists in the 
                                             
83 In his “Sixty Articles” of January 1958, Mao had proposed the formulation of ‘red,’ denoting 
political a correct political orientation, and ‘zhuan,’ referring to professional expertise. The relative 
emphasize on either of the two was subject to contestation between then and the start of the 
Cultural Revolution. Compare Goldman. China’s Intellectuals, ch. 1-4. 
84 Lu Qun. “Xiang Liu Shaoqi de ‘zhuanjia’ ban bao luxian menglie kaihuo,” in Xinwen zhanbao 10 
(30 July 1967), p. 2. 
85 Ibid. 
86 This famous quotation is taken from Mao’s “Lun lianhe zhengfu” (i.e., Mao’s political report at the 
seventh Party congress in 1945). See Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 3, p. 1031. 
 425
editorial offices and had instructed them to carefully edit and rewrite contributions 
from the masses. In the Cultural Revolution context, it was no longer important 
that the latter requirement had in fact originated in Yan’an and had been accepted 
practice all along.87 
Closely following the overall logic of the Cultural Revolution, the article goes 
on to repudiate the theory of newspaper professionalism. Only the workers, 
peasants, and soldiers are the true masters of history; they have assumed the role 
of being master in the political and economic realms, and they must do so in the 
cultural sphere as well. Who else than the master (zhuren 主人), the article asks, 
shall run the newspapers? To deny the masses access to the editorial rooms 
amounts to usurping their power and to an effort overturn the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Liu Shaoqi’s stress on professionalism, along with issues such as 
entertainment, is thus interpreted as antagonistic to mass involvement in the press 
– only capitalist newspapers bar the proletariat from running the newspapers. The 
article concludes:88 
The line of “a newspaper run by the entire Party and by the masses” is of utmost 
importance for the development of the proletarian press. This line is the concrete 
application of the Party’s mass line in press and propaganda work. Without this line, it 
is impossible to guarantee the correct political orientation of the Party papers, 
impossible to realize the Party’s leadership of the press, impossible to accomplish the 
political task of the Party papers; without this line, the newspapers cannot become the 
eyes and ears, the tongue and throat of the Party, cannot become the bridge and the 
bond between the Party and the masses. And it is for this reason that Liu Shaoqi 
desperately tries to oppose the line of “the masses running the newspapers,” 
desperately tries to shut out the workers, peasants, and soldiers [from news work], and 
gives the leading role to the ox ghosts and snake demons. 
 
Mass participation is thus a crucial element of Cultural Revolution media theory; it 
is an essential requirement for the proper functioning of the press. According to 
the author(s), none of the essential tasks of the newspapers – collecting 
information for the Party leadership, speaking in the name of the Party, mediating 
between Party and masses – can be achieved without mass involvement in the 
editorial and publishing process. 
While the discussions on the press in the Red Guard papers stay generally 
within the confines of the media concept, a few instances can be found where 
                                             
87 See chapter two on the origins of the requirement that articles written by the masses must be 
closely monitored and censored, in order to make sure that they conform with the Party line and 
current policies. 
88 Lu Qun. “Xiang Liu Shaoqi de ‘zhuanjia’ ban bao luxian menglie kaihuo.” 
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authors try to go beyond the line and explore new ideas. The article discussed 
above contains one such paragraph. In an indication of the discussions going on 
at the height of Cultural Revolution, the article pushes the problem of mass 
characterization one step further, entering terrain that had not yet been covered by 
the media concept before:89 
Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought have always held that a proletarian party 
paper must not only rely on the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers for its 
making, but the judgment and criticism of the papers’ correctness and quality should 
also be made by the worker peasant solider masses. Only if a paper is endorsed and 
approved by the masses of workers peasants and soldiers, it can count as a really 
revolutionary newspaper. 
 
The above formulation stands out by the absence of the Party as the arbiter of 
truth and correctness that is stipulated by the concept of partiinost; instead, the 
article seems to empower the masses and their reasoned judgment to a degree 
that earlier interpretations of the media concept had generally avoided. The 
author(s) cleverly packages this novel idea into the stock phrase that “Marxism-
Leninism Mao Zedong Thought have always held…,” but the failure to come up 
with an appropriate quotation from Mao, in a text that is otherwise quick to draw on 
the Chairman’s authority, signals that authors are pushing the line here, entering 
new territory. 
How do the masses judge on the Party press, and how can their 
“endorsement and approval” be institutionalized? Is the masses’ “judgment” any 
more than an abstract notion? Could the Red Guard press play a role in this 
process? The article does not elaborate on this issue of letting the worker peasant 
soldier masses judge on the Party press, and it remains open whether of not the 
right to “endorse and approve” the papers is compatible with the Party’s 
prerogative of ultimate control over the media. Yet the carefully-worded foray in 
this article gives at least some sense of the emancipation felt by the Red Guards 
and their tabloids: newspaper making during the Cultural Revolution did 
undoubtedly see an unprecedented degree of mass involvement at different levels 
of society – and not only through the Red Guard press. Perhaps the most 
important element in this process was the aforementioned rise of the big-character 
posters – or, better, big-characters papers: the Chinese name dazibao 大字报 
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suggests a continuum that starts at the grassroots and works through the xiaobao 
to the large papers. This continuum, and the changes it was supposed to bring to 
the modes of communication in the socialist Chinese society, has been thematized 
and even visualized in Xinwen zhanbao. A set of five illustrations with an 
accompanying text, produced by a Red Guard unit from Zhongguo qingnian bao, 
brings to live the ideal of mass involvement and the mass character clause of the 
media concept: 
 
Ill. 3: “Revolutionary big criticism wall posters are great!” Source: Xinwen zhanbao 17 (15 Sept. 1967), p. 
4. 
The illustrations, which take up the upper half of the issue’s last page, show with 
unusual liveliness all the stages of wall poster production: on the top most picture, 
workers, a peasant (on the left, recognizable because of his straw hat), and 
soldiers read a denunciation of Liu Shaoqi (whose name is crossed out, a common 
practice on wall posters); the second picture shows what are presumably Red 
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Guards in PLA uniforms pasting new posters to a wall. The third image depicts two 
Red Guards studying the latest instructions from Chairman Mao, copying them into 
notebooks, possibly for a reprint in the Red Guard papers. The image to the right 
shows the masses writing new posters. Finally, the grand panorama at the bottom 
presents the masses, who have acted as writers and producers of wall posters in 
the pictures above, now as readers of the same. Bridging the gap between media 
producers and consumers was the key point in the Red Guards’ interpretation of 
the fourth clause of the media principle. 
The fifth clause of the media principles reads “the media are essentially about 
education.” The media emerged as tools of instruction, both for general education 
and for Party training, in the Yan’an period; during the Rectification Campaign in 
particular, newspapers became the most widely available and up-to-date 
textbooks for political study by cadres at all levels. Collective newspaper reading 
during political study sessions was a feature of daily life after 1949 and was a 
central element of practically every political campaign, from the land reform 
movement in 1950 to the “Four Clean-ups” (Si qing 四清) campaign in 1964-65. It 
is thus only natural to see that newspapers remained a crucial tool of political 
study in the Cultural Revolution as well. How individual newspapers had dealt with 
the task of education became a topic of contention picked up by the Red Guards. 
The educational function of the media was not limited to editorials, the most 
authoritative source of information on the current political line. Ever since the 
1940s, when Mao had recommended the model soldier Zhang Side in his article 
“Serving the People,”90 the Party press had played the key role in the propagation 
of revolutionary models, figures selected for emulation by the populace. A 
discussion on the pages of Xinwen zhanbao shows how central the correct 
handling of issues relating to the emulation of heroes was for the press. A short 
article in issue 9, written by a Red Guard unit from Zhongguo qingnian bao, 
denounces an early 1966 draft document of the PD on the question of hero 
propaganda.91 The article formulates the major accusations against the 
document’s authors and provides the context of the drafting process; lengthy 
                                             
90 “Wei renmin fuwu,” in Mao Zedong xuanji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), vol. 3, p. 1004-06. 
91 Gongdaihui Zhongguo qingnian bao geming zaofan bingtuan “Yuzhou chengqing” zhandou dui. 
“Yanwang dian fumie qianxi paozhi de fangeming xinwen gangling bixu chedi pipan,” in Xinwen 
zhanbao 9 (16 July 1967), p. 3. 
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excerpts of the original document, with annotations from the Red Guards, follow 
the article – such reprints, designed to serve material as “negative material” 
(fanmian jiaocai 反面教材), are a frequent practice in the Red Guard press. 
The document in question is a draft entitled “Some problems deserving 
attention in the current propaganda in the newspapers” (Dangqian baozhi 
xuanchuan zhong zhide zhuyi de jige wenti). On 23 February, 1966, the PD had 
convened a meeting of leading cadres from the Beijing newspapers, where vice-
head Wu Lengxi called on the papers to implement the spirit of the February 
Outline, asking them to calm down the ideological atmosphere in the wake of Yao 
Wenyuan’s attacks on Wu Han’s play. In accordance with Wu Lengxi’s speech, 
Sun Yiqing 孙轶青, a PD official who had been a former editor-in-chief of 
Zhongguo qingnianbao, drafted the document. Wu had proposed to circulate the 
document through an internal publication of the PD, but when the draft was 
finished a month later, the political climate had already changed and in a last-
minute decision Wu ordered the draft to be scrapped. For the Red Guards who 
had gained access to the document, it was nonetheless proof of the sinister 
intentions of Wu Lengxi and the PD. 
The document chiefly addresses the correct handling of propaganda 
surrounding heroism and the emulation of heroes. Recent emulation campaigns 
had led to tragic excesses. The document quotes the case of a ten-year old girl 
that had been killed in the attempt to rescue an electricity worker. An unnamed 
newspaper had praised her courageous and selfless spirit and her willingness to 
sacrifice her life for others; the paper had called on its readers to study and 
emulate the girl’s spirit and the local Party committee had declared her a role 
model for the youth. The PD questioned the wisdom of providing the populace with 
examples such as this; it had detected a rise of stories about self-sacrifice since 
the onset of the campaign propagating the model soldier Wang Jie 王杰 in 
November 1965.92 Such stories, so the authors of the document, had led to 
sometimes ill-considered sacrifice of people – people who, so the argument, might 
                                             
92 All essential documents on Wang Jie, including his diary and the articles in JFJB and RMRB that 
kicked off the campaign, can be found in Wang Jie shengqian suo zai budui (ed.). Wang Jie. 
Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990. This volume was published in the context of a short and little 
successful effort to revive a number of revolutionary model heroes after the 1989 democracy 
movement. 
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have made other and more contributions to the Party’s cause. The general trend to 
disregard the value of life was worrisome, and the propagation of heroism should 
therefore be managed carefully. Worse, in the case quoted above, Hong Kong 
papers had jumped on the news report, denouncing the sacrifice of a little girl as 
brutal and inhumane. For all these reasons, the emulation of heroes and their 
propagation in the press needed to be handled with more care and consideration. 
The Red Guard commentators denounced the PD’s call for restraint as 
“opposing Mao Zedong thought,” while the girl’s reaction “…is exactly the 
Communist spirit of selflessness and giving everything for others extolled by 
Chairman Mao in his ‘three old articles.’”93 The authors point out:94 
Comrade Wang Jie is a banner planted by the General Political Department of the 
Military Commission, and he has been praised by comrade Lin Biao. To force the 
charge of propagating a so-called “reckless” spirit on the publicity campaign around on 
the accident of comrade Wang Jie is to direct the spearhead against Chairman Mao’s 
close comrade-in-arms comrade Lin Biao and against the PLA. How poisonous a plan! 
 
The authors quote other instances of what they see as PD obstructionism, such as 
admonitions not to do exaggerate the self-sacrifice of Jiao Yulu 焦裕禄, another 
model hero and subject of a major propaganda campaign. The Red Guard’s logic 
is the same: Mao Zedong personally has singled out Jiao Yulu for praise; the PD 
document must thus be opposed to the Chairman and his policies. Importantly, 
since the newspapers are the foremost vehicles of these nation-wide campaigns, 
the PD’s refusal to cooperate with the campaigns damages the paper’s ability to 
function as tools of popular education in the hands of the Party. The PD is 
accused of failing to follow one of the crucial requirements of the media concept. 
Little, then, needs to be said about the final clause of the media concept, the 
use of the media as a tool and site of class struggle. As has become apparent 
from the discussion above, class struggle is omnipresent in Cultural Revolution 
rhetoric, and the adherence to the principles of class struggle served as the 
yardstick against which the Red Guards measured the performance of the 
Chinese press. In fact, in the context of the Cultural Revolution, none of the other 
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94 Ibid. 
 431
five clauses can be thought of in isolation from the demands of class struggle. As 
mentioned above, Mao Zedong had defined the parameters for the press at the 
very onset of the Cultural Revolution by proposing: “To overthrow a political power, 
it is always necessary, first of all, to create public opinion, to do work in the 
ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the 
counterrevolutionary class.”95 The Red Guards adopted this thesis as the guiding 
principle for both the denunciation of the pre-1966 performance of the Party press, 
and as a compass defining the general editorial line of their own papers and 
publications. If the large papers were denounced as the bulwark of the bourgeois 
forces within the Party, the xiaobao were conceived as the weapons with which 
the Red Guards hoped to prepare the ground for their own revolution against the 
capitalist roaders. Like a self-fulfilling prophesy, the media had become the 
foremost tool and a major site of class struggle within the socialist Chinese nation. 
 
 
Beyond the Media Concept? “In Praise of the Red Guard Newspapers” 
As the last section has shown, the theoretical and practical reflections in the 
Red Guard press on the role and function of newspapers remain almost without 
exception within the confines of the Party’s media concept. All six clauses of the 
media concept appear in the debates on the pages of Xinwen zhanbao, and all of 
them are strongly affirmed. In neither case would the Red Guards denounce the 
clauses of the media concept. It would have been easy to link parts or the whole of 
the media concept to Party leaders other than Mao, to those currently under attack, 
and thus to repudiate the concept itself – the media concept had emerged in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s as the Party’s collective project, and others than Mao 
had contributed to its formulation as well. Yet in the quarter century since its 
emergence, the media concept had become the underlying framework of thinking 
for all players in the media sector, and thanks to its flexibility, it had proven 
adaptable to the changing ideological prerogatives as a most effective mechanism 
to steer the press. Rather than denouncing the media concept, the Red Guards 
constructed their arguments from a different vantage point: they sought for 
instances in the Party’s seventeen year history of managing the press that could 
                                             
95 See the “August 8 Decision” of the CC. 
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be interpreted as violating the text or the spirit of the media concept. Liu Shaoqi 
and his followers in the propaganda xitong were accused of not fulfilling the 
theoretical premises of the media sector. 
There were, however, a few attempts to look beyond the theoretical 
stipulations of the media concept. The Cultural Revolution promised a radical 
departure from all dogmatic structures and institutions, and the sudden 
appearance of the Red Guards themselves showed that new organizational forms 
and ideas were possible. The xiaobao were used overwhelmingly to attack the 
pre-1966 propaganda line, yet a few instances can be found in Xinwen zhanbao 
showing that reflections among at least some of the Red Guards went further, that 
some of them were willing to explore new terrain. The above-mentioned attempt to 
reinterpret the clause about mass involvement, while confined to a mere two 
sentences, is one such instance. A much bolder effort to rethink the nature of the 
socialist Chinese public sphere shall be discussed here. 
In issue 19, Xinwen zhanbao printed a page-long article called “In Praise of 
the Red Guard Newspapers” (“Zan hongweibing bao” 赞红卫兵报).96 This article is, 
in another sense as well, a rare departure from the usual practice of the news 
sector xiaobao: while the Red Guard papers tend to comment in much detail on 
the traditional newspapers, they do only rarely reflect on their own position and on 
their eventual role in a post-Cultural Revolution public sphere. This article is a 
notable exception. Towards the end of September 1967, in the course of the 
nationwide crackdown on the escalating violence of the previous weeks, pressure 
on the Red Guards mounted and thousands of xiaobao were forced to cease 
publication. In this situation, Xinwen zhanbao published “In Praise of the Red 
Guard Newspapers” in a last minute attempt to affirm the legitimacy of the Red 
Guard press. Under the pseudonym Chen Chen 陈晨, the author(s) from Beijing 
People’s Broadcasting Station (Beijing renmin guanbao diantai 北京人民广播电台) 
present an elaborate and very eloquent defence of the xiaobao, stressing their 
important function within the public sphere. 
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From the very beginning, the article tries to emphasize the significance of the 
Red Guard papers by presenting them in their larger historical context:97 
The four seas are rising in rage, and thunder rolls over the middle kingdom. 
The year 1966 is of tremendous significance in the history of mankind, and it marks a 
great leap forward for the international Communist movement. The Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in China has greatly enriched the treasure house of Marxism-
Leninism. Like bamboo sprouts after the rain, new things and objects full of strong 
vitality have been springing up everywhere. Following the rise of the great Red Guard 
movement over the Eastern horizon, another new object has appeared: the Red Guard 
newspapers that cheer and shout for the Red Guards. The appearance and 
development of the Red Guard papers is a great innovation in the history of the 
proletarian press and a great victory for Chairman Mao’s news line. In the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Red Guard papers have made enormous 
contributions and have earned eternal merit. The Red Guard papers deserve our loud 
praise. 
 
In this short paragraph, the authors(s) try to enlist as many legitimizing references 
as possible: the Red Guard papers are tied to their creators, the Red Guards, to 
Mao and his “news line” (ban bao luxian 办报路线), to the Cultural Revolution itself, 
and finally to the world Communist movement. The following paragraphs elaborate 
on this genealogy, presenting the reader with a short history of the Red Guard 
press. The appearance of the Red Guards is the logical consequence of the 
sharpening of class struggle in the nation, and they were endorsed in their mission 
by Mao who received them on Tiananmen square. The Red Guards had initially 
taken recourse to leaflets and big character posters, but eventually they created 
their own newspapers; the Red Guard papers were thus born amidst fierce class 
struggle, becoming weapons in the hands of the hands of their creators.. 
In the article, the Red Guard papers claim to be the most effective tool for the 
propagation of Mao Zedong Thought and the highest directives of the Party centre. 
Until the Cultural Revolution, the newspapers tried to suppress Mao’s thoughts 
and his instructions; in contrast, the Red Guard papers have devoted their entire 
space to the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought and have thus helped it to 
spread into the remotest corners of the nation. The xiaobao have thus assumed 
the role originally ascribed to the large papers. This contrast, of course, is meant 
to threaten all those who try to shut down the xiaobao: suppressing the Red Guard 
papers, the most effective means of propagating Mao Zedong Thought, is nothing 
short of an attempt to curb the influence of the Chairman and this Thought! 
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The article then goes on the revisit the accomplishments of the Red Guards 
press over the past twelve months. Invoking Mao’s ubiquitous “To overthrow a 
political power…” quotation, the author(s) stress the great merits of the Red 
Guards papers in denouncing the capitalist roaders within the Party and publishing 
extensive denunciations of those subjected to criticism at all levels, from “China’s 
Khrushchev” Liu Shaoqi at the very top, to the toppled leaders of the thousands of 
individual work units. Finally, the Red Guard papers have given extensive 
coverage to the myriad struggle meetings taking place all over the nation – far too 
numerous to receive adequate coverage from the remaining large papers. 
The most important argument in favour of the Red Guard papers, however, is 
the degree of mass involvement in the process of newspaper making that the 
xiaobao have allowed. The article quotes Mao Zedong: “With our newspapers, too, 
we must rely on everybody, on the masses of the people, on the whole party to run 
them, not merely on a few persons working behind closed doors.”98 Mao’s demand 
for popular involvement, taken from his widely propagated 1948 conversations 
with journalists of Jin-Sui ribao, is contrasted with the idea of news professionalism 
attributed to Liu Shaoqi. In this light, the author(s) observe:99 
The little generals of the Red Guards have never studied the ‘science’ of journalism, 
they know nothing about the ‘five Ws’ and the ‘eight factors.’100 But they are warriors in 
the revolutionary struggle, storm troops of the Cultural Revolution, each of their pens is 
a sword directed at the enemy, every single of their papers is a battleground. The little 
generals of the Red Guards live among the masses, they have the broadest mass base, 
their newspapers carry out the mass line in the most thorough way. The major problem 
that remains unresolved after more than a decade – the detachment of those doing the 
reporting and those doing practical work – has been finally overcome in the Red Guard 
newspapers. 
 
The final proposition points in the direction of the general argument the article 
wants to make. In retrospect, the core problem in the Party’s propaganda sector 
since 1949 has been the CCP’s inability to find a proper solution for the “red” vs. 
“expert” problem; the continued existence of a journalistic corps that has remained 
detached from the masses has provided the bourgeoisie with an opportunity to 
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launch a comeback – the editorial offices of the socialist nation have become the 
breeding ground of the new bourgeoisie. Any return to the old system would 
therefore necessarily entail the same problems all over again. In contrast, the 
article suggests, the Red Guard papers themselves are the solution to the Party’s 
dilemma in the propaganda sector. They are not a transitional phenomenon during 
the “hot” phase of the mass movement, but must become a permanent element of 
the structure of the socialist Chinese public sphere. The article ends on a clearly 
affirmative note: 
With their resolute and courageous action, the Red Guard newspapers have criticized 
the bourgeois, revisionist news line in a most thorough way. This is a great revolution 
with involvement of the masses on an unprecedented scale in the history of the 
proletarian press; it is a new victory for Chairman Mao’s news line. The Red Guard 
newspapers have made a tremendously useful and valuable contribution to the 
experience of the proletarian press, a contribution that deserves to be seriously studied 
and explored by every revolutionary news worker. Let us loudly and with revolutionary 
enthusiasm praise this great new thing of historical significance, let us loudly and with 
revolutionary enthusiasm praise this great innovation in the history of the proletarian 
press! 
 
The article derives the legitimacy of the Red Guard press from Mao’s personal 
endorsement as much as from the positive contributions that the xiaobao have 
made in the course of the Cultural Revolution. While both arguments are intended 
to isolate them from criticism, it is the latter argument that makes them 
independent even from Mao’s personal aura. The author(s) are wise not spell out 
the further implications of their claim, but they are clear from the argument: 
whereas the large papers, the Party press, are conceived as organs of the Party 
bodies at the central and local levels (or at least as the organs of the provisional 
organs of power that had replaced the Party committees since spring 1967 – the 
Revolutionary Committees), the xiaobao do not stand in a clear hierarchical 
relationship with any formal institution. They are run by Red Guard organizations 
that proclaim their loyalty to Mao Zedong but remain otherwise autonomous. While 
large umbrella organizations of various Red Guard factions were formed since late 
1966 and early 1967, the groups united under their roof generally retained a high 
degree of autonomy – including the right to publish their own newspapers, which 
were not subject to editorial control of the umbrella groups. Such a perspective 
however, outlines a decidedly different take on the structure of the public sphere: 
the author(s) of the article perceive of the xiaobao as a bulwark against newly 
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arising bourgeois influences in the press – as an independent watchdog. This is 
the logical consequence of the Red Guard’s own argument about the ultimate 
character of the mass organizations’ publications, were these to be made 
permanent. What is strikingly absent in “In Praise of the Red Guard Newspapers” 
is a clear commitment to the first clause of the media concept and the demand of 
partiinost, or Party character. 
However large the leeway given to the Red Guards and their propaganda 
outlets, and notwithstanding the high degree of editorial autonomy the xiaobao had 
eventually enjoyed – an independent watchdog beyond the reach of Party control 
was not acceptable to the CCP, and not to Mao Zedong. Xinwen zhanbao ceased 
publication shortly after “In Praise of the Red Guard Newspapers” appeared, and 
the last xiaobao were closed down over the next two years. 
 
 
Conclusion 
With the dismantling of the Red Guard press in 1968 and 1969 and the slow 
reconstruction of the Party papers in the early 1970s, from the provincial level to 
the municipal levels and beyond, the Cultural Revolution as a revolution in the 
realm of the superstructure – which is by definition codeterminous with the 
propaganda sector – seems to have come full circle. The Party leadership, and 
Mao Zedong in particular, became convinced of the incompatibility of the xiaobao 
with the prerogatives of press control and Party propaganda. 
The Red Guard press had emerged in the fall of 1966 in a spontaneous 
process, drawing on the proliferation of large character posters and wall papers on 
the one hand, and on the takeover of official student papers and school 
publications on the other. Their appearance was closely tied to the rise and fall of 
their creators, the Red Guards, and the revolutionary mass organizations. When 
the regular structures of authority were sidelined after the Red Guard power 
seizures in early 1967, xiaobao spread across the nation; their total number 
remains unknown until today. With the rise of the xiaobao came the decline in 
prestige of all but a handful of newspapers at the top: the “two papers and one 
journal” (RMRB, JFJB, Hongqi), which find their equivalent in the CRSG that 
controlled them – the Party apparatus suffered a decline similar to that of the press. 
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At the same time, the borders between xiaobao and large papers remained porous: 
the Red Guard papers consciously modelled themselves after the large papers, 
editorial content was exchanged in both directions, and a few selected xiaobao 
even made the transition into dabao. With the escalating violence throughout 1967, 
however, it became evident that the Red Guards were notoriously difficult to 
control by the Party leadership; battles in the streets were accompanied by verbal 
battles in the Red Guard press, especially in the smaller papers of the ‘third” 
category at the work unit level. Once the Red Guards showed signs of asserting 
their autonomy in a more self-conscious and assertive manner, the time of their 
disbanding had come. It is little wonder that “In Praise of the Red Guard 
Newspapers” signalled not the beginning of permanent and institutionalized 
autonomy for the Red Guard press, but their imminent closure.101 The Party 
leadership had opted to return to order from the anarchy of the past two years. 
The biggest paradox about the Cultural Revolution press remains the 
continued functioning of the Party’s control over the media, at a time when the 
institutional apparatus in control of the propaganda sector came down in spring 
and summer of 1966. Party bodies charged with oversight over the press had 
existed virtually from the founding of the Party, and had always been one of the 
two ‘wings’ of Party work. Yet the central PD and its local equivalents crumbled 
under the attacks on the ‘demon king’ and his followers, and no functioning 
bureaucracy was put in its place for more than a decade, until 1977. As one of the 
Party’s core institutions, the PD was among the last to be rebuilt after the Cultural 
Revolution. Yet even without this or another body in overall charge of the 
propaganda field, the Cultural Revolution is arguably the era that saw the highest 
degree of published ideological conformity since the founding of the People’s 
Republic. 
It is in view of this paradox, I suggest, that the real power of the Party’s media 
concept becomes visible. The media concept was developed in the early 1940s, a 
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time when the CCP was undergoing a fundamental transformation in the 
Rectification Campaign and the institutional structure saw significant changes. In 
this setting, the media concept emerged as a theoretical construct that existed by 
virtue of its ideological value, independent or above any particular institutional 
arrangement. In other words, the media concept exists not for the institutions of 
control, but the institutions exist for the implementation of the media concept. 
Powerful as they may appear (and actually be under normal political 
circumstances), they are but one part of what I have called the “mechanics of 
control.” They remain a mechanical component, but the driving force that sets 
these mechanics in motion is the media concept. Once the Party, or, in this case, 
Mao Zedong, decided the discard the mechanical institutional apparatus that was 
being perceived as dysfunctional, the media concept would not necessarily come 
tumbling down with the structures that supported it; it merely sought for alternative 
ways of ensuring Party control of the Chinese media. 
In the heated political and ideological battles of the Cultural Revolution, the 
media concept once more proved its value, due largely to the flexibility of its 
formulations and thus its adaptability. With little difficulty, the Red Guards could 
dissociate the concept from the institutions and the persons they were fighting; 
Mao’s personal involvement in its formulation in the early 1940s made it easy to 
associate the concept with the Chairman himself. This move, supported by ample 
quotations that appear in bold print, and even by collections of quotations for this 
very purpose (see the first issue of Xinwen zhanbao) was sufficient to provide 
legitimacy to the media concept with a new lease of life. Applying the general logic 
of Cultural Revolution ideology, two-line struggle, to the media sector, the Red 
Guards took literal each single element of the media concept, loudly affirming its 
content, and attacking their enemies on charges of not fulfilling or even violating 
the prescriptions of the media concept. As a consequence, the Red Guards and 
their papers themselves moved into the role of press control; their adherence to 
the media concept made sure that control over the Chinese press – both xiaobao 
and large papers – was never really in question throughout the Cultural Revolution. 
The Red Guards were eventually disbanded, but their ideology stayed on until the 
arrest of the Gang of Four, ensuring that dissent, once it became more widespread 
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in the 1970s, was by and large kept out of the public realm and driven 
underground. 
The dismantling of the Red Guard press, however, led to a real dearth of the 
press after 1969, that could only be relieved by allowing an increasing number of 
pre-1966 newspapers and journals to resume publication. This, of course, did not 
resolve what the article “In Praise of the Red Guard Newspapers” had identified as 
the main problem of the Party’s media work since 1949: the question of mass 
involvement in the process of newspaper production. The article had hinted to a 
latent tension, or even contradiction, between two central aspects of the media 
concept: the first and the fourth clause, the stipulations requiring Party character 
and popular participation. The authors of the article were unable to provide a 
solution for this dilemma; it was ultimately up to the Party to search for ways to 
accommodate the two demands. Under the impact of the Cultural Revolution 
attacks, the pre-1966 publications had lost most of their legitimacy, and their 
resurrection in the early 1970s did little to imbue them with new life. The 
effectiveness of Party propaganda went into a decline that reached its deep point 
after the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976. The propaganda sector had 
lost nothing of its importance to the political life of the Party, so one of the most 
urgent tasks to be addressed by the post-Mao leadership was to rebuild the 
credibility and legitimacy of the press and propaganda apparatus. This involved 
greater leeway for the Party’s publications, a fresh debate over the role of the 
media in a socialist society, and an adaptation of the media concept to the new 
circumstances. The following chapter will look into one crucial debate taking place 
in 1979-1980. 

Chapter Eight 
No Taboos for Reading:  
Dushu and the Thought Liberation Movement 
 
“The field of theory work is immensely vast; our theory workers must have 
courage and vision, must dare to proceed from reality and point out new 
problems, as well as to solve them.” 
(Hu Yaobang, January 1979) 
 
“We must lift the taboos; we must liberate any books that may help us to 
absorb cultural nourishment and contribute to the realization of the four 
modernizations – no matter if they are Chinese or foreign, old or new. Let 
them prove their worth in practice.” 
(Li Honglin, April 1979) 
 
The end of the Cultural Revolution left the Chinese populace in a state of 
fatigue; the revolution that was supposed to remake the superstructure had in 
effect eroded the belief of wide segments of the people in the effectiveness of the 
logic of class struggle, the dominant paradigm of the past two decades. The arrest 
of the Gang of Four had removed from power the most unpopular figures in the top 
leadership, who consequently became a convenient scapegoat for all that had 
went wrong since 1966. Hua Guofeng’s economic programme promised at least a 
partial shift from ideological mobilization to economic construction, albeit under the 
banners of Mao Zedong Thought, Great Leap Forward slogans, and Cultural 
Revolution rhetoric. To regain the initiative and rebuild the legitimacy of the Party, 
however, a more through-going debate on the goals and the means of the Chinese 
revolution was needed, a debate that would re-evaluate the nation’s history since 
1949 and arrive at a new definition of the PRC’s “state of affairs” on the path to 
socialism. Such a debate started soon after the fall of the Gang and eventually 
brought Deng Xiaoping into power. 
Since the media had been a core tool of governance ever since 1949 (and 
before that a tool in the CCP’s struggle to seize power), a general debate on the 
credibility and effectiveness of the main pillars of the Party’s ideology did invariably 
affect the definition of the nature and the function of the media. In other words, the 
media concept itself was on the test stand. Once the Party moved from revolution 
to reform, from isolation and world revolution to opening and international 
cooperation, from class struggle to economic construction – how would the media 
henceforth be imagined? Could the media concept with its emphasis on Party 
control, enlightenment and transformation, populism, and class struggle be 
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adapted to the new ideological and political realities? Would it be necessary to 
reach a fundamentally new understanding of the media, for example, to re-classify 
them from administrative agencies to economic enterprises? 
As I will show in this chapter, a lively debate on the nature and the functions 
of the Chinese media set in accompanying the larger political debates that had led 
up to the Party’s Third Plenum in December 1978 that brought Deng Xiaoping into 
power and passed his policy package of reform and opening (gaige kaifang 改革开
放).1 These broader discussions culminated in the “Theory Conference” (Lilun 
gongzuo wuxuhui 理论工作务虚会), a major meeting in Beijing that was designed 
to communicate the new policy initiatives to intellectuals and cadres in the 
propaganda sector.2 The conference lasted, with interruptions, from January to 
April 1979 and went hand in hand with the rehabilitation of victims of the political 
campaigns of the last twenty years – a measure to win back the trust of a crucial 
segment of the intelligentsia, whose input was needed to drive the reform efforts. 
One outcome of the Theory Conference was the founding of the journal Dushu 读
书 or Reading, that led the debate on the media and was to become the most 
influential intellectual journal in the 1980s. 
In this chapter I will first of all inspect the policy documents that resulted 
from the Third Plenum and the Theory Conference. These documents contained 
the normative framework for the entire propaganda sector for the next decade. I 
will then turn to the journal Dushu and the major debate that began to sound out, 
from the journal’s very first issue, the legitimate limits of public discourse on the 
media. Dushu was founded in April 1979 on the credo proclaimed by a seminal 
article: “No Taboos for Reading” (Dushu wu jinqu 读书无禁区). With this 
                                             
1 Chinese historiography tends to overemphasize the significance of the Third Plenum. While it was 
the juncture that saw the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping, the “four modernizations” policy (si ge 
xiandaihua 四个现代化) did indeed date from the early 1970s and must be attributed to Zhou Enlai. 
Compare Barry Naughton. “Industrial Policy During the Cultural Revolution: Military Preparation, 
Decentralization, and Leaps Forward” in William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, David Zweig 
(eds.). New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution. Cambridge, Ma.: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, 1991, p. 153-81. In 1975, the field of literature saw important initiatives 
of normalization that are documented in Xia Xingzhen. 1975: wentan fengbao jishi. Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1995. Several of the best-known pieces of “scar literature” 
(shanghen wenxue 伤痕文学) were published before the Third Plenum. To attribute any and all 
political changes to the Third Plenum goes therefore too far, the momentous role of the meeting in 
modern Chinese history notwithstanding. 
2 See Merle Goldman. “Hu Yaobang’s Intellectual Network and the Theory Conference of 1979,” in 
The China Quarterly 126 (1991), p. 219-42. 
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provocative theme, the journal tried to promote open debate in all fields and to 
allow a competition of opinions, thus echoing policy signals of the Third Plenum 
and the Theory Conference. Concentrating on the taboo debate, I will establish the 
vision that speaks from the programmatic articles in the journal’s founding issue: 
Dushu was conceived as a platform for free debates, where the authors and their 
readers could engage in unrestricted discourses, bound only by their personal 
sense of responsibility and their loyalty to the Party’s cause. I will then inspect a 
series of related arguments that emerged in several articles in late 1979 and lifted 
the debate onto a new level, touching in particular on issues that had hitherto been 
considered as too sensitive to be discussed openly. Finally, I will examine a 
number of voices critical of Dushu’s initial position – voices that appeared in the 
journal itself and must therefore be seen as a conscious expression of the editors’ 
intention to live up to their initial promise and give room to diverse opinions. Dushu 
reacted on these critical voices and the political pressure exerted on it with a 
strong reaffirmation of its initial editorial line two years after its founding. 
The “Taboo” debate discussed in this chapter relates to a much larger issue 
known as the “thought liberation movement” (sixiang jiefang yundong 思想解放运
动). After the Cultural Revolution, large sections of public discourse were handed 
back to the media and the intellectuals running them, as the Party withdrew from 
micro-management of the propaganda sector. To rebuild its legitimacy, the CCP 
hoped to stimulate economic construction and social development by loosening 
the restrictions placed upon society. The media were called in to give their active 
support to these reform efforts; giving more leeway to journalists and editors was 
conceived as a strategy to convince them to throw their support once again behind 
the Party. Since the Party’s general aim, however, was to secure its own position, 
it tool care to keep a close eye on the “strategic heights” of the propaganda sector. 
The opening of the media went only so far as it did not contradict the fundamental 
interests of the Party. These two objectives created a tension, and the debates on 
Dushu’s pages were an attempt to find out where to draw the border. As the larger 
political line shifted, however, the magazine found itself more and more becoming 
a bulwark of the thought liberation movement, resisting pressure to tighten the 
reins in the ideological field. Periods of increased pressure and those of relaxation 
alternated throughout the 1980s. 
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In the instable political climate of the 1980s, the media concept made the 
successful transition to the “new era;” its central prerogatives could be adapted to 
the needs of the reformist CCP. The discussions in Dushu show the search for a 
creative new interpretation of the media concept, an interpretation that grants 
space for innovative thinking while remaining within the central parameters of the 
concept. Proposals that would move beyond the media concept did emerge in the 
debate, but these suggestions were ultimately rejected by the CCP. 
Dushu’s efforts to mediate between these competing objectives must also 
be seen as a function of its very nature. The journal emerged as an outspoken 
platform for liberal ideas, yet while it encouraged independent thinking and 
innovative ideas, it was not its distance from the political authorities that allowed 
the journal to establish its reputation as a courageous path breaker in intellectual 
affairs, but rather its closeness to a reform-oriented leadership: Dushu rose to 
prominence with the strong backing of high-level establishment intellectuals-cum-
cadres. It was founded and run by people highly positioned in the national 
propaganda apparatus who used a window of opportunity to further liberal thought 
in China. The same people continued to protect the journal after the CCP 
propaganda authorities were handed over to more conservative cadres. This 
peculiar construction means that the debate in Dushu reflects the deliberations on 
the nature of the media within the propaganda xitong at a crucial time when this 
xitong was dominated by exceptionally liberal and open-minded leaders. The 
debate also explains how and why the debate ended up affirming rather than 
rejecting the media concept. In its new interpretation, the Party’s media concept 
continued to dominate the media sector in the reform decade that followed the 
Third Plenum. 
 
 
The Great Turn-Around: Reform Politics 
In his seminal speech at the Central Work Conference that immediately 
followed the Third Plenum, Deng Xiaoping gave his assessment of the current 
situation: the task ahead for the CCP was “the turn-around of the core of our 
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Party’s work.”3 The general line of the CCP was to be redefined: Mao Zedong had 
set the Party on the path of “class struggle as the key link” (yi jieji douzheng wei 
gang 以阶级斗争为纲); Deng Xiaoping now made “economic construction” the key 
link (yi jingji jianshe wei gang 以经济建设为纲). The change in the general line of 
the CCP was the affirmation of the reform policies for which the coalition around 
Deng Xiaoping had fought; it illustrated Deng’s rise to become the paramount 
leader of the Party. 
The great turn-around (da zhuanbian 大转变) had immediate consequences 
not only for the economic sphere, but produced the need for a general 
reorientation of the policies in the “superstructure” – including the media sector. 
First and foremost, the media, which had served the objectives of class struggle – 
in particular during the Cultural Revolutions – were now to became agents 
supporting the Party’s strategy of economic construction and to create a stable 
social and political environment for this purpose. Yet the four modernizations, the 
primary vehicle of economic construction, also required the reassessment of the 
role of intellectuals in the production process: knowledge and expertise were 
crucial factors in the modernization of the Chinese economy. The rehabilitation 
alone of millions of intellectuals was not enough.4 Rather, their strained 
relationship with their former persecutors from the “worker and peasant classes” 
had to be mediated. As a compromise formula, the Party declared physical and 
mental labour to be of equal value.5 The social status of intellectuals (or, more 
adequately, educated people in general) was confirmed in 1982 when they were 
officially acknowledged as part of the working class.6 
The signal for the intellectuals was Deng Xiaoping’s call for “thought 
liberation” (sixiang jiefang 思想解放). He placed his speech at the Central Work 
                                             
3 “Jiefang sixiang, shi shi qiu shi, tuanjie yizhi xiang qian kan” (dated Dec. 13, 1978) in Deng 
Xiaoping wenxuan. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994, vol. 2, p. 140-53, here p. 147. 
4 The intellectuals were newly defined as members of the working class immediately after the Third 
Plenum. See “Wanzhengde zhunquede lijie dangde zhishifenzi zhengce” (signed “ben bao teyue 
pinglunyuan”) in RMRB, Jan. 4, 1979. 
5 This issue is discussed in Rudolf Wagner. “The Concept of Work/Labour/Arbeit in the Chinese 
World” in Manfred Bierwisch (ed.). Die Rolle der Arbeit in verschiedenen Epochen und Kulturen. 
Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003, p. 103-36, esp. p. 104-12. 
6 See Hu Yaobang’s work report at the 12th Party Congress “Quanmian kaichuang shehuizhuyi 
xiandaihua de xin jumian” in RMRB, Sept. 8, 1982. 
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Conference under this motto and explained the need for more freedom in the 
intellectual arena:7 
Only if thought is liberated can we, guided by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought, find correct solutions for the problems left over from the past, as well as for 
newly emerging problems, and correctly reform the relations of production and the 
superstructure that do not correspond with the rapid development of the productive 
forces; [only if thought is liberated] can we determine the concrete road, the orientation, 
methods, and measures for the realization of the four modernizations under the actual 
conditions of our country. 
 
In the Marxist understanding of China’s situation in late 1978, the superstructure 
did no longer correspond to the productive forces of the economic base. To bring 
back into accord thinking and material production, the Party had to allow free 
thinking and to encourage the “workers” of the superstructure, i.e. the intellectuals, 
to engage in debates and to make their own contributions to the Party’s project. 
Deng declared: “The more people we have in the Party and among the people’s 
masses who are willing to use their brains and think over problems, the better for 
our cause. During both revolution and reform, we need a batch of path breakers 
who dare to think, to explore, and to make innovations.”8 Deng Xiaoping’s motive 
to initiate the opening up of the intellectual sphere was the promotion of the PRC’s 
economic development. The method he proposed was the proper implementation 
of the “system of democratic centralism” (minzhu jizhong zhi 民主集中制): “An 
extremely important condition for the liberation of thought and for people to use 
their brains is the proper carrying out of the system of democratic centralism. We 
need centralized and unified leadership, but only if we have a sufficient amount of 
democracy, we can achieve real centralism. At the present time, we must place 
special emphasis on democracy.”9 Deng could not stress the democratic element 
any more explicitly. 
Deng Xiaoping claimed legitimacy for his policies by emphasizing the link to 
Mao’s “Double Hundred” policy and called on the Party to implement the Hundred 
Flowers.10 Consequently, he urged cadres “currently we must pay special attention 
to overcoming bureaucratism.”11 Doing so was in fact a reversal of the policy shift 
of June 8, 1957, when large numbers of intellectuals were made to suffer for their 
                                             
7 “Jiefang sixiang, shi shi qiu shi, tuanjie yizhi xiang qian kan,” p. 141. 
8 Ibid., p. 143. 
9 Ibid., p. 144. 
10 Ibid., p. 145. 
11 Ibid., p. 149. 
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efforts to do exactly that – battling bureaucratism. At the same time, Deng tried to 
convince hesitating cadres that almost thirty years after the founding of the PRC, 
there was nothing to fear from competing opinions – to the contrary: “A 
revolutionary political party fears nothing more than being unable to hear the voice 
of the people; the most frightening thing is absolute silence.”12 Deng Xiaoping was 
thus giving the decisive signal for the opening up of discussion in his speech at the 
Third Plenum. 
Less than four weeks after the end of the Plenum, the Theory Conference 
was convened in Beijing. The aim of this meeting was to communicate the policy 
shift to high-level cadres of the propaganda xitong who were responsible for 
elaborating the new policies and to explain them in the terms of Marxism-Leninism. 
The Theory Conference must be divided into two periods, separated by the 
holidays of the lunar new year. Merle Goldman has commented on the distinct 
character of the two stages that resulted from the sudden turn in the political 
climate when Deng Xiaoping ordered the crackdown on the Democracy Wall 
Movement.13 Yet the Theory Conference was conceived from the outset to be 
divided into two stages: the participants in the first stage, lasting from January to 
February, were propagandists from Beijing and from the central-level organs, while 
a larger number of cadres from the provinces and from lower-level organs were 
invited to join the second stage of the conference.14 
It was the task of Hu Yaobang, head of the PD since the Third Plenum, to 
hold the opening speech of the conference and to prepare the attending cadres for 
the issues that they were to be confronted with. Hu formulated the aims of the 
conference: “What are the goals we have convened this theory conference for? 
First, to summarize the general experiences and lessons on the theory and 
propaganda frontlines. ... Secondly, to study the basic task of our theory and 
                                             
12 Ibid., p. 144f. The notion of “absolute silence” can, of course, be contested, as the last chapter 
has shown. Deng’s remarks are better understood as encouraging tolerance for differing and 
competing opinions initiated by the Party; such Party-endorsed competition had indeed been muted 
during most of the two decades since the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 
13 Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era. Cambridge, 
Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 47-61. On the Democracy Wall Movement see Andrew 
Nathan. Chinese Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, ch. 1. 
14 See the announcement in Hu Yaobang’s speech at the conference’s opening ceremony “Lilun 
gongzuo wuxuhui yinyan” in Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting (ed.). Dang de xuanchuan 
gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, p. 
247-58, here p. 249. See also Goldman. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy, p. 47-61. 
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propaganda work after the shift of the Party’s general focus of work.”15 To do so, 
Hu called for “thought liberation” and echoed Deng Xiaoping’s call for free 
discussion: “During this conference, we must carry on the spirit of the Third 
Plenum and the CC work conference [immediately following the Plenum]; 
everybody must liberate their minds, start their engines, speak as they wish to, 
and fully restore and promote intra-Party democracy and our Party’s fine traditions 
of seeking truth from facts, the mass line, and criticism and self-criticism.”16 The 
tradition Hu Yaobang wanted to see continued was that of the Hundred Flowers. 
In his speech, Hu identified three key tasks for theory and propaganda 
workers for the period ahead. The first was to “consciously read the works of Marx, 
Lenin, and Mao Zedong.”17 A new approach to Mao Zedong Thought had been the 
core issue of the “theory criterion” debate that had raged through summer and fall 
1978: with the slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” (shijian shi jianyan 
zhenli de weiyi biaozhun 实践是检验真理的唯一标准) Deng’s supporters had 
rejected Hua Guofeng’s claim to be the legitimate heir of Mao, based on the “two 
whatevers” (liang ge fanshi 两个凡是: “we will resolutely uphold whatever policy 
decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions 
Chairman Mao gave”).18 Also rejected were the Cultural Revolution policies that 
Hua had tried to continue. Deng Xiaoping’s alternative policy package and his 
claim to power were legitimated by a new, pragmatist interpretation of the official 
ideology. After Deng’s triumph at the Third Plenum, the new approach had to be 
consolidated to prepare the ground for the next moves of the reform coalition. 
These new policies, too, had to be explained in the terms of Mao Zedong Thought 
– the theory and propaganda workers were expected to shoulder the bulk of this 
new task. 
The second task outlined by Hu was to “face reality” (mianxiang shiji 面向实
际), another reference to the slogan of the truth criterion debate. “Facing reality” 
was but another formulation for the creative application of Marxism: “Marxism-
                                             
15 “Lilun gongzuo wuxuhui yinyan,” p. 248f. 
16 Ibid., p. 249. 
17 Ibid., p. 255. 
18 On the truth criterion debate see Michael Schoenhals. “The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy” in 
CQ 126 (1991), p. 243-68, and Schoenhals (ed. and trsl.). The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy, 
publ. as Chinese Studies in Philosophy 25.2 (1994). The most comprehensive treatment is Shen 
Baoxiang. Zhenli biaozhun wenti taolun shimo. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997. 
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Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought is the theoretical foundation guiding all our 
work. We must firmly hold on to this foundation, and not for a single moment we 
can betray it. However, if theory does not face up to reality and does not solve the 
real problems, then this can be no longer called relying on Marx and Lenin, but 
means rather to lie on them sleeping.”19 A flexible approach to ideology did allow 
the reformers to address the four modernizations and other reform-related projects 
within a redefined framework of Marxism that would lend legitimacy to these 
policies. 
Hu’s last point addressed the main theme of Deng Xiaoping’s talk at the 
Third Plenum: thought liberation. In the spirit of Deng, Hu declared: “The field of 
theory work is immensely vast; our theory workers must have courage and vision, 
must dare to proceed from reality and point out new problems, as well as to solve 
them. They must adopt a scientific attitude of upholding truth for the interests of 
the people, and they must oppose the bad practice of selling out their principles in 
favour of individual profits.”20 Encouraging discussions was a precondition to solve 
the problems the CCP faced. The aim of thought liberation, according to Hu 
Yaobang, was to overcome dogmatism: “We must liberate our minds from the 
state of paralysis and half-paralysis, liberate them from the force of habit of small 
production, and from the [practices] of ‘regulating, blocking, and suppressing 
everything’ of bureaucratism. We must smash all ‘taboos [jinqu 禁区],’ break into 
pieces all shackles of the mind, and fully promote democracy of theories.”21 
Thought liberation was designed, first of all, to encourage competition of opinions 
in the field of theory. To leave behind the “shackles” of the past two decades, Hu 
proposed not only a greater diversity of voices, but also more variety in the fields 
that were open to discussion. In the last section of his speech Hu explicitly 
addressed the representatives of the newspapers and the propaganda 
departments present at the Theory Conference and commented on two areas in 
particular that he hoped would be discussed more broadly in the papers: the issue 
of socialist democracy, and the “mass line.” Both topics were hotly debated during 
the “Democracy Wall Movement” that had brought to the streets and into the 
population the same issues discussed behind the doors of the Theory Conference. 
                                             
19 “Lilun gongzuo wuxuhui yinyan,” p. 256. 
20 Ibid., p. 257. 
21 Ibid., p. 256. 
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By encouraging “thought liberation,” Hu Yaobang called for nothing short of 
“smashing all ‘taboo areas’” (chongpo yiqie “jinqu” 冲破一切禁区). The same 
formulation appears at two more instances in Hu Yaobang’s speech, stressing the 
importance he attached to the “taboo” issue.22 To break down the all too narrowly 
defined limits of public discourse became the main trend in the development of the 
Chinese media in the 1980s. The founders of Dushu magazine were quick to 
capitalize on Hu’s speech and made his formulation into the rallying cry for their 
new journal. 
 
 
Dushu and the Taboo Debate 
Dushu published its first issue in April 1979, but the preparations for the 
journal had begun in late 1978, immediately after the Third Plenum.23 Two men 
were involved in the process of the journal’s conceptualization from the very first 
hour: Chen Hanbo 陈翰伯 and Chen Yuan 陈原. Both were veterans of the 
publishing sector. Chen Hanbo (1914-1988) had joined the CCP at age 22, the 
same year he graduated from the School of Journalism at Yanjing 燕京 University. 
He had worked with a number of newspapers and after 1949 joined Xinhua she 
and held medium-level positions in the CCP PD. In the 1950s, Chen was in charge 
of  the CC organ Xuexi 学习 until he was made head of Shangwu yinshuguan and 
later Renmin chubanshe.24 The linguist Chen Yuan (b. 1918, unrelated to Chen 
Hanbo) had received training in the Xinzhi and Sanlian publishing houses. After 
1949 he worked with Sanlian and was made vice editor-in-chief of Renmin 
chubanshe and later editor-in-chief of Shangwu. Both men had closely cooperated 
for decades and shared many common viewpoints. 
 
                                             
22 Ibid., p. 250, 251. 
23 On Dushu and its founding see Shen Changwen. “Chu yu wuneng” (dated Oct. 2000). This 
article has been circulating widely on the Internet, for example at 
http://www.cc.org.cn/wencui/oldwencui/ zhoukan/1117adaa22.htm (downloaded May 10, 2003); it 
appears also in Shen Changwen. Gelou renyu: Dushu de zhishifenzi huiyi. Beijing: Zuojia 
chubanshe, 2003. 
24 On Chen Hanbo see “Zi ni xiao zhuan” and “Cong xiao duzhe dao lao bianji,” both in “Chen 
Hanbo wenji” bianxiezu (ed.). Chen Hanbo wenji. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2000, p. 351f. and 
424-28. 
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When institutional reconstruction after the onslaught of the Cultural 
Revolution began in 1970, both men quickly rose to high-level positions in the 
publishing sector: Chen Hanbo first served as director and editor-in-chief of 
Renmin chubanshe and in 1978 became acting head of the State Council’s 
Administrative Bureau of Publishing Affairs. Chen Yuan was made a member of 
the Bureau’s Party group and was concurrently director and editor-in-chief of the 
prestigious Shangwu yinshuguan. So by late 1978, the two Chens were high-level 
cadres who as a matter of fact controlled the Chinese publishing sector. It was 
from this position that they initiated the journal Dushu. As Sanlian was not an 
independent publisher but existed in name only, they borrowed Sanlian’s name for 
the journal that was in fact run by Renmin chubanshe. It is thus fair to say that 
Dushu was nothing less than the unofficial organ (jiguan 机关) of the Bureau of 
Publishing Affairs.25 
Dushu magazine was not born in a conceptual vacuum. Rather, it was 
modelled after a journal published by Shenghuo shudian back in the 1940s: Dushu 
yu chuban 读书与出版. This magazine had started in 1946 as a forum where 
Shenghuo advertised its new books; in early 1947, the publisher decided to turn it 
into a regular journal with a new design and a proper editorial board.26 The board 
members were Zhou Jianren, the historian Du Guoxiang 杜国庠, Ge Baoquan 戈宝
权 (a translator specializing in Soviet literature), Chen Hanbo, and Chen Yuan. A 
veteran Shenghuo man, Shi Mei 史枚,27 was made editor-in-chief; Chen Yuan took 
over in this position after Shi left for Hong Kong.28 Dushu yu chuban presented its 
readers a broad variety of issues, focusing on books of “progressive” content; the 
journal hoped to make readers sensitive to the problems China was confronted 
with and to introduce foreign knowledge to China. The journal thus placed itself in 
the May Fourth enlightenment tradition, with the leftist leaning typical for Sanlian 
                                             
25 This assessment has been supported by interviewee 109. 
26 On the background of Dushu yu chuban and Dushu’s relation to this journal see Shen Changwen. 
“Chu yu wuneng.” Dushu yu chuban was closed by the GMD authorities after only 21 issues in 
1948. 
27 Shi Mei (1914-1981) joined the CCP as early as 1931 and worked as a propaganda cadre in the 
Shanghai underground. He worked for a number of leftist journals and joined Shenghuo in 1939. 
After 1949 he was made head of Sanlian’s editorial department and later joined Renmin chubanshe. 
The open-minded Shi was declared a Rightist in 1957 and rehabilitated only twenty years later. 
28 See Chen Yuan. “Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhi san jia chubanshe de zazhi he wo” in Chen Yuan 
chuban wenji. Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1995, p. 461-64, here p. 464. 
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journals. The magazine’s slogan read: “a general interest journal of intellectual 
reviews, focusing on books” (yi shuji wei zhongxin de sixiang pinglun de 
zonghexing zazhi 以书籍为中心的思想评论的综合性杂志).29 
For the first issue after the 1947 reform, Dushu yu chuban had asked the 
well-known educator Sun Qimeng 孙起孟 for a contribution that in fact must be 
read as a statement of intent of the journal itself.30 Under the title “Knowledge and 
Learning” (Xuewen yu wen xue 学问与问学), Sun elaborated on the relation 
between learning (xue 学), critical and independent thinking (wen 问), and the 
purpose of knowledge (xuewen 学问). Sun proposes that “knowledge is mankind’s 
cognitive tool to explain and solve the problems of life,”31 but cautions that this 
practice-related character of knowledge can develop properly only if learning is 
closely bound to a concrete purpose: “Learning must focus on questions! A great 
scholar [xuezhe 学者] is necessarily a great asker [wenzhe 问者]! If one does not 
dare to ask or is not good at asking, then it is not suitable to talk about knowledge 
[xuewen 学问].”32 Inversely, critical thinking is a necessary condition for successful 
studying: “Whoever wants to learn, must first ask! He must first learn to ‘ask!’ Only 
when he has learned to ‘ask,’ he has [grasped] the foundation of knowledge.”33 
Sun ends his article with a Marxist turn: “Truth is objective; knowledge is the 
subjective reflection of truth. ... Our learning must focus on ‘questions;’ first we 
must learn to ‘ask,’ and when we have learned this we might start asking 
questions. Only when ‘asking’ and ‘learning’ have arrived at the same level, this 
may be called true knowledge.”34 Real knowledge is a reflection of reality, but it 
can become “real” only through earnest study and free and critical thinking. This 
call became the guide for action for the young journal Dushu yu chuban, and it 
was these ideas that inspired the founding of Dushu thirty years later – ideas that 
                                             
29 See Shen Changwen. “Chu yu wuneng.” 
30 In Dushu yu chuban 1947.1, p. 1-3. My assumption that Sun’s article was more than just a 
contribution to the journal is based on the fact that his core arguments were repeated by the 
journal’s former editors even decades later as their own motto, even without quoting Sun. For 
example, Chen Hanbo. “Cong xiao duzhe dao lao bianji,” p. 426. 
31 Sun Qimeng. “Xuewen yu wen xue,” p. 1. 
32 Ibid., p. 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 3. 
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the patrons of Dushu had internalized a generation earlier, before the founding of 
the PRC.35 
After the Third Plenum the conditions to start a journal in the tradition of 
Dushu yu chuban seemed ripe: the “Truth criterion” debate of 1978 had formulated 
the same ideas as contained in Sun Qimeng’s article, and Hu Yaobang’s talk at 
the Theory Conference confirmed the same line: to promote discussion and free 
thinking in order to generate input for China’s modernization drive. Chen Hanbo 
and Chen Yuan used their administrative positions and sought another man of the 
Dushu yu chuban team to serve as Dushu’s first editor-in-chief: Shi Mei. With the 
strong support of other well-known establishment intellectuals, such as the 
translator Feng Yidai 冯亦代,36 who agreed to assume the position of a vice editor-
in-chief, the two Chen’s went ahead with their venture.37 Yet while the idea for 
Dushu certainly came from the two Chen’s, it is unlikely that so prominent a 
venture could have gone ahead without approval and support from people placed 
even higher in the CCP’s hierarchy. The self-confidence of Dushu suggests 
considerable trust of the editors in their backing, which may be sought in the 
environs of Hu Yaobang, or possibly even in Hu himself, who in 1979 was PD 
head. 
A considerable amount of support was indeed necessary for a journal such 
as Dushu. In analogy to its predecessor, the journal declared it’s motto to be “a 
journal of intellectual reviews, focusing on books” (yi shu wei zhongxin de sixiang 
pinglun kanwu 以书为中心的思想评论刊物).38 This characterization had profound 
implications. Reviewing of ideas had been monopolized for decades by none other 
than the theoretical organ of the CCP CC – Hongqi. As a “journal of intellectual 
                                             
35 Sun Qimeng’s article was not explicitly mentioned in Dushu. This may be attributed in part to the 
journal’s editorial policy to refrain from addressing its readers directly, but to speak to them through 
the journal itself. The only explicit programmatic statement of Dushu was “Liang zhounian gao 
duzhe,” which is discussed below. My assumption that the 1947 article inspired the two Chens 
when they founded Dushu is based on their close association with Dushu yu chuban in the 1940s 
and the programmatic nature of the article. Finally, the name of the modern Dushu is a direct 
reference to the 1940s journal and its tradition. 
36 Feng Yidai (b. 1913) had been active in the publishing field since the Republican era; after 1949 
he held positions in the General Press Administration. Since 1952 Feng led the Foreign Languages 
Press and was vice editor-in-chief of the English-language monthly Chinese Literature. 
37 On the involvement of the two Chen’s and the founding of Dushu compare also Chen Fong-ching, 
Jin Guantao. From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: the Chinese Popular Cultural Movement 
and Political Transformation, 1979-1989. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997, p. 168f. 
38 See Shen Changwen. “Chu yu wuneng.” 
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reviews,” Dushu in fact entered into direct competition with the Party’s powerful 
mouthpiece.39 It did so on the basis of the Hundred Flowers policy that Deng 
Xiaoping had called for in his speech at the work conference following the Third 
Plenum. The goal that the founders had set for the journal was ambitious indeed. 
Dushu’s first issue was scheduled for April, but while the journal’s launch 
was still being prepared, political events were once again overtaking the efforts of 
the editorial board. A change in the situation became apparent in February 1979 
when newspapers began to talk about people who, under the pretext of 
democracy, tried to do harm to China’s social and economic stability – a reference 
to the Democracy Wall activists. The second half of the Theory Conference was 
held in a markedly different atmosphere, and on March 30 Deng Xiaoping 
addressed the Conference. In his speech, he delivered a sobering message:40 
The Centre maintains that, to carry out the four modernizations in China, we must 
uphold four cardinal principles in ideology and politics. This is the basic prerequisite for 
realizing the four modernizations. These four principles are: 
1. We must keep to the socialist road; 
2. we must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
3. we must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; 
4. we must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
 
With the four cardinal principles, Deng Xiaoping had outlined the absolute borders 
of free discourse. The thought liberation movement had helped to bring Deng back 
into power, but when he saw his newly won power endangered by the very forces 
he had called in, the new paramount leader closed the lid on free debates. 
It was under these circumstances that the first issue of Dushu reached the 
audiences. In a bold move, Dushu chose to ignore the speech Deng had held only 
a few days earlier, and to go ahead with a format that rather answered to Hu 
Yaobang’s January speech and Deng’s speech at the December 1978 work 
conference. The change in the political climate had been in the air even before 
Deng’s March 30 speech, so the editors of Dushu would have had enough time to 
accommodate, or even to postpone the launch date in order to conform with the 
new political line. Choosing to do neither, they put their new slogan squarely in 
front of a nationwide readership: “no taboos for books!” 
                                             
39 Dushu was reminded of its precarious undertaking sometime in the 1980s during a confrontation 
with “a leader in the discourse [i.e., propaganda] circles (yi wei yulunjie de lingdaoren 一位舆论界的
领导人).” See ibid. 
40 “Jianchi si xiang jiben yuanze” in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan 2.158-84, here p. 164f. 
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Such is the title of the front article in Dushu’s first issue. Instead of a notice 
of publication (fakanci 发刊词) or another form of introduction, Dushu chose a 
format that could not be closer to Sun Qimeng’s programmatic article in Dushu yu 
chuban. For this purpose, Chen Hanbo and Chen Yuan had asked the scholar Li 
Honglin 李洪林 for a powerful contribution. After the Cultural Revolution, Li had 
established himself as an open-minded intellectual with a liberal inclination.41 Even 
more important, Li was the deputy head of the CCP PD’s Theory Bureau. With him, 
Dushu had won one of the CCP’s most prominent theoreticians for its first issue; 
due to Li’s close association with Hu Yaobang (Hu had arranged Li’s transfer to 
the PD), the journal hoped to boost its political standing. 
“No Taboos for Reading” is a straightforwardly argued but highly readable 
article of the very kind that became known later as the “Dushu style,” combining 
intellectual appeal (sixiang xing 思想性) with readability (kedu xing 可读性). Li 
Honglin laments the deplorable situation of the Chinese book market, that is still 
characterized by a dearth of books – even more than two years after the fall of the 
“Gang of Four.” He likens the persecution of books during the Cultural Revolution 
with the search for criminals on the run: whoever was found in the possession of 
such “criminals,” or books, was declared guilty by association. The books 
themselves, like common criminals, were locked up for more than a decade, if they 
did not fare even worse and were pulped to produce paper for the printing of new 
books of a more “revolutionary” nature. In Li Honglin’s opinion, the cultural 
authorities had wreaked more havoc under the “Gang of Four” than the censorship 
regimes of the Qing period or Chiang Kai-shek: instead of compiling lists outlawing 
thousands of books, during the Cultural Revolution a single positive list of slightly 
less than one thousand books had existed, with anything else being banned from 
book stores and libraries.42 
                                             
41 The Dushu article was not Li Honglin’s only answer to Deng Xiaoping’s “four cardinal principles.” 
In a famous series of three articles in RMRB, he offered a liberal interpretation of Deng’s new 
policy. See “Women jianchi shenmeyang de shehuizhuyi?” in RMRB, May 9, 1979; “Women jianchi 
shenmeyang de wuchanjieji zhuanzheng?” in RMRB, June 22, 1979; “Women jianchi shenmeyang 
de dang de lingdao” in RMRB, Oct. 5. Li had written a fourth article that could not be published due 
to opposition from Hu Qiaomu. See Hu Jiwei. “Bing xue qi qing, jin shi qi jian: zhuisi Wang Ruoshui 
tongzhi” (dated Feb. 2002) at http://www.wangruoshui.net\jinian\hujiwei.htm (downloaded Feb. 28, 
2003). 
42 According to Li, two issues of what was presumably a periodical, with the title Kaifang tushu mulu 
were issued at an undisclosed date, containing ca. 1000 books of the humanities (wenke). I have 
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The situation had slightly improved in 1978, when an increasing number of 
reprints entered bookstores across China. Yet the general situation was far from 
satisfactory:43 
But, the taboos for books have not been lifted entirely, because a matter of principle 
has not yet been clarified, and the poison of the “Gang of Four’s” cultural despotism is 
still around and creating mischief; some of our comrades still shudder at the thought of 
[things past]. 
This matter of principle is: Do the people have the liberty to read? 
 
With this question, Li Honglin has arrived at the crucial point in his argumentation. 
For him, the answer is obvious: “To seal up books in the shops and libraries, to 
search other people’s houses and confiscate their books, to inspect and seize 
books  at the customs offices or the post office, and to burn or pulp books at will – 
all these acts apparently proceed from one legal assumption: that the people have 
no freedom to read books. The people themselves have no power to decide which 
books to read and which not, and therefore also which plays to watch, which films 
to see, and what music to listen to, etc.”44 To restrict the circulation of books in 
society is, first of all, illegal. Li calls for more freedom for the Chinese people, the 
freedom of access to reading matter, and, by implication, also the freedom to 
publish many and varied books – a diversity of books to choose from is the 
precondition for the people to regain those rights that the “Gang of Four” is 
accused of denying to them. 
The question that necessarily arises is, can “good” and “bad” books equally 
be published? Or, in Li’s words, “what policy shall we adopt towards all the 
different kinds of books, including fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds?”45 
History has shown that the power of judgment on “good” and “bad” can lead to 
disaster if it falls into the wrong hands. During the Cultural Revolution, all criteria of 
judgment, be they political or moral, had been turned upside down. As a 
consequence, not only the criteria themselves had lost their credibility, but what 
was at stake was the moral authority of the Party to legitimately make such 
                                                                                                                                      
been unable to locate this extremely interesting publication. Li’s observation notwithstanding, there 
were of course numerous lists of denounced books circulating during the Cultural Revolution in all 
kinds of Red Guard publications. 
43 Li Honglin. “Dushu wu jinqu” in Dushu 1979.1, p. 2-7, here p. 4. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 6. 
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judgments. Like many other intellectuals, Li had lost the trust in the CCP’s wisdom, 
or at least in the policy of banning books:46 
Yet generally speaking, making a policy out of “banning books” is a product of feudal 
despotism. Feudalism profits from the people being stupid. The less culture the masses 
have, the easier they can be manipulated, and the easier they will follow the will of 
those in authority. For this reason all feudal rulers practice cultural despotism and 
compile long lists of “banned books.” In fact, “banning” is often a powerful impetus to 
promote the circulation of books – because these so-called “banned books” for the 
greater part are good books loved by the masses, and the more you try to ban them, 
the more they will circulate. And therefore “closing the door in a winter night to read 
banned books” has become a great pleasure in all feudal times; if there was no “book 
banning policy,” there would be not be such “pleasure.” 
 
This latter observation, too, must be seen as a direct consequence of the Cultural 
Revolution, when the puritanism of the cultural authorities had ended up being 
counterproductive and had rather encouraged a grey market of illegal books that 
were exchanged and sometimes even hand-copied.47 
Li Honglin calls the negative interventions into the publishing sector a 
blatant failure that had served neither the people (who were denied access to 
“spiritual nourishment,” jingshen liangshi 精神粮食) nor the Party, since the people 
were even more attracted by the forbidden matter. The excessive control 
measures introduced during the Cultural Revolution to tighten the grip on the 
media had damaged their effectiveness, and also the effectiveness of the media 
concept that governed media work, and that had allowed for the excesses 
firsthand. Li Honglin proposed an entirely different approach to the problem:48 
As Marxists, we do not face the civilization of all mankind with an attitude of hate, fear, 
and bans, but adopt an analytical, critical, and constructive approach. At the same time 
we are confident that the proletarian culture, which represents the highest level of 
mankind, is able to defeat all hostile ideologies, to overcome the shortcomings our 
culture displayed in the past, and to build an even higher culture on the present basis. 
Therefore we do not adopt a “book banning policy,” and we do not prohibit the people’s 
masses coming into contact with negative things. Twenty-two years ago, comrade Mao 
Zedong criticized some Party members, saying that they knew too little about negative 
things. He said: “The books of Kant and Hegel, Confucius and Chiang Kai-shek, all this 
negative stuff must be read.”49 
 
                                             
46 Ibid., p. 6. 
47 Comp. Perry Link. “Hand-Copied Entertainment Fiction from the Cultural Revolution” in Perry 
Link, Richard Madsen, Paul G. Pickowicz (eds.). Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in 
the People’s Republic. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1989, p. 17-36. 
48 Li Honglin. “Dushu wu jinqu,” p. 6. 
49 “Zai sheng, shi, zizhiqu dangwei shuji huiyi shang de jianghua” (dated Jan. 27, 1957) in Mao 
Zedong xuanji 5.330-62, here p. 346. Note that this is a quotation from the Hundred Flowers period. 
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Drawing legitimacy from Mao Zedong, Li calls on the Party to have confidence in 
its own project and to place more trust into the people’s ability to follow the Party 
line on their own account. The socialist culture of the PRC has nothing to fear from 
competition with other schools of thought. This far-reaching argument, of course, 
was possible only after the “great turn-around” decided at the Third Plenum: the 
shift from class struggle to economic construction also contained a re-evaluation of 
the last clause of the media concept. The role of the media as weapon and arena 
of class struggle had dominated media policy ever since 1957; under the new 
political climate, other aspects of the media concept became the focus of attention. 
The Third Plenum thus must be seen as a major turning point in PRC media 
policy. Yet does this mean that the 35 year-old media concept was discarded? Li 
Honglin shows that the media concept does still apply in the new situation:50 
Not banning is naturally not tantamount to letting things drift along. The Party’s 
leadership of editing, translating, publishing, distribution, and reading must be 
strengthened, in order to strengthen the Marxist camp. All those books that tarnish 
human dignity, corrupt the social ways, and poison the minds of the youth, must be 
rigorously suppressed, because such books do not belong to culture at all. They are 
extremely dirty and, as Lu Xun has said, are not better than excrements and snot.51 
 
There is still a bottom line that cannot be crossed: the leadership of the CCP. Yet 
after the Third Plenum it was not difficult for a liberal Marxist like Li Honglin to 
accept this bottom line, as many intellectuals were confident that in the new setting 
they would be able to promote their own ideas and to claim enough freedom for 
themselves. Li’s understanding of the bottom line is quite clear: it is absolutely 
necessary to sort out those books that cause deliberate damage to the Party’s 
cause, which is also that of loyal intellectuals. For Li, it is completely possible to 
tell “fragrant flowers” from “poisonous weeds;” what he rejects is the overly narrow 
interpretation of this process, that had ended with the large-scale – and in Li’s 
eyes unjustified – book bans during the Cultural Revolution. Li’s intention is clear: 
there must be a limit to what is allowed. This line is reached whenever books are 
found to be openly hostile to the projects of the Party. The CCP has the right and 
the power to determine the direction of the country, and the media, including 
books (or a magazine like Dushu) ultimately have the function to support the Party 
                                             
50 Ibid., p. 7. 
51 Such a remark of Lu Xun is widely reported, but I have been unable to find it in his writings. 
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in its efforts. It is not the media concept itself that has changed, but rather the 
strategies that are employed to guide the media in fulfilling their mission. 
The official strategy of the time is thought liberation, the banner that Deng 
Xiaoping had declared at the Third Plenum. Deng had called on the Party to open 
up their minds so as to be better prepared to meet the challenges of modernization. 
Li Honglin echoes that call:52 
The main problem in the field of books currently is a critical shortage of good books, is 
that the thinking of some people has not yet been sufficiently liberated, is that the 
masses do still lack the democratic right to read books – but that does not mean that 
things should be left drifting along. To meet the needs of the four modernizations, we 
hope sincerely to see more and better books. We must lift the taboos; we must liberate 
any books that may help us to absorb cultural nourishment and contribute to the 
realization of the four modernizations – no matter if they are Chinese or foreign, old or 
new. Let them prove their worth in practice. 
 
To achieve the goals of the reform policy, there is only one way to go in the media 
sector: to get rid of the numerous taboos that strangle free discussion and bog 
down the enthusiasm of the intellectuals who are the main audience of a journal 
like Dushu. Li concludes his article:53 
In the world, there is no absolute “purity.” In the air, there is always some dust, and in 
water there are always some microorganisms and other matter. We must have 
confidence in the human respiratory organs to clean the dust and in the digestive 
tract’s ability to deal with the microorganisms. Otherwise we would have to wear a gas 
mask and drink only distilled water. After lifting the taboos for our books, there will 
certainly (certainly, not possibly) appear some really bad books (and not just those that 
the false monks [i.e., the “Gang of Four” and their followers] have called “bad books”). 
This is something we can definitely anticipate and that we need not fear. Let the people 
face them, and they will know how to deal with them. 
 
Li Honglin calls on the Party to have faith in the ability of the Chinese people to 
judge right from wrong and to draw the correct lessons from the books they read. 
The same logic, of course, applies to the intellectuals in charge of Dushu, and in 
the entire media sector: they deserve the CCP’s trust to follow their own 
understanding and to adhere to the Party policies. 
Li Honglin’s article is a courageous piece for the boldness with which he 
makes his argument: he cannot accept compromises when the liberty of the 
people to read, and thus to enlighten themselves, is at stake. The date of 
publication – shortly after Deng Xiaoping had signalled his retreat from the thought 
liberation policy – helped to draw attention to the article. Its programmatic nature 
                                             
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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was underlined further through its position on the first pages of the journal, a 
conscious parallel to Sun Qimeng’s article in Dushu yu chuban. Another 
intervention of Dushu’s editors made sure that Li’s article would have the planned 
impact: the article had originally been entitled “Reading must also do away with 
taboos” (Dushu ye yao pochu jinqu 读书也要破除禁区).54 Yet the editors decided 
to change this title into “No Taboos for Reading” (Dushu wu jinqu 读书无禁区) – a 
much more provocative slogan. They did not even bother to tell Li Honglin. It was 
little wonder that the article caused an uproar when it was published and triggered 
a major debate. 
“No Taboos for Reading” was accompanied by a number of shorter articles 
in the same issue addressing the same topic. Four essays elaborated on the 
theme of Li Honglin’s article and drew attention to particularly deploring aspects of 
China’s book market. Considering the fact that all four articles are signed by 
pseudonyms and that they all take up Li Honglin’s main theme – the authors had 
obviously read Li’s essay – I consider it likely that the small quartet stems from the 
pens of Dushu’s editors. The first article is entitled “Liberate ‘neibu books’” and 
criticizes the practice of publishing excessive numbers of books for a restricted 
readership (neibu 内部).55 Many different kinds of books were classified for limited 
distribution, including the works of “revisionist” authors such as Bernstein and 
Kautsky, but also the memoirs of Richard Nixon or seemingly innocent academic 
works such as Tongjian jishi benmo 通鉴纪事本末.56 In the years 1975-1977 alone, 
more than 1,500 books were published for internal circulation, with some 
publishing houses classifying more than fifty per cent of their output as neibu. 
Even worse, the author laments the strict hierarchy of neibu books, that carefully 
limits access to different levels of the political and administrative ranks. The author 
calls on publishing houses to abolish these excessive forms of secrecy, that do 
                                             
54 See Shen Changwen. “Chu yu wuneng.” Li himself later remembered that the original title had 
read “Smashing the taboo for Reading” (Dapo dushu jinqu 打破读书禁区). See his Lilun fengyun. 
Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1986, p. 20f. Yet since Shen claims that he is still in possession of the 
original manuscript (See “Shushang xianhua: Shen Changwen dushu luntan fangtan lu,” July 3, 
2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14738/25835/1949052.html; downloaded Aug. 18, 2003), I 
consider the title he gives to be more reliable. 
55 Yu Chen. “Jiefang ‘neibu shu’” in Dushu 1979.1, p. 8-9. The two characters making up this name, 
yu 雨 and chen 辰, combined become zhen 震 – tremor of earthquake. Nothing less than an 
earthquake in the book market was needed to liberate the ‘neibu’ publications. 
56 A popular work of historiography by the Song dynasty scholar Yuan Shu 袁枢 (1131-1205). 
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more harm than good: “I think that we should let our young people (of course only 
those young people that are able and willing to read these books) come into 
contact with this kind of negative examples; we may call this collecting 
experiences by braving the storms – instead of becoming ‘hothouse flowers.’ What 
is wrong with doing so? Even less do we need to mention researchers who need 
these kinds of books.”57 Negative examples (fanmian jiaocai 反面教材) were 
regularly circulated as study materials during the Hu Feng campaign, the anti-
Rightists campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and other mass movements. The 
author thus calls for trust into the readers’ ability to digest this fare even without 
the Party’s guidance. The argument is the same as that in Li Honglin’s article: to 
have more confidence in the audiences’ ability to deal with the books they read 
without falling prey to the corrupting influences of non-proletarian literature.58 
Another article addresses a related problem: the scarcity of books is 
aggravated not only by an excessive number of books classified as neibu, but also 
by the habit of many work units to “swallow up” newly appearing books to provide 
them to their leading cadres: “And especially if it happens that Xinhua shudian has 
been allocated a few dozen bestselling books, typically each member of some 
standing committee buys a volume, no matter if they need it or not; and the 
propaganda and theory organs that need these books for their work do not even 
catch a glimpse of them.”59 Books are thus channelled to unproductive purposes, 
to the disadvantage of the professionals on the one hand, and the general readers, 
the people, who only rarely get the opportunity to purchase interesting new books 
through the regular channels, on the other hand. 
The third article laments the difficulty of importing foreign print products to 
China: “The customs ‘pass’” (Haiguan zhe yi guan 海关这一关). Too many foreign 
language books are stopped by the Chinese customs service and sent back; this 
practice, so the author, does harm to China at a time when the CCP’s 
modernization project required the large-scale import of foreign knowledge. 
                                             
57 Yu Chen. “Jiefang ‘neibu shu,’” p. 8f. 
58 Besides the politically motivated arbitrary decisions on books, there are other reasons why books 
are labelled neibu, which the author does not mention. A substantial number of translations, for 
example, were classified as neibu because they were unauthorized and the Chinese publishers 
paid no copyright fees; this is supported by a quick glance at Zhongguo banben tushuguan (ed.). 
Quanguo neibu faxing tushu zongmu, 1949-1986. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988. I am grateful to 
Rudolf Wagner for bringing this point to my attention. 
59 Xin Shan. “Zhizhi ‘qintun’” in Dushu 1979.1, p. 8-9, here p. 8. 
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Without access to foreign language literature, intellectuals and publishing houses 
are hard pressed to increase their output in foreign translations. The approach the 
author proposes corresponds to that put forward by Li Honglin: “We honestly hope 
that we proceed in everything we do from the four modernizations and do truly 
trust our people, that we liberate our thinking a little bit, and that we walk a little 
faster.”60 Trust in the people (and especially in those in the publishing industry) is a 
prerequisite for modernization. 
The last essay deals with China’s library system: “Borrowing books is 
difficult.”61 The author likens Chinese libraries (tushuguan 图书馆) to “store houses 
for forbidden books” (jinshuguan 禁书馆): too short opening hours that conflict with 
most people’s regular working hours, bad and slow service, a mountain of 
bureaucratic regulations restricting access, and finally an excessive number of 
books locked up in “special collections” (te cang shu 特藏书) are making life 
difficult for those readers who have been unable to purchase the books they need 
in the bookstores and therefore have come to the libraries to read. 
The issue of libraries was discussed in another article that appeared a 
month later, in Dushu’s second issue.62 The author, Fan Yumin 范玉民 (probably a 
pseudonym, “against ignorance among the people,” a word play on yumin 愚民),63 
starts with an unusual idea: the Chinese word for ‘library,’ tushuguan 图书馆, could 
in fact be shortened as follows: . This new character shows the character shu 
书 (book) in a square encirclement – a book in a prison. Chinese libraries, so Fan, 
have become nothing less than prisons where books are incarcerated (qiujin tushu 
de jianyu 囚禁图书的监狱), sometimes for decades. Even after the Cultural 
Revolution, progress has been slow, and most books have remained under 
detention. Fan Yumin calls for the libraries to open all “four doors,” that is the four 
sides of the encirclement, and thus to liberate the books. The argumentation that 
follows is familiar from the articles of the first issue: the excessive restrictions on 
the access to books are unreasonable and prevent the people from informing 
themselves and raising their “cultural level.” Even worse, they are an impediment 
                                             
60 Huang Lun. “Haiguan zhe yi guan” in Dushu 1979.1, p. 10-11, here p. 11. 
61 Huang Ke. “Jie shu nan” in Dushu 1979.1, p. 10-11. 
62 Fan Yumin. “Shu/Tu bixu si men da kai” in Dushu 1979.2, p. 11-16. 
63 I am grateful to Barbara Mittler for suggesting this reading. 
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on modernization and reform. Fan calls on the authorities to open up the libraries, 
to trust the people – and especially to have faith in their ability to deal with books 
considered politically incorrect. He even suggests that everyone willing to read it 
should be given access to Chiang Kai-shek’s Zhongguo zhi mingyun 中国之命运: 
only few people would voluntarily read such reactionary writings anyway, and 
those who did would certainly be bored. There was nothing wrong with letting the 
people taste the propaganda of times long gone by. After living under socialism for 
thirty years, the Chinese people would no longer be corrupted by reading such 
works.64 
This argumentation in fact characterizes the self-understanding of the 
journal Dushu that found its first expression in the “No Taboos for Reading” debate: 
throughout the 1980s, Dushu tried to touch on issues that hitherto had been 
untouched and to bring up new ideas, from both China and from abroad.65 The 
journal claimed legitimacy for its editorial line from the reform and modernization 
policies and in particular from Deng Xiaoping’s call for thought liberation. These 
policies made it easy for the intellectuals, and especially those in the media sector, 
to support the Party line. Yet Dushu clearly had its own agenda, as became 
apparent soon thereafter: it was in the self-interest of the Chinese intellectuals to 
create a larger space of public debate in which they could legitimately manoeuvre. 
After the Cultural Revolution, the intellectuals’ revolutionary enthusiasm was 
eroded to a degree where they found it reasonable to demand their particular 
rights ever more consciously. Journals such as Dushu were a medium for the 
intellectuals’ quest: they were in search of greater independence from the 
government, and at the same time searched for avenues to participate actively in 
politics. On the initiative from the intellectuals who were running them, the media 
were trying to redefine their status and their relationship with the government. 
 
                                             
64 Zhongguo zhi mingyun was modelled after Hitler’s Mein Kampf and was published in 1943. 
Interestingly, the leftist Shenghuo shudian published another collection of Chiang’s speeches in 
1939 with the argument that people should study it widely in order to understand the book’s 
arguments and reject them. See Xu Juemin. “Shenghuo shudian wei he chuban Jiang 
weiyuanzhang kang-zhan yanlun ji” in Chuban shiliao 7 (1987), p. 36-37. In his Dushu article Fan 
Yumin also suggests that books such as those of the Chinese Trotskists and the members of the 
Hu Feng clique, in 1979 still labelled counter-revolutionary, should be open to everyone, quoting 
the same reasons. 
65 Shen Changwen summed up this approach with the slogan “Opening whatever bottle is still 
closed” (na hu bu kai ti na hu 哪壶不开提哪壶). See “Chu yu wuneng.” 
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The Debate Widens: Thought Liberation 
The debate in Dushu was not limited to the taboo issue. The larger question 
of thought liberation (sixiang jiefang 思想解放) featured prominently on the 
journal’s pages from the very beginning. In the taboo debate, leading 
establishment intellectuals had called for more freedom in publishing and in the 
book trade. In general, they echoed the new Party line that had emerged at the 
Third Plenum, because they could identify their own demands with this line. 
Consequently, they remained within the limits of the media concept in a number of 
respects: first and foremost, the journal seemed to toe the Party line by advocating 
thought liberation and the four modernizations (in the light of Deng’s speech on the 
“four cardinal principles,” of course, it must be said that they opted for a selective 
approach). Secondly, the leadership of the Party and its right to determine the 
direction of the propaganda sector was questioned nowhere in the debate: the 
appeals to open up libraries or to ease the customs regulations on books all 
proceeded from the premise of the Party’s power and its right to determine the 
proper direction. Most importantly, however, was the intellectuals’ adherence to 
the general normative project that guided the propaganda sector: all articles of the 
taboo debate defined the function of books in the terms of enlightenment and 
education. Even where the people were allowed access to more diverse reading 
matter, the ultimate goal remained the “raising of standards” and the improvement 
of “cultural levels.” 
The thought liberation debate touched on more fundamental issues. From 
the first issue, Dushu made efforts to transport its message – the lifting of taboos – 
into other related fields, such as history. The founding issue contained an article 
that reviewing the state of the field of modern Chinese history (jindaishi 近代史) 
that shows how the principle of “thought liberation” is to be applied across various 
academic disciplines and fields of knowledge.66 In line with the master narrative 
prevailing in the spring of 1979, the author opens with a denunciation of the “Gang 
of Four:”67 
                                             
66 Bian Zhe. “Jiefang sixiang, tupo jinqu: Zhongguo jindaishi zhuzuo zhong de wenti mantan zhi yi” 
in Dushu 1979.1, p. 25-30. The author is a well-known historian (no psuedonym). 
67 Ibid., p. 25. 
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During the long time of cultural despotism under the rule of the “Gang of Four,” 
research in modern Chinese history fared just like research in other social sciences: 
forbidden areas and taboos everywhere. The “Gang of Four” has been crushed, but 
people’s hearts are still shuddering in fear and they do still carry the poison in them; the 
taboos have not yet all been broken open. If we do not smash these shackles of the 
mind and break out of the taboos, the research in modern Chinese history will be 
unable to achieve even richer results. 
 
Chinese historiography has been forced into a straightjacket that has strangled not 
only any new results emerging from historians’ research, but has even distorted 
historical truth. One-sided interpretations of facts were the result of political 
manoeuvring during the Cultural Revolution. But even during the time before 1966, 
political interference had led to serious problems, for example, with regard to the 
Taiping movement: “In the research from the seventeen years before the Cultural 
Revolution, a trend to exaggerate is omnipresent in the assessment of this great 
rural revolution.”68 The Taipings had been greeted as a revolutionary peasant 
uprising, yet superstitious, feudal, and irrational elements in the Taiping’s ideology 
and their actions had long been a taboo issue. The author calls for a more diverse 
view of history that would allow for a more appropriate vision of China’s past. He 
finds similar problems with the Chinese historians’ judgement of the 1898 
constitutional reforms, the Boxer uprising, and the 1911 revolution. He hopes to 
see these issues discussed in the media, such as in the journal Dushu. 
Modern Chinese history was but one area where Dushu wanted taboos to 
be lifted as the debate moved on to more comprehensive themes. A test came in 
the summer of 1979, when anxiety rose among intellectuals: in the aftermath of 
Deng Xiaoping’s speech on the “four cardinal principles,” some provincial leaders 
had tried to reign in the debates and start “tightening” (shou 收). In this situation, 
Dushu came forward with a strong piece in defence of thought liberation. To avoid 
drawing too much attention, the article was buried at an inconspicuous place in the 
middle of the journal; neither was it advertised on the issue’s cover. The essay’s 
tone, however, makes it stand out from the usual style of the articles appearing in 
Dushu. The language of the article and its sharp rhetoric are familiar from 
important RMRB editorials or speeches of the leadership, but they are highly 
unusual for an article in a  young academic journal. For these reasons, the atypical 
                                             
68 Ibid. 
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character, and the sheer boldness of this intervention into the debate, this article, 
published in Dushu’s August issue, deserves our attention.69 
The article carries the title “Liberate thought and march towards victory.” 
The title of the article’s first subsection, “Three thought liberation movements” is an 
obvious reference to a long article by Zhou Yang that had appeared in RMRB two 
months before – “Three great thought liberation movements.”70 This latter article 
was a report Zhou had given at a conference convened by the Academy of Social 
Sciences to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the May Fourth movement. The 
May Fourth movement was the first of the three movements Zhou was speaking 
on; the other two were the Yan’an rectification campaign, and the reforms since 
the Third Plenum. 
Qiao Shu’s Dushu article borrows not only the subtitle from Zhou Yang. 
Rather, a full third of his article consists of literal quotes from Zhou Yang. This 
technique is extremely unusual, and for a liberal journal like Dushu in particular. 
However, Qiao apparently uses Zhou Yang, an authoritative liberal voice amidst a 
tightening political climate, only to transport an even more radical message. Qiao 
comes to his point right at the start of his article:71 
Some people are saying that after the Third Plenum, the [Party] Center has changed 
the policy of thought liberation, and that now is the time of “tightening” (shou 收). This is 
entirely wrong. The policy of thought liberation is a long-term policy. Generally 
speaking, one needs a correct method of thinking to liberate thought; this is a 
materialistic and dialectical method. To liberate thought, one must uphold seeking truth 
from facts, proceed from reality in everything we do, and combine theory with practice; 
this means to get rid of superstition, to respect science, and to understand and 
transform the world from the original outlook of the objective world (and the principles 
of its development). 
 
The unusual pitch of the article becomes apparent from these first lines, especially 
from the categorical “entirely wrong” that seems to belie Dushu’s openness for 
different opinions. The ominous starter “some people are saying” (you xie ren shuo
有些人说) is the common indicator of the countertext against which the text is 
written; as becomes clear later in the article, in this case the addressees are an 
unidentified group of people in opposition to the policy of thought liberation. What 
                                             
69 Qiao Shu. “Jiefang sixiang, zou xiang shengli” in Dushu 1979.4, p. 15-20. Qiao Shu 乔淑 is 
almost certainly a pseudonym, but none of the sources on the early years of Dushu give any 
information on the author or the background of the article. 
70 Zhou Yang. “San ci weida de sixiang jiefang yundong” in RMRB, May 7, 1979.  
71 Qiao Shu. “Jiefang sixiang, zou xiang shengli,” p. 15. 
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is missing in these first lines is an explicit reference to the “four cardinal 
principles.” The stress lies instead on the earlier slogan, liberation of thought. 
Following closely the argument of Zhou Yang, the author then places the 
post-1978 reform movement into the context of the May Fourth movement that has 
liberated China from “feudal” thinking, and the Yan’an rectification campaign, to 
which he accredits the overcoming of Soviet “dogmatism” and the creative 
integration of Marxist theory and Chinese reality, and thus the formation of Mao 
Zedong Thought. It is in this tradition that Qiao (or rather, Zhou) sees the thought 
liberation campaign: literal interpretations of ideology must be rejected in favour of 
creative and innovative thinking. Yet while this is where Zhou Yang stops, it is only 
the point of departure for Qiao Shu. 
In the following paragraphs, he accuses a not further specified group of 
people of trying to put an end to the public criticism of Lin Biao and the “Gang of 
Four.” This, so Qiao, is as dangerous as it is harmful because “the main danger is 
still a ‘leftist’ tendency.” He does not even hesitate to label the leftist forays a 
“struggle between two ideological lines” and declares straightforwardly:72 
The Third Plenum has highly appraised the debate on “practice is the sole criterion of 
truth” and has solemnly and boldly declared to the entire Party: “If a Party, a state, or a 
nation proceed in everything from written dogma and if their thinking becomes ossified, 
they cannot advance, their vitality disappears, and Party and state are doomed.” This is 
entirely correct; it fits not only our present situation, but is a general law of social 
development. Whoever violates this law will receive his punishment. 
 
The policies associated with the truth criterion debate and Deng’s December 1978 
speech must remain the guiding principles for all public discussions, including 
those in the media. 
Yet the declaration of the “four cardinal principles” had given rise to other 
interpretations as well: “Recently, the Centre has demanded that we must uphold 
without wavering the four cardinal principles, that is, to uphold the socialist road, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Party, and Marxism-
Leninism Mao Zedong Thought. This should actually be no problem, yet some 
people have consciously or unconsciously taken the Centre’s renewed stress on 
                                             
72 Ibid., p. 18. The first sentence and the following quotation are again taken literally from Zhou 
Yang. The quotation is from Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the Third Plenum. “Jiefang sixiang, shi shi 
qiu shi, tuanjie yiqie xiang qian kan,” p. 143. Both Zhou and Qiao omit the phrase “and superstition 
prevails” (mixin shengxing 迷信盛行) that follows after “thinking becomes ossified” in Deng’s text. 
The judgement following the quotation, “is absolutely correct” (qian zhun wan que de 千准万确的) 
does not appear in Zhou Yang’s speech, but is the opinion of Qiao Shu. 
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upholding the four cardinal principles for a correction of the ‘deviation’ of thought 
liberation.”73 Throughout his article, Qiao Shu refuses to explain to the readers, 
who those people are who distort the Centre’s correct policies. The author’s less 
than enthusiastic support for Deng Xiaoping’s effort to tighten the grip on the 
debates that had mushroomed all over China, however, nourishes the suspicion 
that he might even have Deng Xiaoping and the “four cardinal principles” in mind. 
Qiao Shu has spared the most delicate issue for the end of his article: the 
proper relationship between thought liberation and the “four cardinal principles.” 
Deng Xiaoping in his March 31 speech had declared to the Party that “we must 
resolutely implement the policy of thought liberation, eradicating superstition, and 
proceeding in everything from reality. All this has been decided by the Third 
Plenum and I repeat it here; we do not allow the slightest wavering in these 
respects.”74 This confession notwithstanding, Deng had mentioned thought 
liberation only three times in his long speech, and the stress had been clearly on 
the “cardinal principles.” Both Zhou Yang and Qiao Shu tried to define, in similar 
words, the relationship between these two policies. The following is a comparison 
of their formulations; identical passages are highlighted:75 
Zhou Yang Qiao Shu 
必须明确认识： 
 
我们的思想解放运动， 
不是放弃而是坚持社会主义道路， 
不是取消而是坚持无产阶级专政， 
不是摆脱而是坚持党的领导， 
不是背离而是坚持马列主义、毛泽东思
想。 
 
也就是说， 
我们党如此强调破除迷信、解放思想， 
也就是为了根据新的历史时期的新情况， 
 
更好地坚持社会主义道路，更好地坚持无
产阶级专政，更好地坚持党的领导，更好
地坚持马列主义、毛泽东思想， 
以便更好地实现社会主义现代化的宏伟纲
同时必须指出， 
只有解放思想，才能真正坚持四项基本原
则。 
我们的思想解放运动， 
不是放弃社会主义道路， 
不是取消无产阶级专政， 
不是摆脱党的领导， 
不是背离马克思主义、毛泽东思想的科学
体系， 
而正是为了坚持四项基本原则。 
 
我们强调发扬民主，解放思想， 
也就是为了根据新长征路上的新情况、新
问题， 
更好地坚持这些原则， 
 
 
以便更好地实现社会主义现代化的伟大任
                                             
73 Qiao Shu. “Jiefang sixiang, zou xiang shengli,” p. 19. 
74 Deng Xiaoping. “Jianchi si xiang jiben yuanze,” p. 183. 
75 The quote appears after about two thirds of section three in Zhou Yang’s speech, and in Qiao 
Shu’s article, where it is the second last paragraph, on p. 19f. 
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领。 
在这样的原则问题上，是绝不能有丝毫含
糊和丝毫动摇的。 
务。 
那种把坚持四项基本原则，与深入地进行
思想解放运动对立起来，甚至当作“纠
偏”，是没有道理的。 
We must see clearly: 
 
 
our thought liberation movement 
does not abolish the socialist road but 
upholds it; 
it does not remove the dictatorship of the 
proletariat but upholds it; 
it does not eliminate the leadership of the 
Party but upholds it; 
and it does not depart from Marxism-
Leninism Mao Zedong Thought, but 
upholds it. 
 
 
And this means that 
our Party stresses eradicating superstition 
and thought liberation 
in order to uphold even better, according 
to the new situation of a new historical 
period, 
the socialist road, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the leadership of the Party, 
and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong 
Thought, 
so as to even better realize the grand 
plan of socialist modernization. 
On such questions of principle, we cannot 
allow the slightest ambiguity and the 
slightest wavering. 
At the same time we must point out 
that only with thought liberation, we can 
truly uphold the four cardinal principles. 
Our thought liberation movement 
does not abolish the socialist road, 
 
does not remove the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, 
does not eliminate the leadership of the 
Party, 
and does not depart from the scientific 
system of Marxism and Mao Zedong 
Thought, 
but exists exactly to uphold the four 
cardinal principles. 
 
We stress promoting democracy and 
thought liberation 
in order to uphold even better, according 
to the new situation and new problems of 
a new Long March, 
these principles, 
 
 
 
so as to even better realize the great task 
of socialist modernization. 
To set against each other the upholding 
of the four cardinal principles and the 
deepening and implementation of the 
thought liberation movement, or even to 
“correct the deviation” [of the latter], is 
entirely unfounded. 
 
 
What is interesting in the two text passages are, of course, the differences 
between them. On the purely linguistic level, there are a few deviations. Where 
Zhou Yang speaks of Marxism-Leninism, Qiao mentions only Marxism. It is 
unlikely that this is an oversight, since Qiao’s addition “scientific system” tells us 
otherwise: for Qiao, Marxism is more of an open ideological complex that can be 
interpreted; he avoids the canonization that the attribute “Leninism” implies. A 
similarly minute difference in tone can be observed with regard to the terms “plan” 
(gangling 纲领) and “task” (renwu 任务). The latter is clearly more open, since a 
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task is a goal, while a plan prescribes the method to reach this goal. The 
differences are more obvious in Qiao’s statement “We stress promoting 
democracy and thought liberation...” “Promoting democracy” is a constructive 
approach to the present situation, and not a mere “getting rid of superstition” – as 
a method, the former goes much further. Qiao also leaves out the Party: it is the 
author and like-minded people who stress thought liberation, and not just the Party. 
The most obvious difference concerns the opening remarks of Qiao Shu’s 
statement: “Only with thought liberation, we can truly uphold the four cardinal 
principles.” This means that thought liberation is a necessary precondition for the 
“four cardinal principles:” only on the basis of thought liberation can the “cardinal 
principles” be successfully implemented. Yet Zhou Yang does make no such 
statement. To the contrary: in his text, thought liberation is a useful, even an 
important medium to achieve the holding up of the “cardinal principles,” but it 
remains clearly subordinated to them. The stress in Zhou Yang’s text lies on the 
“cardinal principles,” and in his conclusion he echoes Deng Xiaoping’s words (“the 
slightest wavering”). Qiao Shu apparently has a different conception of this 
relationship; to demonstrate this, he also avoids the laborious repetition of the four 
principles that Zhou Yang brings in the second part of the statement. 
It is clear by now that Qiao Shu wants to promote an agenda that follows 
that of Zhou Yang, but goes beyond it to a significant degree. Qiao is speaking on 
behalf of the Chinese intellectuals, and also on behalf of the journal Dushu: he 
wants to protect the journal and the journal’s cause from the pressure under which 
it had come after Deng Xiaoping had called on the Party to reign in on free 
discourse by setting clear limits to public discussions. Qiao Shu’s article is a 
rallying cry for the continuation of the thought liberation movement and for Dushu’s 
own slogan, “no taboos for reading.” Within the limits of the liberal interpretation of 
the media concept that Dushu had adopted in its earliest days, the journal tried to 
fight off the advances of those people who, as Qiao said in the last sentence of the 
passage quoted above, “set against each other the upholding of the four cardinal 
principles and the deepening and implementation of the thought liberation 
movement.” In the light of the policy changes that emanated from Beijing after 
Deng’s “cardinal principles” speech, the subversive potential of Dushu’s slogan 
had grown immensely. 
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Dushu continued to live up to its “no taboos” slogan and tried to formulate 
this issue in more abstract terms. In its December 1979 issue, Dushu carried two 
important articles dealing with the question of freedom of speech from a much 
more radical standpoint. Both articles were written by prominent intellectuals 
associated with Hu Yaobang’s network.76 This time, the journal chose to place the 
articles at a prominent location and advertised them on the issue’s cover. In 
“Freedom of Speech,” Zhang Xianyang and Wang Guixiu discuss their topic from a 
legal perspective,77 as does Yu Haocheng in his “The Speaker Bears no Guilt.”78 
Zhang and Wang start their article with a bold statement:79 
The constitution of our country stipulates that the citizens have freedom of speech. 
Freedom of speech is a basic and also a minimal democratic right of the people’s 
masses. Freedom of speech must penetrate the exercise of the right to vote as well as 
the enjoyment of the free rights of communication, publishing, assembly, association, 
procession, demonstration, or strike. Without freedom of speech, all these democracies 
and freedoms are meaningless, and even if they could be achieved in form, they would 
be pointless in substance. ... In reality, the so-called freedoms of publishing, assembly, 
and association are nothing but different forms and means to realize freedom of 
speech. If the people’s masses want to be the master of their own house and take 
charge of the state affairs, freedom of speech is an indispensable right. Without 
freedom of speech, the people’s masses cannot freely make public their opinions on 
the nation’s political, economic, cultural, and educational affairs; how could they 
demonstrate that they are their own masters, how could they run their country? 
 
All PRC constitutions, from the first in 1954, to the 1978 version in place when 
Zhang and Wang were writing, had granted Chinese citizens freedom of speech 
as a basic right: “Citizens have the freedom of speech, communication, publishing, 
assembly, association, procession, demonstration, and strike...”80 Proceeding from 
this legal argument, Zhang and Wang try to provide Dushu’s claim that reading, 
and even more, writing and publishing, has no taboos, with a solid theoretical 
foundation. Yu Haocheng complements their argument with an important point: not 
                                             
76 On Hu Yaobang’s “intellectual network” see Goldman. Sowing the Seeds For Democracy, ch. 
two and passim. 
77 “Yanlun ziyou” in Dushu 1979.9, p. 2-8. Zhang was a lecturer of philosophy at the Chinese 
People’s University and was later called to join the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong 
Thought. Wang was also lecturing at People’s University. In 1989, Zhang was elbowed out of his 
positions. See Goldman. Sowing the Seeds For Democracy, p. 50-51, 334. 
78 “Yanzhe wu zui” in Dushu 1979.9, p. 9-15. Yu was a veteran legal journalist and director of 
Qunzhong chubanshe 群众出版社 that belongs to the Ministry of Public Security. He was forced out 
of this job in 1985 and after the 1989 Democracy movement Yu was imprisoned for more than a 
year before leaving the PRC in 1994. 
79 Zhang Xianyang, Wang Guixiu. “Yanlun ziyou,” p. 2. 
80 See article 45. Compare article 87 in the 1954 constitution. 
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only does everybody has the right to speak; he can enjoy this right only if he is 
granted the right to speak with immunity:81 
Whether or not the speaker truly “bears no guilt,” that is, whether citizens can become 
guilty by speaking – this is a major issue [to judge if] there truly is freedom of speech 
and whether or not the people of our country do truly enjoy democratic rights. The 
unjust case of comrade Zhang Zhixin 张志新, a good daughter of the Party and the 
people and an outstanding Party member, has been righted and redressed; yet since 
the appalling news of her brutal and inhuman treatment have become public, this 
problem has confronted the people of the entire country even more as an extremely 
acute and urgent question that has drawn much attention both at home and abroad. 
 
The case of Zhang Zhixin was widely discussed in 1979: Zhang had been a 
lecturer at a PLA school in Shenyang and was arrested in 1968 for her opposition 
to Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four.” When she was executed in 1975, the “right of 
speech” was denied to her in the most savage and literal manner – before 
shooting her, the executioners cut out her vocal chords to prevent her from 
shouting slogans. Her brutal killing was one of the charges levelled against the 
“Gang.”82 When Zhang was rehabilitated in March 1979 and declared a martyr, 
she became a symbol for the repression of freedom of speech in Cultural 
Revolutionary China. Yu Haocheng uses her shocking example to urge immunity 
for those who make use of their right to freedom of speech. 
So how is freedom of speech defined? Zhang and Wang elaborate:83 
There are two conditions. First, being able to speak does not mean that there is 
freedom of speech. [To judge] whether or not there is freedom of speech, one must see 
if there is the freedom to speak on state affairs [guojia dashi 国家大事]. ... Secondly, 
the freedom of speech means that one has the freedom to express his opinions 
according to one’s own will and one’s own views, no matter if this opinion corresponds 
with those of the leadership organs, the power holders, or the majority. To put it more 
to the point, it means the freedom to express different and even mistaken opinions. 
 
By demanding the right to address with impunity political issues, the authors 
extend the potential scope of discussion significantly. Even more contentious is 
their claim that Chinese citizens have the right to voice opinions at variance with 
those of the leadership, and thus “mistaken opinions.” If this right were granted, 
the leadership would be left without the tools to persecute eventual opposition to 
                                             
81 Yu Haocheng. “Yanzhe wu zui,” p. 9. 
82 See Cyril Birch. “Literature under Communism” in Roderick MacFarquhar, John K. Fairbank (ed.). 
The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, vol. 15, p. 743-
812, here p. 807. 
83 Zhang Xianyang, Wang Guixiu. “Yanlun ziyou,” p. 2f. 
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its policies. This is exactly what the authors have in mind, and they deliver a 
carefully argued Marxist explanation:84 
Our freedom of speech – just as the various other democratic rights – has been 
attained through the struggle of the people’s masses, under the leadership of the CCP, 
in the brave and resolute fight of several decades, and by overthrowing the reactionary 
rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratism, and the [consequent] founding of the 
state institutions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In short, [freedom of speech] has 
been won by the people’s masses through their own fight, and it is therefore the 
property of the people; it has not been granted by anyone. The view of [freedom of 
speech] as granted is not a Marxist view. 
 
Freedom of speech is an undeniable right of the people, because they were the 
agent of the momentous struggle that brought the CCP into power. According to 
the authors, the idea that the Party “gives” or “returns” the right of free speech to 
the people is mistaken, since it is an expression of idealism. A correct dialectical 
Marxist understanding must proceed from the people themselves, who are the real 
owners of their basic rights and freedoms. To underline their argument, Zhang and 
Wang quote Mao Zedong: “Where has our power come from? It comes from the 
working class, from the poor and lower middle peasants, it comes from the broad 
labouring masses who make up more than ninety per cent of the population.”85 
The authors comment: “This is the real Marxist viewpoint.”86 
Yu Haocheng confirms the argument that the right of public discussion 
includes criticism of the political leadership:87 
Currently there are still some people who as a matter of fact still think that Party and 
state leaders cannot be criticized. The people possess the right to elect and recall their 
own leaders, so why shouldn’t they possess the right to criticize them? Appraising the 
merits and faults of their leaders is a form of democracy; it is indispensable if the 
people are to become the masters of their own house. It is not only no crime – there is 
no fault with it anyway. 
 
Yu Haocheng declares criticism of the Party leadership, and by implication also 
the policies advocated by the leadership, to be a legitimate right. This is indeed a 
very far-reaching claim. 
Are there any limits to debate and to freedom of speech? For Yu Haocheng, 
there are clear limits that all sides involved, the participants of public discourse 
and the Party and government, must respect:88 
                                             
84 Ibid., p. 3f. 
85 This widely circulating quotation was never officially canonized. It appeared, without context, in 
Hongqi, Oct. 14, 1968, as “Zui gao zhishi.” 
86 Zhang Xianyang, Wang Guixiu. “Yanlun ziyou,” p. 4. 
87 Yu Haocheng. “Yanzhe wu zui,” p. 12. 
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And it must be clarified: is all speech absolutely free, with no inhibitions whatsoever? 
There are no absolute things, and freedom cannot be unlimited, too. The limit to one 
person’s freedom should be that no-one else’s freedom is impeded and that the 
interests of society as a whole are not harmed. The recently proclaimed Penal Code of 
the People’s Republic of China has provisions for defamation, libel, and 
counterrevolution. This is absolutely correct and also absolutely necessary. ... On the 
one hand we must grant and protect the freedom to express all kinds of political views, 
ideological standpoints, and academic theories; on the other, we have to prohibit and 
prosecute defamation, libel, attacks on the person, and the instigation of turbulence. 
 
The criteria that Yu sets are very high: he acknowledges limits to free speech only 
where the same freedom of others is impaired, and for the sake of “the interests of 
society as a whole.” This latter point needs further interpretation. “Instigation of 
turbulence” has been interpreted quite broadly by consecutive Chinese 
governments. Yet by referring to the Penal Code, Yu Haocheng limits his own 
rather vague formulation “instigation of turbulence” to “counterrevolution.” The 
latter now is a very narrow interpretation – that allows in turn for very relaxed limits 
of discourse. 
So what about the “four cardinal principles?” The answer is: neither Zhang 
and Wang nor Yu mention them anywhere in their texts. They avoid to take an 
unequivocal stand on this issue by way of neglecting it. Yu Haocheng comes 
nearest to addressing the “cardinal principles” with the rhetorical question: “Some 
people might ask: if we really carry out [the principle that] “the speaker bears no 
guilt” – doesn’t this mean that people can criticize the Communist Party, criticize 
the Socialist system just as they please ?!”89 His answer is straightforward: why 
not criticize the Party and the system? China’s political system and the CCP’s rule 
have been consolidated over the past thirty years, there is in fact nothing to fear 
from criticism, since the absolute majority of the people supports the Party and the 
system; in the past, the CCP has dealt with enemies much more dangerous than a 
few isolated critics. This argumentation rejects the Stalinist projection of the 
bourgeois attacks on the socialist system in the field of the superstructure – the 
projection that had triggered the radicalized interpretation of the media concept in 
the 1950s, and that dominated Cultural Revolution discourse on the media. It is 
with the rejection of this principle that Yu Haocheng leaves the framework of the 
media principle. 
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The ideas that Zhang Xianyang, Wang Guixiu, and Yu Haocheng presented 
in Dushu in 1979 were among the most far-reaching proposals for the media 
sector published since the founding of the PRC. Even in the relatively relaxed 
atmosphere a year after the Third Plenum, however, these proposals could not be 
implemented across the board: the CCP was not willing to abolish its control over 
the Chinese media sector. All a journal with a liberal inclination (and the necessary 
political backing), such as Dushu, could do was to open its pages for proposals as 
radical as these, an act that in hindsight appears to be enormously courageous. 
Most other journals, who lacked the kind of backing that Dushu enjoyed, did not 
dare to enter such controversial discussions. For most of the periodical sector, 
even the relatively liberal years of the 1980s were a rough ride, and the 
propaganda authorities remained always on the watch-out.90 And in Dushu, too, 
the majority of articles were of a more moderate nature than those of Zhang 
Xianyang and Yu Haocheng. Concern for the journal’s main slogan, however, the 
taboo issue, permeated these voices, too. 
 
  
No Taboos: In Defence of Reading 
Dushu gave expression to its strict adherence to a no-taboo policy by 
printing articles critical of its own line. In this way, the journal hoped to encourage 
discussions and to create a climate of uncensored debates. The first test case for 
this strategy was the taboo issue that was discussed controversially in fall 1979. 
In the September issue, Dushu published two pieces sharply critical of Li 
Honglin’s essay and the consequent elaborations on the question of taboos. With 
the title “Such a formulation is inappropriate,” the journal printed a reader’s letter.91 
The author of the letter acknowledges Li Honglin’s intention to speak out for 
thought liberation, but criticizes his use of the Mao quote to support his argument 
of letting circulate even harmful books. The reader tries to prove his own point with 
another Mao quote (a technique familiar from Cultural Revolution rhetoric, see ch. 
seven): “All the mistaken ideologies and all poisonous weeds can under no 
                                             
90 The annual compilations of the PD’s neibu journal Xuanchuan dongtai make for a sobering 
reading in this respect. 
91 Bai Xiancai (Bai the foremost talent?). “Zheyang de tifa bu qiadang” in Dushu 1979.6, p. 6.  
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circumstances be allowed to spread freely.”92 So what is it that legitimates banning 
books? The author explains, certainly in Mao’s sense, that “it is to consolidate the 
political power. We are practicing the dictatorship of the proletariat, how could we 
refrain from dividing books into good and bad, and instead give all of them green 
light, letting mistaken ideologies and poisonous weeds spread freely?”93 The 
author of the letter apparently still adheres to a strict reading of the final element of 
the media concept that calls for vigilance in the face of attempts to overthrow the 
socialist system and the rule of the CCP. In the superstructure, he still sees the 
danger of the people being poisoned by heterodox thinking – an attitude notably 
different from that of Zhang Xianyang or Yu Haocheng, who expressed confidence 
in the people’s ability to deal with such “poison.” Not so the author of the letter: 
“Banning books is like banning opium. Despite the medical value of opium, we 
cannot lift the ban on it. And while bad books may be used as negative examples 
in teaching, we cannot let them spread among the broad people’s masses. Thus I 
believe that the formulation “no taboos for reading” is inappropriate.”94 While he 
argues that the bans have gone too far under the heavy-handed rule of the “Gang 
of Four,” he acknowledges in principle the correctness of the policy of control and 
its premise, the Party’s task to lead and enlighten an ideologically backward 
populace. 
The comparison of “bad” books with “poisonous weeds” (ducao 毒草) 
became a common metaphor in the debate, giving a new lease of life to a 
derogatory term that had proliferated in the Cultural Revolution ever since Yao 
Wenyuan’s attack on Wu Han’s play “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office.” A short 
article on the following page in the same Dushu issue used a line of argument 
identical to that of the letter. In “Reading cannot be ‘without taboos’” the author 
Zhang Shoubai (Zhang-who-protects-the-white/pure) explains: “We often say that 
books and journals are our spiritual nourishment. Since they are nourishment, they 
cannot be poisonous. So what about reactionary books and journals? Should we 
see them as spiritual nourishment, too? No, they are poison. We cannot take 
                                             
92 From Mao’s March 12, 1957, speech at the Propaganda conference. See Mao Zedong wenji 
7.281. 
93 Bai Xiancai. “Zheyang de tifa bu qiadang.” 
94 Ibid. 
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poison for nourishment.”95 “Spiritual nourishment” (jingshen liangshi 精神粮食) is 
another metaphor frequently used in the taboo debate, an image that refers back 
to the educational function of the media, as stipulated in the media concept: just as 
parents raise their children by feeding them, the people must be brought up to the 
level of consciousness through spiritual nourishment, provided by the Party. 
Zhang especially addresses the question of libraries: can books and 
journals published outside the control of the CCP be made openly available? He 
reasons:96 
A part of the old books and journals from before liberation is undoubtedly relatively 
good, but many of them propagate reactionary things. We cannot let this stuff 
proliferate wantonly. For this reason we could not do without restrictions for the reading 
and borrowing of such stuff from the libraries, not in the past nor in the present. It is 
entirely correct that the libraries have [established] procedures of inspection and 
approval for [people who want to] borrow and read such things, and that they cannot be 
borrowed and read as one pleases. If there are “no taboos for reading” and these 
procedures are abolished, so that people can borrow and read [such stuff] just like they 
borrow other books – this would mean harming the people! 
 
The idea of “harming the people” (hai ren 害人) reveals the paternalistic spirit of 
the media concept: it is the Party’s obligation to prevent the ignorant people from 
inflicting harm on themselves – a harm that the author further characterizes as 
“being poisoned” (zhong du 中毒). An especially delicate issue is the spiritual 
health of the youth: “We must know that the yellow stuff is a kind of poison, too, 
even if it is sugar-coated. Many young people are full of vigour but impetuous; if 
they are carried away by the yellow stuff and if they keep on reading it, their 
revolutionary will disappears, they will be led astray and they might even lose the 
interest to live on. Can you bear to watch these people drown and not try to rescue 
them? The first thing to rescue them is to ban yellow books and journals, to 
prevent people from getting in contact with yellow books and journals.”97 Young 
people need even more guidance than the rest of the population to develop in a 
healthy manner. The panicky reaction of Zhang Shoubai towards the loosely 
defined “yellow stuff” (huangse de dongxi 黄色的东西) – a term that can mean 
anything from romantic scenes in literary works to explicit pornography – reflects 
the puritanical fervour not only of the Cultural Revolution, but of the entire CCP 
                                             
95 Zhang Shoubai. “Dushu bu neng ‘wu jinqu’” in Dushu 1979.6, p. 7-8, here p. 7. 
96 Ibid., p. 7f. 
97 Ibid., p. 8. 
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tradition.98 While the limits of discussion in politics and scholarship were hotly 
debated in 1979, the elite was still unanimous in its rejection of any degree of 
tolerance for “yellow stuff.” Li Honglin had declared it to be “excrements and snot,” 
and “not culture at all.” 
Yet Zhang Shoubai went much further than Li Honglin in defining the limits 
for reading and warns in drastic terms of the consequences: “If there are no 
taboos for reading, the world will be in chaos! [tianxia da luan 天下大乱]”99 In the 
face of this danger, the ultimate fear of all Chinese rulers, Zhang cannot but 
sharply reject Li Honglin’s argumentation and come to the conclusion: 
“Considering all this, the slogan ‘no taboos for reading’ cannot make sense [bu 
tong zhi lun 不通之论], but is extremely harmful. The correct method should be: 
reading needs guidance. We must guide people, and especially the young, in 
reading.”100 By declaring “No taboos for reading” a harmful mistake, Zhang also 
attacks the journal Dushu itself. Yet the journal’s reaction must be seen as a 
rejection of the alternative slogan that Zhang Shoubai proposes: Dushu not only 
printed Zhang’s article, but published it without comment – the journal did not 
consider to “guide” (zhidao 指导) its readers, but rather left them with the choice to 
judge on Zhang’s article by themselves – and thus demonstrated its confidence in 
the judgment of its readers. 
Dushu printed a third article in the September issue that was also critical of 
Li Honglin’s essay, but tried – eventually unsuccessful – to find a more balanced 
position, as the title shows: “Imprisoning is not good, but absolute opening up does 
not work either.”101 When working on a historical novel, Wu, a writer, had himself 
experienced the difficulties caused by the book banning policy. Yet he also cannot 
approve of a total liberation of China’s book market. His rather moderate position 
reads: “Since culture is a [part of] the superstructure serving the economic base, 
the organs in charge of publishing and distributing books, as one battlefield on the 
cultural front, mustn’t publish and sell reactionary books and journals. But works 
                                             
98 An attitude, admittedly, to which the GMD had subscribed, too. 
99 Ibid., p. 7. 
100 Ibid., p. 8. 
101 Wu Yue. “Jingu bu hao, wanquan kaifang ye bu tong“ in Dushu 1979.6, p. 9-12. Wu-Yue 吴越 is 
the area around Shanghai and Zhejiang, but might also be read Wu yue 无曰 – “he-who-says-
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that have exerted some kind of influence in history and that have been proven to 
be wrong long ago, should receive a different kind of treatment.”102 He does not 
question the general architecture of the propaganda sector and confirms the role 
of the media on the “cultural frontlines,” yet he hopes to see a more reasonable 
treatment of material that already exists in published form and that had once 
widely circulated. This is possible and is not even harmful; in this point the author 
rejects the fears of Zhang Shoubai:103 
Clear-minded and healthy people have nothing at all to fear from coming into contact 
with incorrect things or even enemy propaganda and slander. If somebody who has 
gone through many years or even decades of training in Marxism-Leninism, is carried 
away by the enemy and is drawn to their side after reading a single enemy book, then 
we can only blame ourselves that our level in Marxism-Leninism is too low. A real 
Marxist-Leninist grows up amidst the fierce confrontation and struggle with erroneous 
theories of every descriptions. 
 
We find another often used argument here: the CCP came to power amid fierce 
struggle against hostile ideas, it has proven powerful enough to prevail, so there is 
nothing to fear from heterodox ideas. Wu does, of course, ignore the other side of 
the CCP’s experience: the Party had successfully undermined the legitimacy of the 
GMD regime through effective propaganda; well aware of this process, the CCP 
had erected barriers after 1949 in order to fare better than its predecessor – the 
very barriers that Dushu and intellectuals were fighting against now. It appears 
that Wu had more confidence in the regime than the Party itself had. 
However, Wu cannot come up with a practical solution; his article thus 
illustrates the fundamental dilemma that both the CCP and the intellectuals 
involved in the debate were trying to address: Wu dislikes taboos, but he cannot 
approve of total liberalization either. The solution he proposes (“We can only 
chose a differentiated way of treatment: thoroughly locking up whatever must be 
locked up, and courageously opening whatever should be open”)104 offers no 
criteria for a “differentiated way of treatment;” it must have sounded little 
convincing to Dushu’s readers. Yet this was exactly the problem the Party faced 
as well: how to balance openness with control, how to mediate between “thought 
liberation” and the “four cardinal principles,” how to reinterpret the media concept 
without discarding it. Wu Yue ends his article by returning to the nourishment / 
                                             
102 Ibid., p. 10. 
103 Ibid., p. 10f. 
104 Ibid., p. 12. 
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poison metaphor: “Some people have called books the spiritual nourishment of 
mankind; if we can say that food can be divided into food for infants, food for the 
sick, and food for adults, then it is just as reasonable to divide books into those for 
children, for the youth, and for adults. Since nobody can eat poisonous food, why 
can’t we forbid a number of bad books that have no proper function at all!”105 While 
Wu’s argument lacks the theoretical depth and reflection of the other articles that 
either call for the abolition of taboos, or reject the “no taboos” slogan, his position 
seems it fact to be closest to the political realities of the 1980s. Throughout the 
decade, the CCP alternated between the two more radical options that had 
surfaced in the debate; the result was a muddling-through approach that led to ad 
hoc decisions based on individual cases and the political constellation at a given 
time. The Party found itself caught up in the internal contradictions between 
competing interpretations of the various elements of the media concept. 
In the next issue, a month later, Dushu published an answer to the three 
articles criticizing the “no taboos” slogan as inappropriate. Written by an author 
using the pseudonym Zi Qi 子起 (“the philosopher stands up”), this article is 
entitled “Reading should have no taboos.”106 Thoughtful and well-argued, it rejects 
a number of arguments made by the opponents of Dushu’s slogan and comes 
forward strongly in support of the journal’s founding policy.  
Zi Qi starts by identifying the key question. To do so, he refers back to Li 
Honglin’s initial article that had triggered the debate: “From the ideological 
perspective, there is still this question: ‘Among books, there are flowers as well as 
poisonous weeds, there are gems as well as dregs. If the people just go and read 
them – what if they are poisoned?’ Therefore we must start from this problem 
when we want to speak on no taboos for reading.”107 The problem at the heart of 
the liberalization of the CCP’s media policy and the degree of controls necessary, 
thus is the question of how to deal with heterodox thinking. It is the last point of the 
media concept, the media’s function in the struggle between classes, that is up to 
re-evaluation. All other questions are only related issues. The author first of all 
feels it necessary to treat the problem with the complexity it deserves. He rejects 
as inappropriate the simplifying language and the images used by proponents and 
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106 Zi Qi. “Dushu yingdang wu jinqu” in Dushu 1979.7, p. 19-25. 
107 Ibid., p. 19. 
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opponents of the “no taboos” slogan alike: “In real life, it is relatively easy to tell the 
difference between nourishment and poison [duyao 毒药], and the two cannot 
easily be confused. Although we sometimes may give a little poison to patients in 
order to cure their ills, nobody would give poison to healthy people. But when we 
talk about reading, we are talking about normal people, and not about abnormal 
people, such as ‘sick patients.’”108 The “nourishment” metaphor cannot adequately 
describe the situation of the propaganda sector. The idea of “bad books” as 
“poison” in particular is useless to describe the processes in the propaganda 
sector, where it is just the “healthy” people who undoubtedly can be allowed to get 
in touch with those books labelled as “poison.” The comparison, although very 
common, doesn’t make much sense in the first place and reduces the complexity 
of the issue too much. 
The author sees the need for further discussion of a second issue, namely 
that of “yellow stuff.” The puritanical fervour on this issue, so Zi Qi, has obscured 
the most important point, namely the definition of the borderline between the 
depiction of love and pornography. While he falls short of providing the reader with 
the objectively grounded definition he himself calls for, his approach to the subject 
of love is more liberal than that of most of his colleagues: “In brief, we must 
differentiate between the normal representation of love and sexuality, and 
unnatural and distorted, or permissive and improper [representations] of it; we 
cannot describe the normal representation of love and sexuality and related 
depictions as yellow.”109 This is an important step for the rehabilitation of major 
works of classical fiction, such as the play Xixiang ji 西厢记 and the famous novel 
Jin ping mei 金瓶梅. The furthest Zi Qi would go is to compile “purified editions” 
(jieben 洁本) of such works for public distribution. He entirely rejects the 
classification of books into neibu and publicly circulated categories: such a 
classification is not reasonable, since the categories are in fact determined by 
political status and not by education and become meaningless through massive 
abuse anyway.110 
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Closely related to the question of neibu books is Zhang Shoubai’s proposal 
that “reading needs guidance.” Zi Qi does not reject the idea of guidance, but he 
demands that the reader’s right and ability to think and judge independently must 
not to be impaired by guidance: “While giving guidance to reading, we must 
maintain independent thinking. If your guidance is correct, I will listen to you; but if 
you are wrong, then speak as you please, I will read what I consider correct. And 
for this reason, guidance of reading should try hard to use the methods of 
elicitation and discussion.”111 This is a novel interpretation of the media concept’s 
prescription: the reader is to be enlighted not by paternalistic guidance from above, 
but rather through mutual help and discussion among equals. This conception 
comes closest to Xu Junyuan’s 1957 ideal of newspapers and readers being 
“friends.” In Zi Qi’s projection, however, the general objectives of enlightenment 
and education remain intact as the key function of the media; in this respect, he 
stays clearly within the scope of the Party’s media concept. 
Neither does Zi Qi reject the basic assumptions on which the propaganda 
xitong is built. Propaganda is a key area of political work and an important domain 
of the Party. In this instance, he can agree with Li Honglin who had argued that the 
leadership of the Party had to be strengthened rather than loosened:112 
If there are no taboos for reading, this will make the tasks of the propaganda and 
education workers more troublesome. Firstly, they must exert themselves to 
understand the current situation and keep apace with developments. Secondly, they 
must organize their struggle in accordance with current needs: some [books] must be 
refuted, others rejected, attacked, or pursued. No taboos does not mean that there is 
liberalization [ziyouhua 自由化], but rather means that we struggle on an immense 
battlefield, that we are engaged in a battle of persuasion! It is in this battle that 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought will develop. 
 
Thus, the Party’s propaganda workers would have to increase their vigilance and 
their scope of work, instead of withdrawing from the scene. 
It remains debatable in how much Zi Qi’s proposal was a genuine wish and 
not just lip service to the current CCP line. Many intellectuals and the platforms 
they used – journals of the like of Dushu – undoubtedly used the reference to 
Marxism as a ticket to claim more freedom for themselves; after the Cultural 
Revolution, belief in ideology had eroded to a significant degree. Nevertheless I 
                                                                                                                                      
reject this idea, he would question the validity of the political leadership’s claim to be the agent 
educating the populace. It is impossible to tell from his article if this was what Zi Qi had in mind. 
111 Zi Qi. “Dushu yingdang wu jinqu,” p. 24. 
112 Ibid., p. 24f. 
 483
would suggest that adherence to Marxist philosophy and the struggle for more 
freedoms and rights and less state interference were not mutually exclusive for 
many Chinese intellectuals. Humanist interpretations of Marxism, inspired by 
thinkers from Eastern Europe and Western critical Marxists received much 
attention throughout the 1980s. Eventually it was only the brutality of the events of 
June 1989 that shattered the belief in Marxism of all but the staunchest supporters 
of the CCP. It is important, however, not to project the post-1989 decline of official 
ideology backwards on the early 1980s. What Zi Qi was looking for was a new 
modus vivendi for the media, a new arrangement with the CCP. This spirit speaks 
from the concluding lines of his article:113 
No taboos for books – old and new, Chinese and foreign – means the complete 
liberation of thought for all people who read, means throwing oneself into the battle free 
from all restraints. And specifically for the young readers it means plunging into the 
ocean of books, riding the waves and rolling up and down; they may swallow some 
water, [but in this way] they train their real skills in Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
To lock people up in a sterile hot house and shower them with nutrient solution is a 
foolish method that will not bring the desired results. 
Reading should have no taboos – this is the only correct way! 
 
Taking up another argument made earlier, Zi Qi pronounces his hope that the 
younger generation in particular will train themselves in real life rather than in a hot 
house. The goal of this training are “the real skills in Marxism and Mao Zedong 
Thought.” 
Zi Qi’s article temporarily closed the lid on the “taboo” debate that had 
lasted for half a year; all important arguments had been made, opponents of 
Dushu’s policy had been given the opportunity to bring up their criticism, and in the 
light of all these opinions the journal had decided to carry on with its general line: 
to be “a journal of intellectual reviews, focusing on books,” a platform of debate 
open to all. Dushu claimed for itself the autonomy that Chinese intellectuals after 
the Cultural Revolution demanded for themselves. The journal did not, however, 
leave the general context of Marxism as an ideological foundation and the 
principle of contributing to the Party’s political project. Even the most vehement 
supporters of the journal and its line, such as the stubborn Chen Hanbo, were 
Marxists by conviction, and they hoped for the journal that was their brainchild to 
make its own contribution to China’s development. A glimpse of Chen Hanbo’s 
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ideals and his ideas for the journal can be obtained from a draft paper that was 
published years after his death. The paper, dating from circa 1980, contains 
proposals for articles, columns and debates, all prepared for the journal Dushu.114 
Among Chen’s proposals are: “In every issue there must be something 
propagating the study of M-ism;” “Ask ten well-known people to write something 
about how they embraced M-ism, or how they read (studied) M-ism, or why we 
need M-ism.” Chen also proposed a column called “Introduction (or ABC) to social 
sciences,”115 including philosophy, political economy, scientific socialism, history 
etc. While the thought paper is too short to make for a comprehensive content 
description and its dating is too insecure, Chen Hanbo’s concern with issues 
related to Marxism and Marxist philosophy is obvious. Yet the convictions of its 
founders notwithstanding (or just because of their particular understanding of 
these convictions), Dushu called for an open and critical approach to ideology that 
was prone to bring it into conflict with other, more orthodox interpretations within 
the CCP. 
The “no taboos” slogan that the acting editors had inherited from the 
journal’s founders caused them more than a few headaches. Not long after its 
founding, Dushu found itself in frequent clashes with the authorities, namely with 
the PD, where Wang Renzhong 王任重, a conservative-minded bureaucrat had 
taken over from Hu Yaobang in February 1980 after Hu became CC Secretary 
General (zong shuji 总书记). The journal’s political capital – its close association 
with and support for the Party line of the Third Plenum – turned into a liability as 
the political situation further evolved. Dushu’s uncompromising attitude and the 
boldness of many of its articles – such as those of Zhang Xianyang and Yu 
Haocheng (who both belonged to Hu Yaobang’s intellectual network, which 
explains why Dushu got away with publishing them) – caused many a conflict with 
the propaganda officials. After a particularly violent confrontation in April 1981, the 
acting editor-in-chief Shi Mei returned from the PD only to suffer a stroke on the 
same evening; he died a day later.116 
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Dushu entered a difficult period in late 1980 when the liberal voices in the 
political arena came under pressure. While Deng Xiaoping had tolerated a far-
reaching debate on political reforms all through spring and summer 1980, since 
the fall of that year he began to listen to the voices of more conservative politicians 
who warned of the danger of “bourgeois liberalization” (zichanjieji ziyouhua 资产阶
级自由化).117 Under the impression of events in Eastern Europe and especially in 
Poland, where dock workers in Gdansk had been on strike and the independent 
labour union Solidarity had been formed, the CCP leadership began to retreat from 
its liberal course. The situation in the literary realm had been tense already since 
the criticism of the play Jiaru wo shi zhende 假如我是真的 by Sha Yexin 沙叶新 in 
February 1980. The public attacks on Sha were only harbingers of the storm that 
was to hit the literary sector and the entire propaganda xitong in spring 1981 in 
form of the campaign against the writer Bai Hua 白桦.118 
The fact that Dushu was able to weather the increasingly difficult climate of 
fall 1980 must be credited to the journal’s close association with reform-minded 
intellectuals of Hu Yaobang’s network, and in particular to the efforts of the fiercely 
liberal Chen Hanbo and his colleague Chen Yuan, who had reached notoriety for 
their uncompromising and independent stance. Dubbed the “CC Club,”119 the two 
Chens succeeded in sheltering Dushu from many attacks coming from less liberal 
quarters in the Party. In late 1980, Chen Hanbo came to help the journal. It was 
especially Li Honglin’s programmatic essay that was weighing down time and 
again on Dushu’s editors, so they asked Chen for help: “At that time I felt great 
pressure from the article ‘No taboos for reading’ published in the initial issue and 
asked him [Chen] to take care of [this issue]. After he had me explain in detail, he 
inserted along paragraph in the essay that distinctly supported that article.”120 In 
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consultation with the editorial board of Dushu, Chen wrote an essay in 
commemoration of the journal’s second anniversary that was, however, published 
already in January to bring immediate relief to Dushu. 
Bearing the somewhat inadequate title “Telling Our Readers on Our Second 
Anniversary,” the article was signed “editorial board of this journal” – a signature 
Dushu had not used hitherto.121 Chen Hanbo speaks to the readers on a basis of 
equals: “Since its founding, Dushu has already published 22 issues, two months 
more and it will be two years. We want to use this opportunity to discuss with our 
readers how to continue improving this journal; this seems to be necessary.”122 
Chen had chosen the word “discuss” (shangliang 商量) with careful consideration: 
he indicates that the readers have a say in the making of the journal, an idea he 
also respected in the process of writing the article. As Shen Changwen 
remembers, Chen sought him out repeatedly to understand the opinions of the 
journal’s readers.123 In the article, Chen Hanbo stresses this democratic attitude 
and first of all sums up a number of points that readers and contributors had made 
towards the journal. These points express also the hopes that readers have placed 
in the journal, and Chen promises that Dushu will do its best to live up to the 
expectations of its audience. In particular, Chen points out: “We appreciate our 
readers to criticize anything we have printed. We treat seriously all criticism of our 
readers and see it as them supervising us.”124 The term “to supervise” (jiandu 监督) 
is certainly a conscious choice: it is the readers who are supposed to supervise 
the journal – and not the PD. Dushu wants to remain a platform of discussion and 
unbridled criticism; this requires that the journal itself be open to opinions on its 
editorial policy. 
The key passage of the anniversary article concerns the most contentious 
point, that is, the “no taboos” policy. As the journal’s editors had asked him to do, 
Chen came forward strongly affirmative of the slogan guiding Dushu:125 
 
                                             
121 Ben kan bianjibu. “Liang zhounian gao duzhe” in Dushu 1981.1, p. 2-5. Chen Hanbo’s 
authorship is beyond doubt, as the article has been reprinted in Chen Hanbo wenji, p. 184-87. 
122 Ben kan bianjibu. “Liang zhounian gao duzhe,“ p. 2. 
123 Shen Changwen. “Chu yu wuneng.” 
124 Ben kan bianjibu. “Liang zhounian gao duzhe,” p. 5. 
125 Ibid., p. 3f. 
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We reiterate our support for the slogan “no taboos for reading.” As everyone knows, we 
have witnessed in our modern history a book banning hurricane without precedent. 
After the downfall of the “Gang of Four” the storm has passed, but there are still many 
people who do not dare to lift the ban on books. When we targeted the current 
malpractices and shouted loudly “no taboos for reading,” we were greeted by our 
readers and felt very grateful [for their support]. It is common knowledge that nobody 
would advocate uncritically that “there is merit in every book” and propose reading 
randomly. And indeed, the author of the article “No taboos for reading” has already said: 
“The Party’s leadership of editing, translating, publishing, distribution, and reading must 
be strengthened, in order to strengthen the Marxist camp. All those books that tarnish 
human dignity, corrupt the social ways, and poison the minds of the youth, must be 
rigorously suppressed, because such books do not belong to culture at all. They are 
extremely dirty and, as Lu Xun has said, are not better than excrements and snot.” We 
quote this long passage to show that the very first article has already spelled out: it is 
absolutely unnecessary to take every bush and tree for an enemy or to entertain 
groundless fears. On this topic, our journal has published different opinions, and we 
plan to do the same with regard to some other issues of concern for our readers. To 
add one more sentence: the articles published in this journal do not represent the 
opinion of the editorial department. Our authors should take responsibility for their own 
texts; and everyone can express different opinions on any article. 
 
This last point is an interesting proposal, as it is in contradiction to a long-standing 
CCP policy for the publishing sector, namely the system of editor responsibility 
and in particular the “three tier system” that has been discussed in chapter four. 
Understandably, the CCP would not give in on this point, and final responsibility for 
what was published did still rest with Dushu’s editorial board; just like other 
journals, Dushu, too, had to make compromises and carry out amendments to 
submitted manuscripts. We must therefore read Chen Hanbo’s concluding lines as 
a step to encourage both the readers and the journal to come as close as possible 
to the ideal of “no taboos for reading.” For the past two years, Dushu had done its 
best to act according to its own slogan, and it had not imposed any limits to the 
discussions on its pages. Letting different opinions compete in a setting open to all 
voices covering all areas of interest was the guiding principle of Dushu, a principle 
that was to remain in place throughout the 1980s. 
Dushu confesses openly its support for the CCP’s ambitious project of the 
modernization of China and the reform and opening of the country. Readers 
appreciated the journal’s broad scope and its effort to introduce foreign ideas to 
China; Dushu thus became arguably the most widely read and most influential 
intellectual magazine in the PRC. In Dushu, a number of open-minded intellectuals 
with experiences in journalism dating from the 1940s, and who consequently 
moved into high positions in the Chinese propaganda sector, were finally given a 
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chance to realize their vision of an engaged and liberal journal loyal to the CCP 
and to Marxist principles. Yet doing so had became possible only when the Party 
itself had decided to shift its general orientation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The launching of the reform and opening policies in 1978 and the CCP’s 
shift from revolution to reform, from the logic of class struggle to economic 
construction, became the greatest challenge for the Chinese media concept that 
had governed the media in the PRC ever since 1949. The rise to power of the 
reform coalition around Deng Xiaoping and the large-scale rehabilitation of 
intellectuals who had been subjected to persecution for more than two decades 
changed the outlook of the Chinese political landscape. The media were forced to 
adapt to the new situation. While other corner stones of the PRC’s political 
architecture, such as the People’s Communes (renmin gongshe 人民公社) were 
swept away in the “great turn-around,” the media concept, part of the CCP’s 
Yan’an heritage, proved flexible enough to allow for new interpretations; thus it 
was able to adapt to the new situation and continued to provide the Party with 
guiding principles for its propaganda work. 
The profound changes of the Party’s general line were summarized by 
Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenum; Hu Yaobang outlined their implications for the 
media sector. The shift from class struggle to economic construction and 
modernization first of all required that the last phrase of the media concept had to 
be toned down significantly: class struggle was henceforth to play a subordinate 
role in the ideas guiding regarding the direction of the media. On the other end of 
the equation, the use of the media for enlightenment and educational purposes 
was stressed by both the Party leadership, that wished to make the populace 
internalize the new policies and to devote all energies to the economic reforms, 
and by the intellectuals who celebrated their regained role as the brains and 
teachers of the nation. The normative function of the media was strengthened 
rather than weakened in the course of reform. 
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The decline of class struggle and the emphasis on the intrinsic value of 
knowledge and its mediation were two crucial issues in the background of a 
profound debate on the function of the Chinese media that took place in 1979 – 
the discussion on the slogan of the newly founded monthly Dushu: “no taboos for 
reading.” The debate on the journal’s pages brought forward, within less than a 
year, practically all arguments that dominated Chinese media theory and practice 
throughout the 1980s. While conservative voices warned of the dangers that a too 
radical liberalization would pose to the Party and its propaganda apparatus, liberal 
ideologues argued that after three decades of consolidation the political system of 
the PRC and the rule of the Party had nothing to fear from a less aggressive 
approach to governance; to the contrary, only the competition of ideas in the 
space of public communication would be able to mobilize people’s minds to come 
up with the input needed to carry out the four modernizations and to accelerate 
China’s development. Beyond these opinions, more radical voices emerged that 
called for a near-total abolition of the mechanisms of control, accepting only the 
legal limits on personal freedom, including the rights of speech and publishing. 
The last group of opinions could never reach the political mainstream. In 
1989, the radical proponents of democracy finally lost out and they also lost the 
right to express their views legitimately in the PRC. The other two groups on the 
continuum (that only gradually began to crystallize into opposing factions) 
competed throughout the 1980s for influence in the propaganda sector. The 
general trend of the “cycles of relaxation and repression” in the media sector (that 
coincided with the political campaigns of 1981, 1983, and 1986/87)126 was towards 
more liberalization of the media: progressive decentralization, increasing 
interdependence with the outside world, and the transformation of society brought 
about by the economic reforms all served to make impossible a permanent return 
to a closely controlled setting. This development in the media sector illustrates a 
general shift in the CCP’s approach to governance: the Party began to withdraw 
from micro-management of society and retreated to the “commanding heights” of 
the political landscape, those topics that were directly relevant for the primary 
                                             
126 See He Yuhuai. Cycles of Repression and Relaxation: Politico-Literary Events in China, 1976-
1989. Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1992. 
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objectives of the Party-state.127 In this process, the operating space for the media 
increased significantly: many areas of public communication, namely in the field of 
entertainment, became available to the media. This trend continued and 
accelerated in the 1990s. 
Yet more diversity in the media did not necessarily mean less control. The 
Party stopped to care for issues that were no longer considered as immediately 
relevant to core questions such as policy making and regime survival. In these 
core areas, however, the Party defended its claims of control with all means, as 
the various political campaigns showed. Exhausted from the ideological excesses 
of the Cultural Revolution, the media were used in a less proactive manner, but 
the general structures of control remained in place and could be reinforced 
whenever the need to do so arose. The general liberalization notwithstanding, the 
fundamental arrangements in the media sector, such as the ownership structure, 
remained unchanged: media enterprises were in their entirety exempted from 
marketization and commercialization until the late 1980s. Private ownership of the 
media remained unthinkable. 
Even the one aspect of the media concept that most visibly lost in 
significance due to the reform policies was not discarded entirely, but continued to 
loom in the background. The discussions in Dushu had acknowledged almost 
unanimously the Party’s right to take action against counterrevolutionary 
tendencies. None of the participants would declare the end of class struggle, and 
the end of the media’s function as a tool and site of class struggle. The CCP made 
use of its right to intervene repeatedly during the 1980s, when Western influences 
were denounced as “bourgeois” and thus as reactionary tendencies. In 1989, the 
rebellion of media people was interpreted by the Party as an effort of class 
enemies to bring down the rule of the CCP and the socialist system through an 
attack on the “ideological frontlines;” the consequent crackdown in the media 
sector was particularly severe.128 
                                             
127 For the media, these were generally formulated in terms of taboo areas that require close 
scrutiny of relevant publications, in contrast to most over themes. See the discussion in ch. 4. 
128 The collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had a chilling 
effect as well: the events of 1989-91 did fit perfectly well with the assumptions that class enemies 
try to undermine a socialist nation through the superstructure and the media and eventually bring 
down the regime itself, leading to the restoration of class struggle. The Chinese democracy 
movement of 1989 and the consequent events abroad served to confirm the conviction of the CCP 
leadership for the continued need of the class struggle clause in the Party’s media concept.  
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The other elements of the media concept, too, remained valid in reform 
China. The Party character (dangxing) of press and publishing could never be 
called into question openly. It was newspapers lower in the hierarchy and farther 
away from Beijing, the political centre, that could establish a limited degree of 
autonomy, but neither the Chinese press nor other sections of the Chinese media 
apparatus were ever able to claim the form of independence that, for example, the 
Polish Solidarity press enjoyed. They remained within the framework determined 
by a liberal interpretation of the media concept; the basic lines of this interpretation 
had been explored in the “taboo” debate in Dushu back in 1979. 
The circumstances of Dushu’s founding and the line taken by the journal 
since 1979 are paradigmatic for the situation of the Chinese media in the 1980s. 
The journal was conceived by a number of establishment intellectuals who had in 
mind the model of a liberal but loyal press that predated the founding of the PRC. 
In 1979, when they reached high-level positions in the propaganda sector, their 
time had come to translate this vision into reality. The liberal journal Dushu that 
spoke out on behalf of the intellectuals was not a popular medium, but rather a 
government organ. It was the coincidence of the interests of establishment 
intellectuals and the political line of the CCP under Deng Xiaoping that had 
brought about the new atmosphere in the media sector, yet the initiative for these 
developments had come from the Party. Dushu was founded by officials from the 
PD. Thus, while the new setting provided the intellectuals (who were in charge of 
the media apparatus) with much more potential for manipulation and subversive 
activities that allowed them to advocate their own agenda, in the last consequence 
the intellectuals were once again following the political line which the CCP had 
decided on. The media concept and its inherent contradictions were responsible 
for the clashes between the opinions in the “taboo” debate; but the concept must 
also be credited with the flexibility to allow the general shift in climate while 
preserving the authority and the power of the Party in the media sector. 

Chapter Nine 
Great Walls of Soap: 
Chinese Television in the Era of Marketization 
 
“For the first time, the Chinese media of mass communication have 
adopted something like a middle standpoint, assuming the role of a 
medium of dialogue between the top-level policy makers and people’s 
masses.” 
(Heshang) 
 
“Maybe you have all along been taking our journal to be a battle field or a 
bridgehead fortress or some other kind of defensive bulwark. But listen to 
what everybody says: aren’t you treating our broad readers like opponents 
who must be attacked or guarded against? This way of thinking definitively 
needs to be corrected.” 
(Bianjibu de gushi) 
 
Political liberalization and economic reforms have been the two factors 
shaping and transforming China in the 1980s. In the new political climate, Chinese 
society plunged into debates of a breadth and depth unseen since the May Fourth 
era. The abolition of the people’s communes in the countryside and the 
emergence of new forms of enterprise, including collectively owned and private 
companies in both urban and rural areas, set the PRC on a path of rapid economic 
growth; rising living standards nurtured quickly expanding markets and led to the 
emergence of a consumer society. For most of the 1980s, however, the media 
sector was exempted from the second of the two factors. In the years immediately 
after the 1949 take-over, the CCP had transformed the Chinese press and 
publishing industries from a competitive part of the national economy into a 
subsection of the propaganda xitong, an area within the political imaginaire entirely 
removed from the economic sector. So when economic reforms started in the early 
1980s, the new policies did not yet apply to the media. Neither were individual 
entrepreneurs (getihu 个体户) allowed to establish publishing houses, nor did the 
Party approve of collectively-owned media enterprises such as newspapers. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, and notably after 1987, structural 
reforms of the economic and administrative system also reached the media sector. 
As before, the CCP refused to grant private entrepreneurs the right to set up 
businesses in the sector, and it also did not allow market principles and free 
competition to shake up the media in the same way many industries were 
transformed by market forces, but the reduction of government subsidies (or at 
least the threat to do so) brought increasing pressure on the media – publishing 
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houses, newspapers and journals, as well as radio and TV stations – to pay 
attention to their bottom line. When the media enterprises moved to diversify their 
sources of income, the most likely choice was to attract advertising revenues. The 
resulting pressure to expand their audience forced the media to be more attentive 
to the demands and the tastes of their readers and viewers. 
How did marketization affect the Chinese media sector? The modern 
Chinese media concept had defined the function of the media and made them an 
element of the Party’s normative social project. Did the media concept lose its 
relevance, after almost fifty years, when market principles were introduced to the 
sector? The concept had survived the reorientation of the CCP’s general line in the 
wake of the Third Plenum and had proven flexible enough to cope with the political 
liberalization and the opening that characterized the 1980s. Were the principles 
governing the media sector able to adopt to another decisive change of their 
overall environment? 
It has been argued that the reform politics have basically altered the 
paradigms of media work in the PRC: the propaganda model of the press, based 
on command communication and dating from the Mao era, was replaced by a 
setting in which political demands were negotiated with an economic rationale in 
an increasingly consumer-oriented society.1 
While I do not question this assumption, I would suggest a higher degree of 
continuity: rather than breaking radically with the Maoist past, the CCP has tried to 
modify the media concept and adapt the media sector to the new social and 
economic conditions. In this chapter I will show that the media concept was able to 
cope with the major challenge posed by the marketization (shichanghua 市场化) 
and commodification (shangpinhua 商品化) of the Chinese economy that reached 
the sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First of all, the predicted erosion of 
the Party’s actual ability to control the media has not happened: even in an 
environment characterized by market mechanisms and monetary pressures, the 
CCP has retained the ability to prescribe media contents, to enforce (if necessary) 
the media’s pedagogic function, and to punish individual deviations from current 
                                             
1 See, for example, Chin-Chuan Lee. “Mass Media: Of China, About China” in Chin-Chuan Lee 
(ed.). Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism. New York: The Guilford Press, 
1990, p. 3-29. For a similar argument see Yuezhi Zhao. Media, Market, and Democracy in China: 
Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998. 
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policies. The furthest the Party would go was to move into the background and 
allow more room for obviously non-political forms of entertainment that had 
disappeared in the early 1950s – under the condition that they were not 
detrimental to the project of education and enlightenment that, since the 1980s, 
was referred to as the “construction of spiritual civilization” (jingshen wenming 
jianshe 精神文明建设). The CCP has tried to turn the new market mechanisms to 
its own advantage and to make media controls and commercialization compatible. 
As the analyses in this chapter show, the Party has only partly succeeded in this 
effort, as the forces it has set free – for example, the subversive power of laughter 
and comedy – have engaged the Party’s propaganda authorities in a protracted 
tug-of-war. At the same time, however, it is clear that the media concept continues 
to set the parameters of the discussion. 
In this chapter, I will turn to Chinese television to examine the impact of 
marketization on the media and on the media concept. The first Chinese TV 
stations began to operate in 1958, but in contrast to broadcasting, television 
played just a minor role in the media sector for the next twenty years.2 In 1978, 
only three million TV sets existed nationwide. In 1981, however, the number 
reached 10 million, and the 100 million benchmark was passed in 1987. While 
penetration in the countryside was still low at this time, TV sets could be found in 
practically all urban households, which had started to shift to colour TV sets since 
1986.3 Since about 1987, then, television had become, at least in the urban areas, 
the prime medium of both information and entertainment.4 
I will first of all outline the political measures that pointed the way for the 
introduction of market principles into the media sector, and into the television 
industry in particular. While the CCP created a stimulus for television stations to 
pay attention to their bottom line, the Party refrained from radical approaches: 
                                             
2 On the origins of Chinese television see Guo Zhenzhi. Zhongguo dianshi shi. Beijing: Wenhua 
yishu chubanshe, 1997, p. 3-18. Zuo Moye (ed.). Dangdai Zhongguo de guangbo dianshi. Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987, vol. 2, p. 3-22. 
3 Numbers taken from Guojia tongjiju (ed.). Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981, 1982, 1987. Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1982 (p. 410), 1983 (p. 508), and 1988 (p. 804, 808, and 833). 
4 On Chinese television in the period under consideration here see also Yin Hong. “Meaning, 
Production, Consumption: The History and Reality of Television Drama in China” in Stephanie H. 
Donald, Michael Keane, Yin Hong (eds.). Media in China: Consumption, Content, and Crisis. 
London: Routledge, 2002, p. 28-39; Jinglu Yu. “The Structure and Function of Chinese Television, 
1979-1989” in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.). Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism. 
New York: The Guilford Press, 1990, p. 69-87; James Lull. China Turned On: Television, Reform, 
and Resistance. London: Routledge, 1991. 
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subsidies were reduced or reallocated but not cut entirely, neither would financially 
unsuccessful stations (especially in poorer inland provinces) be allowed to go 
bankrupt.5 I will then turn to two approaches to respond to the new demands that 
appear to be radically different in their effort to create revenues by attracting more 
audiences. In effect, however, common points become visible. The two 
approaches I will contrast here are the television documentary Heshang 河殇 aired 
in 1988, and the soap opera Bianjibu de gushi 编辑部的故事 produced in 1991. 
Both of them were enormously successful with the audience and can be seen as 
blueprints for television making in the 1990s. 
While higher-charged and more controversial documentaries of the kind of 
Heshang have reappeared periodically, most media producers have preferred the 
lower-risk option of the soap opera approach with its soft forms of irony; the “sex 
appeal” of politics notwithstanding, it was soap operas that turned out to be the 
winning formula in the TV stations’ struggle for survival between the “Party line” 
and the “bottom line.” Entertainment with a popular appeal that avoids sensitive or 
political issues has thus become the mainstream mode of Chinese television in the 
1990s. The CCP, so my conclusion in this chapter, allowed the triumph of 
entertainment in the media, so long as the objectives of the Party’s moral project 
were not questioned (for example by pornography or all too blatant glorification of 
violence) and political taboo issues were not touched.6 The media concept was not 
abolished, but looms in the background, ready to be implemented with full force 
whenever necessary. 
 
 
The Media and the Market 
The transformation of the Chinese economy was an incremental process 
that advanced in different stages, and with varying speed, throughout the 1980s. 
Economic reform was accompanied by debates on political reform (zhengzhi tizhi 
gaige 政治体制改革): progress in this area was even slower than in the economic 
                                             
5 In most cases, indirect financing, such as almost unlimited access to bank credits, free use of 
property and real estate, and economic favours from local-level officials, have replaced direct 
subsidies. This trend has continued into the 1990s and beyond. 
6 For a similar argument see the articles in Wang Jing (ed.). Chinese Popular Culture and the State. 
Special Issue, Positions 9.1 (2001). 
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field and suffered more setbacks. Nevertheless, both reform projects had a 
significant impact on the functioning of the Chinese media. These effects became 
gradually more visible in the second half of the decade. 
As part of the propaganda sector, the media were formally exempt from 
economic reform: even after 1990, newspapers, publishing houses, and 
broadcasting stations were classified as “institutions,” or shiye danwei 事业单位, 
rather than “enterprises,” or qiye danwei 企业单位.7 While qiye danwei are part of 
the national economy, shiye danwei are public service providers; it is not by 
coincidence that shiye also means “cause,” such as in “the Party’s cause” or “the 
cause of cultural construction.” Literally, the media are thus units working for the 
public cause. This designation was rigidly applied all through the 1980s, and only 
in the late 1990s the Party gave green light for the enterpris-ation (qiyehua 企业化) 
of selected media units. 
The rapidly expanding economy and the adjustments introduced to the 
administrative structure in the course of political reforms, however, deeply affected 
the media, their official status and designation notwithstanding. These 
developments became increasingly obvious by 1987. After a freeze caused by the 
campaign against “bourgeois liberalization” (zichanjieji ziyouhua 资产阶级自由化) 
in late 1986 and early 1987, and the ouster of CCP General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang, the economy was rapidly expanding by the time the Party’s 13th National 
Congress was held in October that year. In his report to the congress, Zhao 
Ziyang did stop short of using the designation “market economy” (shichang jingji 
市场经济) for China’s economic structure8 – the term “socialist market economy” 
(shehuizhuyi shichang jingji 社会主义市场经济) was coined only at the Party’s next 
congress five years later.9 Yet while Zhao did not mention the term “market 
                                             
7 On the distinction of qiye danwei and shiye danwei see also Daniel C. Lynch. After the 
Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford 
University Press, 1999, p. 75-84. Lynch says that since the mid-1990s, Chinese officials have been 
using the slogan “institutions managed like enterprises” (shiye danwei, qiye guanli 事业单位，企业
管理) as the de facto compromise formula. See ibid., p. 77. 
8 See Zhao’s report “Yanzhe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin” in RMRB, Nov. 6, 
1987. On Zhao’s report see also Goldman. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy, p. 232-37. 
9 See Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th Party Congress: “Jiakuai gaige kaifang he xiandaihua jianshe 
bufa, duoqu you Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi shiye de geng da shengli” (Oct. 12, 1992) in RMRB, 
Oct. 21, 1992. On the process of drafting this document see “Rang sixiang chongpo laolong: 
‘shichang jingji’ xiejin shisi da baogao de jianxin licheng” in Zhongguo qingnian 1993.1, p. 4-5. 
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economy,” he was equally careful to avoid the term “planned economy” (jihua jingji 
计划经济). The term linking the two conceptions of the national economy was 
“commodity” (shangpin 商品): Zhao spoke of a “planned commodity economy” 
(you jihuade shangpin jingji 有计划的商品经济), but also of “commodity markets” 
(shangpin shichang 商品市场). The message behind Zhao’s careful wording is 
clearly that the market is on the rise: not only appears the word “market” with a 
considerably higher frequency in his speech than “plan;” he also uses two 
substitutes for the non-word “market economy,” namely “market system” (shichang 
tixi 市场体系) and “market order” (shichang shunxu 市场顺序). 
In his speech, Zhao Ziyang declared: “The socialist commodity economy 
surges forward with unstoppable vigour.” Since the Third Plenum, so Zhao, 
economic stagnation and mismanagement had been corrected and the Party had 
led China onto the path of accelerated economic growth. The result of this process 
was a commodity economy. The “commodification” (shangpinhua 商品化) of the 
Chinese national economy, Zhao said, was an inevitable result of the Chinese 
road to socialism; it was closely related to the “primary stage of socialism” 
(shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan 社会主义初级阶段). This latter theory originated from 
Zhao’s own pen and was his major contribution to Chinese socialist theory. He 
explained to his audience: “Our country currently is in the primary stage of 
socialism: because our socialism was born in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal 
society, the level of the productive forces lags far behind that of the developed 
capitalist nations. Therefore we must go through a prolonged primary stage in 
which we must carry out the industrialization and commodification, socialization 
(shehuihua 社会化), and modernization of production that many other countries 
have achieved under the conditions of capitalism.”10 With the radical redefinition of 
China’s stage in the process of social advancement, Zhao Ziyang in fact returned 
to the gradualist policies associated originally with Lenin’s New Economic Policy of 
the early 1920s, which Soviet advisers had recommended to the Chinese as the 
best path for the People’s Republic. Mao had brushed away this blueprint in 1953 
in favour of a more rapid “transition to socialism,” a step that the CCP had now 
                                             
10 “Yanzhe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin.” 
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decided to undo.11 Zhao explained that the creation of a commodity economy was 
a necessary condition for China to leave behind the various forms of small-scale 
production and handicraft that still dominated the Chinese national economy and 
that were actually remnants of a feudal mode of production. Only if China reached 
an advanced level of industrialization, the country would be able to move on to 
higher forms of socialism. 
As the commodification of the economy was inevitable, and even a 
necessary factor for development, there was nothing to fear from it:12 
Taking public ownership as the mainstay, we must vigorously develop the planned 
commodity economy. Fully developing the commodity economy is a stage in the 
development of society and economy that cannot be passed by, and that is an 
indispensable and fundamental condition for the socialization and modernization of 
production. With regard to the system of ownership and the distribution [of incomes], 
the socialist society does not demand puritanism and equalitarianism. To the contrary, 
during the primary stage, we must develop – under the premise of taking public 
ownership as the mainstay – varied components of the economy, must carry out – 
under the premise of taking “each according to his work” as the mainstay – various 
forms of [income] distribution, and encourage some people to get rich first through 
honest labour and lawful business, with the goal of common prosperity. 
 
The latter remark was a reference to Deng Xiaoping’s famous credo to “let some 
become rich first.”13 Economic competition was thus positively recognized as an 
ingredient in the economic structure that would have stimulating effects on 
economic development and on the construction of socialism. At the same time, 
there was nothing to fear about the process of commodification: “The essential 
difference between the socialist commodity economy and the capitalist commodity 
economy is that the basis of their systems of ownership is different.”14 The 
changes brought about by economic restructuring, Zhao promised, would remain 
within the framework of China’s socialist system. 
Zhao Ziyang’s speech at the 13th Party Congress had a profound impact not 
only for qiye danwei, for the economic enterprises, but also for the shiye danwei, 
such as that of the media sector. This impact was felt by the media directly and 
indirectly. First of all, pressure to react to market mechanisms had built up 
                                             
11 For an exemplary study of industrial organization in the early 1950s and the Soviet models see 
Deborah A. Kaple. Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
12 “Yanzhe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin.” 
13 See “Shehuizhuyi he shichang jingji bu cunzai genben maodun” (dated Oct. 25, 1985), in Deng 
Xiaoping wenxuan. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, vol. 3, p. 148-51, here p. 149. 
14 “Yanzhe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin.” 
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gradually over the past years. In spring 1987, for example, a set of guidelines 
issued by the Ministry of Finance had urged shiye danwei across the propaganda 
sector to reign in costs and to mobilize sources of incomes other than government 
subsidies.15 The “Guidelines” declared:16 
All shiye danwei that can do so must tap their potential and expand their paid services; 
they must rationally cultivate [sources of] income and must raise the level of self-
sufficiency in operating expenditures. Shiye danwei with a relatively high fixed income 
must, according to the degree of their financial self-sufficiency, adopt the methods of 
either receiving subsidies for [income] shortfalls [only], or paying for their expenditures 
from their income [for those danwei with a better cash flow], or practicing enterprise-like 
management (qiyehua guanli 企业化管理) [for the top earners among shiye danwei]. 
Shiye danwei with full budget management (quane yusuan guanli 全额预算管理), too, 
must be urged to actively cultivate their [sources of] income and to use it to repay parts 
of their budget allocations. 
 
The ministry tried to reduce the reliance of shiye danwei, such as hospitals, 
research laboratories, and media units, on subsidies and encouraged them to 
cultivate other sources of income. While support would not be withdrawn from 
those units unable to meet their own financial needs, there were limits to the 
amount of money they could hope to receive. 
As for the broadcast media, the “Guidelines” singled out advertising as a 
potential source of revenues that the stations were to pursue: “Radio and 
television must receive funds according to the hours they broadcast; they must 
bring all revenues from advertising, except some bonuses and welfare funds 
subtracted according to the guidelines, into their budget and repay part of their 
financial allocations.”17 As TV and radio were expected to have a higher potential 
to create revenues, they even had to cover part of their investment needs 
(investments are usually paid for by the state) from advertising income. Other 
Party and government documents also urged reforms in the news sector. The 
“propaganda blueprint” for the year 1988, issued shortly after the 13th Party 
congress, called on the state’s organs of financial administration, price regulation, 
and taxes, to work together with the PPA on “rational” (helide 合理的) tax levels 
                                             
15 “Guanyu jieyue shiyefei kaizhi de ji xiang guiding” (dated May 18, 1987), in Xinwen chubanshu 
zhengce fagui si (ed.). Zhongguo xinwen chuban fagui jianming shiyong shouce, 1949-1994. 
Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1994, p. 221f. 
16 Ibid., p. 221. 
17 Ibid., p. 222. 
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that would leave enough room for the build-up of funds in the industry, a step to 
encourage the self-reliance of the media units.18 
Indirect pressure on the media to react to the marketization of the Chinese 
economy came from the economic sector: with his speech, Zhao Ziyang had not 
so much opened up uncharted terrain as he had acknowledged formally the result 
of nine years of economic reforms. This can be seen from the growth of an 
industry that prior to 1979 for all practical purposes had not existed, but that 
played an increasingly important role for the media: advertising. The first Chinese 
television advertisement ever was broadcast on Jan. 28, 1979 on the Shanghai TV 
station; in November the same year, the PD gave formal approval to the 
broadcasting and printing of ads in the news media. Since December 1979, 
advertisements became a regular feature on CCTV.19 As enterprises were urged 
to compete, advertising expenditures grew rapidly – and with them the revenues 
that the media received from advertising.20 Enterprises lobbied increasingly harder 
to place their ads in media they found promising. 
Indirect pressure, coming from enterprises willing to increase their amount 
of advertising, and direct pressures from the government thus complemented each 
other. While the flow of subsidies for the media – at least for the politically most 
important, such as central and local Party organs – never ceased entirely, 
subsidies were not likely to grow at a time when the Party promoted more self-
sufficiency for the economy and tried to scale back the political interventions in 
social micro-processes in favour of a “macro approach of management” 
(hongguan guanli 宏观管理), another catchword of Zhao Ziyang’s speech at the 
13th Party Congress. Furthermore, at a time when the government became ever 
more unwilling to shoulder the costs, the media found themselves confronted with 
rising expenditures, aggravated by inflationary pressures. Finally, in an 
                                             
18 “Yijiubaba nian xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian” (dated Jan. 16, 1988) in Zhongyang xuanchuanbu 
bangongting (ed.). Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian, 1951-1992. Beijing: 
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, p. 852-63, here p. 859. 
19 See Ma Dawei. “Shilun wo guo dianshi guanggao de fazhan” in Xinwen yanjiu ziliao 60 (1993), p. 
17-27, here p. 17. Compare also Randall Stross. “The Return of Advertising to China: A Survey of 
the Ideological Reversal” in The China Quarterly 123 (1990), p. 485-502. CCTV, for example, 
earned 27 million RMB from advertising in 1987. Advertising revenues had surged to 1.2 billion 
RMB in 1994, and reached 13,36 billion RMB in 1998. Numbers taken from Yin Hong. “Meaning, 
Production, Consumption,” p. 31. 
20 Although prices for ads were fixed by the state until the mid-1980s, advertising grew quickly as a 
source of income for the media. For numbers see the tables in Lynch. After the Propaganda State, 
p. 57 and 59. 
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environment where living standards were rising quickly across the full spectrum of 
society, the media work units were hard pressed to increase their revenues so as 
to create surpluses that could be distributed as bonuses to their employees. 
Under this package of pressures, the media turned to advertising. In this 
way, economic reforms and marketization, or, in Zhao Ziyang’s terms, the 
commodification of the Chinese national economy, reached the media sector. As 
competition in the economic field intensified, so did competition for advertising 
revenues in the media sector. The ability to attract large audiences thus became a 
crucial factor for the media units for the first time around 1987. In this setting, the 
media profited from the Party’s earlier relaxation of the ideological realm that now 
provided them with the opportunity to jockey for popularity and to cater to public 
tastes. Television, with an increasingly broad reach, especially among the affluent 
urban strata, was well positioned to profit from the onslaught of commercialization: 
while in 1983 TV attracted only 15 per cent of all advertising expenditures in China, 
its share rose to 25 per cent in 1987 and to 40 per cent in 1994.21 Yet competition 
among television stations for lucrative prime time advertising soon heated up and 
forced television stations across the nation to create ever more sophisticated 
programming to meet popular tastes.22 TV stations all over China experimented 
with different approaches to popularity, concentrating on TV series. The first 
Chinese blockbuster TV series was broadcast in June 1988: Heshang. 
 
 
Heshang and the Popular Appeal of Politics 
The six-part TV series Heshang (usually translated as River Elegy) was first 
aired on Chinese Central Television (CCTV) on June 11-16, 1988, and caused an 
uproar that soon engulfed intellectual groups, viewers across the nation, the top 
Party leadership, and even overseas Chinese circles. In the large body of literature 
on the subject,23 Heshang has been interpreted as the culmination of the 1980s 
                                             
21 Compare Lynch. After the Propaganda State, p. 59. 
22 The first decisive effort to raise the quality of programming was the creation of inter-regional 
exchange networks for TV programming. See Jinglu Yu. “The Structure and Function of Chinese 
Television,” p. 31. 
23 Heshang seems to be a subject nobody writing on the 1980s can avoid. Among the more 
significant discussions are: Chen Fong-ching, Jin Guantao. From Youthful Manuscripts to River 
Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation, 1979-1989. Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997, p. 215-27. Wang Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, 
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“cultural fever” (wenhua re 文化热) and as a powerful statement in support of 
China’s opening and reform. Heshang, it has been said, was sympathetic of Zhao 
Ziyang’s policies, but went significantly beyond the agenda the Party was willing 
and able to sustain at that moment. These interpretations are certainly correct and 
I will not question them here. In this section, I am interested in a different question 
that has received little attention as yet: what motivated the country’s premier TV 
station to support the production of a controversial piece like Heshang? I will argue 
that, aside from the personal political convictions of the CCTV leadership, 
commercial considerations played a significant role in the decision to get involved 
in the project. 
The Heshang saga can be told in a few sentences. The idea for a TV series 
on the Yellow river, enriched by some of the topics of the feverish discussions 
going on among intellectuals in the 1980s, must be credited to Xia Jun 夏骏, a 
very young but gifted and well-connected journalist at CCTV.24 Xia was only 23 
years old in 1985 when he approached leading intellectuals involved in the cultural 
discussions and tried to warm them for the idea of carrying their debates into a 
television documentary. However, it was not before summer 1987 that the political 
climate allowed the project to be realized and CCTV and a number of reform-
minded intellectuals agreed on a concept of the series. Su Xiaokang 苏晓康, a 
liberal-minded RMRB reporter, became the brain behind the series, while Wang 
Luxiang 王鲁湘 did most of the script-writing. During later stages of production, 
they were joined by other liberal intellectuals, including Jin Guantao 金观涛, chief 
                                                                                                                                      
Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, ch. 3. 
Chen Xiaomei: Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995, ch.1. Marie Claire Huot. Le Petite Révolution Culturelle. Arles: 
Editions Philippe Picquier, 1994, p. 93-98. Chen Zuyan. “River Elegy as Reportage Literature: 
Generic Experimentation and Boundaries,” in China Information VII.4 (1993), p. 20-32. The text of 
the series can be found in Cui Wenhua (ed.). Heshang lun. Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 
1988. The entire text was translated and commented by Richard W. Bodman and Pin P. Wan in 
Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang. Ithaca: Cornell 
University East Asia Program, 1991. For further discussions see Christina Neder. Flußelegie: 
Chinas Identitätskrise: Die Debatte um die chinesische Fernsehserie Heshang, 1988-1994. 
Dortmund, Projekt Verlag, 1996. Weng Ningna (ed.). Heshang: Zhongguoren zui shenchen de 
chang tan. Taibei: Fengyun shidai chuban gongsi, 1988. Zhong Huamin (ed.). Chong ping 
Heshang. Hangzhou: Hangzhou daxue chubanshe, 1989. Hua Yan (ed.). Heshang pipan. Beijing: 
Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 1989. 
24 The twists and turns of Heshang’s birth have been told masterfully in Chen Fong-ching. From 
Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy, p. 215-21. There is nothing to add to this account, and I rely in 
my elaboration of Heshang’s background on Chen and Jin. 
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editor of the influential Towards the Future book series (Zou xiang weilai congshu 
走向未来丛书), published by Sichuan renmin chubanshe. For the intellectuals and 
CCTV, the Heshang project was a mutually beneficial venture: the station hoped to 
profit from the renown of the intellectuals, and the latter saw the opportunity to 
bring the issues of their concern to the attention of a broader public. 
Heshang was produced in winter 1987/88, using footage from a Sino-
Japanese cooperative documentary on the Yellow River, shot in 1984-86, as well 
as some additional material that was later filmed exclusively for the series. Other 
intellectuals, university professors, and writers were invited to appear as 
commentators in the programme. Production expenses were covered by CCTV, 
while the crew also received considerable support from the PLA.25 With the help of 
senior CCTV administrators, the series was rushed through the approval 
procedures obligatory for TV productions (responsibility in this case rested with the 
Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television26) and was prepared for airing in June 1988. 
The title was chosen in analogy to Guoshang 国殇, an elegy in the collection Jiu 
ge 九歌 by the third century B.C. poet Qu Yuan 屈原.27 
Upon airing in mid-June, Heshang caused a sensation. It was a novelty in 
several respects: it was the first time that one of the heated discussions of the 
intellectual scene was carried onto the TV screens and thus reached households 
across China; the appearance of well-known cultural figures as commentators was 
an unheard of thing, not to speak of the documentary’s radical message: that 
China’s “yellow,” earth-bound, land-centred civilization had utterly failed to 
generate prosperity and national strength and therefore deserved to be rejected in 
favour of a “blue,” open-minded, maritime culture that would allow China to join the 
world – in short, for what Wang Jing has called the “indigo myth of modernity.”28 
Borrowing audiovisual techniques from traditional propaganda, the documentary, 
with its strong imagery and easily comprehensible nationalistic (but nonetheless 
                                             
25 See ibid., p. 220, esp. n. 12. The military had been instrumental in lending logistical support to 
the original filming; the PLA was, for example, the only body having helicopters needed for the 
numerous aerial shots. The army was also involved during later stages of production. 
26 The Ministry was reduced into a State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (Guangbo 
dianying dianshi zongju 广播电影电视总局) in 1998. The move came in the course of overall 
administrative reform, but it also reflected the gradual retreat of Party and government from micro-
management that made the Ministry superfluous. 
27 Tang Bingzheng et al. (ed.). Chu ci jin zhu. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1996, p. 75-78. 
28 Wang Jing. High Culture Fever, p. 119. 
 505
iconoclastic) message, appealed to the audiences’ concern for China’s destiny 
and the further direction of the CCP’s reform project. In the 1980s context, such an 
approach seemed logical and the frenzy created by Heshang proved the 
producers right – they had found a way to draw the audiences’ attention. 
While Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping greeted the series, other high-
ranking CCP figures, notably Wang Zhen 王震,29 expressed fierce opposition to 
the denigration of China’s glorious culture and tradition, and to what they saw as 
an attempt of all-out Westernization. When heated intra-Party debates at the 
seaside resort of Beidaihe 北戴河 in August remained inconclusive,30 the series 
was revised along lines proposed by the PD and shown again, creating an even 
bigger uproar. Fierce battles over the correctness of the decision to air Heshang 
reportedly dragged on until December, but the critics were then silenced. However, 
the topic was brought up again immediately after the crackdown on the 1989 
Democracy Movement, and a campaign was launched as the CCP struggled to 
reassert control of the ideological realm. The campaign against the documentary 
and its producers, who either fled the country or were imprisoned,31 continued until 
1990. 
What is remarkable about the production of Heshang is that the initiative for 
the documentary came from CCTV, and not from the intellectual protagonists who 
were later associated with it in the first place. For one, the energetic and youthful 
Xia Jun saw the potential of the massive amount of material that the Chinese-
Japanese co-production, sponsored primarily by the Japanese NHK station, had 
reaped. Xia reportedly was appalled by the poverty and backwardness of China’s 
Northwest – those areas praised to be the cradle of the Chinese civilization. And it 
was he who recognized the perspective of linking the footage with the heated 
cultural discussions taking place among China’s intellectuals. 
                                             
29 Wang Zhen, b. 1908; 1982-87 President of the Central Party School and since 1988 a vice-
president of the PRC, 
30 It was this meeting that made clear that Zhao was losing the grace of Deng Xiaoping. See 
Richard Baum. “The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s” in Roderick MacFarquhar 
(ed.). The Politics of China, 1949-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 340-471, 
here p. 427-31. 
31 Su Xiaokang was able to flee to France and later went to the U.S. Wang Luxiang was arrested in 
Beijing. Xia Jun was protected by CCTV and avoided arrest. See Geremie Barmé, Linda Jaivin 
(ed.). New Ghosts, Old Dreams: Chinese Rebel Voices. New York: Times Books, 1992, p. 142. 
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The intellectuals, in turn, were not immediately interested in the medium of 
television. They were all too fixated on the media they were familiar with: books, 
journals, and occasionally newspaper articles were the platforms where the 
“cultural fever” raged. Xia Jun’s initial efforts to get prominent figures such as Jin 
Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 刘青峰 on board failed, as Jin later recalled, because 
they were “not yet realizing the immense potential of the mass medium [of 
television].”32 Response from other intellectuals contacted, such as Liu Binyan and 
Su Xiaokang, initially was lukewarm, too. 
In fact, Xia Jun found it easier to convince his mentor at CCTV of the 
prospects of his project: Chen Hanyuan 陈汉元 was the station’s vice-director in 
charge of daily affairs. Chen was an open-minded and experienced TV veteran 
who had worked for twenty years at CCTV and its predecessor, Beijing Television. 
He had handpicked Xia when the young man graduated from the Beijing 
Broadcasting Institute and continued to protect him even after the crackdown on 
the Democracy Movement and the consequent campaign against Heshang. For 
the time being, it was Chen who helped the series to get approval from the TV 
station for production.33 
Chen Hanyuan was also instrumental in securing the approval of the 
Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television needed before the series could be aired. 
Chen contacted his old colleague Wang Feng 王枫, a former CCTV director who at 
the time was a vice-minister. Wang Feng saw to it that Heshang encountered no 
trouble in two rounds of internal screening.34 It is important to stress that neither 
Xia Jun nor Chen Hanyuan or Wang Feng were otherwise involved in the cultural 
discussions of the 1980s. They were certainly sympathetic to the debates, yet they 
were not intellectuals in the first place, but either journalists or senior 
administrators in the broadcasting sector. Their sympathy alone would not have 
been enough to make the project attractive for CCTV. Rather, a number of points 
suggest that it was the commercial potential of the popular appeal of politics, as 
presented in Heshang, that created an economic rationale for CCTV’s participation. 
                                             
32 Chen Fong-ching. From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy, p. 217, n. 7. 
33 Chen was responsible for the decision to accept the manuscript. See Wang Luxiang. “Huiyi yu 
sikao” in Cui Wenhua. Heshang lun, p. 91-97, here p. 92. 
34 On Wang Feng’s role in the approval process see the inside account by Cui Wenhua. “Heshang 
dui Zhongguo dianshi de qishi he zai?” in Cui Wenhua. Heshang lun, p. 123-42, here p. 134f. On 
the support of both Chen Hanyuan and Wang Feng see also Wang Luxiang. “Huiyi yi sikao,” p. 96f. 
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The station did not only throw its bureaucratic weight behind the production 
of Heshang, but also entered a significant financial commitment in deciding to 
cover the costs of additional footage that had to be shot at the original locations. 
Apparently the station’s leadership was convinced that their investment (in both 
the political and financial sense) in Heshang would pay off, as it pushed hard to 
ensure the quick viewing of the series. And even when the heated debate had 
started across the country, CCTV must have regarded Heshang as a major 
success. This is the only explanation for the station’s proactive move to produce a 
sequel to Heshang, centring on the May Fourth movement. Basically the same 
team around Su Xiaokang and Xia Jun was entrusted with production, and CCTV, 
with the backing of Chen Hanyuan, provided a generous budget of 300,000 yuan. 
The decision for this series came in late 1988 amidst the heated debate on 
Heshang. No matter which course the debate on the series would take, with 
Heshang China’s premier TV station had created a blockbuster and had caused a 
sensation that was encouraging both intellectually and in financial terms.35 
Sensing untapped sources of income, the investment into a sequel thus seemed 
well worth the risks. Unfortunately, the risks proved bigger than expected; as a 
result the sequel was never finished.36 
The narrative strategies and the textual and visual language of Heshang 
confirms the argument that the series was a conscious effort of CCTV to attract a 
maximum number of viewers (and thus also to boost its income). Heshang 
obviously targets a non-intellectual audience: while the arguments presented in 
the documentary and the underlying theories are all rooted in the intellectual 
discussions of the preceding years, the stress is clearly on popularization. First of 
all, the language in which the series’ message is presented to television viewers is 
not that of intellectual discourse. Jin Guantao, for example, had presented his 
                                             
35 No information is available for advertisement revenues from the series. Advertising, however, 
was but one source of income related to the series; CCTV could hope to create significant extra 
revenues from selling screening rights to local TV stations across China, a lucrative and common 
practice. 
36 The order to stop work on this sequel came after several of those involved in the project had 
signed the February 26, 1989, petition to the PB and the National People’s Congress, the second 
of three such open letters written in spring 1989. See Su Xiaokang. “Shiji mo huimou: guanyu yi bu 
dianshipian de liuchan” in Wenhui yuekan, 1989.5, p. 16-24, here p. 23f. Translated with 
annotations as “Glancing Back at the End of the Century: An Account of the Miscarriage of a 
Television Film” in China Information VII.3 (Winter 1992-93), p. 51-82. See also Richard W. 
Bodman. “New Reflections on May Fourth and Mao Zedong: Introducing Su Xiaokang’s ‘Glancing 
Back at the End of the Century’” in China Information VII.3 (Winter 1992-93), p. 46-50. 
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theory of the ultra-stability of Chinese culture (chao wending jiegou 超稳定结构) in 
numerous books and articles.37 In part five of Heshang, “Sorrow and Worry” 
(Youhuan 忧患), the narrator gives a short outline of the major arguments of the 
theory; he refrains, however, from entering the depths of the discussion and limits 
his explanation to the broadest of terms, that are driven home by the power of the 
images on which the narrator’s voice is superimposed. At the end of the sequence, 
Jin Guantao comments directly on his theory in a studio interview. He speaks as 
an academic, but tries to explain his theory in popular terms:38 
History is the facts of the past, but I believe even more strongly that history is a 
permanent dialogue between past and present. In the course of this dialogue we can 
develop a very deep sense of our suffering. This will be useful for us in the present. 
The lesson that history keeps ready for the Chinese people is: China must avoid all 
destructive convulsions in the evolution of its society, and rather let the progressive and 
the creative replace upheaval. When old things fall apart we should allow the new 
factors to grow that are able to replace the old things. 
 
Jin Guantao sums up here in the most simple terms his conception of the 
dynamics of history. Learning from their own history, the Chinese people have 
developed an aversion against the disruptive and potentially destructive forces of 
change. Such an aversion is in itself a good thing, yet in the Chinese case this has 
led to the ultra-stable structures that Jin criticizes.  
Jin Guantao does not only explain his rather complex theory in a way to suit 
the needs of the audience, but also adopts the language appropriate to the 
medium of television. He avoids jargon and other stylistic conventions that would 
be normal for articles (even in journals that stressed “readability,” such as Dushu) 
or books on the same subject. He speaks freely, and apparently the interviewers 
at CCTV had urged their guests to keep to a popular bottom line so as to make the 
series and its message comprehensible to the average urban household (in other 
words, to what had been called the “stupid folks,” yumin, in earlier times). The 
narrator follows the same pattern: throughout most of the documentary, his voice 
is slow but full of force. He explains even complex issues in a straightforward way, 
such as the “El Nino” climatic phenomenon at the beginning of the series’ fifth 
                                             
37 Notably in Zai lishi de biaoxiang beihou: dui Zhongguo fengjian shehui chao wending jiegou de 
tansuo. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1984. This book was part of the famous Zou xiang 
weilai series. Jin’s theory relies heavily on the “high-level equilibrium trap” proposed by Mark Elvin 
in The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford 
University Press,1973, ch. 17. 
38 Text after Cui Wenhua. Heshang lun, p. 65f. 
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installation: “Nature has suddenly become strange to the people! From blizzards in 
California to the great floods on the plains of Bengal, from the heat wave engulfing 
the shores of the Mediterranean to the unrelenting and widespread drought on the 
African plateau – the earth suddenly seems to shiver like a malaria patient, and in 
the face of all this mankind seems to be utterly helpless, as if it had slipped back 
ten thousand years. Like a ghost (youling 幽灵) does this novel word roam all over 
the world: ‘El Nino.’”39 The dialectics between man and nature are underlined by a 
series of short takes showing a storm-battered coastline, a volcano, snow in an 
American city, and animal cadavers in the Sahel zone of Northern Africa. The 
superimposed voice of the narrator explains the phenomenon and drives it home 
through the strong, metaphoric language. In this way, the audience is confronted 
with issues on the current agenda, debated by scientists and intellectuals alike; the 
appeal to the audience is a crucial part of the narrative strategy of the television 
series. 
However, the self-understanding of Heshang’s producers does not end at 
the role of a mediator or commentator. In keeping with the CCP’s media concept 
and the tradition of the Party media, they slip into the role of educator of the 
people. The narrator is the viewer’s guide through the series. It is only through his 
voice that the viewers can make a sense out of the rapid sequences of images 
that otherwise would appear rather disparate. Instead of merely commenting on 
the pictures, the narrator constructs the strong agenda that Heshang carries; it is 
the combination of images and voice-over that produces the persuasiveness of the 
series. The bias of the narrator-guide becomes especially obvious at the end of 
each of the six instalments. The second part ends:40 
Today, we are much wiser! 
If, as we have said, China once wasted historical choices, we will no longer reject to 
chose. 
If, as we have said, our destiny is not simply fate, then we will no longer listen to its 
manipulations. 
We have recognized: although the Yellow River flows eastwards for ten thousand li, in 
the end it empties into the sea. 
We must no longer reject the invitation of the sea. 
 
 
                                             
39 Ibid., p. 55. 
40 Ibid., p. 27. 
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The first person plural in its constant repetition serves to create an identification 
between the individual viewer at home, the narrator, and the Chinese nation. 
When reading these last lines, the narrator’s voice changes pitch; he speaks 
louder and faster, stressing qualifiers such as “much wiser,” “no longer,” and “in 
the end.” 
The same strategy can be observed in the ending of the fifth instalment. It is, 
however, not only the force of language, but rather the combination of language 
and images that create the narrative power of Heshang. The following table 
contrasts the narrator’s explanation and the images:41 
Voice-over Image 
We are relieved to see that, after embarking on the 
project of... 
Stage and rostrum of 13th Party 
Congress (1987) 
...reforming the economic system, we have finally 
begun... 
Deng Xiaoping at rostrum 
...to experiment with reforms of the political system. Zhao Ziyang at rostrum 
For the first time, a delegate of the National People’s 
Congress courageously raised his hand to reject a 
vote – a step that has not come easy indeed!42 Who 
won’t say that this is progress? 
Taiwan representative 
speaking to reporters 
No matter what obstacles and crises this reform will 
meet with, all we can do is to march ahead. 
Delegates of National People’s 
Congress 
Behind us, there were great floods and endless 
turmoil. 
Refugees in water; trucks 
carrying Red Guards (black 
and white ==> historical 
footage) 
But we must march ahead and break through these 
unceasing cycles of history. 
Hang gliders and wind surfers 
Perhaps we will encounter setbacks, but, isn’t this 
just like Gun, who failed on the verge of success, yet 
whose failure became the foundation for the success 
of his son, the Great Yu?43 
The ice is broken: ice floes are 
carried away by the stream 
Let our generation load the heavy burden of suffering 
on our shoulders! 
Series of short shots: people 
working for reform projects 
We must do this so that our children, grandchildren, 
and the next ten thousand generations will no longer 
suffer! 
Playing children 
 
                                             
41 Ibid., p. 67. 
42 At the meeting of the National People’s Congress from March 25 to Apr. 13, 1988, a 
representative from Taiwan cast the first “no” vote in the history of the Congress. See Zhongguo 
qingnian bao, March 29, 1988. Quoted after Richard Bodman. Deathsong of the River, p. 201, n. 
59. 
43 The Great Yu (Da Yu 大禹), the mythical founder of the Xia dynasty, is credited with diking the 
Yellow River. His father Gun 鲧 had tried in vain to stop the river from flowing and flooding the land. 
The stories of the Gun and his son are found in the Shangshu. 
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As in the passage from the end of the second instalment (see above), the first 
person plural creates a sense of identity. The explicit political message of the 
section is supported by several more rhetorical devices: the narrator works with 
rhetorical questions, the strongly affirmative “must march ahead,” and the two 
exclamations that conclude the passage. Other vocabulary, such as the “finally” in 
the first sentence, or the “no matter” in the middle, underline the authoritative 
attitude of the narrator, who seems to be sermoning to the audience. All these 
elements show the continuities of Heshang with traditional audiovisual propaganda 
techniques. The enlightening function of the media pervades Heshang. 
Even more important than the narrator who guides the audience through the 
film, the pictures themselves and the images evoked and associated thereby have 
an enormous impact on the internalization of Heshang’s message. It is here where 
the TV people could bring all the techniques of documentary filming into full play. 
Especially revealing is the way in which images of old and new, of tradition and 
modernity, of the Chinese and the West are juxtaposed. The last minute of the fifth 
installation is a typical example of the way in which the most disparate images can 
be combined by the voice-over: it is the narrative that gives meaning to the images, 
and in turn the images and the associations they evoke with the viewers that 
render the message its full persuasive power that is further enhanced by the 
background music, a triumphal hymn that gets louder towards the end. With all 
these devices, the narrator creates a sense of urgency intended to shake up the 
audiences. 
Such an open bias, however, the polemic emotional appeal, is absent from 
the intellectual discussions of the “cultural fever.” In these more academic 
discussions verifiable arguments are the main means of persuasion. The TV 
series Heshang, in contrast, operates with entirely different narrative strategies 
that are custom-made for the needs of a broad audience with diverse interests and 
a generally lower degree of intellectual sophistication; the documentary’s purpose 
is to attract and convince this particular audience. While the ideas advocated by 
Heshang were not new, it was their packaging and their transformation on the 
platform of the relatively new medium of television that created their explosive 
impact. Much of the later controversy seemed to question the ideas promoted by 
Heshang, yet in fact it was not so much the ideas themselves that irritated the 
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series’ opponents; if voiced exclusively in academic circles they would not have 
aroused the attention of the leadership – and of the broad television audiences. 
Rather, the manipulative potential opened up by the marriage of intellectual 
discourse and popularization that was created through the medium of television 
alarmed the Party elders. And it was this point where the professional TV people 
came in. Their decision to support Heshang was a courageous and unprecedented 
experiment in popular politics, an attempt motivated by the need to react to the 
pressures in a competitive market setting. Yet at the same time it is clear that 
Heshang was regarded by all sides as what it is: a propaganda piece drumming up 
popular support for Zhao Ziyang’s reform policies. The propagandistic nature of 
Heshang places the series squarely within the tradition of political propaganda in 
the PRC. 
The last question that interests us here is: how is the role of the media 
being treated in the discussion surrounding Heshang? A first hint concerning this 
issue can be found in Heshang itself. Towards the end of the last instalment, there 
is a passage saying:44 
In late 1986 and early 1987, a nationwide student movement suddenly erupted, 
causing anxiety both above and below. Maybe it is still too early to make an 
assessment of this movement. But the forms of direct dialogue between the leadership 
and the students set up in the process of calming down the movement are in fact the 
fulfilment of the goal of the great majority of students who participated in the movement: 
transparency of politics and policy making. 
And even on these formerly so rigid and ceremonious occasions of high-level politics 
[such as the 13th Party Congress], we can now finally see the emergence of an azure 
kind of transparency. For the first time, the Chinese media of mass communication 
[dazhong chuanbo meijie 大众传播媒介] have adopted something like a middle 
standpoint, assuming the role of a medium of dialogue between the top-level policy 
makers and people’s masses. 
 
The “middle standpoint” (zhongli 中立) was a bold formulation that was severely 
criticized when the Heshang debate was reopened after June 1989. An article in 
Beijing ribao heavily attacked the interpretation that Heshang gave of the 1986/87 
events and the role of the media.45 For one, so the article, the assessment of the 
passage runs counter to the Party line, because the CCP had explicitly declared 
the student movement to be mistaken and the result of the proliferation of 
                                             
44 Cui Wenhua. Heshang lun, p. 78. 
45 Chen Zhiang. “Heshang yu xinwen ‘zhongli’” in Beijing ribao, Aug. 5, 1989. For another article 
arguing similarly see Yan Yan. “‘Heshang re’ shuomingle shenme” in Zhongguo jiaoyubao, Aug. 12, 
1989, repr. in Hua Yan. Heshang pipan, p. 72-76. 
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“bourgeois liberalization.”46 Even more dangerous, however, is the idea of the 
“middle standpoint:” “Those sentences on the media of mass communication 
contain at least the following two positions: 1. the ‘top-level policy-makers’ and the 
people’s masses are two opposing social forces; 2. the media of mass 
communication should take a middle position, which means that they should not 
stand on the side of the Party and the government and also shouldn’t stand on the 
side of the people, but rather stand unwaveringly between the two. These opinions 
are entirely absurd and hypocritical.”47 The “middle standpoint” that Heshang is 
accused to advocate denies the Party character (dangxing) that is one of the 
foundations of the media concept. 
Yet is this really the case with Heshang? The opposite seems true. While 
Heshang was accused of deviating from the Party line, such an accusation could 
emerge only after June 1989, when the Party’s general line had fundamentally 
changed. Political reform in particular had been derailed by the purge of Zhao 
Ziyang. Seen from the context of 1988, however, Heshang’s message seems to 
be in line with the policies advocated by Party general secretary Zhao: rather than 
deviating from the Party line, Heshang comes out strongly in support of the Party 
leadership. The series is in fact affirmative of the core policies of opening to the 
outside world and reforming the economic and political systems. In cases where 
Heshang went beyond the line of officially pronounced compromise, it could 
nevertheless hope to express the intentions of the reform-minded circles within the 
leadership: it was, after all, the Party itself that had admitted the TV cameras to the 
13th Party congress and that had allowed the press coverage of the dissenting 
Taiwan delegate to the National People’s Congress. The goal of increasing the 
transparency of the political process had been set by the CCP itself. 
Heshang thus does not negate the Party character of the media; to the 
contrary, it closely sticks to the demand that the media speak for the Party. The 
series is in effect a sophisticated piece of propaganda that tries to sell a liberal 
                                             
46 See Deng Xiaoping “Guanyu dangqian xuesheng nao shi wenti de jianghua yaodian” (Dec. 30, 
1986), published under the title “Qizhi xianmingde fandui zichanjieji ziyouhua” in Deng Xiaoping 
wenxuan. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, vol. 3, p. 194-97. This line was confirmed in 
“Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dangqian fandui zichanjieji ziyouhua ruogan wenti de tongzhi” 
(dated Jan. 28, 1987) in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.). Shier da yilai zhongyao 
wenxian xuanbian. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988, vol. 3, p. 1251-59. 
47 Chen Zhiang. “Heshang yu xinwen ‘zhongli.’” 
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version of the CCP’s core policies to the audiences by packaging them in 
popularly appealing images, enriched by the arguments of the widespread current 
intellectual discussion. The makers of Heshang, and in particular CCTV, saw in 
the documentary a new form of persuasion that would cast aside the antiquated 
methods of propaganda dating back decades. Instead, they made full use of the 
persuasive means of the new media, here TV: the carefully formulated narrative 
and the sophisticated arrangements of Heshang’s imagery combine into a 
powerful message. Most important, only such a radically new approach to the 
making of propaganda, so the people in charge of CCTV, would allow a cost-
conscious medium like television to bridge the two demands of effective 
propaganda and financial sustainability. Yet in comparison to newspapers or 
journals like Dushu, the production process of a TV series is time-consuming; 
when the series was finally screened, the political climate had changed and the 
series had ceased to represent the Party line. 
 
 
The Politics of Entertainment: Stories from the Editorial Office 
The crackdown on the Democracy Movement had closed whatever 
windows of opportunity had been open in the 1980s for the voicing of political 
concerns. For almost three years, until Deng Xiaoping’s tour of Southern China, 
heavy-handed controls were imposed on the media sector, ruling out any attempts 
of liberalization. The post-1989 depression was of political and social as well as of 
an economic kind. In the propaganda sector, the reaction on the Democracy 
Movement was particularly severe, as the Party struggled to regain control of the 
media: at the height of the student movement, journalists in Beijing and elsewhere 
had openly sympathized with the students’ demands; what was worse, a long-term 
liberal attitude had developed in the media that now was said to have contributed 
to preparing the ideological ground for the movement.48 So as the Party sifted 
                                             
48 On the role of the media in 1989 see Linda Jakobsen. “‘Lies in Ink, Truth in Blood:’ The Role and 
Impact of the Chinese Media During the Beijing Spring of ’89.” Discussion paper D-6, August 1990, 
the Joan Shorenstein Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, at 
http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/liesink.html (downloaded Sep. 17, 2003). An analysis of the failures 
of “political thought work” (zhengzhi sixiang gongzuo 政治思想工作) that prepared the ground for 
the student movement can be found in section two of Li Peng’s report to the 4th Plenum of the 13th 
CC (June 23-24, 1989): “Guanyu Zhao Ziyang tongzhi zai fan dang fan shehuizhuyi de dongluan 
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through the rubble left from spring 1989, the media were put under close control of 
the propaganda authorities. 
However, since the CCP avoided to reverse the general direction of 
economic reform (doing so would have further damaged the relations with the 
country’s foreign investors and stifled prospects for domestic growth), the basic 
problem of the media was not resolved: they remained under pressure to prop up 
their budgets by expanding external revenues and to become financially self-
sufficient. As CCTV’s effort to capitalize on the feverish intellectual debates and 
the politicized climate of the late 1980s had backfired dramatically, the Chinese TV 
administrators had to look for other ways to attract audiences and to increase their 
revenues. The general social mood came to their help: in a climate of both 
melancholy and cynicism, many people became inward-looking, turning away from 
the broad social issues and instead began to pursue individual pleasures. The 
early 1990s thus became the golden era of TV melodramas and soap operas.49 
The first to recognize this trend was a Beijing company, the Beijing 
Television Art Centre (Beijing dianshi yishu zhongxin 北京电视艺术中心).50 Zheng 
Xiaolong 郑晓龙, the Centre’s energetic vice-director first had the idea to produce 
cheap soap operas and situation comedies in early 1989, but only later that year 
did he start to devote his energies to the project in earnest. The basic pattern for 
the first Chinese-produced soap opera was summed up by celebrity writer Wang 
Shuo 王朔, whom Zheng had been able to win for the scriptwriting team: “Make 
somebody as good as is possible and then let them be done over really badly. It’s 
easy for people to sympathize with their fate; then you have a show.”51 In short, a 
focus on family drama, emotions, and the life of the small people, so the team 
around Zheng Xiaolong concluded, would be a sure recipe to produce an audience 
hit. They calculated correctly that after the events of 1989, the production of a TV 
                                                                                                                                      
zhong suo fan de cuowu de baogao” in Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu (ed.). Xuanchuan 
dongtai: 1989 nian xuanbianben. Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1991, p. 128-42. 
49 The most comprehensive study of this phenomenon is Jianying Zha. China Pop: How Soap 
Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers are Transforming a Culture. New York: The New Press, 1995. 
See also Michael Keane. “Television Drama in China: Engineering Souls for the Market” in Timothy 
J. Craig, Richard King (eds.). Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2002, p. 120-37. 
50 The Centre, established in 1982 as a production unit, is owned by the Beijing Broadcasting 
Bureau (Beijing guangbo shiye ju 北京广播事业局). 
51 Quoted in Geremie Barmé. In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999, p. 104. 
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melodrama that redirects people’s attention from highly charged political debates 
to more innocuous issues would be welcomed by the Party-state as well. The 
subsidies that Zheng Xiaolong could secure for his project show that the Kewang 
approach served the interests not only of TV stations in pursuit of profits, but also 
those of the government. 
Produced hastily in late 1989 and early 1990, the fifty-part series Kewang 
渴望 hit the airwaves in November 1990. First broadcast by a local station in 
Nanjing, other TV stations nationwide soon picked up the show when news about 
its phenomenal success spread. CCTV started to run the program in December. 
By January 1991, the entire country was in a “Kewang fever;” for months on end 
Kewang was the ubiquitous topic of conversation.52 Even the political leadership’s 
attention was drawn to the series, and on January 8, Li Ruihuan 李瑞环, the PB 
member in charge of ideology, met the crew in Zhongnanhai and “highly praised 
their creative work,” declaring that “the most important thing [for a TV programme] 
is that the people like to watch it. Only then can we talk about education.”53 
Despite – or just because of – its obviously apolitical content, Kewang had 
become a political issue: the Party’s top priority after 1989 was reassuring the 
Chinese populace that the focus on economic reforms would continue and that 
individualism would be tolerated as long as it did not translate into calls for political 
freedom. Kewang could be seen as directly supportive of these concerns. 
The Kewang series addressed issues that were much less controversial 
than those raised by Heshang and propagated a rather conservative view on 
moral values and social harmony that coincided both with the yearnings of the 
people after the turbulent past years (in this way the title, Kewang, literally 
“yearning,” has commonly been understood), and with the anxieties of the political 
establishment. When Li Ruihuan spoke publicly in praise of Kewang, he did in fact 
endorse the rise of a market-driven mass cultural consumption. The Wang Shuo 
phenomenon of the late 1980s had already indicated the new trend of commercial 
                                             
52 See Zha. China Pop, p. 25-28; and Lisa B. Rofel. “Yearnings: Televisual Love and Melodramatic 
Politics,” in American Ethnologist 21.4 (1994), p. 700-22. Compare also Barmé. In the Red, p. 99-
107, and Keane. “Television Drama in China,” p. 124-26. See also the articles in Chao Xi, Yi Fu 
(ed.). Nuan dong: “Kewang” re. Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991. This volume 
also contains summaries of the series’ episodes. 
53 “Shouxian yao rang ren xihuan kan, qi ci cai tandeshang jiaoyu: Liu Ruihuan tong Kewang juzu 
tan fanrong wenyi zhi lu” in GMRB, Jan. 9, 1991. 
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mass culture, but the Beijing TV Art Centre and its chief, Zheng Xiaolong, were the 
first to discover its potential for the production of commercially successful 
entertainment in the mass media. Mass culture is not an apolitical phenomenon in 
and by itself. It can be used for propagandistic purposes; on a minimum level, it 
can transport and disseminate messages that are in tune with, or directly 
supportive of, values and ideologies of the establishment or government. Such 
was the case with Kewang. 
Following its instant success Kewang became the model for Chinese TV 
soaps and sit-coms, a model that was often emulated but never reached. With lots 
of emotional appeal, many tears, and a good dose of humour, it provided all the 
necessary ingredients for a successful television production: a story about ordinary 
people (laobaixing 老百姓) with whom the audience could identify. Kewang thus 
became the blueprint for other projects to follow. Yet the Beijing TV Art Centre did 
not rest on its laurels; trying to capitalize on the initial success of Kewang, Zheng 
Xiaolong did not simply create clones of Kewang, as other studios did, but rather 
experimented with new formats. Two highly successful follow-ups on Kewang 
relied on the basic building blocks of the former, but introduced new ideas: the 
1992 smash hit Bianjibu de gushi was a sit-com containing a considerable amount 
of social satire that drew on the atmosphere of cynicism prevailing in the PRC in 
the early 1990s.54 A year later, the Centre attracted audiences all over China with 
Beijingren zai Niu Yue 北京人在纽约, a series that appealed to the nationalist 
sentiments that were on the rise then.55 As Bianjibu de gushi is set in the offices of 
a fictive journal, and some of the episodes squarely take on the issue of journalism, 
I see it as a reflexive text; in the remainder of this section I will therefore 
concentrate on this series, drawing conclusions from both the statements on the 
role of the media made by the characters in the series, and from the series itself. 
Bianjibu de gushi was a cooperative project: Zheng Xiaolong had drawn up 
the general outline, and his Centre financed the production. A six-man team 
worked on the script, including the celebrity writers Wang Shuo and Feng 
                                             
54 On this climate see Barmé. In the Red, ch. 5: “The Graying of Chinese Culture.” On Bianjibu de 
gushi see Marie Huot. La Petite Revolution Culturelle, p. 98-107. Michael Keane. “Television 
Drama in China,” p. 126-29. 
55 The novel on which the series is based was translated into English. See Glen Cao. Beijinger in 
New York. San Francisco: Cypress Book Co., 1993. 
 518
Xiaogang 冯小刚, both of whom had participated in writing Kewang. Wang and 
Feng in particular were later credited for the fast-paced and witty dialogues that 
became a trademark of TV dramas with Wang Shuo involvement. The idea for the 
series was born in November 1989, even before Kewang was aired, but it did not 
go into production until summer 1991.56 Again, the Beijing TV Art Centre scored a 
major success; Bianjibu de gushi won both the official Feitian 飞天 award and the 
Jinying 金鹰 award sponsored by the popular magazine Dazhong dianshi 大众电
视.57 
Bianjibu de gushi is set in the offices of the journal Renjian zhinan 人间指南 
(“Guide to life,” to use Barmé’s translation), a rather marginal state-owned venture 
in Beijing that seems to be a mixture of a lifestyle magazine and a literary journal; 
the producers intentionally leave the exact nature of Renjian zhinan unknown. The 
editorial offices are inhabited by a mere five staff members and their editor-in-chief. 
All of them are distinct personalities. Li Dongbao 李冬宝 is a photographer cum 
journalist in his thirties. He is a humorous, quick-witted man who doesn’t take his 
job all too serious but is always happy when he can help others. Li spends his time 
hanging around, drawing up great plans, joking with his colleagues, and last but 
not least, pursuing Ge Ling 戈玲, his younger female colleague. Yet it is especially 
in these moments that Li’s softer side surfaces: his sometimes macho-like 
behaviour notwithstanding, he is a thoughtful and sensitive man. Ge Ling is a 
coquette young woman; she finds pleasure in reading fashion journals instead of 
doing her work (if there is any). She has a sharp tongue that is tested time and 
again in furious dialogues with Li Dongbao, but after all she is a friendly and likable 
woman. Li Dongbao and Ge Ling are played by Ge You 葛优 and Lü Liping 吕丽萍, 
two well-known Chinese comic actors. 
Yu Deli 于德利 is an entirely different character: as his name tells – Yu who 
reaps in the profits (li 利), since de 德 (virtue) is a homonym for de 得 (to get); to 
tell even the dumbest viewer, is surname is homophone with yu 馀, “profit.” He is 
the businessman among the staff; his motto is: “money isn’t omnipotent, but it 
                                             
56 See Feng Xiaogang. “Zan yi dao xiju” in Wang Shuo et al. Bianjibu de gushi. Beijing: Zhongguo 
gongren chubanshe, 1992, p. 1-8. Although this account is rather fictional itself, it gives some basic 
information on the beginnings of the series. 
57 See Michael Keane. “Television Drama in China,” p. 126. 
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definitely doesn’t go without money either” (qian bu shi wanneng de, ke meiyou 
qian shi wanwan bu neng de 钱不是万能的，可没有钱是万万不能的). Yu is always 
meticulously dressed in black Western-style suits and wears ties. His constant 
hope is to improve the journal to create a better cash flow. A totally different sort of 
character is Niu dajie 牛大姐: a woman in her fifties, she is an erstwhile political 
activist filled with the romantic revolutionary fervour of her past; between nostalgic 
recollections of the Maoist era, she finds time to lament the declining ideological 
standards of the youth. Liu Shuyou 刘书友, an elderly intellectual with thick 
glasses is of course exactly what his name promises, a book-friend who finds 
satisfaction in the few intellectual pleasures of his job. A soft-spoken and reserved 
man, he is afraid of committing mistakes and seldom sticks his head out. The team 
is completed by editor-in-chief Chen (Chen zhubian 陈主编) who must balance the 
different natures of his staff. He tries to mediate between them and must also 
represent the journal to the propaganda authorities above. Given the deplorable 
state of the journal, he cannot be a very able administrator, yet he succeeds in 
steering Renjian zhinan more or less free of harm through troubled waters. 
The first two installations cover an especially interesting issue, namely, the 
journal’s fight for survival in the face of the onslaught of commercialization. On a 
flourishing market with hundreds of competing journals, Renjian zhinan is losing 
out. Subscribers have run away in droves, and not even readers’ letters arrive any 
longer. Liu Shuyou’s hope that this might be a sign of their reader’s satisfaction is 
shattered when a street vendor tells him that nobody buys the journal; before his 
eyes, an old woman purchases a batch of old issues for a dumping price –not to 
read them but as wrapping for her grandson’s books. Liu Shuyou is aghast. When 
the post office calls the journal to tell them that unsold issues keep piling up and 
that it would be better if the journal closes, this is too much for the younger staff. In 
an embarrassing encounter, Li Dongbao, Ge Ling, and Yu Deli stumble over each 
other in the offices of the Labour Transfer Bureau. They all had the same idea: to 
ask for a transfer and quit Renjian zhinan. Yet they discover that other journals do 
not even consider to employ them upon hearing about their current employer – the 
reputation of Renjian zhinan is rock bottom indeed. 
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The situation changes abruptly, however, when editor-in-chief Chen 
declares that he plans to retire. The journal office immediately begins to brim with 
activity: each of the five editors hopes to be named Chen’s successor and sets out 
to draw up plans for a revamped Renjian zhinan. The proposals coming forth are 
as diverse as the personalities of their originators. Old editor-in-in-chief Chen 
surprises his staff by adopting a democratic attitude and asking everyone to 
present their suggestions so as to convince the others. Little surprise that after the 
intense jockeying that has preceded this meeting, none of the five is willing to give 
in, and in the election process that follows the open debate, each of them votes for 
himself. In the end, Chen cannot but stay on his post; in turn he promises to 
implement all the original plans and proposals of his colleagues. 
What is interesting about this meeting and the debate, is that we are 
presented here – through the mirror of irony – with the actual options available to 
the Chinese media under the pressure of marketization. In the changing economic 
structure and under pressure from the government, they must adopt one or more 
of the strategies outlined in this episode. In what follows I will therefore take a 
closer look at these suggestions and their arguments. 
The first serious option offered is that of Yu Deli who opts, unsurprisingly, 
for the radical commercialization of the journal:58  
Yu: I believe that one of the main reasons why our journal has not been run well, 
is that funds are insufficient... 
Liu: Ay, don’t you have anything new to say, whenever you open your mouth it’s 
about money! How vulgar! 
Yu:  Because of the low remunerations we pay for articles, we have lost a number 
authors. We pay too little travel expenses, so our authors can only look at the 
sky like frogs from the ground of the well, but they cannot plunge into the thick 
of life. Ay, the state is no different from our own parents: they must be fair to 
all their children. But what if the children are numerous and money short? We 
have to come up with ideas on our own. 
Chen: So what ideas do you propose – except turning [our journal] into an 
advertising company? 
Yu: It’s not necessary to do so; yesterday I’ve been busy until deep into the night. 
There are already four companies willing to place advertisements in our 
journal. If you only trust me, I’ll just let things go their way; if things are going 
that way, I guarantee that within no more than three months our Guide to Life 
(Renjian zhinan) will become... 
Li: ... a Guide to Shopping (Gou wu zhinan 购物指南)! The indispensable guide 
for your shopping trip! 
Yu: Not only will our sales surge, our funding problem will also be solved! 
                                             
58 Transcripts are taken directly from the film. Many thanks to Cathy Yeh for helping me with the 
more obscure aspects of Beijinghua. 
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Yu’s analysis focuses on the most pressing issue: the journal’s lack of sufficient 
funds. The poor quality of the contributions to the journal are intimately connected 
to its dire financial situation. The cause for this situation is, of course, the Party’s 
retreat from overall responsibility for the media. The key formulation “But what if 
the children are numerous and money short?” is an accurate description of the 
dilemma faced by the Chinese government in the 1980s: in view of a broad 
number of urgent investment needs, the state was no longer willing to pour the 
necessary amount of money into the media sector; rather, media enterprises were 
urged to look after their own needs (of course, like good parents the CCP was still 
willing to give the most basic provisions to at least a number of core media outlets). 
Yu Deli therefore wants to tap new sources of income: he sees nothing wrong with 
attracting advertisers, since the readers, too, would accept a stronger focus on 
commerce and consumption. Yu finds nothing with advertisements featuring lightly 
dressed girls if this would make his approach acceptable to his readers (he will 
later have to promise editor-in-chief Chen to have the models “dress decently”). 
For Yu, compromises regarding media content are no problem as long as doing so 
fulfils the purpose of increasing circulation figures solving cash flow problems. 
Yu’s approach, however, is too radical for his most of his colleagues. Even 
plain attempts at bribery (he promises a new camera equipment to Li Dongbao, 
lots of political literature to aunt Niu, and overtime benefits to Liu Shuyou) fail to 
get them go along the path of all-out commercialization of the media. The 
strongest opposition comes, understandably, from aunt Niu. She has a very 
different explanation for the journal’s problems, and another vision of its future: 
Niu: I don’t agree with what Yu Deli says. During the time of the New Democratic 
Revolution, many of our Party’s periodicals enjoyed a very high standing 
among the masses and were very influential. At that time, there was nothing 
close to the conditions Yu Deli is talking about. Thus I believe that the key 
point for running a journal is not funds, but rather the guiding ideology! 
Currently our journal has indeed met with some difficulties, but we mustn’t 
forget to closely embrace the general orientation and the policies of the Party... 
Li: Aunt Niu, aunt Niu, are you running a Guide to Revolution (Geming zhinan 革
命指南) or a Guide to Life (Renjian zhinan)? This is a Guide to Revolution! I 
don’t want to offend any of you, but: who of us here would be able to shoulder 
so heavy a burden?! 
Niu:  Me! I can proudly say: taking into consideration political qualification, work 
experience, and loyalty to the Party’s cause, I would make for a worthy editor-
in-chief! [...] A very important reason why our journal has not been run well is 
that our work style has not been correct. In my view, the most pressing 
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demand of the day is to rectify our work styles (zhengfeng 整风), is to 
straighten out our thinking! 
Li: I feel that what first needs to be straightened out is aunt Niu’s thinking! 
Niu: My thinking?! 
Li: Of course! Maybe you have all along been taking our journal to be a battle 
field or a bridgehead fortress or some other kind of defensive bulwark. But 
listen to what everybody says: aren’t you treating our broad readers like 
opponents who must be attacked or guarded against? This way of thinking 
definitively needs to be corrected. Can our Renjian zhinan become a good and 
trusted friend of the broad readers? Said politely, you are muddle-headed; put 
more frankly, you have deviated from the highest principle of serving the 
people! 
 
Aunt Niu is a caricature. She is a stalwart who dreams of bringing back the political 
climate of the 1950s. The very real efforts of conservative forces within the CCP 
between 1989 and 1992 to return to the polity of the early 1950s, however, add a 
sobering note to her championing for Renjian zhinan to became a revolutionary 
fortress. Journals like Zhongliu 中流 or Zhenli de zhuiqiu 真理的追求, set up in 
1990, understood themselves as nothing less than a “Guide to Revolution.”59 If the 
function of a journal is to be a “battle field” (zhendi 阵地) and to educate the people, 
then the criteria for selecting the journal’s leadership are undoubtedly political 
credentials. Likewise, the methods of leadership within the media must be those of 
politics: campaigns, criticism and self-criticism, and thought rectification. These are 
the methods aunt Niu wants to adopt to bring Renjian zhinan back on course. 
 From the above exchange, the most prominent rhetorical feature of Bianjibu 
de gushi is clearly apparent: linguistic irony and ridicule. Copying the technique 
that had made Wang Shuo’s fiction popular, the writing team worked with the 
bizarre effects of decontextualized polit jargon; implanted into an utterly alien 
environment, Aunt Niu’s Stalinist phraseology mocks the ossified thinking of the 
few hardcore stalwarts left in some media units, but also those in the Party’s 
propaganda apparatus. In the context of the early 1990s consumer culture, Aunt 
Niu’s Guide to Revolution becomes an ironic inversion: not only is its proponent 
believed to be muddle-headed, but revolution has become the very opposite of 
serving the people. To serve the people, a journal in reform China must break 
                                             
59 Zhongliu, Zhenliu de zhuiqiu, and Dangdai sichao 当代思潮 were founded up in 1990 by leftist 
hardliners around Deng Liqun 邓力群. They existed throughout the 1990s on the left fringes of the 
political spectrum, repeatedly attacking the more moderate policies of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. 
Zhongliu and Zhenli de zhuqiu were closed in August 2001 after voicing opposition to Jiang 
Zemin’s “Three Representatives” theory. Interviewee 209, Beijing, September 2002. 
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away from Mao-era dogma and embrace modern values. This is of course a bold 
political statement, and it shows that serious questions concerning the direction of 
the media sector lurk closely beneath the surface of laughter in Bianjibu de gushi. 
Yet in the mouth of Li Dongbao, “serving the people” itself sounds awkward 
enough to raise questions about the meaning of the Party’s “highest principles” 
(zongzhi 宗旨) once these are uttered through the mouth of a figure like Li. The TV 
series seems to support the general Party line of reform and opening, but in reality 
the meaning of laughter and the relationship between the media, the Party, and 
the people is much complex. While the CCP did not give in to complaints within its 
own rows about the series, the volatility of politically motivated laughter suggests 
that the relationship remains an uneasy one. 
Besides old-style propaganda and nihilistic ridicule, what options do the 
media have? Accusing her of being ideologically backward and failing to recognize 
the correct current path of the Party, Li Dongbao beats aunt Niu with her own 
weapons. In his eyes, the methods that aunt Niu proposes are those of the 
Cultural Revolution; they have in fact long been denounced and replaced by very 
different interpretations of media policy: newspapers and journals (or, a TV station!) 
do fulfil the “highest principle” of “serving the people” by becoming the people’s 
“good and trusted friend” (zhiyin 知音). Li is disgusted by the aggressive and 
arrogant attitude towards the readership. This humanist position lies at the bottom 
of Li’s own ideas on how to improve Renjian zhinan. When asked by editor-in-chief 
Chen to explain his ideas, Li answers: 
Li: OK. In fact, it is all very easy, there is just one point. Everybody follow me, 
there’s something I want to show you. 
(all go from Chen’s office to the editorial room, where Li shows them a blackboard) 
 All these columns here I have copied from magazines that enjoy much 
popularity; this was my own idea. Since we are a general interest social 
magazine there’s no problem with digesting the most popular columns from 
other magazines and thus to remake the columns of our Renjian zhinan. As to 
content, we must thoroughly change our dull and lifeless style and the long 
and laborious articles full of hackneyed and stereotyped phrases. We must 
focus on what the people would like to read and hear, and exclude everything 
that causes distress and anxiety; our articles must be short and concise, full of 
novelty, as well as appealing in style and easy to read. They should have 
intellectual depth and be delightful at the same time. 
Chen: Good! It seems that Li Dongbao has been diligent. 
Li: [...] Old Chen, isn’t this what is called “making everything flourish with a mere 
word” (yi yan xing bang 一言兴邦)? If we act according to my prescription, 
wouldn’t our Renjian zhinan be restored from death back to life?! 
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Just like aunt Niu, Li attributes the journal’s decline to its content. However, it is 
not a lack of ideological commitment, but rather Renjian zhinan’s outmoded style 
and the dull and boring articles that have made readers turn away. He therefore 
proposes not more, but rather less politics as a prescription: Li hopes to appeal to 
the readers with a light and popular style. Accommodating to the tastes of the 
journal’s readership is for him the way to success. Walking this path is not difficult 
either: other journals have long since shown the way, so all Renjian zhinan must 
do is copy their strong sides – in this case, their most successful columns. This 
eclectic approach – which is in fact outright plagiary (remember to the numerous 
rip-offs on Bianjibu’s predecessor, Kewang) – is typical for Li Dongbao who likes to 
take the path of least resistance. He is not picky in choosing his means either: 
“his” proposal turns out to be a cooperative product of him and Ge Ling, and his 
line “this was my own idea,” is not just the odd attempt to copyright the technique 
of plagiarism, but a blatant lie that eventually costs him Ge’s vote in the spoilt 
election for the new editor-in-chief. Li’s proposal is of course not original either: 
copying and imitating successful formats was rampant across the Chinese media 
sector in the 1990s. Borrowing ideas, or, put differently, copyright infringements, is 
thus a rather convenient way to attract audiences and secure financial success, 
while steering a middle course that avoids politically or otherwise contentious 
issues. The expansion of the commercially driven mainstream was a result of the 
Party’s introduction of economic stimuli into the media sector, and of the political 
climate after 1989. 
The concepts proposed by Yu Deli, aunt Niu, and Li Dongbao stand for 
three radically different strategies addressing the same problem: how to revive a 
journal that has come to the brink of bankruptcy due to the economic pressures 
that the change in government policy in the late 1980s had created. In Renjian 
zhinan’s case, editor-in-chief Chen decides to solve the question of the journal’s 
direction and its future leadership by announcing to stick to his post while adopting 
all three proposals at the same time: he commissions to Yu the task to attract 
advertising clients to improve the journal’s bottom line; he promises to 
accommodate to aunt Niu’s demand to strengthen “thought work” so as to stress 
the journal’s educational function; and he accepts Li’s and Ge Ling’s proposals for 
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new columns that would have the effect of increasing Renjian zhinan’s 
entertainment value and its attractiveness to the readers. 
This “solution” is the ultimate pun on the situation of the Chinese media in 
the early 1990s. Keeping the old guard in place and trying to adopt minimal doses 
of three contradictory if not mutually exclusive approaches to media making looks 
like a sure recipe for inviting the worst of three worlds. In a sense, so the script 
writing team seems to suggest, this is just the direction into which the Chinese 
media sector is headed. The three proposals symbolize the competing demands 
confronting the media sector: all that newspapers, journals, and TV stations could 
try to do was expanding advertising income and other sources of revenue, steering 
clear of contentious issues by means of endless copying of proven formulas, and 
paying lip service to ideological pressures from conservatives quarters such as the 
PD. The “great integration” proposed by Li Baodong is a caricature of the 
modernized interpretation of the media concept. The CCP had hoped that the 
media become financially self-reliant while at the same time remaining organs of 
Party propaganda and value education, and appealing to the audiences in a 
consumption-oriented, individualized society. Within the bounds allowed to them, 
and through the veil of irony, the media workers express grave doubts about the 
viability of this compromise formula. Wang Shuo and the other writers of the series 
demonstrate the consequences of the “a little bit of everything” approach most 
clearly on the linguistic plane: much of the series’ success lies in the comic effects 
created by the recontextualization of randomly selected decontextualized linguistic 
fragments. The economic jargon of Yu Deli, the youth speak of Li Dongbao, and 
especially the highly charged political language constantly used by aunt Niu are all 
familiar to the audience, but their juxtaposition makes a mockery of each of them – 
and, by consequence, of the Party’s attempt to bridge ideological prescriptions 
with market elements. Contrasted with each other, they expose themselves to 
ridicule; neither Yu’s advertising efforts nor aunt Niu’s struggle to keep the 
ideological banner flying gain any credibility. What is pure fun for the audience, 
however, is a rather sobering message to the advocates of an integrative 
approach to the media’s function: the sophisticated audiences of the 1990s are no 
longer comparable to those of the “time of the new democratic revolution” that aunt 
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Niu refers to in her speech; they will see through the efforts of the Party to sell 
them products they don’t appreciate – and react by poking fun at it. 
So what is the implicit alternative that Bianjibu de gushi proposes? The 
series is the product of an age of commercialization, declining belief in political 
ideologies, and nihilistic cynicism. With their series, the makers of Bianjibu de 
gushi make a point by showing the most promising approach to television 
production and media making in the 1990s. Their soap opera appeals to the tastes 
of the audiences – as long as the audiences are satisfied (here through the means 
of irony) the cash flow will be right. On the other hand, it is the economic variable 
that determines the bottom line of being more responsive to the audiences; 
securing profits is a basic condition for media making. What is entirely ruled out is 
the moralistic and ideological approach of aunt Niu. Yet this is no longer necessary, 
since the Party has started to redefine its overall approach to ideology: once 
economic construction and social evolution rather than revolution have become 
the main aim of the CCP, the media must change their approach as well and shift 
to other means to support the Party line – the first of the demands of the media 
concept. It is striking to see how three TV series as different as Heshang, Kewang, 
and Bianjibu de gushi do all end up providing support for the Party’s general 
direction (or at least for the ideas promoted by the dominant faction within the 
leadership). At the same time, none of the three is a product of Party propaganda 
in the traditional sense. All three allow other interests to be accommodated, in 
particular the fiscal needs of the media enterprises that have to survive in a 
marketized setting. Under these conditions, the CCP even allows the media to pay 
only lip service to Party principles. Many media outlets, for example, have joined 
the nationalist discourse not so much to participate in the CCP’s campaigns of 
patriotic education, but rather because popular nationalism was on the rise and 
would appeal to the audiences. The follow-up to Bianjibu de gushi, the series A 
Beijinger in New York, is probably the most prominent example of this kind. The 
media have not become depoliticized, as the ironic undertones of Bianjibu de 
gushi show. Yet the Party has decided to tolerate these forms of laughter, as long 
as they do not turn into rebellion. Newspapers, journals, and television can indulge 
in tears and laughter, as long as their emotional appeal remains compatible with 
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the general line and the media keep clear of that small number of core areas that 
are of direct concern for the Party. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The tidal wave of marketization and economic pressures that engulfed the 
Chinese media sector since the late 1980s has certainly transformed the xitong 
more thoroughly than any other earlier challenge. In this light, what has remained 
of the modern Chinese media concept that was conceived in Yan’an and was 
instituted across the nation after the CCP’s takeover in 1949? To answer this 
question, it will be necessary to look at the different aspects of the concept one 
after another. 
The media concept first of all required the media to represent the unified 
voice of the Party and made them into tools of Party propaganda and Party 
building. Building on its producers’ ties with the government, the 1988 series 
Heshang tried to appropriate the voice of the Party on the modernization issue and 
experimented with a modernized version of political propaganda, broadcast to an 
increasingly sophisticated audience. It was the tragedy of Xia Jun, Su Xiaokang, 
and the other makers of Heshang that there was no single, unified voice they 
could represent. As the CCP leadership was deeply split, the radical policy 
package that the documentary advocated was associated with the environment of 
Zhao Ziyang, and when Zhao’s position became untenable, Heshang very much 
became a victim of this political allegiance (an alliance, it must be said, into which 
the filmmakers had entered consciously). In the tightly controlled climate after 
1989, Bianjibu de gushi opted for another technique: with the consent of the Party 
which had to provide the population with a measure of diversion while ensuring the 
profitability of the major media, the producers of the series refrained entirely from 
active propaganda, and even went so far as to poke fun the Party’s propaganda 
efforts. The CCP was ready to accept a certain amount of nihilism and cynicism 
that spoke from the series, because just like Kewang, Bianjibu de gushi portrayed 
a rather conservative value package and refrained from challenging the status quo 
and touching politically sensitive subjects. The bottom line emerging in the 1990s 
was that most of the mainstream media were allowed to reduce active propaganda 
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to a minimum as long as they steered clear of off-limits topics and did not openly 
question the Party line in any crucial aspect. This retreat, however, remained a 
temporary one, as the Party would reactivate its call on the media as propaganda 
tools whenever it felt necessary – for example at high-level political events, or 
during campaigns such as those against the Falun gong 法论功 sect in 1999 or the 
SARS epidemic in spring 2003. 
On a similar note, the media’s task to raise the consciousness of the people 
and to educate them was reduced on the daily agenda but was not lifted entirely. 
The normative claims of television are most apparent in Heshang with its 
sermonizing commentator and the manipulative imagery that try to convince the 
population of a policy package centring around reform and opening. In Bianjibu de 
gushi, such appeals appear in ironicized fashion if at all; however, the latter’s 
refusal to lecture the audiences is tolerated only as long as this isn’t felt to be 
detrimental to the government’s efforts to educate the populace. The normative 
project continues to loom in the background, and the media must be prepared to 
make compromises in order to avoid being accused of “spiritual nihilism” or of 
spreading “corrupting influences,” especially to the youth. The risks involved, 
however, are relatively small for the media, as long as major political issues are 
avoided; they seem acceptable especially in view of the profits that can be made. 
It is the mass factor, the fourth element of the media concept, that has 
turned out to be the dominant factor in media making in the 1990s: in a reversal of 
the earlier understanding, however, it is no longer the Party alone that determines 
the objective needs of the masses. Instead, the media are claiming more room to 
appeal directly to the subjective tastes of the audience in a competitive setting. 
This has led, since the 1980s, to the re-emergence of the strong, century-old 
tradition of popular culture: martial arts novels, tales of love and romance, as well 
as popular music have returned to the media sector after being banned from there 
for almost half a century.60 The CCP has been remarkably tolerant of this trend, as 
long as the Party’s right to control those areas defined as critical is not charted. 
Kewang and Bianjibu de gushi are typical representatives of this kind of 
                                             
60 On the re-emergence of popular culture see Barmé. In the Red. Wang Jing (ed.). Chinese 
Popular Culture and the State. Perry Link, Richard P. Madsen, Paul G. Pickowicz (eds.). Popular 
China: Unofficial Culture in a Modernizing Society. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. Craig. 
Global Goes Local.  
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entertainment. With a conservative value model, embodied by the main characters 
of the series, and an apolitical message, both stay clear of those topics defined as 
sensitive: the role of the CCP, the political system, foreign relations, or religion. 
Lists with topics considered off-limits have been published all through the 1990s.  
So what remains of the media’s role in class struggle, the last aspect of the 
media concept? The bloody suppression on the 1989 Democracy Movement and 
the consequent crackdown on the media have demonstrated dramatically that the 
liberalization in the media field introduced after the Third Plenum does not mean 
that the media concept’s last clause is no longer relevant. It lies dormant, only to 
be reactivated whenever needed. The accusation of anti-socialist conspiracy 
remains a last resort to deal with dissent, and it has resurfaced time and again: the 
makers of Heshang were accused of supporting anti-Party, anti-Socialist activities. 
Similar accusations were levelled against individual journalists who dared, for 
example, to call for the rehabilitation of the victims of the Democracy Movement, 
but also against newspapers pursuing a too active role in exposing cases of high-
level corruption.61 The class struggle clause lies dormant most of the time, but it 
has not disappeared. 
Marketization and commercialization thus have deeply transformed the 
Chinese media landscape. The sector has exploded in both quantity and diversity 
of supply to the audiences. Choices for readers and viewers have increased 
dramatically, and especially entertainment – symbolized by new cultural icons 
such as Liu Huifang 刘慧芳, the female main character of Kewang, or Li Dongbao 
from Bianjibu de gushi – has emerged as the winner of the economic reforms 
introduced into the media sector. Yet while the diversity has definitely increased, 
the room for the expression of political opinion has not expanded to any significant 
degree. The fate of Heshang was a painful lesson for anyone in the media field. 
The indirect means of control that have characterized the CCP’s media policy ever 
since 1949 remain an effective approach, in particular vis-à-vis the enormously 
expanded number of media outlets. The Party does not insist in permanent and 
universal enforcement of its prescriptions, and in the course of the 1990s, many 
niches have emerged that allow for a media diversity unheard of in China for most 
                                             
61 See, for example, “Beijing hits media for not toeing party line,” Taipei Times, June 20, 2001, at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/06/20/story/0000090751 (downloaded June 22, 2001). 
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of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the media concept continues to define the 
general direction of the media sector which is, just as before, considered to be a 
crucial section of the propaganda xitong. The CCP has gone to great lengths to 
ensure if not the constant control of the media, then at least the constant potential 
to impose controls wherever and whenever it feels necessary to do so. 
Chapter Ten 
China.com: 
Media Control and the Internet 
 
“We must study the characteristics of [the Internet] and adopt forceful 
strategies to meet these challenges. We must take the initiative and attack, 
and we must strengthen our positive propaganda and our influence on the 
Net.” 
(Xie Haiguang, 2002) 
 
“Providers of Internet information services must supply their users going 
online with good services, and they must guarantee that the contents of the 
information they provide is legal.” 
(“Methods for the Administration of Internet Information Services,” 2000) 
 
Economic liberalization and marketization have greatly enhanced the 
diversity on the Chinese media market in the 1990s. The supply and the variety of 
media products has grown steadily, in particular in the area of entertainment. 
Chinese consumers today have more choices than ever before. The CCP and the 
Chinese government have allowed or even fostered this trend with the objective of 
furthering a consumer society that is capable to sustain long-term economic 
growth. High growth rates are necessary to enhance the overall “national capacity” 
(guoli 国力) of the PRC, and to secure the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. While the 
Party has retreated from micro-level planning in the course of the 1990s, the 
general architecture of media control and the Party’s claim exercise supervision 
remain in place. 
This architecture, the mechanics of control discussed in chapter four, has 
been challenged since 1997 by the advent of the Internet in the PRC. In the past, 
the CCP had dealt successfully with the challenges posed by technological 
innovation: audiovisual media such as radio and television, but also sound and 
music recordings, could be integrated into the existing structures of control with 
relative ease. The net-related media technology, however, has produced a new 
quality of challenges. These challenges must be attributed, in the first place, to: 
• the decentralized structure of the Internet that makes hierarchical networks of 
editorial control increasingly difficult; 
• the blurring of the border between private communication (telecommunications) 
and public communication; 
• the potential of interactivity and user anonymity; 
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• the blurring of the boundary between technology (traditionally administered as 
an industry in the economic affairs xitong) and the media (belonging to the 
propaganda xitong). 
With view to these challenges, a radical overhaul of media paradigms has once 
been proposed.1 More recently, however, analysts have taken a more pessimistic 
outlook on the Internet’s potential to erode authoritarian regimes and to foster 
democracy.2 
So how has the proliferation of the Internet affected the Chinese media 
sector? Has the media concept finally become obsolete, or did the CCP see the 
need to modify it significantly? After the initial enthusiasm created by a short 
period of “web anarchy,” most assessments of the prospects created by the 
Internet have become more cautious. Learning from its early failures, the CCP her 
been ever more successful in limiting those influences of the Net it considers 
harmful. What is more, the Party has grasped the importance and the potential of 
the Internet and wants to exploit the new technologies to its own advantage. The 
prospects for political and social change through new technological and media 
thresholds therefore look bleak at least in the short to mid term. 
In this chapter I look at the Internet as a new medium of public 
communication. I argue that the CCP regards the “Chinese” Internet as a virtual 
space codeterminous with the national territory of the PRC and claims the 
authority to regulate and govern the Net in close analogy to the traditional media. 
The media concept has been adapted and applied to the Internet in the same way 
it is used to control the traditional media. The Party has opted for a generally 
liberal interpretation of the media concept, so as not to impede the growth 
potential of the Net and its stimulating effects on the Chinese economy. Chinese 
consumers thus have gained a significant amount of choices in the media sector; 
the variety of both entertainment and news has increased, as has the speed and 
                                             
1 In a March 2000 address, Bill Clinton likened the effort of controlling the Internet to “nailing jell-o 
to the wall.” See “Remarks by President Bill Clinton on China – Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies” (http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/press/release/2000/clinton38.html).  
More recently, weblogs and citizen journalism have been celebrated as the next cyber revolution 
likely to topple authoritarian regimes across the globe. 
2 See Shanthi Kalathil, Taylor C. Boas. Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the 
Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2003. Michael S. Chase, James C. Mulvenon. “You've got Dissent!: Chinese Dissident Use of the 
Internet and Beijing's Counter-Strategies.” Santa Monica: RAND, 2002. Also available online at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1543/ (downloaded Nov. 10, 2003). 
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timeliness of news delivery. With regards to those activities or contents that were 
labelled as sensitive or forbidden in the print and broadcast media, the CCP has 
adopted a policy of heavy-handed intervention. Making use of the full array of web-
related technologies, the government’s interventions into the Internet have grown 
more sophisticated and effective as time has passed. 
The first section of this chapter sketches the growth of the Chinese Internet. 
I will then investigate the evolution of the regulatory regime that governs Internet 
activities in the PRC. The government guidelines and regulations issued between 
1994 and 2000 show a growing understanding of the nature of the Internet; yet the 
CCP’s learning process also reflects the Party’s efforts to integrate the Internet 
with the existing regulatory framework for the traditional media. I will go further and 
probe into a key question: does the CCP try to exploit the potential of the web for 
proactive approaches to ideological thought work, as it has done in the case of the 
traditional media? A short review of several projects reveals that the Party’s efforts 
in online propaganda look half-hearted at best and seem to have failed more often 
than not. This is the result of both the nature of the Internet that provides an 
unprecedented breadth of choices to users, and of the further retreat of the CCP 
from interventionist approaches to governance. 
So with what means does the Party try to establish a degree of control over 
the new online media? As this emerges to be the crucial question of this chapter, I 
take a closer look at the various techniques used to produce compliance of 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs). I will 
discuss these issues primarily through an analysis of one of China’s most popular 
Internet portal, Sina.com. A download of parts of this website on a randomly 
selected day reveals a surprising degree of freedom in online discussions among 
web users, but also a tendency on behalf of the site operators to avoid sensitive 
issues especially in their news section. Another finding of this chapter is that 
restrictions on news reporting for commercial ICPs are exceptionally strict; Internet 
news is effectively tied to offline news. Finally, we will have to take a closer look at 
some of the issues that have triggered a negative reaction of the authorities in 
charge of Internet control: the closure of websites, the censorship of Bulletin Board 
Systems, and the harassment of Internet cafés. All these instances serve to 
illuminate the borders and the grey areas where the CCP sees the need to defend 
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its grip on the media. Approximately six years into the proliferation of the Internet 
in the PRC, the Net has become another segment in the Party’s media apparatus. 
 
 
The Growth of the Chinese Internet 
The Internet initially reached China not much later than most other countries, 
but not until in 1997 did the Net “take off” for a belated start in the PRC. Both 
technology-related and non-technological reasons are responsible for China’s late 
entry into the Internet age. Most important among the latter is the – until recently – 
low computer penetration rate in Chinese households and workplaces, due to high 
costs. Only the rapid rise of disposable incomes in the 1990s, as well as the 
emergence of cheaper domestic brands, have brought the purchase of a personal 
computer within the range of consideration of both urban households and many 
employers (including schools and universities). Prior to 1997, for all practical 
purposes only research institutions and leading universities had computer 
equipment and could link up to the Internet.3 
The first email message from China was sent in 1987, and administration of 
the country code top level domain .cn for China was laid into Chinese hands in 
1990. But only in 1994 did the first Chinese website go online,4 and in January 
1997, only 1,003 websites were registered under the domain .cn.5 It was only in 
the second half of that year that the growth of the Chinese Net gathered 
momentum. The number of registered websites reached 5,100 by the end of the 
year and then exploded (see table 10.1).6 The first Chinese Internet users were 
                                             
3 On the growth of the Internet and especially the technical infrastructure see Eric Harwit, Duncan 
Clark. “Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political Control over Network Infrastructure and 
Content.” in Asian Survey XLI.3 (2001), p. 377-408. William Foster, Seymour E. Goodman. “The 
Diffusion of the Internet in China” at http://cisac.stanford.edu/docs/chinainternet.pdf (downloaded 
July 26, 2001). Some information can also be found in Manuel Fries. China and Cyberspace: The 
Development of the Chinese National Information Infrastructure. Bochum: Bochum University 
Press, 2000. 
4 See Monika Ermert, Christopher R. Hughes. “What’s in a Name? China and the Domain Name 
System” in Christopher R. Hughes, Gudrun Wacker (eds.). China and the Internet: Politics of the 
Digital Leap Forward. London: RoutledgeVerzon, 2003, p. 127-38, here p. 131f. 
5 Statistics are available from CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center, Zhongguo hulian 
wangluo xinxi zhongxin 中国互联网络信息中心) that administers the domain, at 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/registration/domain1997.shtml (downloaded Sept, 29, 2003). 
6 Chinese content providers can also apply for .com domains that are administered by VeriSign Inc., 
a private sector company in the United States. .com addresses based on servers in the PRC must 
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thus overwhelmingly academics. It was this computer-literate, highly educated, 
and highly institutionalized segment of society that first discovered the significance 
of the Internet – the consequences of this discovery were still felt years later: the 
notorious distrust of the government towards independent-minded intellectuals 
was carried over to the Internet when the Party, with some delay, began to react to 
its subversive potential. 
 
Table 10.1: Number of registered .cn websites 
Jan. 1997 1,003 
July 1997 2,760 
Jan. 1998 5,375 
July 1998 10,764 
Jan. 1999 19,608 
June 1999 29,045 
Jan. 2000 56,502 
Jul. 2000 103,203 
Jan. 2001 127,928 
July 2001 128,152 
Jan. 2002 128.013 
July 2002 126,530 
Jan. 2003 182,263 
July 2003 256,346 
Source: CNNIC statistics at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/registration/tongji.shtml (downloaded Sept. 30, 2003) 
 
The second half of 1997 became the short “golden era” of the Chinese 
Internet: by then, the various networks of universities and research institutions had 
been interconnected and the web community had grown to a point where the Net 
reached momentum as a discussion forum with an unprecedented reach. The 
Party’s initial slowness to respond to the emergence of the Internet must  be 
attributed to a lack of expertise on behalf of the cadres in the propaganda 
apparatus, and to bureaucratic infighting. The PD awakened only after other 
groups – intellectuals, students, and dissidents – had started to use the web for 
their own purposes. Yet the PD’s early attempts at regulating the Internet were 
frustrated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication (MPT), owner of the 
fibre-optic communication grid that powers the Net, and the Ministry of Electronic 
Industries (MEI), responsible for the high technology industry, which defended its 
                                                                                                                                      
seek approval from CNNIC, which does not, however, disclose the number of these websites. The 
exact number of Chinese websites is therefore unknown. See Ermert. “What’s in a Name?,” p. 134. 
 536
claims in the lucrative field of hi-tech.7 Infighting between the MPT and the MEI 
was particularly protracted and severe, and ended only after the two ministries 
were merged into the Ministry of Information Industries (MII). Yet the MII, too, 
belongs to the economic affairs xitong and sees its core objective in fostering the 
technological advance and the economic development of the nation. Officials in 
the MII feared that a more heavy-handed approach, such as called for by the PD 
and also the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT),8 would 
cripple a fledgling technology that was poised to become a crucial segment of the 
national development strategy.9 The conflict over interests, objectives, and 
bureaucratic turf illustrates the rigidity of the borders of the xitong in the Chinese 
political landscape. 
Since 1998, however, the CCP has adopted a more proactive position 
towards the Internet issue and has come forward with a series of regulations and 
directives. These documents and the motives that triggered these interventions will 
be discussed in the next section. The government also reacted with police actions 
on infringements of the new guidelines as well as violations of other laws and 
regulations existing in the PRC. These interventions were designed primarily to 
deter other potential violators. 
With increasing quantity and diversity of Internet content, the number of 
users has also exploded. In late 1997, there were less than a million Internet users; 
the number had risen to five million in July 1999, ten million six months later, and 
reached 68 million in July 2003 (see Figure 10.1).10 In less than five years, the 
Internet had thus become a mass medium in the PRC. 
                                             
7 The inter-bureaucratic struggles (that eventually even turned into physical violence) surrounding 
the authority over the Internet have been discussed repeatedly. The most complete study to date is 
Junhua Zhang. “Network Convergence and Bureaucratic Turf Wars” in Hughes (ed.). China and the 
Internet, p. 83-101. 
8 Until 1998 the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television. 
9 On the increasing role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the Chinese Five 
Year Plans see Dai Xiudian. “ICTs in China’s Development Strategy” in Hughes (ed.). China and 
the Internet, p. 8-29. 
10 Numbers taken from CNNIC. Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao 
(2003/7) at http://www.cnnic.cn/develst/2003-7/ (downloaded Sept. 30, 2003). Karsten Giese points 
out, however, that the numbers given by CNNIC are notoriously unreliable. See. “Internet Growth 
and the Digital Divide: Implications for Spatial Development” in Hughes (ed.). China and the 
Internet, p. 30-57, here p. 31f.  
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Figure 10.1: Number of Intent users in the PRC (in 10,000) 
 
Source: CNNIC statistics at http://www.cnnic.cn/develst/2003-7/7-1.shtml (figure 1-4) 
(downloaded Sept. 30, 2003) 
 
The rapid growth of the Chinese Internet has also deeply transformed its character. 
This becomes visible from the social composition of Chinese Internet users. First 
of all, the Internet remains a largely urban phenomenon, with computer 
penetration being highest in the cities of the eastern coastal regions that are also 
China’s most prosperous. Chinese Internet users are young (average age 27 
years), male (but women make up a sizable 40 per cent of users), and have an 
above average education (high school or college degree).11 43 per cent of Internet 
users are students, with public service employees, especially in education, 
research, and culture, being the second largest group. They usually come from 
families with an above-average household income.12 
The social composition of Internet users also decides their interests and 
uses of the Internet to a significant degree. The Internet is used, first of all, as a 
tool of communication: email, chat rooms and Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) have 
                                             
11 These and the following numbers are taken from Guo Liang, Bu Wei. “The CASS Internet Report 
(2000): Survey on Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities,” here tables AA, AB, and AC. 
The survey of over 3,000 respondents was conducted in February 2001. I am very grateful to Guo 
Liang for providing me with this survey. The survey results are discussed in Guo Liang, Bu Wei. 
“Internet Use in China: A Comparative Analysis” in Junhua Zhang, Martin Woesler (ed.). China’s 
Digital Dream: The Impact of the Internet on Chinese Society. Bochum: Bochum University Press, 
2002, p. 71-91. For a different survey covering similar topics see Jonathan J.H. Zhu, Zhou He. 
“Information Accessibility, User Sophistication, and Source Credibility: the Impact of the Internet on 
Value Orientations in Mainland China” in Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7.2 (Jan. 
2002), available online at http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol7/issue2/china.html (downloaded Nov. 10, 
2003). 
12 “The CASS Internet Report (2000),” tables AE and AL. 
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greatly enhanced the frequency in which urban Chinese exchange opinions and 
information; it is the interactive features of the Internet that have become its 
greatest attraction.13 Yet survey respondents list accessing news on the second 
rank (with 57 per cent) when asked about their purpose of using the Internet, even 
before “personal hobbies.” While entertainment-related uses, such as “music” and 
“games” received high ratings, too (45 and 32 per cent, respectively), the number 
of people seeking serious information (high ratings for “expanding knowledge,” 
“remote learning,” and “enhancing computer skills”) is remarkable. The Internet in 
China is thus used – just like other media – for both entertainment and information. 
Chinese Internet users spend an average of 10.5 hours weekly online, as 
compared to 13.5 hours watching TV, and 5.3 hours reading newspapers.14 About 
a third of respondents admitted that after starting to use the Internet, the time he or 
she spends for other media, and in particular radio and television, had 
decreased.15 Yet while the Internet was top ranked as a medium for information 
gathering on personal life (including shopping, travel etc.), to enhance knowledge 
and to study (here the Net was beaten narrowly by books), and for entertainment 
or personal hobbies, it came in third only in the category “knowing news.” 
Television and newspapers were still considered to be better suited to meet the 
users’ needs.16 The reason for this judgement is apparently the higher degree of 
trust that the traditional media enjoy with Chinese users: 4-5 per cent of 
respondents said they “didn’t trust” or “not very much” trust domestic TV and 
newspapers, the majority (73-74 per cent) gave them a relative amount of trust, 
and 19 per cent each said they “extremely” trusted news from TV and 
newspapers.17 In contrast, only 7 per cent said the same about the Internet, while 
ten per cent believed they could “not” or “not very much” trust online news. 
So while the Internet as a source of news does still have a credibility 
problem, it is appreciated by a young, critical, and well-educated online community 
as an essential tool of information gathering and exchange. The speed, the 
diversity, and the interactive potential of online news have made them a crucial 
segment of the news media field. These developments have not escaped the 
                                             
13 See ibid., table CG “Your purpose of using the Internet is...” 
14 Ibid., table AM. 
15 Ibid., table CN. 
16 Ibid., table AR. 
17 Ibid., table CR. 
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attention of the Party, and after an initial slowness to respond, the CCP has come 
out to actively shape the dissemination of news on the Internet. The next section 
will explore the measures taken by the Party to create a regulatory framework for 
the Internet that closely interacts with the existing regulations for the traditional 
media. 
 
 
The CCP’s View of the Internet: The Evolution of the Regulatory Regime 
How does the CCP perceive of the Internet and its nature? The regulations 
and laws put into place to govern the Net provide ample information on the 
evolution of the CCP’s conceptions of the Internet. Internet-related legislation in 
the PRC dates back as far as 1994,18 but early guidelines, including a set of 
temporary guidelines issued on May 20, 1997,19 proved ineffective and showed a 
lack of understanding on the side of the government of the nature of the Internet 
and its peculiar complexities. The main concern speaking from the February 1994 
“Regulations” is security, as their full name reveals: “Regulations for the Protection 
of the Security of Computer Information Networks.” Article two gives a definition of 
“computer information networks” that is, however, too vague and does not 
succeed in clarifying the features of these networks. Three years after the creation 
of the World Wide Web it comes as a surprise that the State Council (the signator 
of the “Regulations”) seems to understand the Net primarily as a kind of file- and 
information-sharing mechanism. Other articles give further testimony to the failure 
to grasp the significance of the Internet: article 15 relegates the prevention of 
computer viruses “and other harmful codes that endanger social public security” to 
the Public Security organs – the reader very much has the impression that 
protection from computer viruses was to be lumped together with the Chinese 
disease control regime. Article twenty-one demands that all network computers be 
stored in rooms complying with national security standards – not a very practical 
                                             
18 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jisuanji xinxi xitong anquan baohu tiaoli 中华人民共和国计算机信息
系统安全保护条例, issued by the State Council on Feb. 18, 1994. See 
http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/5.shtml (downloaded Sept. 30, 2003). 
19 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang guanli zanxing guiding 中华人
民共和国计算机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定, issued by the State Council. See 
http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/1.shtml (downloaded Sept. 30, 2003). 
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rule either. The obsession with security and the ideas of how to protect computers 
seems to be incompatible with the decentralized, open nature of the Internet. 
The May 1997 rules, too, are characterized by vagueness concerning the 
nature of the Net, and lack specific prescriptions of activities considered illegal. 
Only on Dec. 30, 1997, the Ministry of Public Security issued a set of measures 
that set clear limits to the freedom of Internet-related activities and detailed a 
number of taboo areas.20 The new instructions go far beyond the earlier 
regulations and are of a more restrictive character; apparently, the Party had been 
alarmed by the free spread of discussion and the exchange of information on the 
web that had emerged over the latter half of the year. Article five of the measures 
contains a list of forbidden topics that “no work unit or individual” is allowed to 
“create, multiply, read, or spread:”21 
(1) [Information that] instigates resistance, violates the enforcement of the constitution, 
the law, and administrative rules; 
(2) instigates subversion of state power and the overthrowing of the socialist system; 
(3) instigates secessionism and destroys national unity; 
(4) instigates ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, and destroys the unity of the 
different nationalities; 
(5) fabricates or distorts the facts, spreads rumours, and upsets the social order; 
(6) propagates feudal superstition, obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, 
murder, terrorism, and instigates to crime; 
(7) publicly insults other people or fabricates facts slandering others; 
(8) denigrates the reputation of state organs; 
(9) or otherwise violates the constitution, the law, and administrative rules. 
 
The above catalogue is a negative list that is intended to bring the information 
circulating on the Internet under the control of the Chinese state. The basic 
categories of banned and sensitive content – general political principles, religious 
issues, the minority question, pornography, violence – resemble those of similar 
catalogues found in other pieces of legislation for the media sector, for example, in 
the Publication Administration Regulations issued by the State Council on Jan. 2, 
1997.22 They also contain the vague point nine, that is found in similar fashion in 
                                             
20 Jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang anquan baohu guanli banfa 计算机信息网络国际联网安全保
护管理办法. See http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/7.shtml (downloaded Sept. 30, 2003). 
21 Ibid. 
22 See article 25 of “Chuban guanli tiaoli” in Zhongguo chuban nianjian she (ed.). Zhongguo chuban 
nianjian 1998. Beijing: Zhongguo chuban nianjianshe , 1998, p. 230-33, here p. 231. Similar 
catalogues have also been discussed in chapter four. 
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many legal documents from the PRC.23 It is the Public Security organs that are 
entrusted with the exercise of overall control and supervision of the Net. 
 Besides the police, the Internet Service Providers (ISPs, here still called 
jieru danwei 接入单位) are made responsible for the enforcement of the rules and 
restrictions specified in the regulations. For all practical purposes, however, it is 
not feasible to charge ISPs with the responsibility for Internet content; rather, this 
task must be given to ICPs. Yet the idea to delegate responsibility for content 
downwards is the same as that underlying the editor responsibility system 
practiced in publishing houses, journals, and newspapers: to enforce compliance 
by increasing pressure on lower-level organs that are made responsible for 
content, and to encourage self-censorship. 
 With the regulations of late 1997, for the first time a clearer legal framework 
emerged that also signalled a better understanding of the Internet on the side of 
the Party. However, there are still points revealing that the CCP had not yet fully 
grasped the importance of the Net and the way it functions. The guidelines talk, for 
example, only about corporate users, that is, danweis or enterprises using the 
Internet. They do not yet consider individual users as a significant factor. Similarly, 
the guidelines overestimate the technical feasibility of controlling Internet access 
when demanding that all ISPs must set up files for all users and users must 
register whenever logging on to the Internet (articles 10 and 11). Security of data 
still seems to be the main concern of the authorities, and the conservative general 
attitude speaking from the regulations seriously underestimates the potential of the 
web. The CCP had not yet come up with a final answer: is the Internet primarily a 
technology or a medium of public communication? 
By fall 2000, the latter had been identified as the more accurate answer. 
Modernized and more systematic legislation of the Internet was put in place when 
the State Council enacted two sets of guidelines for the information and Internet 
sector.24 These latter rules were confirmed by a decision of the NPC Standing 
                                             
23 On this calculated vagueness see Ronald C. Keith, Lin Zhiqiu. “The ‘Falun gong Problem:’ 
Politics and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in China” in CQ 175 (Sept. 2003), p. 623-42, esp. p. 
641. 
24 Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa 互联网信息服务管理办法, and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
dianxin tiaoli 中华人民共和国电信条例, dated Sept. 25, 2000. See 
http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/18.shtml and http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/19.shtml, respectively 
(downloaded Sept. 30, 2003). 
 542
Committee in Dec. 2000.25 The most important of these regulations are the 
“Methods for the Administration of Internet Information Services” of Sept. 25, 2000. 
The “Methods” are a stratified version of the 1997 regulations. This becomes clear 
from the language and the formulations used, that are now brought into line with 
similar legal texts from other related fields of the propaganda xitong. The 
catalogue of the nine “don’ts” (here article 15), for example, has been streamlined: 
the first item now bans “[information that] violates the basic principles stipulated in 
the constitution.” As the preamble of the Chinese constitution mentions the “four 
basic principles” (the leadership of the CCP, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
socialist system, as well as Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought), more 
explicit references such as that to the Socialist system become redundant; the 
reformulation thus condenses the first and the second point of the 1997 
regulations in a more elegant and more complete form. Moreover, the new 
formulation is almost identical with that found in the catalogue of the Publication 
Administration Regulations mentioned above.26 
The Sept. 2000 “Methods” are speaking of the Internet (hulianwang 互联网), 
a term not yet used in 1997, and of information services (xinxi fuwu 信息服务). 
Both ISPs and ICPs are covered by this latter term. The “Methods” thus move 
further in defining the liability of the service providers for the content that runs 
through their servers. Especially important in this respect is article 13 that says: 
“Providers of Internet information services must supply their users going online 
with good services, and they must guarantee that the contents of the information 
they provide is legal.” The demand that ICPs guarantee the legality of any content 
on their pages requires them to take steps of controlling all information uploaded. 
They are made into effective censors at the grass-roots level – just as the editor 
responsibility system makes editors liable for anything they have signed off. The 
responsibility system is clearly imported from the traditional media into the realm of 
the Internet. Even more significant in this respect is article 14 that details the 
responsibilities of Chinese ICPs: 
                                             
25 Quan guo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu weihu hulianwang anquan de 
jueding 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于维护互联网安全的决定 (dated Dec. 28, 2000). See 
http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn/gb/paper117/1/class011700003/hwz62384.htm (downloaded Sept. 
30, 2003). 
26 The latter reads fandui xianfa suo queding de jiben yuanze de 反对宪法所确定的基本原则的, 
instead of fandui xianfa queding de... . See “Chuban guanli tiaoli,” p. 231. 
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Internet information service providers engaging in services such as news, publishing, 
public information etc. must record the content as well as the time of publication and 
the Internet address or domain name of all information they provide; providers of 
Internet access services must record the time of access, the user account, the Internet 
address or domain name, and the telephone number of all users going online. 
The back-up records of Internet information service providers and providers of Internet 
access services must be kept for 60 days, and must be handed over to the state 
organs concerned during legal inquiries. 
 
Both content and service providers are required to keep exact records that will 
allow the police, in the event of an investigation, to retrieve not only the offending 
piece of information with all relevant data, but also to track down users and 
reconstruct all their moves on the Internet. These stipulations give far-reaching 
powers to the police while keeping the providers responsible – users as well as 
providers can thus become targets of prosecution. 
 Another mechanism to gain control over the Internet is the introduction of 
licensing procedures. The objective of these bureaucratic measures – clearly 
modelled after existing procedures for newspapers or publishing houses discussed 
in chapter four – is to limit content providers to work units that the Party feels can 
be trusted or easily controlled: especially providers of non-commercial information 
need to have a sponsoring work unit (zhuban danwei 主办单位), which means that 
individual and private enterprises are excluded from running such websites on 
their own account. Websites intending to “engage in news, publishing, education, 
health, and pharmaceutics or medical equipment Internet information services”27 
must furthermore obtain permissions from “the departments concerned” (you guan 
bumen 有关部门). A prospective Internet publisher, for example, must therefore 
register with the SPPA according to the Publication Administration Regulations, 
just as any other publishing house has to do. These regulations are even more 
strict than the Internet guidelines and contain detailed prescriptions concerning 
institutional affiliation, employee training, minimum capital, etc. (discussed in 
chapter four). Upon approval, the content providers receive a registration number 
and a permit that must be displayed “on a prominent place on the main page of 
their website” (article twelve). A typical permit looks as follows: 
 
                                             
27 Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa, article five. On the requirement for permissions see article 
eight. 
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Ill. 10.1: ICP permits of Sina.com at http://www.sina.com.cn (downloaded Oct. 2, 2003) 
 
On the bottom of the main page, the popular portal Sina.com carries its ICP 
licence, with the registration number Jing 京 (for Beijing) 000007. In addition, 
Sina.com displays its permits to run education- (jiao-yan 教研), health- (wei 卫), 
and medicine- (yao 药) related contents, and the licence for online advertising. 
Finally, the main page carries the “red shield” (hong dun 红盾), an emblem 
distributed by the Beijing Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
(Beijing shi gong-shang xingzheng guanli ju 北京市工商行政管理局). To run its 
website according to official guidelines, Sinca.com thus had to obtain a total of 
seven licenses. The “red shield” on the right side is a link to a site at the Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce that provides basic data on the owner of the website 
(Sina.com), including its address, telephone number, registered capital, and a 
description of its business scope (jingying fanwei 经营范围).28 This website further 
carries the notice: “In case you discover that this website is engaging in any online 
activities violating state laws or regulations, please immediately report to the local 
administrative organs of industry and trade.” Web surfers are thus integrated into a 
comprehensive framework of licensing and control. 
The licensing requirement does not only serve as a market entry restriction, 
but also as a convenient means of punishing offenders and closing them down. 
When the Publication Administration Regulations were enacted on February 1, 
1997, article 56 required all publishing houses to renew their licenses by “going 
once again through the procedures stipulated in these guidelines.”29 Article 26, the 
second last article of the Sept. 2000 “Methods for the Administration of Internet 
Information Services,” contains almost the same formulation: “[Danweis or people] 
that have engaged in Internet information services before the proclamation of 
                                             
28 See http://www.hd315.gov.cn/beian/view.asp?bianhao=0102000102300001 (downloaded Oct. 2, 
2003). 
29 “Chuban guanli tiaoli,” p. 233. 
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these ‘Methods’ must, within 60 days of the proclamation of the ‘Methods,’ go 
through the relevant formalities as required by the relevant guidelines in these 
‘Methods.’” As explained in chapter four, the Chinese government can declare 
existing business licences invalid at will and ask publishers, or in this case, ICPs to 
renew their licences, and might use this opportunity to withhold approval. Without 
a valid business licence, websites can be declared illegal and shut down. This is 
what happened to the popular BBS Shiji shalong 世纪沙龙 (forum.cc.org.cn) that 
was closed in September 2003.30 Through the licensing requirement, the CCP 
thus has a tight grip on content providers. The mechanisms to enforce the Internet 
providers’ compliance are the same as those used for the traditional media. 
The licensing requirements seem to be enforced in a rather lax manner, 
however. Many websites, and in particular non-commercial sites, do not display 
their permits as required on their main pages – if they have one at all. The rather 
strict licensing regulations thus are less a means of permanent bureaucratic 
control than a potential weapon in the hands of the authorities that can be 
enforced whenever this is considered necessary. As in other fields of the 
propaganda sector, the government is usually satisfied with having the power to 
intervene – an economic and yet very effective way of oversight. This approach 
has come to characterize the general attitude towards the media in recent years. 
 The guidelines issued in 1997 and 2000 for the regulation of the Internet 
were complemented by other, more specific guidelines, such as for online news 
and online advertising.31 The “Temporary Guidelines for the Administration of 
Internet Sites Publishing News” from Nov. 2000 will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Since 2000, the government regulations for the Internet sector have 
reached a relative degree of stability, and have been propagated widely as the 
guiding legal documents for the Internet sector. However, for most of the past sixty 
years, the CCP has not been satisfied with ruling through regulative frameworks 
alone. We must now examine the Party’s efforts to carry the proactive propaganda 
                                             
30 See Kathy Chen. “China Cracks Down on Growing Debate Over Political Reform: To Quell Talk 
of Reform, Beijing Closes Internet Sites, Blames Foreign Funding” in Wall Street Journal, Sep. 25, 
2003. More on this case below. 
31 For a discussion concerning the effectiveness of a set of regulations governing business 
websites, issued in Sept. 2000, see Clara Liang. “Red Light, Green Light: Has China Achieved its 
Goals Through the 2000 Internet Regulations?” Vanderbilt University Law School, at 
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/journal/35-01/Liang.htm (downloaded Nov. 10, 2003). 
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approach into the new medium. How successful were the experiments with online 
ideological thought work? 
 
 
Political Thought Work Online? The Decline of the Normative Approach 
The growing choices available to media users in the PRC have made ever 
new adaptations of the original media concept necessary. Under the conditions of 
a confusing variety of sources of information and entertainment, the Party must 
work ever harder to make its own voice heard. In particular the second and the 
third provision of the media concept – “the media must represent the unified, 
single voice of the party; they are indispensable tools of party propaganda and 
party building” – have become increasingly difficult to enforce. How has the 
affirmative, proactive approach to using the media, an approach the CCP calls 
thought work (sixiang gongzuo 思想工作), evolved in the era of the Internet? 
From a media perspective, perhaps the most surprising finding of the 
Chinese Internet is that there seems to be no co-ordinated Internet appearance of 
the CCP. In a world populated by organ newspapers (jiguanbao 机关报) and organ 
publications (jiguan kanwu 机关刊物), the “organ website” (jiguan wangye 机关网
页) simply does not exist. The CCP has no website.32 Neither has the CC. The CC 
organ, RMRB, has gone online (see the Renminwang 人民网 site at 
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn), yet this site serves primarily as a general 
information provider; the CC has not set up an independent website. Most of the 
CC departments and bureaus haven’t gone online either.33 While the CCP 
traditionally has preferred to let others speak to the public on its behalf, there have 
always been publications addressing Party members, such as the theory journal 
Qiushi; periodicals serving Party construction and the ideological education of 
Party members have abounded on all levels of Party organization. The almost total 
                                             
32 The best guess, http://www.ccp.org.cn (accessed Nov. 5, 2003) leads to a local Party website in 
Yunnan. 
33 Of 20 units under the CC listed at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9670/ 
20021127/875830.html (downloaded Nov. 4, 2003), only five have websites. While the United Front 
Work Department has a website (http://www.zytzb.org.cn/zytzbwz/index.htm) (accessed Nov. 4, 
2003), none of the three other big Departments (Organization, Propaganda, and International 
Liaison) has built an Internet presence. 
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absence of the CCP from the web signals a changed approach to the media since 
the late 1990s. 
There are of course Party websites. Some of these shall be examined now. 
To start with, the CC’s United Front Work Department (Tongzhanbu 统战部, 
hereafter UFWD) runs an elaborate website at 
http://www.zytzb.org.cn/zytzbwz/index.htm. The UFWD, responsible for the CCP’s 
co-operation with the “Democratic Parties” has traditionally been one of the more 
communicative CC bodies. The UFWD website carries a large amount of up-to-
date news, as well as information for special target groups, such as the other 
parties, minorities, and non-Party intellectuals. Other resources include 
biographies of the current UFWD leadership, and a description of the internal 
setup of the Department. However, with the exception of the news section, other 
content seems to be updated infrequently. Conspicuously absent from the 
UFWD’s homepage are links to other CCP websites. There are links to pages for 
the provincial-level UFWDs, that are – with the exception of the Guangdong site – 
based on the server of the Central UFWD and seem to receive little attention and 
maintenance; especially the pages of the poorer provinces are permanently under 
construction. In sum, a visit to the UFWD’s website suggests little enthusiasm for 
online public relations efforts.34 
While the central CCP apparatus has been hesitant to establish an Internet 
presence, regional and local CCP bodies have been more straightforward. Take 
the Sujiatun 苏家屯 website (http://www.sjtdj.gov.cn/; downloaded Nov. 9, 2003) as 
an example. The Organization Department of the CCP committee of Sujiatun, a 
district of Shenyang city, has built, with the assistance of the local PD, an 
elaborate and well-maintained website that includes features such as “grassroots 
Party building” (jiceng dangjian 基层党建), “cadre work” (ganbu gongzuo 干部工作), 
“propaganda front” (xuanchuan zhanxian 宣传战线), as well as an “online Party 
school” (wangshang dangxiao 网上党校). Furthermore, the designers have added 
interactive features, such as a contact mailboxes for the Organization Department, 
                                             
34 The Communist Youth League seems to pay more attention to its web presence and features a 
better maintained website at www.ccyl.org (accessed Nov. 5, 2003). The CYL’s colourful page is a 
full-fledged portal and mixes ideological and educational contents with lifestyle and has many links 
to other, non-Party websites. Obviously, the younger clientele of the CYL has prompted the League 
to opt for a more attractive format. 
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and a quick vote system; such features are rare for official Chinese websites. The 
Sujiatun website covers practically all aspects of Party life, and was built as a 
portal for the local cadres. Apparently, local governments and Party committees 
are often more eager to approach the public than the Party Center.35 
Websites dedicated to thought work can be found at some institutions of 
higher learning,36 and at the main institutions responsible for cadre training, the 
Party schools that exist on all levels of the Party hierarchy nationwide.37 An 
exception, however, is the website of the Central Party School (Zhongyang 
dangxiao 中央党校) at http://www.ccps.gov.cn/ (accessed Nov.4, 2003). The 
amount of information found on this website is scant, especially in comparison to 
the resources usually found on websites of most regular universities. In particular, 
information, resources, or links related to thought work, which would be expected 
from the Party’s most prestigious theory think tank, are entirely absent. A number 
of links, including that to the “digital library” (shuzi tushuguan 数字图书馆) are 
permanently unavailable, a sign of neglect. Again, local level Party schools are 
often more forthcoming with information. If the actual web presence is any 
indication, at least the CCP Center attaches little importance to the Internet as a 
medium for the proactive advertising of its message. 
The Internet has not entirely escaped the attention of the CCP. A major 
state-sponsored project was launched in summer 2000 to investigate the 
possibilities of helping “ideological and political work” to go online; the project was 
listed as a “key point program of the national social sciences fund” under the 10th 
Five Year Plan. The results of this undertaking, that involved some seventy cadres 
and scholars, as well as thirty-six contributors from public sector companies, think 
tanks, and local governments, have been published since 2001 in form of a book 
                                             
35 For other examples of well-run local CCP websites see Hongkou jiaoyu dangjian wang 虹口教育
党建网, maintained by the Information Center of Shanghai’s Hongkou district, at 
http://www.hkedu.sh.cn/ hkbbs1/index.htm; and Yunling dangjian 云岭党建 at http://www.ccp.org.cn, 
which is run by the CCP Yunnan Provincial Committee (accessed Nov. 5, 2003). 
36 See, for example, the website of the Organization Department of Beijing University, at 
http://www.pku.edu.cn/administration/pkuzzb/ (accessed Nov. 5, 2003). 
37 See, for example the Chongqing Party School at http://www.cqdx.gov.cn/, or the website of the 
Hubei dangxiao at http://www.hbdx.gov.cn/ that has links to other provincial-level Party schools 
(accessed Nov. 5, 2003). 
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series.38 The head of the PD of Shanghai Jiaotong daxue 上海交通大学, Xie 
Haiguang 谢海光, was placed in charge of coordinating the project and the 
resulting publications. The most interesting of these volumes was published in 
April 2002 and contains 88 examples of “successful” political thought work on the 
Internet. 
In the preface – carrying the title “The Internet era and our mission” – the 
editor summarizes the intention of the project:39 
We must study the characteristics of [the Internet] and adopt forceful strategies to meet 
these challenges. We must take the initiative and attack, and we must strengthen our 
positive propaganda and our influence on the Net. Leading cadres on all levels must 
pay close attention to the new trends in the development of information networks and 
study them; they must strive to acquire knowledge about the web, must be good at 
using the Net in their work, and work hard to grasp the initiative in the struggle on the 
Net. 
 
The participants in the project advocate an active and affirmative approach to the 
Internet: the web has the potential to carry the Party’s message in a globalized 
modern world. If the CCP wants to maintain the ideological leadership under the 
conditions of media convergence and an increasingly multipolar information 
market, it has no choice but to vie for an active role in the Chinese cyberspace. 
The anarchic nature of the Internet makes interventions by the Party even more 
necessary, especially in the area of ethics: “we must develop an information 
ethics.”40 
Xie Haiguang defines several core fields where the Party may become 
active and gives the following recommendations:41  
For example, we can set up on the Internet special websites dedicated to ideological 
thought work; establish web-characteristic homepages; open up a large number of 
mainstream propaganda channels dedicated to news and current affairs, economy and 
society, character cultivation, psychological counsel, and popular legal education; on 
BBS we can urge their operators to set up areas where they post all kinds of positive 
information. Furthermore, we can discuss and practice web ethics and other ideological 
education. 
 
                                             
38 Xie Haiguang. Hulianwang yu sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo gailun. Shanghai: Fudan daxue 
chubanshe, 2000. Xie Haiguang (ed.). Hulianwang yu sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo shiwu. Shanghai: 
Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2001. Xie Haiguang (ed.). Hulianwang yu sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo anli. 
Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2002. Another publication, Sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo 
wangshang zhi lu, was distributed as a software package. 
39 Xie Haiguang. Hulianwang yu sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo anli, p. 1. 
40 Ibid., p. 8. 
41 Ibid. 
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The CCP thus has a broad spectrum of options to intervene affirmatively in the 
world of the new, net-based media. The body of the volume details several dozen 
of such efforts. I will now look at two of these examples. 
How can Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) be used to educate web surfers? 
The administrator of a BBS affiliated with Nankai 南开 University in Tianjin reports 
on the experience of his system when the Chinese Internet community exploded 
with heated discussions after the collision of an American “spy plane” and a 
Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea on April 1, 2001. The Chinese jet 
was lost, while the U.S. plane was damaged and forced to land on Hainan island. 
Among the well over 1000 postings on the Nankai BBS, “there were some 
postings with too extreme statements or too vulgar language that were 
immediately deleted by the teachers in charge of supervising [the BBS].”42 
However, as a rule, the personnel overseeing the discussions on the website 
opted for other means to direct the debate. In this case, they tried to diversify the 
range of information by posting other, more moderate messages on their own 
system. When the U.S. side officially apologized about the incident, the 
administrators immediately posted this information and brought it to the attention 
of surfers. 
Trying to influence the direction of discussions on some of the public 
spaces on the Internet certainly is one option of positive interventions. Yet the 
limits of this approach are obvious: it is closely tied to negative interventions (such 
as censorship in the above case), and it becomes prohibitively expensive as the 
scale of the Chinese Internet grows. The establishment of websites of an 
affirmative (zhengmian 正面) character is thus another key strategy. One such 
website, www.chinaredweb.com, was built and developed by the automobile class 
of Qinghua University. chinaredweb.com was perceived as “a theory study website 
centring on ideological and political education.”43 The site featured collections of 
classic Marxist texts and other material for political education, information on how 
to become a Party member, a news and commentary section, and a discussion 
                                             
42 Ibid., p. 222. 
43 Ibid., p. 7. 
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forum, among other items.44 Initiated by students, the website received logistical 
support from the university administration and from the school’s Party branch. 
How lasting are the strategies proposed by the experts around Xie 
Haiguang? If chinaredweb.com is any standard to go by, they are a failure. Little 
over a year after the publication of the volume, the website no longer exists. Other 
case studies presented by Xie’s crew must be considered as naïve; yet others are 
lack in concreteness. The state-funded project does not seem to have produced 
tangible results. The survey of online thought work websites has led to the 
impression that the CCP’s efforts to build a proactive (zhengmian) approach to the 
Internet and making “political thought work” go online have led nowhere, and the 
“achievements” reported in the Xie Haiguang volume raise doubts even about the 
sincerity of the Party’s efforts. 
The conclusion from these findings is that in the course of the 1990s the 
CCP has changed its general approach to governance, a shift in emphasis that 
has affected the media, too: the gradual retreat from many sectors and the 
concurrent expansion of market forces that has started in the 1980s, has greatly 
gained speed. All the while, the CCP has fine-tuned its macro-management 
capabilities to reduce costs and raise efficiency. The Party has not, however, 
abolished the media concept or changed its attitude towards the media. The CCP 
is still present, and it makes its presence felt by anyone who dares to infringe upon 
those narrowly defined key areas of concern where the Party sees its primary 
interests at stake. The next two sections will illustrate this. 
 
 
Indirect Approaches to Control: The Popular Internet 
The efforts of the CCP to carry the proactive thought work approach onto 
the Internet seem to be half-hearted and little successful. The main reason for this 
failure is the nature of the Net that gives people the opportunity to choose freely 
from the marketplace of information and entertainment. To see how modern web-
based media operate within the constraints of the media concept, we must turn our 
attention to those websites that are most popular with Chinese surfers. In this 
section, I will take a closer look on Sina.com, one of the most frequented Internet 
                                             
44 See ibid., p. 11. 
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portals in the PRC; the goal of this investigation is to understand how a successful 
Internet operator manoeuvres in the matrix consisting of the technical possibilities 
of the web, the heterogeneous demands of its customers, and the restrictions 
imposed by the government. How far does the freedom of the online media go, 
and where are the limits?45 
The portal Sina.com (at www.sina.com.cn; the Chinese name is Xinlang 新
浪) was set up in December 1998 when the Beijing-based Sitong Lifang 四通利方 
company acquired Sina, a U.S. based portal popular with overseas Chinese. The 
company was first and foremost looking for a way to distribute its hugely popular 
Richwin software online.46 In the short time span of four years, Sina.com became 
one of the most popular Chinese language Internet portals with 68 million 
registered users; in March 2000, it applied as one of the first Chinese hi-tech 
companies for a listing on the American NASDAQ exchange. The early success of 
the website must undoubtedly be credited to the decision of the parent company, 
to distribute Richwin free over its website. The new version of Richwin, back in 
1998 the most popular software available for writing and reading Chinese 
characters, was attracting droves of customers to the fledgling portal. Sina.com 
reacted fast and capitalized on this early success by constantly adding features to 
its websites, providing computer technology-related information and increasingly 
news, sports, entertainment, and lifestyle content. 
Significant events in Sina.com’s history were the 1998 soccer World 
Championship tournament in France and the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese 
embassy at Belgrade. During the first event, the Sitong company had set up a 
website especially to cover the event (http://france98.srsnet.com/); the servers of 
this direct predecessor of the later portal were still based in the U.S. (due to 
insufficient bandwidth capacity in the PRC). The site was able to establish a 
reputation as a provider of fast and accurate reporting with extensive coverage of 
all games, and earned the respect of a soccer-fanatic audience. Sina.com built on 
this success at subsequent major sports events, such as the 2000 Olympic Games 
                                             
45 Since an Internet portal like Sina.com is subject to constant change, I have downloaded the 
front-page and parts of its subdirectories. This download has been depositied in the Digital Archive 
for Chinese Studies (DACHS) and is available through the following website: http://www.sino.uni-
heidelberg.de/dachs/volland050530.htm. Download date was Nov. 6, 2003. 
46 Information in this and the following paragraphs comes from Interviewees 217 and 219. See also 
the account of Sina.com’s history at corp.sina.com.cn\chn\sina_info.html. 
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in Sydney, and the 2002 soccer world cup in Japan and Korea. When NATO 
airplanes bombed the Chinese embassy on May 8, 1999, reducing the building to 
rubble and killing three staff, Sina.com reported the incident within 30 minutes, 
being the first news organ in the PRC to do so. As crowds floated to Sina.com, the 
portal was once again able to highlight its position as the leading Chinese online 
news site.47 Since then, Sina.com has grown steadily to about 40 million registered 
users in September 2002 (of whom 10 million were said to be regular visitors to 
the Sina.com website) and 68 million a year later. In the 2002 Annual Report,48 the 
company lists assets of US$ 130 million and revenues of US$ 13 million. 
Sina.com is a comprehensive Internet portal, offering the complete range of 
services from email management and chatrooms to e-commerce, business 
information, entertainment, and news. The function of Sina.com as an online news 
provider is undoubtedly the site’s most critical feature; a detailed investigation of 
the news content provided by Sina.com will follow later in this section. First, 
however, I will take a look at the other areas of the website’s business scope. I will 
first turn to the interactive features, email and BBS, that are unique to Internet-
based media. 
Sina.com offers free webmail services to registered customers. To get an 
email address, a new user must first become a “member” (huiyuan 会员) of 
Sina.com; his membership also allows him to access other services, such as BBS. 
The guidelines analyzed above require ISP’s to verify the identity of their users, 
which is, however, difficult to accomplish. Upon registration, prospective users 
must submit their date of birth as well as the number of their identity card; this 
allows for some degree of verification, as the latter number contains the birth date 
in a coded form. This system, however, is far from secure, especially as users are 
also allowed to use student ID’s to register.49 The registration rather seems to be a 
pro forma act; supervision remains elusive, especially if users access their email 
accounts from public computer terminals. Strictly speaking, however, electronic 
mail is a form of private communication, and not public communication, which is 
                                             
47 Random questioning of Chinese students in September and October 2002 confirmed this 
assessment. 
48 Available online at corp.sina.com.cn\chn\Annual_Report_2002_Final.pdf. 
49 The registration forms are at unipro.sina.com.cn\cgi-bin\neoregi_3.cgi and 
unipro.sina.com.cn\cgi-bin\neoregi_3a.htm. 
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the subject of this study. Lower standards of regulation are therefore tolerated for 
email, as long as it is not used, for example, to circulate information that violates 
national laws and regulations (see article 3.4 of “Xinlang wangluo fuwu shiyong 
xieyi” 新浪网络服务使用协议, that users must agree to before registering50). 
Enforcement of these regulations is left to the police force that controls email traffic, 
for example, at the international gateways that connect the “Chinese” web with the 
Internet. Stricter standards of supervision apply to another of the interactive 
features offered by Sina.com, its BBS systems.51 
In its BBS section, Sina.com offers hundreds of chatrooms to surfers. These 
can be grouped into two general categories: topical BBS and news-related BBS. 
The former includes chatrooms with titles such as “Chatting on heaven and earth,” 
“Jin Yong guesthouse,” and “Sports salon.” The amount of cosmic background 
noise devoid of even the slightest amount of meaning constantly produced by 
thousands of bored Internet surfers is outright amazing. Much of the gobbledygook 
on these forums does not even pretend to be related to the theme of the BBS. 
Consequently, it is undoubtedly the other category of chatrooms that is more 
interesting, as it allows Internet users to share thoughts about current and evolving 
news events. 
On the sample day of my download, a fire in an apartment complex in 
Hengyang 衡阳 city in Hunan had killed scores of people, including fire-fighters, 
and injured dozens more. Sina.com set up a BBS section to discuss this incident. 
Voices in the forum were mixed.52 Some expressed grief and called the fire-
fighters heroes and martyrs. Some opinions, such as “Those burnt were just 
trash,” were obviously provocative. However, the number of critical voices was 
surprisingly high. One comment read: “Grief! But it is bureaucratism and corruption 
that are responsible, this was just a lesson.” Another more elaborate statement 
linked the tragedy to official complacency and policy failures: 
 
                                             
50 See mail.sina.com.cn\fwtq_sina.html. 
51 On the monitoring of BBS see also the detailed report “‘Living Dangerously on the Net:’ 
Censorship and Surveillance of Internet Forums.” Reporters without borders, May 12, 2003, at 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6793 (downloaded Nov. 10, 2003). 
52 For a snapshot of the discussion see comment.sina.com.cn\cgi-bin\comment\comment.cgi@ 
channel=gn&newsid=2061715&face=face3&style=1 of the download, from which following 
quotations draw. 
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These days, the government and its departments all day long mull over how to keep 
their system running, and only after something has happened they come out eloquently 
saying we have already issued so-and-so many circulars ordering changes, we have 
so-and-so many times visited and inspected sites [of disasters], we have convened so-
and-so many meetings on [construction] security, we have so-and-so often 
implemented the spirit of the leadership[‘s policies], we have issued so-and-so many 
documents... and all this has been documented in the relevant files! They do not really 
grasp fire-fighting and [constructing] security issues. [...] The government must 
examine itself and draw a lesson from this bitter experience, so that such tragedies 
won’t happen again! [...] We stand in silent tribute to the people who have perished! A 
very long road still lies ahead until all people in China have developed a sense for fire 
prevention! It is an undeniable fact that after all, citizen quality (guomin suzhi 国民素质) 
in China is still rather low! The increasingly lopsided spending on education in China 
makes the poor even poorer; in this vicious cycle [people’s] quality will become ever 
more polarized; so in the long run, how could the citizen quality comprehensively rise?” 
 
The line of thought in this contribution meanders from one conclusion to the next, 
and its deductive logic sometimes gets lost. Nevertheless, the author (probably 
some person with close contact to the education sector, as his concern for the 
issue of government spending in this sector suggests) points to some fundamental 
problems that result in pointed criticism of government policies and demonstrates 
a considerably high level of reflection. Other voices tried clearly to stay within the 
confines of government discourse: “The policy of the central [government] is good, 
but as soon as it reaches the localities, it turns bad – pay our respects to the 
martyrs!” It is a common argument of the government and the media that 
corruption and malpractices are a grassroots phenomenon and are in fact a 
distortion of well-intended policies. Thus, it is easy to find scapegoats for tragedies 
like the Hengyang fire – local officials: they are punished harshly to prove that the 
central government can act decisively, and to let the people feel that justice has 
been done. The longer comment translated above, in contrast, is much more 
subtle, implicating the national education policies (probably with the idea that a 
lack of responsibility leads to shoddy construction standards). 
BBS pose the biggest headache to the CCP and the bureaucracies 
concerned with propaganda and media control. It is here that communication 
transcends the traditional divide between the private and the public sphere. While 
filter software may go after the individual email message, email is not prone to 
affect the sensibilities of the propaganda sector, because it is usually directed at 
individually defined recipients. In contrast, it is impossible to predict how many 
readers a message posted on a BBS might find. The message thus becomes part 
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of public communication which is usually subject to much stricter supervision – 
mostly in the form of responsible editors. The only way to control BBS effectively is 
through the constant presence of human “monitors” or supervisors who might 
intervene and censor messages that have “crossed the line.” Chinese ISPs are 
held to ensure that their chatrooms are monitored whenever online. This has led 
Renminwang, RMRB’s website, to close its popular “Strong Nation Forum” 
(Qiangguo luntan 强国论坛) BBS every evening at 10 p.m. to save personnel 
costs.53 
Why was the posting translated and discussed above not deleted by the 
“monitor”? This question is hard to answer. Decisions lie with individual “monitors” 
who may be overwhelmed with the number of postings. Possibly the posting had 
as yet escaped the attention of the monitor – it was posted at 18.29 p.m. Beijing 
time, the page was downloaded at 18.34. A more likely reason was suggested by 
interviewees: complaints of users who had their messages deleted appear 
frequently in the chatrooms; monitors who are perceived to be all too pedantic do 
quickly draw the wrath of users. Given the volatility of the online community, such 
chatrooms might be abandoned in a matter of minutes by entire crowds of users 
who shift their discussions to other locations. Yet due to their popularity, BBS are 
valuable assets: ISPs need the advertising revenue created from their BBS and 
therefore instruct their monitors not to be too picky – they simply cannot afford 
excessive censorship.54 
BBS monitors are thus left alone with the decision on how far censorship 
should go. Sometimes, topics make it onto the pages of BBS that are clearly 
beyond what the CCP is ready to tolerate. Such happened on April 15, 2003, when 
a user at Shiji shalong 世纪沙龙, a BBS popular with Beijing intellectuals, 
reminded other surfers of the 14th anniversary of the death of former Party general 
secretary Hu Yaobang – an incident that had become the catalyst of the 1989 
student movement. Others reacted quickly with postings such as “give history back 
its true face,” “commemorate Hu Yaobang, remember Zhao Ziyang,” “Mao, Deng, 
                                             
53 For the rules governing Qiangguo luntan, that allow the censoring of postings found to be 
inappropriate see http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/guest (downloaded Nov. 9, 2003). On censorship in 
Qiangguo luntan see also Tao Wenzhao. “Censorship and Protest: The Regulation of BBS in China 
People Daily” [sic]. First Monday 6.1 (Jan. 2001), taken from 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_1/tao/index.html (dowloaded March 19, 2001). 
54 Interviewees 216, 217. 
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and Jiang do not understand how a modern political system works.”55 Given the 
government’s sensitivity on this particular topic, a discussion would either be a 
dangerous oversight by the monitor, or a courageous case of benign neglect. 
Neither could have been the case here, since the original posting was from the 
evening before, had been read 1,440 times and triggered 70 responses. Even 
more, it had received a recommendation from the monitor in the form of a small 
icon next to the message title.56 
What sense, then, can we make of the discussion on the merits of the late 
Hu Yaobang? If thinly veiled calls for a reversal of the verdict on the democracy 
movement, positive comments on a persona non grata like Zhao Ziyang, and 
criticism of Jiang Zemin’s policies can all appear on a forum like this, the monitor 
must certainly be using the BBS for his own agenda, showing sympathy to the 
discussion, if not to the individual postings. Monitoring of BBS thus does not 
necessarily mean heavy-handed control. As with other media, the personnel 
involved might try to use the power available to them to pursue their own goals – 
such as to promote a freer climate of discussion in China. The Internet in particular 
has the potential to build such niches. In the case of Shiji shalong, however, the 
lenience of the BBS monitors backfired. Two weeks later, when the outbreak of the 
SARS epidemic neared its climax, Shiji shalong announced a weak-long closure of 
its forum, allegedly voluntarily, to let things cool down. Only few users believed the 
closure to be a voluntary act.57 The forum briefly reopened after a week but soon 
thereafter was again permanently unavailable. In August 2003, it was reported to 
have been closed down for the reason that it had no valid business license. The 
real reason was supposedly connected to a nationwide crackdown on a debate on 
democratic reforms that had originally been launched by the new leadership team 
                                             
55 See forum.cc.org.cn\luntan\china\showcontent.php3@db=1&id=134601&id1= 41155&mode=1 
(downloaded April 16, 2003). 
56 See forum.cc.org.cn\default.htm (downloaded April 16, 2003). 
57 On the closure see Nan Shui. “Linshi guanzhan, zema ji gonggongxing, zhishifenzi liangzhi” at 
http://www.sinoliberal.com/academic/nanshui%20on%20century%20salon%20shut.htm 
(downloaded July 12, 2003), and Qiu Feng. “Shiji shalong ziyuan guan zhan, hen zhengchang” at 
http://www.sinoliberal.com/note/qiufeng%20on%20century%20salon%20shut.htm (downloaded 
July 12, 2003). Ironically, Qiu Feng, who held that the action of self-censorship was “very normal,” 
saw his own website, China Austrian Review, shut down by government orders in August 2003. 
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around Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao but that was brought to an end when the debate 
was overheating.58 
Interactive features like email and BBS are only two – albeit enormously 
popular – elements of a large portal like Sina.com. The bulk of the website 
contains information on practically all provinces of knowledge, including large 
amounts of entertainment-related content. Entertainment as a main function of 
media emerged in the course of the 1980s and moved to the foreground of the 
Chinese media scene with the arrival of commercialization, as I have discussed in 
chapter eight. As a purely commercial website – Sina.com says it has never 
received government subsidies – it is only natural that entertainment is used to 
attract surfers and thus create advertising revenues. A computer game corner and 
online cartoons, some of them animated, belong to the stock of Sina.com’s 
website as do ring tones that users can download on their cellphones free of 
charge. Delivery of entertainment is for online media just as attractive as for 
traditional media: it is unlikely to touch the various sensibilities and “don’ts” of the 
government and is unlikely to attract the Party’s attention as long as it stays clear 
of sexuality, excessive violence, and religious propaganda. The consensus that 
emerged in the late 1980s does also apply to the online media: that the media are 
allowed to withdraw from active propaganda as long as the limits defined by the 
Party are not violated and a generally affirmative tone is maintained. 
In contrast to many other Chinese ISPs and ICPs, however, Sina.com does 
also provide a significant amount of news, and has even built its reputation on its 
ability to deliver timely and accurate news. It is to this issue that I will turn now. 
Probably the most inconspicuous form of news is sports news, on which Sina.com 
drew so heavily in its early career. The most problematic aspect concerns news 
sources: while traditional Chinese media are relatively free to investigate domestic 
news wherever they happen – with the exception of major events, of course – all 
foreign news have until recently been the exclusive prerogative of the Xinhua 
                                             
58 See Kathy Chen. “China Cracks Down on Growing Debate Over Political Reform: To Quell Talk 
of Reform, Beijing Closes Internet Sites, Blames Foreign Funding” in Wall Street Journal, Sep. 25, 
2003. In November 2003, I discovered that Shiji shalong was accessible from within China, while it 
continued to be permanently unavailable from outside the country. This seems to open up and 
entirely new dimension of control, namely the return of limited public spheres: in analogy to 
“domestic circulation only” publications, foreigners are excluded from discourses in China. This is a 
reversal of the policy to block Chinese users’ access to foreign media and dissident websites. I 
have been unable to find more evidence for this practice and it is unclear if this is an isolated case. 
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News Agency. So it caused a sensation when Sina.com was granted permission in 
1998 to send two of its journalists to France to cover the soccer world 
championship. This step must be considered particularly unusual given the fact 
that Sina.com is a non-Party, commercial medium. Yet the experiment proved a 
success, and on consequent occasions, Sina.com could send more journalists of 
its own to major sports events. 
Sports, however, is a comparatively inconspicuous subject: as long the 
patriotic consensus is upheld – which is likely to be the case – there are few 
sensibilities that might be touched on. Yet what is the situation with other news? A 
quick check reveals that Sina.com delivers a large amount of up-to-date news, but 
produces none of it itself. Rather, it buys news from partners: international news, 
for example, is likely to come from Xinhuawang 新华网, the news agency’s online 
service.59 Other articles might come from RMRB, or from local media, such as the 
popular Beijing chenbao 北京晨报. A report entitled: “Three central ministries 
publish circular: nude paintings in public places forbidden” was reprinted from 
Xiaoxiang chenbao 潇湘晨报, a Changsha-based newspaper. On its website, 
Sina.com lists its main cooperation partners that include mainstream media such 
as Xinhua, CCTV, Jiefang ribao, Nanfang ribao, and the English-language China 
Daily.60 
Sina.com does not generate news on its own – because it is not allowed to. 
As a commercial entity, Sina.com cannot hire journalists, which is a prerogative of 
state-owned media. It is in this way that the CCP limits access to the crucial 
territory of news media and prevents non-Party players from entering. Just as no 
private newspaper can be registered in the PRC, no enterprise can hope to start 
an online news medium. A set of regulations, the “Temporary Guidelines for the 
Administration of Internet Sites Publishing News” was promulgated in November 
2000.61 It is article seven of these “Temporary Guidelines” that is relevant for 
Sina.com:62 
                                             
59 See, for example, a report on large-scale unrest in eastern India, killing at least 21 people, that 
was reported as breaking news: news.sina.com.cn\w\2003-11-06\16351069661s.shtml. 
60 See http://corp.sina.com.cn\chn\sina_parter.html.  
61 Hulian wangzhan congshi dengzai xinwen yewu guanli zanxing guiding 互联网站从事登载新闻业
务管理暂行规定 (dated Nov. 7, 2000). See http://www.cnnic.cn/policy/22.shtml (downloaded Sept. 
30, 2003). Also reprinted in RMRB, Nov. 7, 2000. 
62 Ibid. My italics. 
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Comprehensive (zonghexing 综合性) Internet websites established legally by non-news 
units (below: comprehensive non-media unit websites) can, if they meet the conditions 
listed in article nine of the Guidelines, and after receiving approval, reprint news 
published by Central news units, by news units of the various organs and departments 
of the [Party] Center and the State, or by news units directly under the provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities, but they are not allowed to publish news 
written by themselves or from other sources. Other websites set up legally by non-
news units are not allowed to reprint news. 
 
As Sina.com was founded by the Sitong lifang company, a software enterprise, it 
could apply for a permission (article 8) to reprint news published by other sources, 
but was definitely denied the status of a bona fide news unit, banning it from 
creating news on its own account. 
Websites thus can be grouped into three categories: 
• websites such as Renminwang or Xinhuawang can receive full permission to 
enter the news sector, albeit always in tandem with their sponsoring unit, a 
traditional medium. Even such websites, however, have to go through an 
application process that requires final approval from the News Office of the 
State Council (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务院新闻办公室) (article six); 
• “comprehensive” websites, obviously of the kind of Sina.com, that have no 
direct institutional link to a brick-and-mortar news unit can apply a for partial 
license that will allow them the reprinting, but not the writing of news. In this 
way the Party secures its monopoly, if not over news distribution, so at least 
over news writing. A news item that does not make it into some other news 
medium cannot appear on the Internet legally; 
• other websites, mostly specialising into one particular area of interest, are 
barred from the online news business entirely. No university website, for 
example, is allowed to put any news on its website other than those relating 
directly to campus affairs. 
In this way, the Chinese government has effectively transferred the institutional 
structure of control of the news sector from the traditional media to the new 
domain of the Internet.63 
Other articles of the same document give testimony of the same transfer 
process. Article 13 gives a list of nine forbidden items, the famous “don’ts” we 
have already found in both the regulations governing the publishing sector, and in 
                                             
63 Interviewees 217, 218, and 219 have confirmed this practice. 
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several Internet-related documents. The nine points of the enumeration are almost 
identical with that of the September 25, 2000, “Methods for the Administration of 
Internet Information Services” discussed above. 
Another interesting restriction is that contained in article 14: “If Internet 
websites want to offer links to foreign64 news websites, or if they want to reprint 
news published by foreign news media and Internet websites, they must 
specifically seek approval from the News Office of the State Council.” News 
produced outside the PRC proper escapes the CCP’s authority of ultimate control; 
normally, it is the task of the Xinhua news agency to ensure that the interpretation 
of foreign events, as well as foreign information on both foreign and domestic 
events that is released in China, is in compliance with the current Party line. Only 
in special cases will the Party give up this powerful prerogative. A point deserving 
special attention is the ban to provide even links to foreign news websites. For an 
open and decentralized medium like the Internet, this demand seems absurd, 
since it is exactly the links that make a “net” or a “web” out of the millions of 
individual sites scattered across the globe. Yet the phrase in article 14 is 
absolutely understandable from the CCP’s point of view; the Party wants to uphold 
its interpretive sovereignty. If a mouse click is enough to give surfers access to 
other, unfiltered, and potentially destabilizing information, the Party’s media 
hegemony would break down. 
This passage of the “Temporary Guidelines” is probably the best of all 
possible illustrations of the CCP’s conception of the Internet: the Party regards the 
“Chinese” Internet as a virtual space literally codeterminous with the borders of the 
PRC. Just as the CCP rules the country’s physical terrain with unrestricted 
authority, it claims the same authority for “its” section of cyberspace.65 Thus, the 
concept of sovereignty is copied from the confines of the nation-state into the 
Internet – or rather, Intranet. With projects such as the “Golden Shield,”66 the CCP 
                                             
64 jingwai 境外, lit. “outside the territory,” a term for foreign countries, as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Macau. 
65 This point has been discussed by Nicola Casarini in “Realistic Analysis of China and the 
Internet.” Paper presented at the XIV EACS Conference in Moscow, Aug. 26-28, 2002. 
66 Greg Walton. “China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance 
Technology in the People's Republic of China.” Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development, 2001, taken from 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/ globalization/goldenShieldEng.html 
(downloaded Aug. 23, 2002). 
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has tried to de-link the Chinese Net from the Internet: international data traffic is 
limited to only three gateways located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou that 
can be controlled with relative ease;67 international email traffic is filtered here, and 
so a ban on links to foreign websites is thus just a reasonable extension of the 
same logic. The efforts to regionalize the Internet make it abundantly clear that the 
CCP regards the Internet not as something entirely new, but rather as the 
application of a new technology to a long-standing system, in this case, the 
propaganda and media sector. 
The CCP obviously regards online news with great concern and wants to 
handle its administration with utmost care. The main providers of online news – 
and of political news and information in particular – are still the large web portals 
linked with the traditional media: Renminwang and Xinhuawang, but also new 
institutions like Qianlongwang 千龙网. Qianlongwang was launched in March 2000 
as the online platform for about a dozen Beijing news media, including Beijing 
ribao 北京日报, Beijing wanbao 北京晚报, Beijing renmin guangbo diantai 北京人
民广播电台, Beijing dianshitai 北京电视台, Beijing qingnianbao 北京青年报 etc.68 
Together with RMRB’s and Xinhua’s online ventures, Qianlongwang belongs to a 
group of ten national key point projects that receive massive state funding and 
support.69 While the Party’s efforts of proactive online propaganda and thought 
work appear to be half-hearted at best, the CCP invests an enormous amount of 
energy in the control of online news. The chatter in BBS can be overheard as long 
as it does not get too loud, whereas news escaping the Party’s grip would have 
immediate detrimental effects to its rule. News has direct political implications and 
does therefore belong to those few core areas that the Party guards with 
unrelenting strictness. 
What can a website like Sina.com – that depends on delivering timely, 
accurate, and abundant information to its users – do in such a setting? A glimpse 
on the website reveals that little of the news at Sina.com is “hard” political news. In 
its news section (http://news.sina.com.cn\default.htm), a considerable number of 
the stories classified as “domestic news” or “international news” are in fact human 
                                             
67 See Dai Xiudian. “ICTs in China’s Development Strategy,” p. 15. 
68 See http://www.qianlong.com/aboutus/ (downloaded Nov. 8, 2003). 
69 Information from interviewees 217, 218. 
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interest stories. Stories on low-level corruption, the beating of a Hong Kong 
resident in England, or a car accident in Shaanxi will attract readers but are not 
likely to touch on political sensibilities. Economic news consumes about half of the 
news page at Sina.com. Economics, too is a relatively safe terrain that will not 
create trouble as long as the articles do not question the fundamental economic 
architecture and the Party’s current policies, which is unlikely to happen given that 
Sina.com acquires its news from other, state controlled news organs. In contrast, 
Renminwang – and even more so the website’s “news centre” (xinwen zhongxin 
新闻中心) – has a clear focus on Party and state politics, and on major 
international political events. A central feature of Renminwang, just as in the 
mainstream traditional media, is the day-to-day coverage of the activities of the 
Party and state leadership, as well as important speeches and documents. Such 
documents can only rarely be found on commercial websites like Sina.com. The 
strength of Sina.com thus lies not in permanent coverage of high-level politics, but 
in catering to the main areas of demand of its readers – chiefly human interests, 
entertainment, and economic information. In this way, Sina.com is even able to 
play an affirmative role: the articles appearing as news on its website echo the 
stress on the positive rather than the negative side of life that is found in Chinese 
newspapers. In a certain sense, thus, Sina.com thus takes on the educational 
function that is demanded in the media concept. 
These two factors, the rule that Sina.com cannot write its own news and 
must carry news items produced by other, state-controlled news media, and the 
choice of the items it eventually sources, guarantee that Sina.com remains within 
the limits that the government has set for commercial online news providers. 
Flexibility and the high speed of its reporting have allowed the portal to maintain its 
popularity with users, who find their tastes being catered to, and feel that they can 
find all relevant information in good time on the site – it is this mix that gives 
Sina.com an edge over its competitors. On the other hand, the portal lives in a 
tacit form of symbiosis with the government: Sina.com does not challenge the 
Party’s claims of authority over the virtual universe of the “Chinese” Internet, and 
in turn receives favourable treatment of the government that is willing to overlook 
minor transgressions of the rules – such as in the case of the chatroom 
discussions on the Hengyang fire – as long as the cornerstones of the Party’s 
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agenda are not challenged. The CCP, finally, can present Sina.com as a 
successful new player in the crucial hi-tech economy, a growth sector: the portal is 
a home-grown company that plays according to the rules of a modern authoritarian 
government and at the same time has the potential to become a global player, as 
Sina.com’s efforts to get listed on the NASDAQ exchange and a series of 
acquisitions in 2003 show. Sina.com thus is the perfect model of the domestication 
and regionalization of the once anarchic Internet, and the integration of a new 
medium into the existing infrastructure of the Chinese media sector. 
 
 
The Invisible Line: The Limits of Freedom on the Internet 
The CCP has been remarkably successful in shaping the Chinese Internet 
into a fiefdom linked to, but at the same time secluded from, the world wide web. 
Chinese players have by and large adapted to the situation and websites such as 
Sina.com have learned to play by the rules that the CCP had formulated half a 
century ago for the media under its control, and that have since dominated the 
Chinese media sector. In the last section of this chapter, we must ask: how has 
the CCP’s approach to media management changed? What areas are considered 
sensitive enough to trigger a reaction of the Party? So where are the limits to 
freedom on the Internet? To answer these questions, we have to examine some of 
those incidents in which the CCP has decided to intervene in order to uphold and 
defend its principles. 
The most common government intervention into the daily life of Chinese 
Internet surfers comes in the form of websites that are blocked, which means that 
access is denied to surfers using computers with Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
registered in the PRC. A large-scale investigation carried out by researchers from 
the Harvard Law School has found about 20,000 Internet addresses that are 
permanently unavailable from computers in the PRC.70 This number amounts to 
almost 10 per cent of all websites tested, a number that is high also in comparative 
perspective: the same authors found only 1.2 per cent of websites tested to be 
blocked in Saudi Arabia, another regime that tries to restrict information available 
                                             
70 Jonathan Zittrain, Benjamin Edelman. “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China” at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/ (downloaded Nov. 8, 2003). 
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to its citizens and to shape their thinking. An interesting result of the survey relates 
to websites with sexually explicit content: whereas 86 per cent of a sample 752 
websites were blocked from Saudi Arabia, only 13 per cent of the same sites were 
blocked from China (see Figure 9.2).  
 
Figure 10.2: Internet Filtering in China and Saudi-Arabia 
 
Source: Zittrain / Edelman. “Empirical Analysis” at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/. 
 
Note: ca. 50,000 websites tested in Saudi Arabia and subsequently in China. 
 
The official proscription of pornography and its ban in all relevant regulations and 
guidelines notwithstanding, the Chinese government adopts a rather relaxed 
attitude towards this issue, in striking contrast to the Saudi kingdom. The 
puritanical fervour of past decades has long since given way to more lenience in 
this area: the CCP no longer regards love and sexuality as the major distractions 
of the “new man: the socialist project is supposed to build, but defines these 
dangers more narrowly. It is a very different complex of issues that the CCP feels 
most concerned of. The findings of the empirical study confirm my own 
conclusions in chapter eight, as well as those of other authors.71 
If it is not pornography and sexuality that is most prone to poison the minds 
of the Chinese people, what then are the most sensitive areas? The Zittrain / 
Edelman study seems to provide some answers. As of fall 2002 (the time of their 
research), an especially high number of Taiwanese sites (often with the .tw top 
level domain) and those relating to Tibet were found inaccessible.72 Issues relating 
to Chinese sovereignty thus top the list of sensitive issues. Next come keywords 
such as “democracy / China,” “dissident / China,” and “freedom / China,” i.e. sites 
that are likely to contain information and opinions questioning the political system 
and the current leadership of the PRC.73 The preservation of the regime and its 
national and international prestige emerges as a key priority of the CCP; any 
                                             
71 See Daniel C. Lynch. After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and ‘Thought’ Work in 
Reformed China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 197-205. 
72 The authors point out that the websites in question simply report errors, so that the user is left in 
the dark, not knowing whether his search has failed due to a technical glitch or to blocking. Saudi-
Arabia has opted for a different option, telling surfers the reason why a certain website has been 
made unavailable. See ibid., “Conclusion.” 
73 See the graphic at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/google-kw-chart.html. 
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challenge in this regard that appears online is to meet with drastic sanctions. The 
rather crude nature of the filtering systems will make sure that access to an entire 
server is blocked even if only one piece of information classified as illicit is found 
there. Thousands of other pages on the same server thus disappear from the 
Chinese web; a prominent example was the website of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (http://www.mit.edu/). The authors found, however, that the Chinese 
authorities began to upgrade their filtering software in the course of summer and 
fall, 2002, now allowing for selective kinds of filtering that would block individual 
pages but not the whole server.74 The sophistication of Internet supervision seems 
to rise rapidly.75 
The findings of the Zittrain / Edelman study are remarkable in that they 
permit us to study the concerns of the CCP and to rank these sensitivities based 
on empirical evidence. It shows that different items that are all listed on the 
catalogue of “don’ts” do in fact range differently on a scale of de facto concerns. 
The findings of the study, however, are limited for two reasons. Firstly, it tracks the 
government’s strategies of selective Internet blocking filtering, but does not ask for 
the reactions of the media users (the study’s methodology would not have allowed 
the authors to do so). Yet while many surfers do not seem to care or are simply 
annoyed of the practice, a surprisingly large number of Internet users interviewed 
for the CASS survey admitted to having found their way around the blocking of 
websites: 35 per cent said that they had used proxy servers, the most convenient 
way to circumvent government blocking of websites, and 10 per cent answered 
that they were frequently using proxy servers.76 How concerned is the government 
about resistance to its blocking strategies? In general, the CCP does not seem to 
be too anxious about individual efforts to exploit loopholes in the system. The state 
is working continuously to upgrade its technical infrastructure and to improve the 
controls. While gifted specialists, especially hackers, will always be ahead of the 
government in terms of sophistication, the average user is unlikely to keep pace 
for too long. The CCP is confident that with increasingly sophisticated means of 
control the effort necessary to escape these controls will rise beyond the abilities 
                                             
74 Zittrain, Edelman. “Empirical Analysis,” “Conclusion.” 
75 For the same argument with reference to the selective blocking and rerouting of popular search 
engines see Joseph Kahn. “China Seems to Refine Bid to Restrict Web Access” in New York 
Times, Sept. 14, 2002. 
76 “The CASS Internet Report (2000),” table CJ. 
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of the average users; small communities of tech freaks, however, are a socially 
marginal group that does not pose too much of a threat to CCP rule.77 
A different problem of the Zittrain / Edelman study is that it was executed 
overwhelmingly in English, which is certainly not the language of choice of 
Chinese surfers. While they used individual key terms such as minzhu 民主, ziyou 
自由, or Falun gong 法轮功, this approach still escapes the subtleties of the 
Chinese political landscape. Search terms such as liu si 六四, Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, 
or zhengzhi (tizhi) gaige 政治(体制)改革 do not appear on their list of search terms, 
yet these terms do certainly touch on sensibilities of the CCP. It is therefore 
necessary to examine more closely the few incidents of persecution of “cyber 
dissent” that have become known to the public. 
The closing of the popular Shiji shalong BBS has been discussed earlier; 
this incident was related to the discussions triggered by the SARS outbreak in 
spring 2003 and the widespread criticism of the government’s handling of the crisis. 
The recent closure of the China Austrian Review website (Sixiang pinglun 思想评
论 in Chinese, at www.sinoliberal.com\default.htm), too, has already been 
mentioned. The closure of this rather academic platform came at a time when the 
government tried to close the lid on public debates on political reforms and 
possible changes to the Chinese constitution. China Austrian Review hosted many 
contributions by Li Shenzhi 李慎之, Liu Junning 刘军宁, Xu Youyu 徐友渔, and 
other prominent intellectuals of the liberal wing who came under attack in summer 
2003.78 Three years earlier, the Tianya zonghe 天涯综合 website 
(www.tianya.com), another popular forum for intellectual debate, had been shut 
down. The censorship and closure of websites that are found to have carried their 
debates into areas “beyond the line” confirms that political issues that relate to the 
CCP’s power monopoly are of particular concern to the Party. 
Beyond the action taken against violations of the rules for Internet content, 
the government has sought to crack down on infringements of the rules governing 
Internet access. The most conspicuous targets here have naturally been Internet 
cafés. Internet bars and cafés have long posed a problem to states wishing to 
                                             
77 Chase and Mulvenon come to the same conclusion. See “You’ve Got Dissent!” 
78 A partial download of the website, executed on May 15, 2003, roughly three months prior to the 
closure, can be found at http://www.sino.uni-heidelberg.de/dachs/volland050530.htm. 
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control their citizens’ Internet behaviour. While it is not too difficult with the right 
technology to track down users accessing the Internet from their home computers 
or from terminals at work units, the Chinese government has fought a protracted 
war with operators of Internet cafés. Internet cafés have allowed millions of surfers 
to gather their first experiences on the web and were an important institution for 
those who could not yet afford their own computers, many of them students. Since 
the CCP concurrently promoted the Internet and Internet use heavily in order to 
spur economic growth, the lucrative market for Internet cafés was growing quickly. 
The Party made the mistake of imposing too high market entry barriers on 
prospective operators, and thus drove many of them underground. When ever 
more illegal Internet cafés sprang up to profit from this lucrative business the CCP 
saw its ability to control the netizens in danger and ordered a crackdown that 
eventually led to the closure not only of the illegal backyard ventures, but also of 
the numerous legally operating businesses.79 After a fire broke out in an illegal 
Beijing internet café in June 2002 that killed 24 students, the Chinese government 
used this accident as a pretext to launch a nationwide crackdown of 
unprecedented scale. In this way, the government hoped to solve the problem of 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable Internet access once and for all.80 
In the case of the Internet cafés, the authorities tried to prevent the growth 
of grey niches on the Internet sector that had the potential to create trouble; the 
danger here was rather diffuse. Yet the police has also targeted individuals on 
very specific charges. In June 2000, Huang Qi 黄琦, an Internet operator from 
Sichuan province was arrested on charges of subversion: he had allowed for 
messages critical of the 1989 crackdown on the democracy movement, and even 
some calling for then-premier Li Peng to be put to trial, to be published on his 
website. Such explicit criticism of the Party’s Achilles’ heel was intolerable to the 
                                             
79 One of these, the Feiyu 飞宇 chain that owned an entire street of Internet cafés door by door 
near the Southern gate of Beijing University, published its success story in form of a book just 
months before all its cafés were closed: Gan Yi. Wangba Feiyu: Zhongguancun de linglei xin jiechu. 
Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2001. 
80 See “Deadline Tightens Mainland Net Crackdown” in SCMP, July 1, 2002, and on the fire 
“Putting Out Fires” (editorial) in Asian Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2002. On earlier action against 
Internet cafés see “China has Shut Down 17,000 Internet Bars” by AP WorldStream, Nov. 21, 2001, 
and Thomas Crampton. “China Closes Internet Cafés” in International Herald Tribune, June 15, 
2001. Taken from http://www.iht.com/articles/22928.html (downloaded Dec. 20, 2001). 
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CCP, and Huang was sentenced to a five-year prison term.81 Even longer prison 
terms – eight and ten years – were handed to four dissidents who had set up a 
democracy study group on the Internet and criticized government policy.82 In 
another incident, the computer entrepreneur Lin Hai 林海 was sentenced by a 
Shanghai court to two years in jail for selling 30,000 Chinese email addresses to 
the dissident online magazine VIP Reference (Dacankao 大参考, at 
http://www.bignews.org/), this reportedly being the first punishment handed out in 
the PRC for a “cyber crime.” Lin was originally charged with “instigation to 
subversion of the state's power,” which would have sufficed for a lifelong jail 
sentence. From the perspective of the CCP, Lin Hai’s crime is a double one: not 
only had he supported a dissident organization, but he was also preparing the way 
for the subversion of the Party’s sovereignty over its virtual state territory: dissident 
organizations mass mailing their pamphlets to Chinese users are undermining the 
Party’s efforts to control the Chinese cyberspace.83 
A different case, targeting not an overseas dissident networks, but rather 
what turned out to be a naive young girl, was that of Liu Di 刘荻, a 22 year-old 
Beijing student. Liu Di was arrested in December 2002 after a week-long hunt of 
the authorities for the owner of the pseudonym “stainless steel mouse” (buxiugang 
laoshu 不锈钢老鼠), under which messages calling for democracy had been 
posted in different chatrooms. Liu was an isolated individual who had made use of 
one of the most alluring aspects of the Internet, the anonymity it provides – up to a 
certain point.84 
The harsh sentences handed out in all these cases and the relentlessness 
with which the government has persecuted these cyber-dissidents should not be 
mistaken for irrational panic reactions of the CCP. To the contrary, they are 
perfectly rational and understandable from the perspective of the media concept. It 
                                             
81 On this incident and the trial see BBC News Online, Feb 13, 2001, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/ world/asia-pacific/1167050.stm, and May 19, 2003, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/asia-pacific/3039041.stm (downloaded Nov. 8, 2003, and May 19, 
2003, respectively). 
82 “Four Dissidents Jailed in Internet Dissent Case” in SCMP, May 29, 2003. 
83 On this incident see Greg May. “Spamming for Freedom,” Washington Post, Feb. 19, 1999. 
Taken from The Nixon Center website at 
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/spam2_19_99.htm (downloaded Nov. 8, 2003). 
84 Her case is documented at the “Stainless steel website” (Buxiugang wangzhan 不锈钢网站) at 
http://171.64.233.179/ (downloaded Nov. 8, 2003). This site (hosted overseas) also contains 16 of 
the essays Liu Di published on the web. She was released from prison in Dec. 2003. 
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is the last clause, the Stalinist argument that the media serve as a weapon as well 
as a battlefield of class struggle, and the assumption that class struggle sharpens 
in the ideological realm after the revolution, that has triggered the harsh reactions 
in the above cases. Once an incident of open defiance in the media is identified 
and interpreted as a conscious attack on the CCP, the mechanism of class 
struggle is set into motion – even in the Internet era. No other factor can provide a 
convincing explanation for the severity of the penalties and the harshness of the 
accusations. All these cases illustrate how brutal the Party can act when it sees 
the need to defend the legitimacy of its rule against the murmur in cyberspace. 
The three cases reported above are isolated incidents that cannot provide a 
comprehensive picture of the Chinese government’s continuing efforts to crack 
down on Internet dissent. They serve well, however, to indicate the general 
direction of the CCP’s actions. It is illustrative that not a single case of distributing 
online pornography or Internet-related economic crime has been publicized in the 
way the other cases were; the long sentences handed out to people like Huang Qi 
serve, in the first place, to deter others from committing similar acts. With a well-
dosed mixture of deterrence, policing, filtering email and Internet traffic, and 
pressure on ISPs and ICPs, the Party hopes to uphold the control over a 
cyberspace that is regarded by the CCP as merely an extension of the bricks-and-
mortar media infrastructure in the PRC. 
 
* * * 
 
The introduction of the Internet in China posed a challenge to the CCP’s 
established structures of media control. Since 1997, however, when the Party first 
became aware of the full dimension of the problem, it has found effective ways to 
handle the Internet. Most importantly, the Net has been effectively integrated into 
the existing structures of control that have been redefined in a way to 
accommodate the new, web-based media forms. The speed with which the Party 
has learned to make use of the potential of the Internet on the one hand, and to 
restrict its eventual negative impact on the other, is remarkable. Nevertheless, 
mixed signals keep emanating from China: while the Internet is promoted as a 
central pillar of the country’s effort to build a domestic high-tech industry, and thus 
 571
of the national development agenda, the government persecutes web-based 
dissident activities with sometimes draconian measures. The promotion of the 
Internet as a vehicle of growth and prosperity clashes time and again with the 
Party’s anxiety to keep under control the realm of public communication. 
The ambiguity of the CCP’s attitude towards the Internet must be attributed, 
first and foremost, to the hybrid nature of the web: the convergence of technology 
and communication is not compatible with the strict sectoral boundaries that have 
characterized the Chinese political imaginaire, the xitong. Transcending the 
borders between the economic affairs xitong and the propaganda xitong, the 
Internet forced the CCP to adjust its mechanisms of governance. Furthermore, the 
fusion of private and public communication that has become possible thanks to the 
unique technical features of the web, in particular its interactive potential, had 
initially irritated the Party. Since then, however, the CCP has found ways to make 
the structures that control the Chinese media apparatus work for the Internet too. 
In this process, the Party has relied to a significant degree on its 
experiences with the traditional media. As I have shown in this chapter, the CCP 
has made use of many concepts and ideas developed for the newspaper and 
publishing sectors and which were consequently applied to the web-based media. 
This process is most obvious in the regulatory framework that has been put in 
place over the past years, parts of which have been copied almost literally from 
the offline media. Similarly, providers of online news are subjected to restrictions 
that closely resemble those of offline newspapers; as a rule, permits for online 
news ventures (the most sensitive area of the Internet) have been restricted to 
online subsidiaries of established media institutions. 
Thus, the modern Chinese media concept has come to bear on the Internet, 
too. This becomes especially clear in those cases where the CCP intervenes to 
set limits to the freedom of web surfers. The Party has created a virtual national 
space codeterminous with the physical map of the PRC and controls its citizens’ 
access to any information emerging from outside the CCP-controlled territory. The 
Party claims for itself the right to decide which information is suitable to the minds 
and the needs of its citizens, and what must be prevented from poisoning the 
brains of its citizens. The CCP has moved even more aggressively to persecute 
infringements on those issues it regards as crucially important for its own rule; the 
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punishments handed out to Internet dissidents have been as unrelenting as those 
given to anyone questioning the fundamental political assumptions of the Party. 
In the course of the investigation of the Chinese Internet, several long-term 
trends could be observed that have been noted in earlier chapters. The 
comparatively lax enforcement of the ban on pornography, for example, shows 
that the CCP is drawing a sharper distinction between those issues that are an 
immediate threat to the regime, and others of secondary importance. The latter 
might be tackled in the course of periodic and targeted crackdowns, while the 
former are subjected to permanent control through a web of filtering software, 
blocking, online censors, and police monitoring. On another note, the failure of the 
Party to come up with a convincing comprehensive concept for online thought 
work suggests that the CCP has accepted in a modern society that has access to 
diverse sources of information, active propaganda can have but a limited impact. 
Especially with regard to a medium so variegated and anarchically organized as 
the Internet, the Party has concluded that the results that can realistically be 
expected from full-fledged online propaganda are simply not worth the effort. 
Rather, the Party employs more sophisticated methods to spread its message: 
influencing the selection criteria and the spin of news distributed by commercial 
content providers is more effective in a modern society than the frontal assault 
through dedicated propaganda outlets of the past. All this hints to a new 
understanding of governance: in a modern information society, the CCP has 
updated its macro-approach to social control and has concentrated on matters of 
direct concern to the core questions of politics; it will intervene only when it sees 
immediate danger to its core objectives. I have called this approach “governance 
though the potential” to intervene. 
To make such an approach work in the media sector, the media concept 
has been reinterpreted. The case of the Internet, however, shows that the concept 
still determines the ways in which the CCP thinks of the media and how it acts. 
After all, the successful integration of the new web-related media into the existing 
framework must be credited to nothing else but this concept. The openness and 
the flexibility of the media concept have allowed for a creative new interpretation; 
thus, the concept that had originated in the Yan’an era been successfully 
transported into the twenty-first century. 
Conclusion 
 
“What is the mission of this newspaper? It can be summed up in one single 
sentence: to unite the people of the entire nation in their fight to defeat 
Japanese imperialism. This is the general line of the Chinese Communist 
Party, and it is also the mission of this newspaper” 
 
What can the lines above tell us about the media in the People’s Republic 
of China? This short statement, that has been quoted at the beginning of chapter 
one of this study, reveals a fundamental point of Chinese Communist newspaper 
making: the unity of interests of the Party and the press. It is taken from the 
editorial that announced the launch of Jiefang ribao, the CCP organ of the Yan’an 
era. Composed by Mao Zedong and published on May 16, 1941, the editorial was 
a hallmark in the development of Chinese media thinking. The CCP has never 
given up on the fundamental idea that the general line of the Party must 
concurrently be that of all the media. To ensure that this is the case, the CCP 
claims the right to exercise control over the entire media apparatus in the PRC – to 
the present day. 
In the Introduction I have raised a number of fundamental questions: What 
are the media? And what are they about? What is their function? In the chapters of 
this study I have tried to find some answers that may explain the logic behind the 
Chinese media apparatus and the way it functions. Drawing from these chapters, I 
will now sum up some of the results of the investigation that will help us to answer 
these most fundamental questions; furthermore, I will address several general 
issues: the problem of perspective that deserves closer scrutiny in the discussion 
of the Chinese political imaginaire; secondly, the nature of the processes of 
cultural transfer that made a foreign ideological import such as the socialist media 
thinking appealing to the CCP; thirdly, the inherent tensions that plagued the 
media concept, but which are, somewhat paradoxically, responsible for the 
concept’s resilience and its ability to adapt to ever new emerging situations; then, 
the close interaction of the media with their social environment that makes the 
media into a micro-cosmos of the larger state-society framework and allows us to 
make broader statements concerning the evolution of the CCP’s approach towards 
governance. Finally, I will return to the relationship between ideology and 
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institutions, that is, between the media concept and the mechanics of control, and 
the implications of this relationship for further studies on the Chinese media. 
The first issue to be addressed here concerns perspectives. Any discussion 
of the Chinese media should try as much as possible to proceed from the peculiar 
Chinese perspective on the media (in this case, we are talking specifically about 
the Chinese Communist perspective; however, much of what can be said for the 
CCP holds for the GMD as well). The investigation into the Chinese media has 
proceeded from a paradox: while newspapers, magazines, radio and television 
belong to everyday life in China just as they do anywhere else, there has until 
recent times been no linguistic or conceptual equivalent to the English term 
“media.” This presents a study of the media with the fundamental problem that it 
must either take for granted that the players in the Chinese media sector conceive 
of the media in the same way as other (Western) studies, or alternatively, it must 
make the effort to understand the particular Chinese perspective and define the 
media in those terms in which they are imagined by the players themselves. While 
the latter is a laborious task, I have chosen this path. The basic assumption of the 
present study is therefore that the functioning of the media in the PRC can be 
explained from the point of view of their cultural, social, and political background. 
The first part of this study has been devoted to this effort. 
The central thread in this study has been the “modern Chinese media 
concept,” a formulation that is as awkward as it is artificial: the CCP has never 
come up with a coherent and universal theory of the media (or of newspapers 
etc.).1 To some extent, this study has tried to do so, as it were, on behalf of the 
CCP. In this enterprise I have proceeded from the assumption that, the lack of an 
explicit theory notwithstanding, the Chinese media work not at random, but are 
guided by a set of highly normative rules that are relatively stable and that have 
been internalized by everyone in the media sector. In their totality, the rules or 
principles form a framework that governs the operation of the media in the PRC. 
The task I had set myself in the first half of this study was to make visible these 
general assumptions and to define their most important elements. 
                                             
1 Which, of course, raises the question, why it never occurred to a regime as obsessed with 
formulations and definitions as the CCP to reflect on an issue as fundamental as this. 
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Any investigation into the Chinese media faces the problem to define its 
object. As demonstrated in chapter one, the Western concept of ‘media’ is 
structured in ways that differ significantly from the organisation of the 
corresponding conceptual space in Chinese. While newspapers, journals, books, 
films etc. do certainly exist in China, they are summarized under the concept of 
propaganda, as I have shown through a functional approach that has investigates 
the dimensions of the propaganda xitong in the Chinese political imaginaire. The 
consequence of this understanding is that the Chinese media are imagined in a 
socio-political environment that differs significantly from those of the media in, say, 
English-speaking countries. These differences become most obvious when the 
functions of the propaganda xitong as a whole are taken into perspective: the 
objective of the CCP is the formation of a new, socialist man who is free from the 
corrupting influences of pre-revolutionary society; the various components of the 
propaganda sector complement each other in the effort to care for the mental as 
well as physical health of this man. The media are closely integrated into this 
project. 
This means, of course, that the findings established here for the Chinese 
media have at least some degree of validity beyond the media sector proper. The 
six clauses of the media concept can be found, in slightly modulated form, in other 
elements of the superstructure, in the larger propaganda xitong that has been 
mapped in the first chapter. Reflexive discussions very similar to those invested 
here have taken place in the fields of literature, the arts, or education: in 1949, in 
1957, during the Cultural Revolution, and during the reform era, these sectors saw 
debates about issues such as Party character, mass character, enlightenment and 
education, and class struggle, that all sound familiar from the discussions in the 
media field. If the media sector is a microcosmos of the Chinese polity, then the 
theories guiding the media are indicative of the CCP’s core ideology in general. To 
elaborate on this point and provide additional evidence would go beyond the 
scope of this study, but the interrelatedness of the media sector with its 
institutional environment should not get lost. Within this environment, however, it is 
clear that the media occupy a special position: many of the debates that raged on 
ideological issues in the past fifty years were brought to the point in the media 
sector and formulated sharper there than anywhere else. In the reform era, the 
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Party’s continued close control of the media apparatus (in contrast to, for example, 
literature and art) attests to the importance the CCP attaches to the traditional and 
new media. 
The second major issue deserving our attention are the processes that are 
responsible for the development of the media concept. The particular construct of 
the CCP’s propaganda sector emerged during the late 1930s and early 1940s as a 
consequence of a protracted historical process. The formative period of the media 
thus culminates during the CCP’s Yan’an era, a time when the Party experimented 
with styles of governance in the relative isolation of Northern Shaanxi. Concepts 
and methods were developed and tested for their practibility and then inscribed on 
the entire Party through the Rectification Campaign. In this process, central ideas 
concerning the media were imported from the Soviet Union: core texts were 
intensively studied, discussed, and quoted – such as Lenin’s “What is to be 
Done?” or the Short Course commissioned by Stalin – that contained important 
ideas which were imported by the CCP and thus came to inform the Party’s media 
concept.  
This process of cultural transfer, however, was more complex than this 
description suggests, since the CCP did not simply accept the relevant Soviet 
ideas lock, stock, and barrel. Rather, the sinification of Soviet concepts and 
theories was subject to a selection process: the Chinese leadership accepted only 
those ideas and concepts that could be imagined from within their own cultural 
context and their past experiences, and that seemed to enjoy wide acceptance on 
the international marketplace of ideas. Functional approaches of the press were 
practiced by the GMD as well as various foreign powers, abroad, as well as on 
Chinese soil; even liberal nation were disinclined to engage in propaganda when it 
suited their purposes. I have first outlined the major ideas available to the CCP in 
the first third of the twentieth century, and then looked at several cultural factors 
that came to act as catalysts to understand Western media practice. The closest 
functional equivalents of the modern Chinese media in the recent dynastic past do 
necessarily deserve the greatest interest: the Kangxi emperor’s Sacred Edict 
(Shengyu 圣谕) of 1670, the religious propaganda of the Taiping rebellion, and the 
indigenized early press in China, had all established modes of thinking and figures 
of thought that made particular components of the ideological imports from the 
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Soviet Union to possess more appeal and more power to convince than others: 
consequently, only those elements of the Leninist-Stalinist complex of ideas could 
be successfully sinified which could be explained and imagined from the 
perspective of traditional Chinese thinking. It was these components that came to 
make up the modern Chinese media concept. 
The media concept, however, has never been a monolithic bloc. The very 
processes that were responsible for its formation also left their peculiar imprint on 
the concept. As elements stemming from different contexts and consequently 
containing different meanings came to be united in the modern Chinese media 
concept, the concept carries in itself the heritage of these various traditions. The 
demand that the media serve the masses, originally a product of the mass line 
developed in Yan’an, has been open to widely diverging interpretations. Not all of 
these multiple readings, however, were compatible with meaning structures 
created from other parts of the media concept. Since the 1940s, the media 
concept has carried with it an inherent tension between the single elements of 
which it was made up. 
The CCP has shown capable of accommodating these latent tensions for 
long periods of time. Especially in political settings dominated by insecurity, such 
as the mass campaigns of the Maoist era, the tensions – for example, between the 
party character and the mass character clauses, or between the mass character 
clause and the class struggle clause – could become acute and sometimes even 
break through the surface, leading to violent clashes between different 
interpretations of the media concept. The demise of extraordinarily successful 
model of Sanlian shudian in 1949 and 1950s must ultimately be seen as a result of 
disagreements over how to interpret the media concept, and in particular its first 
clause that mandated the media’s “Party character.” In the enthusiastic situation of 
the founding years of the PRC, the clashes between the varying interpretations of 
the concept were still limited in scope. Not so in 1957, when a significant number 
of frustrated and disappointed intellectuals reacted to Mao’s call for “blooming and 
contending.” Several years into the regime, many of the hopes of 1949 had not 
materialized and uneasiness was widespread among journalists with the course of 
the media and the campaigns to learn from a Soviet model, a model that 
apparently not even Mao Zedong seemed to support honestly. 
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Yet when the Party, once again following Mao’s lead, abruptly changed 
course and withdrew the offer of allowing for a new perspective on the media, the 
confrontation was inevitable: the media people were themselves too deeply 
engaged in the Hundred Flowers campaign to adjust immediately to the new 
situation. WHB was hit especially hard. Less then three months before the begin of 
the anti-Rightist movement, Mao had explicitly encouraged the WHB leadership 
and had endorsed their editorial line, that is, their interpretation of the media 
principle – an interpretation, or course that Mao himself had nurtured with his 
speeches in the Hundred Flowers context. So when the Chairman abruptly turned 
to a different interpretation of the media concept, now moving the concept’s last 
clause, the class struggle element, in the middle of the debate, his shift wreaked 
havoc for all those who were caught up in the earlier interpretation. The public 
attacks on WHB and GMRB attest to this change of interpretations. 
Clashes between different interpretations of the media concept, based on 
multiple interpretations that stress different elements of the concept, have not 
been limited to the Mao era. The Chinese journalists who took to the streets in 
May 1989 went to lengths to profess their loyalty to the Party and their intentions 
to serve the overarching goals set by the Party. It was honest sympathy with the 
student movement that driven them into the streets, yet with the students they also 
shared a common understanding that acknowledged in general the existing 
political structures; they demanded better working conditions for themselves, but 
they did not disapprove of the system as such – not least because it rendered 
them many advantages and privileges. The CCP reacted with particular sensitivity 
to what it perceived to be challenges to its regime: the media sector has always 
been a field of special concern and a core tool of governance, it could not possibly 
be allowed to slip from the hands of the Party. So in June 1989, in an unlikely 
reversal of the policies that had dominated most of the 1980s, an interpretation of 
the media concept, based primarily on the concept’s final element and following 
the logic of class struggle, resurfaced. The demonstrating journalists could identify 
with the policies Zhao Ziyang, but after the latter’s ouster their interpretations of 
the media’s role clashed violently with those of the new Party leadership core 
group: the hardliners in the leadership interpreted the democracy movement and 
the protest of the journalists through the lens of the media concept’s final clause, 
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as an attempt of class enemies to undermine the socialist system by targeting the 
Party at its weakest point, the superstructure. The collapse of the socialist regimes 
in Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet Union in the next two years appeared 
to prove the interpretation right that liberation in the superstructure – which 
includes the propaganda sector, and thus the media – paved the way for the fall of 
the socialist parties; consequently, in the aftermath of the Chinese democracy 
movement, the media sector was cleansed from some of the most unreliable 
media personnel, i.e. the most vocal proponents of an alternative course. 
Another issue that needs to be addressed concerns the CCP’s approach to 
governance. After three decades characterized by an extremely tense political 
climate, the social atmosphere seems to have cooled down since the early 1980s. 
As has been remarked in passing in the last two chapters of this study, the media 
sector has experienced a period of rapid growth and diversification not despite the 
CCP’s efforts to stay in power, but because the CCP consciously initiated a reform 
process and ordered the media to go along it. The price the media had to pay for 
the enormously increased amount of freedom was the continued pledge to follow 
the Party’s lead. 
The introduction of the Internet to China was a challenge for the CCP’s 
project of media control in both technological and ideological terms. Not only did 
the fusion of private and public communication, as well as the speed, 
interconnectability, and decentralized nature of the Net create many a headache 
for the administrators of the media sector; the accelerating development also 
forced the CCP to redefine its position in the overall socio-political framework. A 
more prosperous setting and a diversifying society with increasingly 
heterogeneous demands required changed forms of governance from the Party. 
With increasing complexity, micro-level management is no longer feasible; 
anything else than a macro-approach would almost certainly be detrimental to 
economic growth. Yet since the CCP has built its legitimacy on the promise to 
provide the population with an increasing degree of affluence and a constant 
improvement of the life situation of the majority of the people, economic growth 
has become the Party’s key objective. As a consequence, the CCP has continued 
on the road it had taken after 1989 and that has been indicated in chapter eight: a 
gradual withdrawal from many of the laborious tasks of day-to-day administration. 
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The media concept and the mechanics of control developed in the 1940s, were 
especially adept to implement this changing approach, as they had always relied 
on those indirect means of control (such as through the editor responsibility 
system) that were required now to steer a numerically much larger and structurally 
more complex media sector. 
This direction as well as the amount of this withdrawal can be measured 
from the CCP’s handling of the media. The trend to transfer an increasing amount 
of burdensome administrative affairs to second-tier agencies such as those of the 
government (for example, the PPA created in 1987 with the intention to assume 
the role of a bureaucratic regulator) or in the hierarchy of the “consultative” organs 
and associations, has accelerated in recent years. When management functions, 
and in particular those of day-to-day affairs, were transferred to other bodies or 
were no longer taken care at all by the government, the Party bodies, the carriers 
of the most crucial political functions were freed from workload. They could 
consequently concentrate their energies on other fields, such as co-ordinating the 
activities of other agencies through agenda-setting, supervision of policy 
implementation, or most importantly, policy formulation and strategic long-term 
planning. 
The perceived withdrawal, thus, does not mean the disappearance of the 
CCP. The Party continues to be present, and it can intervene whenever and 
wherever it sees the need to do so. The single most important development in the 
1990s, as seen from the media sector, seems to be a substantial gain in self-
confidence of the CCP. The Party has finally gotten rid of the anxiety that had 
plagued it since the days of its founding. In this new setting, the CCP has 
withdrawn to what I call the “commanding heights” of the Chinese state. The 
situation is characterized by a paradox: the laissez-faire approach that is visible 
across all sectors of social life stands in marked contrast to extremely harsh 
reactions to infringements on a small number of areas that the Party perceives to 
be crucial for its legitimacy and its survival. In these cases, extremely heavy-
handed and usually well-publicized actions are the consequence; in most other 
areas, however, the Party is satisfied with keeping up a general degree of order. 
The moral education of the populace is no longer seen as a vital question for the 
CCP in a well-consolidated authoritarian state; hence the weak responses to 
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violations of the pornography ban. Openly questioning the nation’s one party 
system, in contrast, is a sure way to bring into play the full might of state power. 
This form of governance could be called “governing by potential:” the CCP 
is satisfied to rule the country by reliance on the certain knowledge that it can 
always and everywhere intervene if the situation should make it necessary to do 
so. Under normal circumstances, however, the Party will not make use of its power. 
This approach is highly economical and is a much more sophisticated technique of 
statecraft than the mass campaigns of the Mao era; the observer feels reminded of 
the notion of “acting through non-action” (wuwei 无为) often attributed to Daoist 
political theory. The fine-tuned and increasingly sophisticated handling of the 
Internet, a modern, commercialized, decentralized new mode of public 
communication, is perhaps the best illustration for this mode of government and 
shows how far the Party has travelled in its handling of the media – while at the 
same time keeping alive the very spirit of their media concept. 
Finally, the relationship between ideology and institutions needs to be 
addressed. This study has placed emphasis on the former, rather than the latter. I 
have traced the emergence the CCP’s media concept and have tracked its 
evolution through the sixty years since its inception in the Yan’an era. In contrast, I 
have treated institutions – formal organizational bodies, censorship mechanisms, 
discursive controls etc. – as merely a function of the underlying ideology, as the 
mechanics that are employed to implement the media concept. Most other studies 
of the Chinese media have emphasized the organizational surface structures, but 
as this study has shows, such attempts are misleading, since the mechanics of 
control can be redesigned and restructured in accordance with changing needs 
and priorities, suggesting change and discontinuities where actually continuity 
factors more importantly. The shortcomings of this organizational focus are most 
apparent in chapter seven: during the Cultural Revolution, the Propaganda 
Department and most other formal institutions were dismantled, producing a 
radically different institutional environment, but as the chapter shows clearly, the 
media concept remained in place even under these extreme conditions, and the 
Party remained in control of the media. This means, of course, that further studies 
of the Chinese media – and by implication, of other sectors of the propaganda 
xitong, such as the education system or the scientific research establishment – 
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should not neglect the ideological underpinnings that support the more readily 
apparent surface structures. In the early twenty-first century, the CCP adapts to a 
changing global environment and newly arising challenges, but the fundamental 
goals of the Party, and its ideological commitment to pursue these goals, remain in 
place. The media have been a core tool in the Party’s ambitious project of social 
engineering, and they remain a crucial instrument of governance today. 
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